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Abstract
This thesis will assess the "readiness" and analyze the factors that will lead to the development of an
effective secondary housing mortgage market in the Philippines. We will use secondary mortgage market
models from the United States and other countries with well-established secondary mortgage institutions
(SMIs) as a lens through which to analyze the readiness of the Philippine market. In the course of our
assessment, we will examine the following four key issues:
1. The primary and secondary fixed income securities market;
2. The mortgage origination process;
3. The securitization and trading process; and
4. The regulatory, legal and tax environment.
We will offer recommendations and alternatives with regard to the Philippine market's further
development.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Background
"Housing is a postponeable expenditure," he lamented, on the priority that the government had placed on
the housing sector, despite government's proclamations to the contrary'. Despite the government's
promises to prioritize shelter programs, only P11.5 Billion ($217 Million) out of the mandated P38.5
Billion ($726 Million) housing fund has been released over the last six years2. Tell that to the those who
live in Manila's shantytowns, who thought they would finally have a corrugated steel roof over their
hastily-constructed shelters.
In June 1998, Joseph Ejercito Estrada, a former B-movie action star turned politician, rode on a massive
populist vote to win the presidency of the Republic of the Philippines. In his movies, "Erap" (which
means "friend" spelled backwards) played the role of the Filipino robin hood, a "thug with a heart of
gold", whose gangster-like ways, albeit Machiavellian, helped uplift the Filipino everyman from the
clutches of poverty. However, his ability to uplift the lives of the Filipino people remained to be
cinematic fiction.
Celluloid thugs don't seem to always have the best-laid plans when assuming the presidency. Case in
point: the housing sector had been in turmoil since Estrada assumed office due to the lack of strong
leadership behind the government's mass housing program.3 Initially, the goal of the Estrada
administration was to pursue reforms that would develop a more stable and longer-term sources of
financingfor the housing sector. In fact, "Erap's" administration was about to "reconfigure" the housing
finance system- the driving force of the shelter sector4 . One of President Estrada's earliest announcements
was that housing, along with agriculture, would be the government's priority program. While the shelter
sector has always been considered an important engine of growth given its multiplier effect, this was the
first time it had been accorded this level of attention under any administration.
The government's lead housing agency, the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council
(HUDCC), under the progressive leadership of Prof. Karina Constantino-David, a long-time advocate of
1 Limligan, Victor. Professor at the Asian Institute of Management. Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati City,
Philippines.
2 Aquino, Norman P. Gov't shelter program woefully underfunded. Businessworld Publishing Corporation. March
12, 2001. Makati City, Philippines.
3 Bancod, Ed and Ladrido, Bonnie. BNP Prime Peregrine Property Sector Philippines. BNP Prime Peregrine. April
10, 2000. Makati City, Philippines.
4 Tenorio, Arnold S. Housing program back to square one. Businessworld Publishing Corporation. February 8, 2001
poor people's housing, instituted tougher credit policies and market-oriented (versus subsidized) interest
rates which were met with stiff opposition by private developers who had benefited from the less stringent
policies of the previous administration.
But everything started to turn awry when Estrada buckled under the pressure from the private developers.
He relieved the forward-looking HUDCC chair of her duty, scrapped his own development plans, created
a Presidential Commission on Mass Housing (PCMH) and dubbed himself the self-styled "housing czar".
The thinking behind this move was to group all of the financial institutions under his belt to expedite
funding for his mass housing project, a reversion to the policies of old. The PCMH got off on the wrong
foot when the appointed vice-chairman appeared to have questionable credentials. Thus, it came as no
surprise the vice-chairman hastily resigned (in less than a month's time) due to negative publicity. These
types of political appointments were, unfortunately, characteristic of the Estrada administration.
Fast forward a mere thirty (30) months later: In January 2001, after successive bouts of political and
economic mismanagement, Estrada was ousted in a peaceful and orderly transition of power (which the
Filipino people have dubbed "People Power 2", a "sequel" to the 1986 revolt that ousted late strongman
Ferdinand E. Marcos). Former Vice-President and now President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, an
economist by training, has assumed the reins of power as the country trudges its way towards political
and economic stability.
Although President Arroyo has communicated the development of the secondary mortgage market as a
priority, there are still institutional obstacles in place, which are inimical to the development of this
market. Moreover, there are still developers groups for whom securitization is a bitter pill to swallow
because of the stringent measures it imposes. Thus, the measures they lobby for unwittingly deter not
only securitization, but also capital market development.
This only seeks to illustrate that housing can make or break a presidential administration as it has been
and continues to be one of the thorniest, and most misunderstood, issues to plague successive presidential
administrations. In a developing country like the Philippines, housing finance is a politically charged
issue because of the dual nature of housing itself: Housing serves as both a commercial good and as a
social need. In a country debilitated by poverty (40% of the country's 76.5 million-strong population live
below the national poverty line5), basic needs such as shelter have yet to be sufficiently met by the
government. Thus, a sound housing finance policy can literally make or break an administration.
As part of the major policy reforms undertaken by former President Corazon C. Aquino6, she issued
Executive Order (EO) 90 in December 1986, which created the National Shelter Program (NSP), the
cornerstone of current Philippine housing policy. The NSP was established primarily to implement
provisions and development programs targeted at providing adequate housing facilities for the lowest
30% of the economic class7.
One of the key institutions integral to the implementation of the NSP was the National Home Mortgage
Finance Corporation (NHMFC). The NHMFC, roughly patterned after the United States' Federal
National Mortgage Association (FNMA or "Fannie Mae"), was mandated to become the Philippines'
publicly-owned and managed Secondary Mortgage Institution (SMI). Thus, the NHMFC was tasked to
generate a critical mass of mortgages that would eventually be securitized and sold to public and private
institutional funds. The development of the NHMFC as an SMI was viewed as a solution to housing
finance in the problem.
Despite the laudable intentions of the NSP, the execution of the program failed to be sustainable in nature
and long-term in character. Through the NHMFC, the government tried to address housing as both a
social need and a commercial good. A confluence of factors, including lax underwriting guidelines, a
production- versus finance-driven construction incentive, poor collection efficiency, and subsidized
interest rates (which will be elaborated on in the later chapters of the thesis), resulted in large pool of non-
performing loans. In 1996, The NHMFC was eventually relegated to a mere collection agency, to catch
up on its delinquent mortgages. This move effectively waylaid the development of the SMI. After
sending NHMFC to the wayside, the government has since entered into remedial stopgap measures to
continue supporting housing finance for the lower socio-economic classes.
Underlying the aborted development of NHMFC were the shortcomings of the other 'cogs' that would
lubricate the secondary mortgage market: an extremely thin secondary bond market, a highly prohibitive
5 www.Inq7.net. More than 30 million Filipinos living in poverty: census. July 25, 2001. Makati City, Philippines.6 Corazon Aquino succeeded ousted strongman Ferdinand Marcos in a peaceful and orderly transition of power
which restored democracy to the Philippines in February 1986.
7 Tan, Edward L. Real Estate in the Philippines. Solar Publishing Corporation. 1999. Mandaluyong City,
Philippines.
tax regime for bonds and asset-backed securities (ABS), and a legal and regulatory structure unfriendly to
securitization.
However, in her first State of the Nation Address, recently installed President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
has apparently renewed calls for the establishment of an SMI as a means to encourage long-term savings.
Aside from promising to establish a secondary housing mortgage market by the end of 2002, President
Arroyo has also asked Congress to fast track the implementation of the Securitization Act and the
amendments to the Securities Regulation Code8 . Again, an SMI is being touted as the solution to a
sustainable housing finance solution in the Philippines.
President Arroyo's proclamations augur well for the housing industry, which has been in a financing glut
since the 1997 regional financial crisis. But there are still questions which are left unanswered with
regard to the SMI: Will the NHMFC be rehabilitated into a working SMI or do we need to set up an
altogether new SMI? In the event of a new SMI, will it be privately- or publicly-led? Is an SMI the best
solution to developing a long-term market structure to address housing finance? Moreover, another set of
questions arises that involve the 'cogs' of the secondary mortgage market such as: Is the secondary bond
market still too thin to introduce mortgage-backed securities (MBS)? Have the tax, regulatory and legal
structures evolved to become more conducive for securitization?
Purpose
The government's renewed call for a secondary housing mortgage market is a timely opportunity to re-
look the feasibility of establishing such a market in the Philippines.
The process of securitizing, issuing and trading mortgage-backed securities (MBS) has been likened to an
'alignment of the planets' given that are several moving parts need to fall into place before the secondary
mortgage market can be truly viable. Thus, the purpose of this thesis is both to assess the "readiness' of
and opportunities for, the different 'moving' parts that will lead to the development of a vibrant and
effective secondary housing mortgage market. Moreover, we will use secondary mortgage market models
from the United States and other countries with well-established secondary mortgage institutions (SMIs)
as a lens through which to analyze the readiness of the Philippine market. In the course of our
assessment, we will examine the following four key issues:
8 Inq7.net. President Macapagal's State of the Nation speech. July 23, 2001. Quezon City, Philippines.
1. The primary and secondary fixed income securities market;
2. The mortgage origination process;
3. The securitization and trading process; and
4. The regulatory, legal and tax environment.
Finally, we will offer recommendations and alternatives with regard to the Philippine market's further
development.
Organization of the Thesis
This thesis comprises seven chapters. Since Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) are structured similar to
other fixed-income securities, and will eventually be underwritten, traded, cleared and settled in the same
manner as regular securities in the wholesale capital market, the development of the Philippine secondary
mortgage market is contingent on the state of the fixed-income securities market. Chapter 1 will provide
an overview of the Philippine Fixed Income Securities market. Chapter 2 will review the current state of
the Philippine residential real estate market. Chapter 3 will analyze the primary and secondary residential
mortgage markets in the Philippines. Chapter 4 will provide an overview of government housing policies.
Chapter 5 will discuss the current state of the primary and secondary mortgage backed securities market
in the Philippines and make comparisons to the U.S. market. Chapter 6 will analyze the securitization
process of mortgage-backed securities and make comparisons to more developed MBS markets in the
U.S., Europe, and Asia. Chapter 7 will discuss the structural and regulatory framework related to the
securitization process, including tax and legal issues. Chapter 8 will offer recommendations as to the
market's further development.
Methodology
This thesis is based on a review of existing literature and articles in this field as well as one-on-one
interviews with industry participants.
2 OVERVIEW OF THE FIXED INCOME SECURITIES MARKET- PHILIPPINES
Since Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) are structured similar to other fixed-income securities, and will
eventually be underwritten, traded, cleared and settled in the same manner as regular securities in the
wholesale capital market, the development of the Philippine secondary mortgage market in contingent on
the state of the fixed-income securities market.
Primary Fixed Income Securities Market
Current State
Overview ofMarket. As of 1998, the Philippine fixed income securities market was approximately P766
Billion (US$ 14.5 Billion)9 . There are two primary fixed-income instruments in the Philippines, namely
government securities and corporate debt securities. However, government securities control the lion's
share of the fixed income securities market (93.5%) with the balance accounted for by corporate securities
(6.4%)'.
Outstanding Domestic Debt Securities as of 1998 (Millions of Pesos)
Source: Asian Development Bank
* BSP RRPs = Reverse Repurchase Papers
** L TCPs = Long-term commercial papers
*** STCPs = Short-term commercial papers
The table below displays the characteristics of the Philippine fixed income securities market, and the
corresponding money market and capital market subcomponents:
9 For thesis purposes, we will use the conversion rate of US$1 to P53.
10 Saldana, Cesar G. Development of the Government Bond Markets in the Philippines. Asian Development Bank.
March 2000. Manila, Philippines.
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Characteristics of the Philippine Fixed Income Securities Market
Sector Short-term money market Long-term capital market
Public e 91-, 182-, and 364-day T-bills issued by e 2-, 5-, 7-, 10-, and 20-year bonds issued by the national
the Bureau of Treasury (BTr) government, public corporations (i.e. public utilities,
industrial companies, government owned and
controlled corporations (GOCC)), and local
governments.
e Mortgage-Backed Securities backed by Home
Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig
mortgages
Private * Short-term commercial papers of e Long-term commercial papers of varying maturities,
varying maturities, issued by private issued by private corporations, of more than one year
corporations, of up to one year but less than seven years
* Certificates of deposit e Preferred stock* issued by public utility companies
e Money market certificates * Convertibles" issued by companies
(i.e. promissory notes, repurchase * Mortgage-backed securities backed by mortgages of
agreements) private banks
C Interbank loans
Source: Asian Development Bank
* While aform of equity, preferred stock is considered fixed income instruments because the level of their current
income is fixed. Also, the claims of holders ofpreferred stock are superior to the holders of common stock.
** Convertibles are securities that are initially issued as commercial papers, bonds, or preferred stocks that are
convertible to shares of the issuing company's common stock.
The difference between the money market and the capital market lies in the maturities of the instruments
traded. Short-term securities (usually with maturities of up to one year) are traded in the money market
while long-term securities (usually with maturities of over one year) are traded in the capital market.
Since mortgage backed securities are securitized from a pool of mortgage loans, this instrument is traded
in the capital market.
Government Securities
Treasury securities represent a dominant and growing component of the fixed income securities market,
with Treasury bills (58%) comprising the single largest market for debt instruments in the Philippines.
This market for the T-bills comprises the primary and secondary markets for 91-, 180-, and 364-day T-
bills, as well as shorter-maturity cash management bills issued by the Treasury in the event of unusually
tight monetary conditions. The national government finances its temporary cash gaps in its operations
and for budget deficits by issuing treasury securities". As a result of the chronic budget deficits, a
significant proportion of proceeds from treasury issues go to refinancing of the government's maturing
debts.
" Saldana, Cesar G. Development of the Government Bond Markets in the Philippines. Asian Development Bank.
March 2000. Manila, Philippines.
In an effort to develop the capital market, the national government started issuing floating-rate Treasury
notes (FRTNs) in 1991 whose yields were set quarterly at a fixed spread over 91-day T-bills. The
economic stability of the Southeast Asian region encouraged when the country achieved relative
macroeconomic stability in 1992, the government was encouraged to standardize longer-maturity
Treasury issues and to issue them more gradually lengthening the maturity profile of government debt.
The issuance of floating-rate Treasury notes paved the way for longer-term issues of fixed-rate Treasury
notes (FXTNs), with 2-, 5-, 7-, 10-, and 20-year maturities, and, in turn, provided the basis for pricing
longer-term private-sector debt. The government hopes to increase the liquidity of the market for long-
term government securities by further standardizing the tenor and regularity of issues.
Issuance. The Bureau of Treasury (BTr)12 sells the Treasury bills via a weekly Swiss auction to 45
primary government securities eligible dealers (GSED), who bid competitively for the issues. The
auction is electronic to allow for transparency, speed in handling large-scale issues averaging P15 Billion
($230 Million) a week, and the ability to secure competitive, market-determined yields. The Bureau of
Treasury issues securities through either competitive or non-competitive bids. Competitive bids use the
electronic auction while electronic bids use either the Over-the-Counter (OTC)13 or tap method. Prior to
the auction, a committee comprising representatives of the Bureau of Treasury, the Department of
Finance (DoF), and the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas14 (BSP) meet to consider the government's financing
needs and agree on the amount of securities to be offered. Under the Swiss auction system of competitive
bidding, bids tendered by the dealers are ranked according to their yield, from the highest to lowest. The
committee accepts the bids, which offer the lowest yields, and the total volume of awards is subject to the
amounts that meet the required volume of financing. However, current rules allow the Auction
Committee to accept or reject any, or part of, or all of the tenders (i.e. The committee can award less than
the offer or reject all bids).
Demand. There are three major investors in government securities, namely the investors, commercial and
thrift banks, and the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). The Bangko Sentral holds the government
12 The Bureau of Treasury is an attached agency of the Department of Finance (DoF). The Bureau of the Treasury's
functions include (1) the auction of government securities and; (2) the accreditation and evaluation of government
securities dealers.
13 An OTC issuance occurs when the BTr negotiates an offering of securities to government owned and controlled
corporations (GOCC), tax-exempt institutions and local government units (LGU). This is tantamount to a negotiated
sale of treasury securities to government institutions for possible conversion of T-bills, as they mature, to T-bonds.
14 Central Bank of the Philippines
securities as part of its open market operations. Meanwhile, the banks hold government securities are part
of their statutory liquidity reserves and for their trading accounts. Investors are government contractual
savings institutions and non-bank private investors.
Composition of Holders of Government Domestic Securities as of 1998 (in Billion Pesos)
200
0 BSP
150 ECommi banks
D Thrift Banks
100 ODBP*
EGSIS**
50 .SSS***
U Govt controlled trust funds
0 -0 Others
Source: Asian Development Bank
* DBP = Development Bank of the Philippines
** GSIS = Government Service Insurance Corporation
* SSS = Social Security System
T-bills have often been oversubscribed 5 because of the lack of acceptable private investment channels
coupled with the flight to quality riskless assets that commonly characterize periods of economic
uncertainty, similar to the Asian regional financial crisis. Investor demand shifted away from riskier
private investments and channeled their funds into riskless government securities instruments, while
lower-tier firms resorted to borrowing solely from short-term bank lending.
" Oversubscribed T-bills occur when winning bids are substantially less in volume than the bids tendered.
16 Reside, Renato S. Mortgage-Backed Securities in Asia. Asian Development Bank. 1999. Pasig City, Philippines.
Corporate Debt Securities
Corporate debt securities have always been insignificant in size as private companies have relied on bank
loans for short-term financing. As of 1998, the total corporate debt securities consisted mostly of long-
term commercial papers, and were equivalent to only 3.3% of the outstanding loans to companies by
commercial banks 7.
Companies issue debt securities under the Revised Securities Act (RSA), which is administered by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The objective of the Securities and Exchange Commission
is to ensure that the potential investor has sufficient information to evaluate the issuer's underlying
financial capacity to pay the interest and to redeem its debt securities. Thus, under the RSA, the SEC
reviews whether the issue or the security has sufficiently disclosed its financial condition, credit standing
and management aspects, and fulfillment of management requirements.
There are two main types of private money-market transactions - bank-related and corporate commercial-
paper transactions. Bank-related money market transactions comprise the market for interbank call loans,
promissory notes and repurchase agreements. Interbank call loans represent bank-to-bank lending of
reserves. Repurchase agreements (repos) are short-term borrowings of banks against government
securities of equal value. Commercial paper securities comprise both the short-term commercial paper
(STCP) and the long-term commercial paper (LTCP), issued by blue-chip corporation to fund their
business growth.
There was substantial growth in this small segment during the economic boom in the early 1990s, as
commercial paper issuances, particularly from real estate development and construction companies, were
growing in importance (relative to the stock market) among firms raising primary finance. However, the
Asian regional currency crisis caused a decline in the private securities market because of the net
redemption of commercial paper in this sector.
There is a dearth of Philippine bond issues because corporations prefer to issue commercial paper instead
of bonds. Under the Philippine Corporate code, long-term bond issues require approval by at least two-
thirds majority of the corporation's shareholders, while commercial paper issues merely require the
consent of the board of directors. Nonetheless, long-term commercial paper, which has a term to maturity
17 Saldana, Cesar G. Development of the Govemment Bond Markets in the Philippines. Asian Development Bank.
March 2000. Manila, Philippines.
of 3 to 5 years, is nevertheless considered a de facto bond in the Philippines. Short-term commercial
papers is usually issued by finance companies because their businesses require them to raise short-term
funds for re-lending at longer terms and for maintaining liquidity. However, due to the Asian currency
crisis, the supply of long-term commercial paper and the corresponding investor demand for such
instruments disappeared because of economic uncertainty.
Sale of Long-term commercial paper from 1992 to 1" Quarter 1998 (Million pesos)
Year No. of Issues Total Amount Sold
1992 14 6,693
1993 3 1,300
1994 8 9,700
1995 10 13,725
1996 15 34,300
1997 5 5,000
1t Quarter 1998 0 0
Source: Securities Exchange Commission (SEC); Asian Development Bank (ADB)
Issuance. Private money or capital market issues may be sold through a public offering or private
placement. After registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the lead underwriter
distributes the commercial paper or the long-term commercial paper through a network of brokers and
dealers. Presently, there is no central clearing and depository for corporate debt securities. The
underwriter keeps the security and underwriting agreement and allocates the commercial paper to the
dealers. In turn, the dealers sell the commercial paper by issuing "certificates of participation" (CoP) in
the issue to the investors. The dealer cannot sell the commercial paper outright because the investor
usually prefers a term to maturity that is shorter than the term of the original maturity.
The dealer may issue a Certificate of Participation with or without recourse. A Certificate of Participation
with recourse means that it is not considered a deposit substitute, thus the dealer doesn't need to put up
the required liquidity reserves. A Certificate of Participation without recourse means that the Certificate
of Participation is backed up by the dealer's guarantee of payment in case of default by the issuer. In
practice, a dealer may waive the "without recourse" term of the Certificate of Participation and pay for the
dishonored Commercial paper.
The weaknesses in the structure for the primary corporate debt market are evident in such aspects as18:
18 Saldana, Cesar G. Development of the Government Bond Markets in the Philippines. Asian Development Bank.
March 2000. Manila, Philippines
1. Absence of a central clearing institution that can authoritatively validate (and, if necessary,
guarantee) that Certificates of Participation are supported by an underlying debt security;
2. Settlement risks since the Certificates of Participation aren't tied to the validation of the
underlying security and are done with different banks.
3. Absence of a central electronic trading system that can enable the dealers to view, in real time,
not only their securities inventories but also he outstanding balance of their clients.
In the case of private placements, arrangers seek out the investors. Although regulatory approval is
relatively faster versus public offering, because there are fewer investors, the sale can take longer to
complete since negotiations take place with individual investors.
Demand. Investors in corporate securities are usually large contractual savings institutions (CSI) like the
Social Security System, Government Service Insurance System, and AFP-RSBS 9, and the private
insurance companies. Commercial banks and investment houses, through their money market
departments, trade in the corporate bond market.
Secondary Fixed Income Securities Market
As can be gleaned from the primary fixed income market, the secondary market for fixed income
securities is dominated by government securities with corporate securities capturing a small proportion of
the potential secondary market.
Composition of Outstanding Bonds as of 1998
Instrument Percent Control
Treasury bills 58.9%
Treasury notes/bonds 34.5%
Private corporate securities 6.6%
Source: Asian Development Bank
Government Securities
Trading. The secondary trading of government securities is generally liquid because of the large volume
of securities that have been issued under each maturity to finance chronic budget deficits and the
generally high demand from the private sector for risk-free short-term government securities.
19 Armed Forces of the Philippines-Retirement Separation and Benefits System
The Bureau of Treasury's electronic trading system is used, and trades are recorded in the Registry of
Scriptless Securities (RoSS). The process is as follows 20:
1. Prospective purchasers (investors or dealers) request a government securities eligible dealer for a
selling rate quote for a specific bill or bond. An investor/dealer can get quotes from several
government securities eligible dealers through the Dow Jones Market Network.
2. If the government securities eligible dealer has the requested securities in its inventory, then the
dealer makes a sell quote based on the prospective investment amount and the prevailing market
conditions.
3. Once the investor decides to purchase, the government securities eligible dealer closes the sale
and issues a confirmation of sale to the investor. The dealer then sends an electronic instruction
to Bureau of Treasury's Registry of Scriptless Securities to transfer the securities from an account
under the securities client's name.
4. At the end of trading, the Registry of Scriptless Securities sends the government securities
eligible dealer a statement, which contains the securities account balance.
The government securities eligible dealer usually gives a sell quote that achieves a target spread relative
to its buying rate to be compensated for both holding on to an inventory of securities as well as its
services as a dealer. During tight liquidity conditions, the eligible dealer often needs to sell a portion of
its securities portfolio to raise cash at lower quotes, since it is based on a thin spread. According to
Ymson, the spread is partly determined by the market's liquidity. During times of political instability, the
spreads widened considerably22. Current accounting rules require that trading account securities be
periodically revalued to current market values ("mark-to-market"), which affect the pricing of the
securities in the secondary market.
Saldana, in his paper on Philippine bond markets, posits that the reason behind the high volume of trading
in government securities is the common practice of banks to executing an "outright sale" of such
securities to a buyer accompanied by a "side agreement" to repurchase the security at an agreed date.
This practice allows dealers to avoid Documentary Stamp Taxes (DST) and liquidity reserve requirements
20 Saldana, Cesar G. Development of the Government Bond Markets in the Philippines. Asian Development Bank.
March 2000. Manila, Philippines
21 Philippine practice continues to use yield quoted for ease of comparison with interest rates on Certificates of
Deposit (CD) (versus the universal of quoting debt securities at a price per unit of 100)
2 Ymson, Luis, Jr. R. First Vice President of First Metro Investment Corporation. Personal Interview. August 2001.
Makati City, Philippines.
for instruments that the Bangko Sentral considers deposit substitutes. This practice of "informal repos"
allows banks to address asset-liability gaps, thus a substantial number of secondary trades at Registry of
Scriptless Securities probably consisted of informal repos. These appear as outright sales twice when
they shouldn't have been counted as a "secondary trade" at all, which implies that secondary trading data
is likely to be overstated.
Clearing and Settlement. The Bureau of Treasury is the central clearing of all transactions through its
Registry of Scriptless Securities. The outright sale/purchases require verification at the Registry as to
whether or not the seller has sufficient balance (inventory) in its securities holder account. Upon the
seller's authorization, the Registry transfers the security to the securities account of the buyer. Only
securities dealers who are government securities eligible dealers can electronically confirm and authorize
transfers with the Registry of Scriptless Securities.
Settlement of treasury securities is done through a "netting with same day" settlement. This involves
offsetting the sell and buy transactions of each government securities eligible dealer at the end of each
day and using only the net balance to adjust its deposit account with the Bangko Sentral23. The absence
of an electronic link between the Bureau of Treasury and the Bangko Sentral impedes the real time
settlement of secondary trades. To coordinate the settlement with Bangko Sentral, the Bureau of Treasury
manually submits a document to the Bangko Sentral at the end of the day, which contains settlement
information. The "netting system" is prone to settlement risks as there could be an "unwinding" of trades
with the buyer if the buyer doesn't have sufficient funds to pay the net debit to his account. In the event
that the seller has already transferred the security to the buyer, the seller can incur a loss. Despite the fact
all parties can avoid a loss by "unwinding" the transaction, the "netting system" loses credibility.
Moreover, "netting" allows government securities eligible dealers to engage in speculative transactions
within the same day, especially when there are wide intra-day variations in interest rates.
Private Securities
Trading. Due to the lack of a structured mechanism for secondary trading, investors (including
government securities eligible dealers) hold their privately issued debt securities until maturity. Thus,
there is no real active secondary trading.
23 Saldana, Cesar G. Development of the Government Bond Markets in the Philippines. Asian Development Bank.
March 2000. Manila, Philippines.
The secondary market for commercial debt securities is an over-the-counter system with trades conducted
through government securities eligible dealers and other licensed securities dealers24 . The trading begins
with the securities' underwriters, usually the independent investment houses and investment bank
departments of universal banks. For both government and corporate securities, secondary transactions are
usually one-way transactions to institutional investors such as insurance companies, pension funds, and
treasury departments of commercial banks and industrial companies. There are only a limited number of
individual investors in the debt securities market.
In August 2000, The Bankers Association of the Philippines (BAP) and the Investment Houses
Association of the Philippines (IHAP) launched the secondary trading of commercial paper2 1 to help
investment houses to liquefy their holdings. The BAP and IHAP appointed Prebon Philippines Inc., an
international foreign exchange broker, as the sole broker for the secondary trading of commercial papers.
A sole broker was needed to provide a more transparent venue for the buying and selling of commercial
paper and prevent unscrupulous investment houses from engaging in (reported cases of) fraudulent
transactions such as double-selling of securities.
Clearing and Settlement. An over-the counter secondary market operates with the settlement done
directly between the buyer and seller on a delivery-versus-payment (DvP) basis. There is no central
clearing and settlement for secondary trading. Since there is a lack of a central clearing system,
consequent risks arise due to the current practice of issuing certificates of participation. Moreover, since
the settlement is not centralized, the costs are high. The Philippine Central Depository, Inc. (PCD), a
private corporation, operates a computer-based depository system for the equities market called
"FinTracs". The Capital Markets Development Council (CMDC) has determined that this system can be
used for debt securities trading as well.
Obstacles to the Development of the Fixed Income Securities Market
The obstacles that prevent the development of the fixed income securities market are a) macroeconomic
instability; b) absence of market makers who buy and sell securities with bid-offer spreads to provide the
market with liquidity; c) lack of a reliable benchmark pricing mechanism; d) the taxation of financial
intermediaries and transactions and; e) the separation of the clearing and settlement for government and
corporate securities.
24 Ibid.
25 Reyes, Carmina E. Secondary trading of commercial papers launched. Philippine Daily Inquirer. August 16,
2000. Manila, Philippines.
Macroeconomic instability
Macroeconomic stability is a fundamental requirement for the fixed income securities market. Thus, the
development of the fixed income securities market hinges on dependent on sustained economic growth,
low inflation and a credible fiscal policy and performance. This was evidenced prior to the 1997 regional
financial crisis, wherein fiscal condition moved with GDP, which showed that macroeconomic growth
and stability were integral to fiscal performance26
Despite the relatively developed nature of the Philippine bond market versus other Southeast
Asian economies, its growth has been stunted by periods of macroeconomic instability, which
spurred a flight to quality. In particular, investor demand shifted away from riskier private
commercial debt instruments and into government debt instruments27. Thus, the restoration of
macroeconomic stability should hopefully reduce the uncertainty and the consequent risks
involved in purchasing long term commercial debt instruments, including MBSs.
Absence of market makers who buy and sell securities with bid-offer spreads to provide the
market with liquidity
According to Saldana, the present primary fixed income securities market has no real market makers28.
The Bureau of Treasury's present policy of an "open dealer" network has expanded the number of
dealers, but unfortunately did not improve the competitiveness of dealer participation especially in the
wake of unfavorable market conditions. The Bureau doesn't stringently enforce the market-making
obligations of the government securities eligible dealers, which allow these dealers to enjoy the privileges
of a dealer but not the obligations of one. This resulted in weak secondary markets and one-way trades to
buy-and-hold investors.
The Banker Association of the Philippines (BAP), in conjunction with several financial agencies and
organizations29, had developed a trading and market making 'best practices' manual, in line with the
development of the local financial structure to create an atmosphere for a "deep a liquid secondary
26 Saldana, Cesar G. Development of the Government Bond Markets in the Philippines. Asian Development Bank.
March 2000. Manila, Philippines.
27 Reside, Renato S. Mortgage-Backed Securities in Asia. Asian Development Bank. 1999. Pasig City, Philippines.
28 Saldana, Cesar G. Development of the Government Bond Markets in the Philippines. Asian Development Bank.
March 2000. Manila, Philippines.
29 the Investment Houses of the Philippines (IHAP), the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (Central Bank of the
Philippines), the Investment Houses Association of the Philippines (IHAP), and the Trust Officers Association of
the Philippines (TOAP).
market". Presumably, these manuals will be distributed to all local banks that would like to eventually
sell their mortgage loans to a Secondary Mortgage Institution, or perhaps would like to securitize their
own mortgages30
Lack of a reliable benchmark pricing mechanism
An efficient trading system that sets up benchmark prices for securities of various maturities and
structures is integral to the development of a well-functioning primary and secondary fixed-income
securities market31 . A benchmark security is a government security of a certain term to maturity that is
liquid enough so that it has a market-determined yield at any time. A benchmark yield curve is the
schedule of yields generated by active trading of an entire set of benchmark government securities. The
benchmark yield results from the two-way quotes and trades in the secondary market of government
bonds with different remaining time periods to maturity32 .
Benchmarks are important because they help market participants to gauge their expectations of a) future
interest rates, b) inflation, c) risk premiums, and d) to identify the portion of yields that correspond to
default risk. Moreover, benchmarks help market participants hedge interest-rate risks more accurately.
Since investors are exposed to several risks in connection with provision of credit, a long and well-
defined market-based yield curve for riskless securities helps in developing a benchmark for pricing
private securities of comparable maturity. The government has extended the maturity of T-bonds in an
effort to develop a benchmark long-term yield curve. However, the effort has fallen short of achieving its
goal since the secondary market has not been given priority. The primary markets appear to reflect the
current market rates except when contrary signals are generated when auctions do not award the entire
pre-announced offer to the winning bidders33 .
Since 1995, the government has adopted a bond issuance policy that was intended to create a benchmark
yield curve. However, the benchmark yield can only develop with a two-way quote system and trades in
the secondary market of benchmark bonds with different remaining time to maturity. The Bureau of
Treasury has been issuing longer-term fixed-rate T-bonds (FRTNs) to lengthen the benchmark risk-free
30 Bankers Association of the Philippines. Market Reforms Project BAP Briefing to the Media. April 4, 2001.
Makati City, Philippines.
31 Ibid.
32 Saldana, Cesar G. Development of the Government Bond Markets in the Philippines. Asian Development Bank.
March 2000. Manila, Philippines.
3 Saldana, Cesar G. Development of the Government Bond Markets in the Philippines. Asian Development Bank.
March 2000. Manila, Philippines.
yield curve. In April 1997, the Bureau issued its first (and only) 20-year bond 4 . In November 2000, the
Bureau issued a 25-year T-bond, which is the longest term to maturity issued by both government and
corporations. Philippine laws limit long-term bonds to maturities of only 25 years. However, since
current National Treasurer Sergio Edeza assumed office in February 2001, the Bureau of Treasury has
purposely not issued bonds with maturities longer than 5 years. Edeza found the current 10-, 15- and 20-
year Treasury bond yields to be too high, thus rendering the yield curve too steep3.
Without a liquid market, wide gaps will exist between the yield of securities of different nominal term to
maturities. A key constraint to liquidity is also the present issuance policy of spreading out issues among
many different term to maturities and series36. The resulting structure of the outstanding securities is
fragmented, which contributes to the problem of liquidity in the secondary market and, consequently,
making it more difficult to build benchmark securities.
Mortgage loans in the Philippines are priced on the basis of T-bill yields. However, the basic problem
with using T-bill rates to price loans in the primary mortgage market is the large mismatch in maturities
since T-bills are short-term securities while mortgages are long-term securities. Nonetheless, the debt
market continues uses the 91-day T-bill as the benchmark security for loan pricing. Furthermore, lack of
liquidity and secondary trading of fixed-rate T-bonds has made the current market value of such securities
uncertain, and the establishment of a true long-term yield curve even more difficult.
However, the 91-day T-bill doesn't always serve as an accurate benchmark security for pricing loans. A
prime example of this occurred in the 1997 regional currency crisis when the financial markets were left
in disarray. Bank treasurers said that the 91-day T-bill ceased to be a credible barometer against which
loans were priced because they no longer reflected the real market sentiment in terms of interest rates.
These sentiments were expressed as a result of the Bureau of Treasury keeping the yield of the 91-day T-
bill "artificially low" through either lowering its offering or rejecting bids which it deemed too high,
37during the volatile exchange situation
34 Tirona, Jesus Michael A. Government to issue P6.2-B 20-year bonds this year. Businessworld Publishing
Corporation. August 13, 1997. Makati City, Philippines.
35 Ymson, Luis, Jr. R. First Vice President of First Metro Investment Corporation. Personal Interview. August
2001. Makati City, Philippines.
36 Ibid.
37 Tirona, Jesus Michael A. Change in benchmark for interest rates urged. Businessworld Publishing Corporation.
August 13, 1997. Manila, Philippines.
The private sector, through the Bankers Association of the Philippines (BAP) and/or the Financial
Executives of the Philippines (FINEX), has proposed alternative benchmark yields for use in term
instruments:
1. Philippine Inter-bank offer rate (PHIBOR). The PHIBOR, formed in early 1996, would reflect
the rate at which banks would be willing to lend to each other for terms of one week to one year38
These lending rates would be based on accessible funding costs of banks, which would reflect
differences in tax and reserve costs compared with other instruments. During the regional
turmoil, banks strongly urged the 91-day T-bill to be shelved in favor of benchmark alternatives
like the PHIBOR, but the BOT took a neutral stand on the issue, saying it is up to banks to decide
how to price their loans39
2. Philippine Interbank Reference Rate (PHIREF). The PHIREF will be a "peso-interest rate
benchmark" based on completed one-, two, three-, and six-month transactions in the peso-dollar
swap market. This is similar to the PHIBOR, except that this is based on completed transactions.
The PHIREF planned to capture all peso-dollar swap transactions electronically, the same way
foreign exchange trades are captured in the Philippine Dealing System, the country's electronics
40currencies exchange
3. Secondary trading of 91-day T-bills. Senen Matoto, president of the Financial Executives of the
Philippines (FINEX) recommended benchmarking against the secondary 91-day T-bill, using a
NASDAQ-style system to know what deals are being made with regard to the T-bill4 l. However,
this requires that banks and dealers publicize their secondary transactions of 91-day T-bills.
However, with the lack of data on secondary transactions, it will be difficult to convince issuers
of financial instruments that the secondary 91-day T-bill is a credible benchmark.
Taxation of financial intermediaries and transactions
The primary fixed income securities market relies heavily on the potential of secondary trading. Thus, the
taxes levied on the financial instruments constitute the biggest hindrance both for the development of the
primary and secondary fixed income securities market. The current tax rules cause distortions in the
yields of the capital markets, and consequently, create disincentives on the holding and trading of debt
38 Reside, Renato S. Mortgage-Backed Securities in Asia. Asian Development Bank. 1999. Pasig City, Philippines.
39 Falgui, Raymond G. Benchmark rate up to banks - Treasury Businessworld Publishing Corporation. August 18,
1998. Manila, Philippines.
40 Duplito, Ma. Salve I. BAP to create another benchmark for loans (91-day T-bill rate now'unacceptable' - BSP
chief). Businessworld Publishing Corporation. September 3, 1999. Manila, Philippines.
securities. Taxes impact the relative yields of debt securities across different types and terms to maturity,
relative to the equity securities and bank loans 42 . There are different types of taxes that are charged to
debt securities:
Taxes on Long-Term Notes, Bonds and Debentures
Security Tax on Issuance Tax on Income generated in Tax on
holding Sale/Secondary
Trading*
Public Bonds
Documentary Stamp Tax P0.30 per P200 None None
(US$0.06 per US$3.77)
Withholding tax None 20% final tax None
Gross Receipts Tax None Graduated GRT taxes** None
Income Tax None None None
Private Bonds
Documentary Stamp Tax PO.30 per P200 None None
(US$0.06 per US$3.77)
Withholding tax None 20% final tax if considered None
deposit substitute
Gross Receipts Tax None Graduated GRT taxes** None
Income Tax None None 32%***
Source: Asian Development Bank
* Taxes on disposal/secondary trading are capital gains taxes
** Graduated Gross Receipts Taxes are as follows (as per Section 121 of Republic Act 9424)
* Income tax rate is 32% effective January 1, 2000 as per Section 27 of Republic Act 8284.
Graduated Gross Receipts Taxes
Short-term maturity (not more than 2 years) 5%
Medium-term maturity (over 2 years but not more than 4 years) 3%
Long-term maturity
Over 4 years but not more than 7 years 1%
Over 7 years 0%
Income-related taxes. The income-related taxes are the final withholding tax of 20% of interest income
and graduated gross receipts tax of 5% of interest income (for institutions). Bonds with a maturity over
five years are exempt from income tax and the 20% withholding tax4 3 . Withholding taxes and the gross
receipts taxes are costs that financial intermediaries can choose to shoulder or pass on to the other parties
in the financial transactions, which will discourage potential Mortgage-Backed Securities investors.
Capital gains tax.. Capital gains tax is 32% of net capital gains for corporate holders, and graduated rates
for individuals except for those who hold bonds and certificates of indebtedness with a maturity of at least
41 Matoto, Senen. President of the Financial Executives of the Philippines (FINEX). Personal Interview. June
2001. Makati City, Philippines.
42 Saldana, Cesar G. Development of the Government Bond Markets in the Philippines. Asian Development Bank.
March 2000. Manila, Philippines.
43 Ruling 016-200 of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR)
5 years. The capital gains tax on bonds is much higher versus the 0.5% transactions tax for the stocks
traded in the Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE).
Documentary stamp tax (DST). The greatest obstacle to the development of the primary and secondary
fixed income securities market is the documentary stamp tax on bonds and commercial papers. The
documentary stamp tax acts as a "transaction cost" because it is levied for each issuance. In effect, the
documentary stamp tax becomes a disincentive for trading fixed income securities, and instead,
encourages a buy-and-hold policy 44 .
Commercial banks could easily raise liquidity by issuing repurchase agreements versus its asset pool, but
the documentary stamp tax serves as a disincentive45. The prohibitive cost of issuing repurchase
agreements against government securities is the reason for the reportedly common practice of bankers to
"sell" securities with an "informal arrangement" to buy back the same government security46. Secondary
trading is NOT subject to the documentary stamp tax. Separation of the clearing and settlement for
government and corporate securities.
There are still two parallel systems for clearing government securities and private commercial securities.
The absence of an organized system for secondary trading of both government and private securities has
forced market players to proxy the missing infrastructure on a bilateral basis 47. In effect, market players
needed to resort to individualized solutions, which are acceptable to both parties. This has resulted in
"fragmentation", wherein there is a lack of a common standard in such processes as trading, which
impedes the development of the market.
44 Saldana, Cesar G. Development of the Government Bond Markets in the Philippines. Asian Development Bank.
March 2000. Manila, Philippines.
45 For example, a bank with a weekly turnover of repurchase agreements pays the equivalent of 7.8% per year in
documentary stamp tax (DST) alone. DST is computed as P0.30 per P200 or 0.15% per transaction. A week's
average holding period would translate to 0.15% x 52 trades = 7.8% per year.
46 Saldana, Cesar G. Development of the Government Bond Markets in the Philippines. Asian Development Bank.
March 2000. Manila, Philippines.
47 Bankers Association of the Philippines. Market Reforms Project Media Presentation. April 2001. Makati City,
Philippines.
The Bankers Association of the Philippines (BAP) and the Investment Houses Association of the
Philippines (IHAP) announced efforts to improve the system infrastructure for secondary trading of fixed
income securities exchange before year end-2000. The fixed income exchange plans to use the delivery-
versus-payment scheme versus ("netting the same day" settlement for government securities) for both
government and corporate securities to avoid any notable fall-outs from settlement risk 48.
The fixed exchange will carry both corporate and government securities, and eventually asset-backed
securities (including Mortgage-Backed securities), bank issues and fixed income funds. Moreover, as part
of the Bankers Association of the Philippines (BAP)-led market reforms project, the expanded Philippine
Dealing System (PDS) will allow additional bank-dealt products to be captured electronically and be
viewed in the form of the Philippine Interbank Reference Rate (PHIREF) and the secondary trading of
government securities. This is intended to increase trading efficiency, transparency, create the
appropriate benchmarks, and allow the public to access critical information 9 .
48 This refers to an incident of a secondary securities dealer called Bancapital Development Corporation that
apparently sold the same government securities a number of times for future delivery, by issuing its own
"confirmation of sale" documents.
49 Bankers Association of the Philippines. Market Reforms Project Media Presentation. April 2001. Makati City,
Philippines.
3 OVERVIEW OF THE RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE MARKET
Background
The number of housing units in the Philippines grew by 30% during the 1980s, and has since shown no
signs of abating50. Prior to 1995, the growth rate for housing even accelerated as evidenced by the rise in
applications for housing permits by 6.1%. Despite a slowdown in the real estate development due to the
1997 regional currency crisis, there have been signs that the residential market has started to pick up. As
of 1999, the decline in ownership of dwellings is down by only 0.4%, versus a 23% in the same period
from the previous year.
However, in spite of the rapid growth of units, there remains a significant unmet demand for additional
and improved housing. The World Bank paints the following picture of the dire need for housing: Of the
11.4 million dwellings counted in the 1990 Census of Population and Housing, just under half had
durable roofs and external walls, 6% had floor areas of less than 30 square meters, and occupancy rates
were almost 97%, with a large number of households doubling up under one roof.51
As mentioned in Chapter 1, it is easy to see why the government perceives rightly housing as a social
need: Approximately 35 to 40% of the 8 million population of Metro Manila do not own a house. A
number of them live in unsanitary makeshift shanties, congested apartments and even dump sites. The
large housing backlog not only leads to the rapid increase of informal settlers (or politically incorrectly
referred to as slum or squatter colonies) but presumably a corollary increase in social issues as well52 .
To address the shortfalls in housing supply, particularly for the low- and middle-income families, the
government instituted several socialized housing programs to produce, finance and ensure housing units
and sites. Under the National Shelter Program (NSP), more than 500,000 units for low- and middle-
income housing were built or financed with public support between 1992 and 199653. However, there is
still grave concern as to whether government-led efforts can keep up with the pace of ever-increasing
housing demand. Or is it housing backlog? Or is it housing need? A fundamental problem the
government faces in addressing the housing problem is, quite frankly, "getting their numbers right".
5 World Bank. Philippines Housing Finance: Reforming Public Provision and Promoting Private Participation.
June 1997
51 Ibid.
52 Tan, Edward L. Real Estate in the Philippines. Solar Publishing Corporation. 1999. Manila, Philippines.
5 World Bank. Philippines Housing Finance: Reforming Public Provision and Promoting Private Participation.
June 1997
Housing Backlog
There have been conflicting estimates as to what constitutes the actual housing backlog. The Housing and
Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC) acknowledges that the housing statistics are in poor
condition, as there is a need for government to clearly differentiate among effective housing demand from
housing need and housing backlog54 . The inability to deliver more realistic estimates of the total housing
backlog presumably impedes the ability of policymakers, developers, and the housing agencies
themselves from making sound government programs and business decisions. Developers have claimed
that, due to the perceived huge demand, this has resulted in an oversupply of housing".
Presently, the housing agencies report that they measure housing demand in determining the housing
backlog 56. Earlier reported estimates from the government have pegged the number to be approximately
3.7 million new housing units, at least for the period of 1993 to 199857. During the same period,
renovation and upgrading of old housing units was placed at another 1.3 million units. Meanwhile,
housing demand was expected to grow by 600,000 to 650,000 units annually 58.
For the period of 2000 to 2004, another report pegged housing "need" at 3.36 million units based on
100% household growth. Of the total housing need, more than 1.12 million make up the backlog 59. To
address this housing demand, the previous Estrada administration aimed to construct 350,000 housing
units per year until 2004 or a total of 1.4 million new houses. However, the Housing and Urban
Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC) figures indicate that the Estrada administration fell short
of its target as it was able to provide only 274,727 shelter units from 1999 to October 2000.
However, in the October 1999 Philippine Conference on Securitization, the housing backlog was reported
to be 800,000 to 1,000,000 units60 (although it was not specified if this backlog was an annual period or
54 Ortille, Lucille. Deputy Secretary-General of the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council
(HUDCC). Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati City, Philippines.
55 Philippine Conference on Securitization. Mobilizing the Markets for Housing: The Case for Asset-Backed
Securities. October 1999. Makati City, Philippines.
56 Ibid. ff
57 Llanto, Gilberto M., Aniceto Orbeta, Jr., Ma. Teresa C. Sanchez and Marie Christine G. Tang. A Study of
Housing Subsidies in the Philippines. Philippine Institute for Development Studies. November 1998. Makati City,
Philippines.
58 STAT-USA on the Internet US Department of Commerce 1999
59 Adversario, Patricia L. What ails the gov't socialized housing program. Businessworld Publishing Corporation.
February 7, 2001, Manila, Philippines.
60 In the minutes of the roundatable discussion of the 1999 Philippine Conference on Securitization, the Housing and
Urban Development Coordinating Council retracted an earlier statement that the housing backlog was approximately
3 to 4 million units.
for the period of 1998 to 200461). Yet, Colliers Jardine Research estimates that the housing "demand" at
1,730,898 from 1999 to 200462. Meanwhile, the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association
(CREBA), a private real estate development association, recently estimated the housing backlog for the
country at 4.5 million units and growing63
Despite the discrepancy in estimates, let us assume that 800,000 to 1,000,000 are the estimate of the
annual housing backlog. If so, the percentage breakdown of units is as follows:
Percentage breakdown of housing units
Location Percentage
Metro Manila 24%
Provincial Cities 11%
Urbanizing Areas 44%
Rural Areas 21%
Source: HUDCC64
The impression communicated by the various projections for housing "backlog" appear to be target
production-driven estimates versus utilizing other more "market-driven" housing production factors. The
1997 World Bank study on Housing Finance, four determinants were identified that influence demand 65,
namely:
a) demographics;
b) affordability (a function of incomes, housing prices, and access to loans and subsidies);
c) acceptability (a function of tastes, construction designs, and the alternatives open to buyers) and;
d) security of tenure.
In the event that these determinants were used in estimating the housing backlog, then there would
presumably be a year-to-year variance in the government's official projections, driven primarily by
affordability and demographic considerations.
61 The total housing 'backlog' is presumably computed based on the six-year presidential term. In this case, 1998 to
2004 was the presidential term of ousted President Estrada, who served a total of thirty months.
62 Colliers Jardine Research. Philippine Property Market. Colliers Jardine Philippines, Inc. 2000. Makati City,
Philippines.
63 Gorayeb, Charlie V. National President of the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association (CREBA).
CREBA national convention: GMA's 'healing mission'. Philstar.com. July 23, 2001. Manila, Philippines. The
article doesn't specify from where CREBA generated their housing backlog estimates.
64 Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC) estimates as reported to Edward L. Tan's
book, "Real Estate in the Philippines". Percentages based on an estimate of roughly 3.8 Million units.
65 World Bank. Philippines Housing Finance: Reforming Public Provision and Promoting Private Participation.
June 1997
Market Segmentation
The housing finance market in the Philippines is highly segmented. As a result of government policies on
interest subsidies, the housing market has been divided into three distinct market segments based on loan
sizes and the borrowers income levels66.
Market Segmentation of Housing Finance by Income Level and Loan Size
Income Housing Category Price Range Interest Rate Gov't programs
Decile/s
1-4 Socialized Up to P150,000 9% p.a. fixed CMP
(Up to US$2,830) Abot-Kaya*
5-8 Low income P150,000-P225,000 12% p.a. fixed UHLP*/MWLS**
(US$2,830-US$4,240)
5-8 Low/Low-medium P225,000-P375,000 16% p.a. fixed (for 25 UHLP*/MWLS**
income (US$4,240-US$7,070) year loans)
5-8 Low-medium/Medium P375,000-P500,000 17% p.a. (only from HDMF****
income (US$7,070-US$9,430) HDMF****)
8-10 Middle/Low-high P500,000-P800,000 Market Rates Commercial banks
income ($9,430-$15,100)
8-10 Middle-high income P800,000-P1,000,000 Market Rates Commercial banks
(US$15, 100-US$18,870)
8-10 High income P1,000,000 and above Market Rates Commercial Banks
(US$18,870 and above)
Source: World Bank 1997, Real Estate in the Philippines
* The Community Mortgage Program (CMP) is a low cost lending to organized beneficiaries for lot purchase and
development for lot purchase development with interest support from the Abot-Kaya (Extending capacity),
administered by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).
** Unified Home Lending Program
*** Multi- Window Lending Scheme
**** Home Development Mutual Fund/Pag-Ibig (Love)
The Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council recently released an updated category
classification for the income categories under the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig 67:
HUDCC Market Segmentation by Loan Size
Income Decile Category Price Range Interest Rate
1-4 Socialized Housing P180,000 and below 9%
5-8 Economic Housing P 180,000 to P500,000 12%
8-10 Middle Housing P500,000 to P2,000,000 16%/18% p.a.*
8-10 Open Housing P2,000,000 to P5,000,000 18% p.a.*
Source: Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig, author's estimates
66 World Bank. Philippines Housing Finance: Reforming Public Provision and Promoting Private Participation.
June 1997
67 Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-lbig Circular 187. Implementing Guidelines of the Pag-Ibig
Housing Loan Program for Middle-Income and Overseas Pag-Ibig Members. 2001. Makati City, Philippines.
* Available to HDMF/Pag-Ibig members only. If the loan is repaid via salary deduction scheme where the employer
shall guarantee collection of the amortizations due on the housing loan, the loan shall bear an interest rate of 14%
p.a. for the entire term of the loan
However, the previous category classification for income categories, which were used for the Unified
Home Lending program, was as follows:
Interest Rates under the UHLP
Loan Tier Category Yearly Interest Rate (for life
of loan)
Up to P150,000 Socialized housing 9%
Over P 150,000 - P225,000 Low Income housing 12%
Over P225,000 - P375,000 Low Income housing 16%
Over P375,000 - P500,000* Low Income housing 17%*
*Loan bracket amount only applicable for Pag-Ibig.
Source: Asian Development Bank
The following are the income deciles in the Philippines:
Average Income of Families by Decile in Current 1998 Prices
Decile Current Income per year Income Group*
1 P23,449 (US$440) Very low income
2 P35,261 (US$660) Very low income
3 P44,094 (US$830) Very low income
4 P55,108 (US$1,000) Very low income
5 P67,537 ($1,270) Low income
6 P83,331 ($1,570) Low income
7 P105,201 (US$1,980) Low to middle income
8 P138,430 (US$2,600) Middle income
9 P192,466 (US$3,630) Middle to high income
10 P423,953 (US$8,000) High income
Source: 1997 Family Income and Expenditures Survey;
Author's estimates
1998 Annual Poverty Indicator Survey.
Sources of Home Financing
Overview
The prospective homebuyer has two basic sources of financing to pay the owner/developer for the
house/house and lot: from government housing/sub-housing agencies or from private commercial
banks/private financing. However, middle-income homebuyers have had the option of borrowing from
both the government housing agencies and commercial banks.
Sources of Home Financing
Government Private
GSIS Private banks
HDMF/Pag-Ibig Commercial banks
SSS Private financial institutions
Relatives (i.e. Overseas/Expatriate Filipino workers)
Personal resources
Housing cooperatives
Private company loans
In-house developer loans
Source: Real Estate in the Philippines
The Philippine economy, including home financing and residential development, was perilously dragged
down in last quarter of 2000 due to an illegal gambling scandal involving ousted President Joseph
Estrada68. This was reflected in the decrease of the licenses to sell (LTS) 69, where in the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) reported issuing 139,989 licenses to sell, which was a 16.3%
decline versus the previous year. The decline was more pronounced in Metropolitan Manila, with only
13,298 licenses to sell issued, a 36.2% decline versus the previous year. The impact of the illegal
gambling scandal, and the subsequent impeachment case against the President, that not a single license
was submitted for approval in December for Metropolitan Manila 0 .
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) License to Sell
Units 2000 1999 Percent Change
Socializes Housing 23,502 30,482 (22.9%)
Low cost Housing 13,926 14,228 (2.1%)
Middle Income Housing 26,695 27,731 (3.7%)
High Rise Residential 2,631 4,788 (45.1%)
Source: Colliers Jardine Research
In reference to the market segmentation, these are the sources of home financing available to each income
segment:
Socialized and Low Income-Housing
Overview. The Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association (CREBA) has estimated that low-
income housing will grow at 5% per year. The socialized and low-income housing rely primarily on
government housing agencies for home financing. The lowest income households are part of the
"socialized housing" market. The low-cost housing market was originally governed by Executive Order
(EO) 90, which was signed into law in 1986. This established the Unified Home Lending Program
(UHLP), which created the present system of housing finance in the Philippines. Under the system that
68 Former President Joseph Estrada was accused by former confidante and erstwhile Ex-Governor Luis "Chavit"
Singson of being on the take for jueteng, an illegal numbers game. This led to an eventual impeachment trial in
October 2000, and Estrada's hasty resignation on January 2001.
69 Number of transactions.
existed from 1986 to 1996, public contractual savings institutions such as the Social Security System
(SSS), Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), and the Home Development Mutual Fund
(HDMF)/Pag-ibig agreed to set aside a portion of their annual investable reserves to be lent to the
National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) 1 , which was designated as the sole "take out
window". Under what was dubbed a "formula lending" approach, property developers originated the
housing loans from borrowers and then submitted the mortgage papers to the National Home Mortgage
Finance Corporation (NHMFC) for take out. However, the Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP) was
eventually deemed to be unsustainable due to:
e poor underwriting guidelines;
e moral hazard of allowing developers to originate loans;
e sloppy accounting guidelines and poor collection efficiency and;
e unsustainability of the interest rate subsidies
(These issues are discussed in-depth in Chapter 4). When the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC) was relegated to a mere collection agency for its delinquent loans, the Home
Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig took over as the sole "lending window". However,
developer groups complained of the stricter guidelines imposed by the HDMF/Pag-Ibig, as developers
were no longer allowed to originate the loans.
The current Arroyo administration carries out a Multi-Window Lending Scheme (MWLS), where
government financial institutions 72 engage in institutional lending to accredited-private banks for low-
income borrowers. However, it has been reported that loan availability has been generally low under the
MWLS, presumably due to the tight credit policies that the banks continue to maintain as a result of the
currency crisis73 . Since the banks are in charge of the collection efforts, they approve the housing
projects before the government financial institutions can provide financing.
70 Colliers Jardine Research. Philippine Property Market. Colliers Jardine Philippines, Inc. 2000. Makati City,
Philippines.
71 The National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC), via legislation, was intended to be the future
Secondary Mortgage Institution (SMI) through accumulating a critical mass of mortgage loans for eventual
securitization. However, in an effort to 'speed up' lending, the NHMFC was made to do primary mortgage lending,
a function it was not 'built' to perform.
72 Contractual savings institutions such as the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), Social Security
System (SSS), Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig and government owned and controlled financial
institutions such as the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), and the
Philippine National Bank (PNB).
The private sector does not generally lend to the socialized and low-income sector because they cannot
compete against the fixed interest rates offered by the government financial institutions. Furthermore, the
administrative costs of lending to low cost housing are the same as the costs of lending to middle income
housing. Given the larger profits generated from middle-income housing, commercial banks have a
74lending bias for this sector
Loan types. The terms for the loans generated under the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation
(NHMFC) included fixed interest rates, longer maturity periods, and higher loan-to-value ratios
(sometimes 90% and even up to 100%). These comprise the "informal settlers" who receive loans of up
to P80,000 ($1,500) at 6% to 9% fixed interest rates under the Community Mortgage Program (CMP).
Low-income clients who receive socialized housing loans under the Multi Window Lending Scheme
(MWLS) receive loans of up to P180,000 (US$3,400) at 9% to 12% fixed interest rates75. The market
segment of loans from P150,000 to P375,000 (US$2,830-US$7,070) is referred to as "economic
housing". Loans at these low-middle income segments are at 12% to 16% fixed income rates.
Loans above P375,000 (US$7,070) no longer quality for interest subsidies. However, in the event that the
loan is originated by commercial banks, the loan carries Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) guaranty
that confers an implicit subsidy, through under-pricing the guarantee and a tax break to lenders76. On top
of that, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and the Home Development Mutual Fund
(HDMF)/Pag-Ibig have in-house programs that make loans above P375,000 (US$7,070) available to
members at 17% to 18% fixed-interest rates loans for 25 years77.
Under the brief, but progressive, term of Karina Constantino-David, former chairperson of the Housing
and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC), the government adopted market-oriented
interest rates (versus subsidized interest rates) to entice the private sector to lend to the low income
73 Businessworld Publishing Corporation. SS housing loan availments drop despite bigger budget. September 12,
2000.
74 Jacob, Monico. Former Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig Chairman and Conference Chairman
of the Philippine Conference on Securitization. Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati City, Philippines.
75 According to the World Bank, as of April 1996, the maximum loan size for "socialized housing" under the
Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP) are P180,000 (US$3,400) in Metropolitan Manila and other key provincial
cities, and P150,000 (US$2,830) elsewhere. The first P150,000 (US$2,830) of all socialized housing are at 9% fixed
rate, with any excess over P180,000 (US$3,400) at 12% fixed rate.
76 This will be covered under the discussion of credit guarantees in the succeeding chapter.
77 Commercial banks do not like to assume the liquidity and interest rate risks on loans for these term-to-maturities.
sector 7. However, pressure from developer groups who had benefited from the Unified Home Lending
Program (UHLP) versus these market-oriented polices resulted in a return to the "formula lending" and
subsidized approach 9 .
Obstacles to Private commercial bank lending. The private commercial banks have been wary of lending
to the low income borrowers, at market rates, because of the perception that:
a) Low income borrowers have higher default rates (versus mid income borrowers)
b) Difficulty in collection efforts among low income borrowers and;
c) The government's lack of political will to foreclose on low income housing properties.
The perception that low income borrowers have higher default rates presumably stem from the high
default rates for state-originated versus privately-originated mortgages. The default rate of the National
Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) is 49%, versus the commercial bank's default rate of
3.1%80. However, the reason behind the high default rates among low-income borrowers was primarily
driven by:
a) Poor underwriting guidelines8' and;
b) Poor collection efficiency.
In effect, these mortgage loans were arguably perceived by low-income borrowers as government dole-
outs. This further disincents the borrowers to make regular payments. Nonetheless, poor government
policy has shaped private sector perception. Thus, the regional currency crisis and the subsequent
contraction in mortgage lending limits8 2 set by the Bangko Sentral, has put a credit squeeze on the low
income housing market.
However, Coronel claims that it is a misperception that banks are not willing to lend to low cost housing.
But he is careful to add that a) there must be an alignment of incentives among the developers and banks
and the government to encourage the private sector to lend to low cost housing and; b) there must be an
78 Under the Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP), commercial banks found it hard to compete versus public
institutions because of the distortive interest rate subsidies of government loans.
79Llanto, Gilbert M. and Leilanie Q. Basilio. Housing Policy: Developing a Market-Based Housing Finance
System. Philippine Institute of Development Studies. December 1999. Makati City, Philippines.80 World Bank. Philippines Housing Finance: Reforming Public Provision and Promoting Private Participation.
June 1997.
81 Above-standard loan to value ratios of 90% and even up to 100%.
82 Banks are limited to a 20% exposure on real estate.
ACTUAL demand for the housing units that are built for the low cost housing sector. Coronel cites that
the quality of certain previous low cost housing projects left much to be desired. Given this, he cites
certain considerations prior to lending to low cost housing, such as a) the property must be livable, b) the
location must be accessible by public transportation, and c) there must be livelihood projects within the
low income housing community 83.
Moreover, private commercial banks are crowded out by government housing programs such as the
Multi-Window Lending Scheme (MWLS)84 because of a) the banks' reluctance to lend below a price
threshold (i.e. P250,000/US$4,270); b) the subsidized interest rates which the banks cannot compete
against and; c) the difficulty to match the current loan terms set by the public institutions (i.e. 5 years
term-to-maturity for private banks vs. 25 years term-to-maturity for public institution). Thus, low-income
homebuyers usually have no choice but to approach contractual savings institutions for home financing85.
Middle Income Housing
Overview. The Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association (CREBA) estimates that middle income
housing will grow at 2% per year8 6. Alcid adds that there is still vibrant demand for the low middle-to-
middle income-housing sector8 7. The middle-income market is usually the domain of private banks.
However, some borrowers are able to finance their loans from both the public institutions and the private
banks. In this case, 50% of the loans usually come from private banks, while the balance comes from the
contractual savings institutions (CSI)88 .
These "second real estate mortgages" come in the form of in-house developer loans, wherein the buyer
pays a portion of the down payment on installment terms to the developer for a certain number of years 9.
83 Coronel, Leonilo G. Executive Director of the Bankers Association of the Philippines. Personal Interview. June
2001. Makati City, Philippines.
84 Llanto, Gilbert M. and Leilanie Q. Basilio. Housing Policy: Developing a market-based housing finance system.
Philippine Institute of Development Studies. December 1999. Makati City, Philippines.
85 Philippine Conference on Securitization. Mobilizing the markets for housing: The Case for Asset-Backed
Securities. October 1999. Makati City, Philippines.
86 According to Reside, author of Mortgage-Backed Securities Markets in the Philippines, this growth rate is
generally consistent with household growth estimates obtained from the Philippine census and other independent
sources.
87 87 Alcid, Andrew D. Executive Vice President, Investment Banking Division of United Coconut Planters Bank.
Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati City, Philippines.
88 Social Security System (SSS), Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), and the Home Development
Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig
89 Tan, Edward L. Real Estate in the Philippines. Solar Publishing Corporation. 1999. Mandaluyong City,
Philippines.
The rest of the contract price was loaned, previously, from the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC) (and presumably from one of the various Government Financial Institutions (GFI)
or their accredited banks under the Multi-Window Lending Scheme (MWLS)). Government loans will
usually cover house and lot properties/condominiums up to P600,000 (US$11,320) (since the usual
maximum loanable amount from the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig is P500,000
(US$9,430)) In this case, the down payment is approximately P100, 000 (US$1,890) 90.
Both real estate developers and real estate consultants believe in the strong upside potential of the middle-
income housing sector 91. Prior to the 1997 regional currency crisis, banks and developers had been taking
advantage of the recent growth in purchasing power of middle-class Filipinos by stepping up the
development of middle-class housing development. Property developers attract clients with creative in-
house buyer financing schemes, such as staggered equity payments and direct credits by developers to
home-buyers, while obtaining short-term bridge financing from banks for their own financing needs.
The demand for middle-income housing continues to grow as suburbanization pressures remain strong,
particularly in the urbanizing areas south of Metropolitan Manila 92 . The mid-income segment appears to
be in a recovery phase 93 , after high interest rates and economic uncertainty during the 1997 regional
currency crisis drastically decreased the demand for middle-income loans. Improved mortgage rates of
roughly 13% in 2000, have made the home-purchase decision more palatable, versus the nearly 30% per
year which occurred during the 1997 regional financial crisis94.
House prices in middle-income estates started at P500,000 ($9,430), while the upper-middle-income
segment started at P3 Million ($56,600). Well known high-end developers, such Ayala Land, have
entered the mid-income housing segment, with an almost 100% sold ratio in their projects95. This can be
partly attributed to banks, which have been reluctant to lend on real estate, in general, but favor lending in
the form of residential mortgages to the middle-income bracket. This is further confirmed by the Bankers
Association of the Philippines (BAP), as mortgage lending to this sector is considered "recession-
90 A downpayment greater than P100,000 (US$1,890)would be difficult for regular Social Security System (SSS)
and/or Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig members to come up with.
91 Colliers Jardine Philippines. Philippines Report Residential Sector Update. March 2001. Makati City,
Philippines.
92 Urban Land Institute. ULI Market Profiles 2000 Pacific Rim. 2000. Washington, D.C.
93 Colliers Jardine Philippines. Philippines Report Residential Sector Update. March 2001. Makati City,
Philippines.
94 Urban Land Institute. ULI Market Profiles 2000 Pacific Rim. 2000. Washington, D.C.
95 These "pocket" residential developments (dubbed pocked developments because of their proximity to work
coupled with the middle class affordability) range from P1.5 - P5 Million (US$28,300 - US$$94,300).
proof 96. "The last thing you will have is homeowners reneging on their loans," stated Leonilo Coronel,
executive director of the BAP, "unless there is a deep-seated recession."
In 2000, the mid-income housing sector experienced the least decline, due to the presidential scandal and
impeachment case, which only experienced 1 3.7% decline versus the other income housing segments.
Colliers Jardine Research noted that there were nascent signs of recovery in the mid-income housing
segment up to the third quarter of 2000, which were truncated by an abrupt hike in mortgage rates (12.6-
2 1.0%)97
Sample Computation for Middle Income Housing
Amount
Total Contract Price P1,500,000
Down Payment (30%) P450,000
Balance (70%) P1,050,000
Loan Term 10 years
3rd Quarter 2000 Average Mortgage Rate 12.58%
Monthly Amortization P15,418
Peak November 2000 Mortgage Rate 21.04%
Monthly Amortization P21,022
Additional Mortgage Burden P5,604
Source: Colliers Jardine Research
Loan types. Commercial bank residential mortgages are usually 15-year loans characterized by adjustable
rates, with rates revised annually (and in some cases, semi-annually). The longest fixed rate period before
resetting the loan is five years, at a premium of 400 basis points over the one-year adjustable rate
mortgage (ARM)98.
While the private commercial banks continue to finance this market, the government owned banks has
since stopped because their allotted funds for the housing have dried up. Loan packages for middle
income housing charge market rates and are domain of private banks. These private banks have variable
interest rates and lower loan-to-value ratios (typically 60%). For Home Development Mutual Fund
(HDMF)/Pag-Ibig members whose incomes fall under middle-income housing segment, they can borrow
amounts ranging from P500,000 to P2,000,000 for a maximum term of 20 years, with a loan-to-value
ratio of 70%.
96 Coronel, Leonilo G. Executive Director of the Bankers Association of the Philippines. Personal Interview. June
2001. Makati City, Philippines.
97 Colliers Jardine Research Philippine Property Market. Colliers Jardine Philippines, Inc. 2000. Makati City,
Philippines.
High-Income Housing
Overview. High-income housing is primarily the domain of commercial banks. We have found no clear
indicators as to the growth of the high-income sector in the Philippines. This is presumably because new
upscale housing, such as high-end residential condominiums, are perceived as "investments", big-ticket
spending items with a high price elasticity of demand, versus being actual residences. Thus, as a result of
economic uncertainty and high interest rates, the demand for such housing has dramatically decreased. In
fact, high-income housing exhibited the highest decline in terms of licenses to sell (45.1%)99. Other
reasons cited for the decline in the high-income residential units, usually characterized by high-rise
residential condominiums, were the increased competition from new supply which were depressing
property prices, and a limited number of incoming expatriates100.
High-end, high-rise residential and office buildings will take more time to recover'0 1. In fact, high-rise
property developers are facing serious cash flow problems, and some of them are even technically
bankrupt0 2 . Property developers in this segment, mostly dominated by large firms, borrowed heavily
from abroad, issuing long-term bonds to finance their domestic expenditure, and are thus among the
hardest hit in the regional financial crisis. To further compound matters, the high-income market has been
saddled with a growing volume of inventories.
In 2000, developers were finding it difficult to dispose of residential condominiums, especially
condominiums priced at P5,000,000 (US$94,300) per unit, particularly given the oversupply of luxury
condominiums. For perspective, the high-rise residential condominium sector stock grew by an average of
12% per year as of end-1999, while vacancy rate was estimated at 12%. An immense supply is expected
to come online in the luxury residential market, which is expected to push up vacancies to 20% at the end
of 2001 103. There have been reports that developers in the emerging Central Business District (CBD)
areas were offering their condominiums at 20% to 30% discount from their price listI04 . Aside from
offering discounted values, developers were luring in investors through creative in-house financing
techniques.
98 World Bank. Philippines Housing Finance: Reforming Public Provision and Promoting Private Participation.
June 1997.
99 Colliers Jardine Research Philippine Property Market. Colliers Jardine Philippines, Inc. 2000. Makati City,
Philippines.
100 Urban Land Institute. ULI Market Profiles 2000 Pacific Rim. 2000. Washington, D.C.
101 US Department of State FY2000 Country Commercial Guide.
102 STAT-USA on the Internet US Department of Commerce 1999
103 Urban Land Institute. ULI Market Profiles 2000 Pacific Rim. 2000. Washington, D.C.
104 Colliers Jardine Philippines. Philippine Property Market. Colliers Jardine Philippines, Inc. 2000. Makati City,
Philippines.
The high-rise residential appears to be at the tail end of the down cycle, as capital values remain low from
the supply overhang of residential condominiums 105. Established high-end developers such Ayala
Corporation, have reported a recovery in their high-end residential developments 06.
Loan types. Presumably, the loan types are similar in structure to middle-income housing. However,
since most of the high-end developers are saddled with large inventories, almost all of their sales are
107driven by more flexible terms and in-house financing
Residential Developer
Overview. In a developing country like the Philippines, the private sector plays an important role in
property development, particularly due to the lack of government funding. It is quite noticeable that
urban precincts which are developed and managed by corporations or by private consortiums succeed
much better than others do108 . Key to note as well, is that although most of the major real estate
development companies in the Philippines are publicly listed, they are still primarily owned, controlled
and managed by landed families' 09.
Prior to the 1997 regional currency crisis, the business strategy employed by many development
companies was to acquire large tracts of land and park them in their balance sheets over a period of time
until they were 'ripe for development' (sometimes extending to twenty years)". This strategy worked
well initially for ten years prior because land values basically increased from next to nothing at the end of
the Marcos era to exponentially high levels right before the crisis. As a result, "land banking" was not a
problem because the rate of increase of land values was always greater than a company's cost of capital,
thus creating value for the company. Thus, most real estate development companies had actively pursued
a strategy of land banking based on speculative development or trading purposes. For perspective, the
105 Colliers Jardine Philippines. Philippines Report Residential Sector Update. March 2001. Makati City,
Philippines.
106 Colliers Jardine Philippines. Philippines Report Residential Sector Update. March 2001. Makati City,
Philippines.
107 Mortgage loans are paid to the developers directly, who in turn, discount their receivables for these luxuruy
residential units with the commercial banks to generate liquidity.
108 Cornelio-Pronove, Monique and Chemerie Cheng. Cities in the Pacific Rim Planning Systems and Property
Markets. 1999. Makati City, Philippines.
109 Among the more well known families are the Zobel de Ayalas (Ayala Land), the Lopezes (Rockwell Land
Corporation), and the Ortigases (Philippine Realty). Key to note as well is that several of the large development
companies are owned by ethnic Filipino-Chinese, which include SM Prime (Henry Sy). In fact, much of the earlier
equity financing for these companies came from family-based fortunes that were made from other business ventures.
110 Ladrido, Bonnie. Philippine Property Sector Analysis. BNP Prime Peregrine. 2000. Makati City, Philippines.
'rule of thumb' holding period for raw land is two years, which provides enough time to plan out the
development and to obtain the necessary licenses.
However, after 1997, there has been a dramatic decline in companies purchasing raw land as developers
are rechanneling funds to either complete developments or repay debts to commercial banks. Market data
and economic trends now play a larger role in the developer's decision process to minimize speculation
risk. Prior to this, developers would often aggressively proceed with residential developments buoyed by
a "build it and it will come attitude". The research-oriented strategy pursued by larger companies such as
Ayala Land, which purchases raw land and land banks based on an assessment of development potentials
through market research"'.
Revenue. The primary profit driver of local real estate companies is development income" 2. As a result,
the marked slowdown in the revenue of development companies is due to the drastic cut in development
income. In fact, pure real estate development companies suffered the most due to the 1997 regional
financial crisis because of little or no sources of recurring income.
Sources of development financing. Because of the difficulty developers have had in financing their
projects, developers have been 'forced' into the role of financial engineers' "3. The inability of
development companies to source financing from commercial banks have compelled developers to come
up with creative financing schemes to continue with their projects, which has seriously affected their core
competence of building houses. During the Philippine Conference on Securitization, developers voiced
their support for mortgage-backed securitization to allow them to focus more on the efficient and cost-
saving production methods for housing. Given these limitations, there are two primary means of raising
development funds in the Philippines.
"1 Cornelio-Pronove, Monique. Research Manager at Jones Lang LaSalle Philippines. Interview. April 2001,
Makati City, Philippines.
112 Ladrido, Bonnie. Philippine Property Sector Analysis. BNP Prime Peregrine. 2000. Makati City, Philippines.
"13 Philippine Conference on Securitization. Mobilizing the Market for Housing: The Case for Asset-Backed
Securities. October 1999. Makati City, Philippines.
Debt Financing
Commercial bankfinancing. The main financing source for developers, prior to the 1997 currency
crisis, was local commercial banks. During the economic 'boom years' (1993-1996), developers easily
secured development financing' 1 4. However, due to the increased systemic risk in real estate, the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas (Central Bank of the Philippines) issued a circular in June 1997 setting a 20%
regulatory limit on bank loans to the real estate sector. Meanwhile, all real estate loans could not exceed
30% of the bank's total loan portfolio" 5.
Developers groups are claiming that the 20% cap on real estate has not yet been reached because it
combines the developmental loans made to developers, foreclosed properties, and mortgage loans to
homebuyers. Thus, developers are pushing that these loan types not be lumped together with the
objective to free up debt financing for development 16 .
Coronel appears to support the developers groups argument with regard to the overarching definition of
the banks' real estate exposure. According to Coronel, the definition of real estate exposure should cover
properties that generate cash flow. Given this, foreclosed properties as a result of dacion et pago
(payment in kind - via property settlement), should not be considered as part of real estate exposure. If
this definition held true, then Coronel believes that real estate exposure is well below 20%' 17. However,
Limlingan says that given that the non-performing loans (NPLs) of the banks' real estate exposure lie
with development loans and not with the mortgage loans, the banks' will be hesitant to lend to developers
even if these loan types are segregated'.
However, due to defaults from several property developers from speculative property
acquisition/developments during the height of the currency crisis, banks non-performing loans increased
dramatically. Presently, a lot of large developers are over leveraged' '. Since then, local commercial
banks have been very conservative and cautious, due to their large non-performing loans, composed
114 Coronel, Leonilo G. Executive Director of the Bankers Association of the Philippines. Personal Interview. June
2001. Makati City, Philippines.
"5 Reside, Renato S. Mortgage-Backed Securities in Asia. Asian Development Bank. 1999. Pasig City, Philippines.
116 Limlingan, Victor S. Professor at the Asian Institute of Management. Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati
City, Philippines.
1"7 Coronel, Leonilo G. Executive Director of the Bankers Association of the Philippines. Personal Interview. June
2001. Makati City, Philippines.
118 Limlingan, Victor S. Professor at the Asian Institute of Management. Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati
City, Philippines.
119 Alcid, Andrew D. Executive Vice President, Investment Banking Division of United Coconut Planters Bank.
Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati City, Philippines.
mostly of properties, and the large amount of properties they are reluctantly acquiring through "dacion en
pago" cases. In effect, many banks have become larger land banks than most property developers"4.
According to Alcid, banks are hesitant to lend out financing for new development loans primarily because
the current development loans in their portfolio have gone into default"'1.
Before the crisis, a majority of the large developers also had foreign currency loans as international banks
became active when the real estate market was strong. However, development companies suffered
tremendously when the peso was devalued to 25% of its original value in 1998. A number of mid sized
developers who availed of this loan have since gone bankrupt.
Although there is still development financing available, banks are more selective of the developers.
Coronel claims that are certain developers that have built in stability into their cash flows that banks are
willing to lend to 2 2 , such as Megaworld and Ayala Land. For developers who are still able to avail of
development financing, the arrangement is usually for the bank to purchase their mortgage loan
receivables 2 3, at a discounted price, with recourse 2 4. This effectively provides liquidity for developers to
engage in new development projects. However, if the mortgage loan receivables have been sufficiently
seasoned (i.e. 2 year period), the banks will purchase the receivables, at a discounted price, without
125recourse
Other debt financing sources. Aside from commercial bank loans, developers also secured financing
from insurance companies, international banks with local offices, and through floating long-term
commercial papers. For property firms, the long-term commercial papers made sense due to the long
gestation period of their projects. Some companies, such as Insular Life, Sun Life of Canada, and
120 Cornelio-Pronove, Monique. Research Manager at Jones Lang LaSalle Philippines. Interview. April 2001.
Makati City, Philippines.
121 Alcid, Andrew D. Executive Vice President, Investment Banking Division of United Coconut Planters Bank.
Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati City, Philippines.
122 Coronel, Leonilo G. Executive Director of the Bankers Association of the Philippines. Personal Interview. June
2001. Makati City, Philippines.
123 Matoto, Senen L. President of the Investment Houses of the Philippines. Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati
City, Philippines.
124 In this case, recourse means that the developer retains ownership interest over the contracts-to-sell (CTS) that
they discount with the bank, and thus are required to provide liquidity in the event that the a homebuyer defaults on
the contract-to-sell (CTS). Contracts-to-sell (CTS) are discussed under financial instruments in the primary
mortgage market in Chapter 5.
125 In this case, without recourse means that the banks acquire complete ownership of the contract-to-sell (CTS)
through an absolute deed of sale from the developer to the banks. Thus, the banks acquire all the risks, particularly
the default risks, that were borne by the developer.
Citibank are involved in property development particularly for their own buildings, which they then
strata-title12 6
Pre-selling. As mentioned earlier, developers often have to resort to creative in-house financing scheme,
such as pre-selling, because of the difficulty in securing financing from private commercial banks. During
the real estate economic boom in 1995, pre-selling was the key source of financing developers. Unlike
Hong Kong and Singapore, there are no restrictions on the sales period. The market then was very
speculative and the rule of thumb was for developers to start excavation upon receipt of around 40% of
construction cost via pre-selling. Property ownership in the Philippines is characterized by long-term
ownership by a developer or a joint venture partner. The pre-selling provided a more lucrative alternative
versus costly bank financing. This development-funding scheme is a double-edged sword: the developers
have greater latitude to defer or stop construction progress to reflect market conditions. However, they
also run the risk of not delivering the 'finished goods' to clients at the promised datem
Equity Financing
Stock market. When the Philippine stock market was on an upswing (circa 1993), many estate companies
with a small capital base went public to secure cheaper capital. Initially, real estate values increased
tremendously as foreign institutional investors invested heavily in real estate stocks. However, in the later
half of 2000, the Philippine stock market has not been performing well due to the political uncertainties
(coupled with its gradual recovery from the crisis). Moreover, property investment has been very limited,
if at all active, since the 1997 regional financial crisis128.
Challenges faced by Developers. Developers have been unable to focus on their primary task of
producing houses as they are saddled with several finance-related concerns.
a. 'Forced' social component for development.
Since the development of residential communities and condominiums fall under the Urban Development
and Housing Act or Republic Act 7279, an area for socialized housing equivalent to 20% of the total
gross area of the proposed project or 20% of the total project cost is required to be developed. This
socialized housing component can be met by:
126 Cornelio-Pronove, Monique. Research Manager at Jones Lang LaSalle Philippines. Interview. April 2001.
Makati City, Philippines.
127 Ibid.
128 Ibid.
1. New settlement. The development of an entire 'new settlement' or a portion as certified by the
National Housing Authority (NHA) of by the respective municipality.
2. Slum upgrading. The development, upgrading and improvement of a slum or blighted area to be
certified by the NHA or the respective municipality.
3. Community Mortgage Program. The financing of the acquisition, development, and subdivision
of an identified 'Community Mortgage Program' project duly accredited by the National Home
Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).
4. Joint Venture projects. Entering into a joint venture project with the respective municipality or
any housing agency to develop a socialized housing project where the developer's participation is
equivalent to 20% of the project area or cost.
Arguably, this social component 'forces' the developer to take on an additional responsibility for a role
that should lie primarily with the government.
b. High interest rate environment.
Prior to the regional currency crisis, the strength of the primary housing markets brought a concomitant
rise in the provision of primary housing credit by the banking sector to all segments of the housing
market. However, the Central Bank, alarmed at the increasing systemic risk in the housing sector, has
attempted to control bank exposure by limited credit to this sector. Furthermore, the poor investment
climate, due to the banks' negative experience in non-performing real estate loans and the political
uncertainty, there is still a high interest rate environment which has discouraged developers to progress on
either their stalled property developments or their land banked properties.
c. Low profit margins on low income housing units.
As far back as 1997, the World Bank paper on housing finance said that there was emerging evidence that
it was increasingly difficult to construct dwellings that met the P150,000 (US$2,830) ceiling for the
lowest subsidized interest rate group 12 9 . The reason behind the continued development under this housing
category is related to the fiscal incentives allotted to the developer 3 0 . Land values are already included in
the P150,000 (US$2,830) cap on housing, which has steadily risen to 50% (and higher) of the total value
of the property. Interviews by the World Bank suggested that profit margins of 10%-20% are easily
eroded either when contingencies or construction costs rise.
129 World Bank. Philippines Housing Finance: Reforming Public Provision and Promoting Private Participation.
June 1997.
"3 The World Bank suggested that developers cut corners on secondary infrastructure (i.e. inadequate sewerage or
electrification) and on construction (i.e. poor quality of concrete or piping for foundations and infrastructure) in
ways that violated building codes. This was driven primarily by income tax exemptions for the construction of low-
income homes that have been linked to a mortgage loan ceiling of P150,000 (US$2,830) since the late 1980s without
being indexed. Thus, the combination of both rising construction costs and a fixed tax exemption ceiling has
Recently, an Australian-based manufacturer of non-traditional housing materials, James Hardie, claimed
that it could construct socialized housing units worth P100,000 (US$1,890) each using Hardiflex, a
proprietary technology which used fiber cement material to construct walls 3 1. Although this would
presumably be a boon to developers, it still does not address the issue or rising land values as a
component of the P150,000 (US$2,830) price cap.
Developers Associations. There are two notable developers associations which have been able to
influence government policy in the past with regard to housing finance, namely: the Chamber of Real
Estate and Builders Associations (CREBA), and the Subdivision and Housing Developers Association
(SHDA).
Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association (CREBA)
CREBA is a private umbrella organization of various professionals in the real estate industry, which
include builders, brokers, appraisers, manufacturers, suppliers, private funders, architects, and engineers,
which number approximately 4,500. The Chamber of Real Estate and Brokers Associations (CREBA)
actively lobbies for policies they believe will support the growth of the real estate industry. The Chamber
has claimed that the government has failed to provide adequate incentives to developers in addressing the
housing shortagem. In fact, the Chamber of Real Estate and Brokers Association (CREBA) CREBA, ran
for three congressional seats in the recently concluded May 2001 elections under the party list system.
Aside from running for a Congressional party-list seat, the Chamber has lobbied for the following policies
in relation to housing finance:
contributed to a steady deterioration of the size and quality of low-income homes. In 1997, newly constructed
socialized housing was an average of 35% smaller versus ten years ago.
13 Bandal, Desiree M. Housing material manufacturer sees potential in mass housing program. Businessworld
Publishing Corporation. July 14, 2000. Makati City, Philippines.
132 Junia, Catherine C. CREBA bats for P100-B seed fund for housing. Businessworld Publishing Corporation. May
9, 2001. Makati City, Philippines.
1. The implementation of a Centralized Home Financing Program (CHLP), a mass housing
financing program developed by the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association (CREBA).
Their program involves:
a. Creation of a P100-billion permanent revolving seed fund from one-time lump-sum
investments by the Social Security System (SSS), the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS), and the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-IBIG Fund;
b. Subsidized and fixed interest rates for socialized housing over a period of 25 years;
c. Cap on the interest rate spreads of 3% charged by banks on loans for socialized housing;
d. Yearly securitization of the subsidized mortgage loans to ensure continuous funding.
The Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association (CREBA)'s proposal will be covered in Chapter 5.
2. Re-institutionalization of the Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP)' . CREBA member
companies had benefited from the failed Unified Home Lending Program. In the event that
the government transitioned to the World Bank sponsored program (i.e., funding bias against
non-socialized housing projects) there income streams were jeopardized 4 . On behalf of its
members, CREBA complained that their member-developers were experiencing difficulty in
obtaining take-outs from a) the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig, when it
was the sole take-out window that replaced the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation and b) presumably, the HDMF and the other Government Financial Institutions
(GFI) through their accredited banks, under the current Multi-Window Lending Scheme
(MWLS).
3. Active lobbying against former Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council
(HUDCC) Chairperson Karina Constantino David's market-based housing finance program
under the ousted Estrada administration, which called for market-oriented interest rates
(versus cross-subsidized interest rates 3 5) to encourage private lending institutions to lend to
the socialized and low income segments136
133 Aquino, Norman P. and Reena J. Villamor. CREBA seeks 3% limit on housing loan spreads. Businessworld
Publishing Corporation.
14 Tenorio, Arnold S. Housing program back to square one. Businessworld Publishing Corporation. February 8,2001. Makati City, Philippines.
135 Developers favored the cross-subsidy scheme under the Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP), wherein those
paying higher interests at 12% or 16% would subsidize those paying the lower rate of 9%.136 Tenorio, Arnold S. Whereto for the Government's Housing Program: Overhaul of funding scheme may not
sound good under new program. Businessworld Publishing Corporation. October 22, 1999. Makati City,
Philippines.
The housing finance program of former Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council
(HUDCC) Chairperson will be discussed in Chapter 4.
Subdivision and Housing Developers Association (SHDA)
The Subdivision and Housing Developers Association (SHDA) is a private organization composed of
registered national private subdivision and housing developers. The SHDA serves as the political
lobbying arm of these developers with regard to issues affecting the real estate development and housing
industry. Recently, the Subdivision and Housing Developers Association has worked closely with the
Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig to develop developer risk-sharing schemes with the
provident housing fund agency:
1. Implementation of the Developer Contract to Sell (CTS) Schemem37 . The scheme is a risk-sharing
arrangement between the contractual savings institution (CSI)13 8 and developer where the developer
guarantees a 100% collection efficiency on its end-buyer accounts for the first 2 years of the loan
repayment period in exchange for a more expedient take out of the loans. In June 2000, the Home
Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig issued Circular 182, which provided the release of loan
proceeds to developers within seven working days and contained the rules governing the HDMF take-
out window under the developer's contract to sell (CTS) financing scheme earlier worked out by
SHDA with HDMF139.
2. Implementation of the Subdivision and Housing Developers Association (SHDA) Guaranty Fund.
The SHDA guarantee fund serves to complement the Contract to Sell (CTS) scheme. The primary
objective of the guaranty fund is to provide a stand-by back up guaranty protection to the Home
Development Mutual Fund (HDMF) 14 1 and other contractual savings institutions in the event of
failure on the part of any guaranteed developer to comply with their individual undertaking to buy
back defaulting homebuyers loans within the first 2 years of the housing loan repayment period under
the developer contract to sell (CTS) scheme.
137 Subdivision and Housing Developers Association. Concept Paper SHDA Guaranty Fund, Inc. December 2000.
Makati City, Philippines.
138 Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), Social Security System (SSS) and the Home Development
Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig
139 Businessworld Publishing Corporation. Developers laud new home financing rule. June 27, 2000. Makati City,
Philippines.
140 Subdivision and Housing Developers Association. Concept Paper SHDA Guaranty Fund, Inc. December 2000.
Makati City, Philippines.
141 The Subdivision And Housing Developers Association (SHDA)is initially working with the Home Development
Mutual Fund (HDMF) before expanding the schemes to the other contractual savings institutions.
4 GOVERNMENT HOUSING POLICIES
Government Infrastructure
Overview. In a bid to rationalize housing finance and development, the then newly installed Aquino
administration created the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC), through
Executive Order 90, which was directly under the Office of the President (OP). The HUDCC was the
highest policy-making body established to coordinate and monitor all government projects and agencies
related to housing and urban development. The HUDCC is an umbrella organization of multisectoral
representatives from the private and public sector.
Original Government Housing Agency Structure
Housing and Urban
Development Coordinating
Council (HUDCC)
REGULATORY PRODUCTION FINANCE
Housing and Land National Housing National Home Mortgage
Use Regulatory Authority (NHA) Finance Corporation
Board (HLURB) (NHMFC)
Home Guaranty
Corporation (HGC)
Home Development Government Service
Mutual Fund/Pag-Ibig and Insurance
Comoration (GSIS)
Source: Real Estate Development in the Philippines
Social Security System
(SSS)
The Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council is an umbrella organization of multi-sectoral
representatives from the private and public sector. The public sector representatives come from:
a. The contractual savings institutions (i.e. Social Security System (SSS), Home Development
Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig), and the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS));
b. Government housing agencies (i.e. National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation
(NHMFC), National Housing Authority (NHA), Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB) and the Housing Guaranty Corporation (HGC)) and;
c. Various government support agencies (i.e. Department of Finance (DOF), National Economic
and Development Agency (NEDA), Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP))
The private sector representatives come from the developers, banks, contractors, brokers, and low-income
housing programs.
Housing sub-agencies. The two key relevant housing sub-agencies 4 , with regard to the development of
the secondary mortgage market are:
Agency Original objective/thrusts Current objective/thrusts
National Home The NHMFC was originally envisioned to be the In 1996, the NHMFC was
Mortgage and government's secondary mortgage institution, the relegated to a mere collection
Finance equivalent to Fannie Mae. agency for its delinquent
Corporation The NHMFC coordinates the activities of the three sub- accounts.
(NHMFC) agencies, which are the major sources of home mortgage The NHMFC continues to
funds. The three sub-agencies are the Social Security administer the Community
System (SSS), the Government Service Insurance System Mortgage Program (CMP), the
(GSIS), and the Home Development Mutual Fund (Pag- Social Housing Development
Ibig) Loan Program, and the Abot-
Originally, the NHMFC was supposed to develop systems Kaya Mortgage Program.
that would attract private institutional funds via
hsecuritization of long-term housing mortgages.
Home Guaranty The HGC was originally envisioned to be the explicit Aside from its previous mandate,
Corporation government guarantee for the NHMFC, similar to the the HGC has been vested with
(HGC) United States' impicit government guarantee of Fannie the mandate to "pursue the
Mae. development of a secondary
The HGC processes loan applications and approves the market for housing mortgages,
release of money to applicants. It assists and encourages bonds, debentures, notes, and
private developers and commercial lenders to develop and securities." 
143
finance low and middle income mass housing through a
system of guarantees, loan insurance and other incentives.
142 The other two agencies are the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and the National Housing
Authority (NHA). The HLURB is the sole regulatory body for housing and urban development. Its three main
functions are: rules making, enforcement, and adjudication. These functions cut across three programs, namely real
estate management, town planning and zoning assistance and review, and urban land reform. The NHA directly
builds and sells housing units. It also assists in the lowest 10% of urban income earners through slum upgrading,
squatter relocation. The NHA also provides technical assistance to private developers undertaking low-cost housing
projects.
143 Loosely interpreted, this could imply that Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) could become an alternative
Secondary Mortgage Institution (SMI) since the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) can no
longer realistically pursue secondary mortgage market operations.
The Contractual Savings Institutions (CSI) which contribute to housing finance are:
Original objective/thrusts
Agency Current objective/thrusts
Home Development Pag-Ibig administers provident fund Same
Mutual Fund contributions collected from member
(HDMF)/Pag-Ibig employees and employers, utilizing
funds not required for provident
benefits for housing loans for
members.
Pag-Ibig is also charged with the
development of savings schemes for
home acquisition by private and
government employees.
Social Security System The SSS provides social safety nets Same
(SSS) through providential loans and other
benefits to privately employed
income earners.
As of December 2000, the SSS had
26% of its investments in housing
loans 44.
The agency, by mandate, directs its
investments particularly towards low-
145
income housing_ 
__.Government Service The GSIS is the primary provider of Same
Insurance System (GSIS) funds for long-term individual real
estate and mass housing loans for
middle and low-income government
employees, respectively 46.
Key to note is that, in an ideal secondary housing mortgage market, all these contractual savings
institutions, with the exception of the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig, should be
investing in Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) instead of engaging in primary mortgage market
operations (i.e. lending to the homebuyer). Nonetheless, all these agencies were directed to use their
funds for primary lending through: investing their funds in the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC) under the Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP) or setting aside funds to be
lent out through accredited banks for primary lending under the Multi-Window Lending Scheme
(MWLS) (This will be discussed in later portions of the Chapter).
144 http://www.sss.gov.ph/
145 Section 26 of the Social Security Act of 1997 states that the SSS shall invest "(e) In bonds, securities, promissory
notes or other evidence of indebtedness of shelter agencies of the National Government or financial intermediaries
to finance housing loans of members; and in long-term direct individual or group housing loans giving priority to the
low-income groups, up to a maximum of ninety percent (90%) of the appraised value of the properties to be
mortgaged by the borrowers;"
146 http://www.gsis.gov.ph/vindex.html.
Housing finance agencies. The agencies involved in housing finance are the National Home Mortgage
Finance Corporation (NHMFC), the Social Security System (SSS), the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS), and the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig. These agencies provide
mortgage loans to low and middle-income borrowers. Prior to 1996, the NHMFC provided take-out
funding to the public and private institutions using funds provided by GSIS, SSS and HDMF/Pag-Ibig.
While previously channeling funds to the NHMC, the 3 contractual savings institutions (CSI) were also
117providing housing loans to their respective members
Recent history. The brief term of ousted president Joseph Estrada was turbulent for the mass housing
sector due to the lack of a clear government program1 48 . The Estrada administration had initially set off
on the right foot by attempting to reform the housing finance system to bring about stable and longer-term
sources of financing. The president's first appointee as chairperson of the Housing and Urban
Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC), Karina Constantino-David, made strides to reform the
system by instituting tougher credit policies and market-oriented reforms which developers had to
meet1 4 9. This had met stiff opposition from private developers groups, particularly the Chamber of Real
Estate and Developers Association (CREBA)" 0.
President Estrada buckled under pressure from the private sector and created a Presidential Commission
on Mass Housing (PCMH), of which he appointed himself chairman 1 . In what appeared to be a major
policy shifts, he effectively changed a previous plan that he himself launched, the Medium-Term
Philippine Development Plan for Shelter (MTPDP-S), and duplicated the role and functions of the
Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC) tasked to oversee the housing
program. This led to the resignation of Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC)
chief Karina Constantino-David. The new ambiguous thrust of Estrada's housing program was unclear,
147 Llanto, Gilberto M., Aniceto Orbeta, Jr., Ma. Teresa C. Sanchez and Marie Christine G. Tang. A Study of
Housing Subsidies in the Philippines. Philippine Institute for Development Studies. November 1998. Makati City,
Philippines.
148 Ladrido, Bonnie. Philippine Property Sector Analysis. BNP Prime Peregrine. 2000. Makati City, Philippines.
149 The policies under the term of former Chairperson Karina Constantino-David will be discussed under
Government Housing Policy.
150 The Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations (CREBA) were so opposed to former Chaiperson David's
leadership that Manuel Serrano, founding chairman of CREBA, said "Anyone but Karina (David)." A
Businessworld article entitled "Whereto for the Government's Housing Program: Overhaul of funding scheme may
not sound good under new program" (October 22, 1999) claimed that developers from CREBA claimed that David
stood in the way of their participation in the government's housing program. She allegedly dashed developers' hopes
that the government would revive the Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP).
151 In the media, he was known as "housing czar".
which resulted in a World Bank Loan meant to facilitate the implementation of the Medium Term
Development Plan for Shelter (MTDP-S) to be put on hold.
The Presidential Commission on Mass Housing (PCMH) essentially grouped the government financial
institutions (GFI) under one roof to supposedly make it easier to source funding for mass housing
projects152 . The PCMH got off to a rocky start when the president's appointed vice-chairman, Jose Luis
"Sel" Yulo, turned out to have less than a desirable track record 53 . The resignation of the vice-chairman,
after barely a month in office, set back the Estrada administration's mass housing program once more.
The program that was eventually set up under the PCHM was Pabahay sa Bagong Siglo (Housing for the
new Century), which appeared to be another Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP) under a new
154name
Under the newly installed Arroyo administration, bold moves have been initiated to restore confidence in
the government housing program. President Arroyo has since a) abolished the Presidential Commission
on Mass Housing (PCMH)' 55; b) announced the replacement of the Housing and Urban Development
Coordinating Council (HUDCC) with a Department of Housing5 , to be headed by the current
Chairperson, Michael Defensor, and; c) re-initiated talks with the World Bank (WB) and the International
157Finance Corporation (IFC) to support a reinvigorated housing program
The Arroyo administration has yet to reveal whether or not it plans to return to the original Medium Term
Development Plan for Shelter (MTDP-S) that was in place in the earlier part of the Estrada
administration, implement a revised version of the plan, or to embark in a new housing policy plan
altogether.
152 6
In a Businessworld article entitled, "Focus: A Secondary Market for Housing", former Finance Secretary
Edgardo Espiritu had made statements tacitly admitting the need to continue former Housing and Urban
Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC) chair's Karina Constantino-David's initiatives to pursue a market-
oriented approach to housing finance, especially in light of the ballooning budget deficit.
1 In a Businessworld article entitled, "Whereto for the Government's Housing Program: Overhaul of funding
scheme may not sound good under new program" the article referred to Yulo as 'portrayed as the Trojan horse of
real estate developers, particularly the 4,000-strong construction industry organization Chamber of Real Estate and
Builders' Associations Inc. (CREBA)'. Yulo enjoyed CREBA's support as he was a private developer himself who
had interests in 10 realty companies. After his appointment as the new Presidential Adviser on Mass Housing and
the resignation of Ms. David from the HUDCC, CREBA sent out paid advertisements and press releases
congratulating Mr. Estrada for the creation of the PCMH, and "extend(ing) the glad hand of partnership" with Mr.
Yulo as co-chairman of the commission.
154 Contractual savings institutions were again asked to put funds into housing finance that would be lent out at
subsidized rates.
155 www.abs-cbnnews.com. Mass housing body abolished. July 18, 2001. Quezon City, Philippines.156 www.abs-cbnnews.com. GMA set to create housing department. July 20, 2001. Quezon City, Philippines.
157 Philippine Star. March 5, 2001. Manila, Philippines.
Government Housing Policies
Overview. The National Shelter Program (NSP) was a program pursued by both the Aquino (1986-1992)
and Ramos (1992-1998) Administrations that embodied the government's comprehensive strategy to
address the housing problems of the Philippines. The NSP was based on three principles namely: a)
reliance on the initiative and capability of the of beneficiaries to solve their housing problem with
minimum assistance from the government; b) the use of the private sector as the principal player in
providing decent and affordable housing and; c) the role of the government as enabler, facilitator and
catalyst in the housing market. Although there will still be subsidies provided, they would be targeted to
provide adequate housing facilities for the lowest 30% of the economic class 58 .
The National Shelter Program (NSP) had 4 major programs: a) production of housing units; b) mortgages;
c) development loans and; d) community programs. These programs targeted either direct end-
beneficiaries/households or private developers/private commercial banks. The NSP invests the Housing
and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC) with oversight responsibility over four major
housing programs for low-income beneficiaries:
Low-Cost and Socialized Housing Programs
PROGRAM DESCRIPTION
*Resettlement of families displaced by public infrastructure projects or Mt. Pinatubo eruption or in
Resettlement danger areas, managed by National Housing Authority (NHA) with minimal monthly payment for
a 60-sq-m lot
Community * Low-cost lending by National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) to organized
Mortgage groups of beneficiaries for lot purchase and development with interest support from Abot-Kaya
Program Pabahay Fund.
Direct * Direct financial assistance to target beneficiaries of National Shelter Program (NSP) who are
Housing Social Security System (SSS)/Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and Home
Provision Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-ibig members usually for purchase of lot and/or
construction of new dwelling unit.
* Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP) managed by National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC) from 1986 to 1996. The Expanded Home Lending Program (EHLP)
managed by Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig managed by Pag-Ibig from 1996
to 1999. The Multi-Window Lending Scheme (MWLS) managed by the contractual savings
institutions (SSS, GSIS and HDMF), and the government financial institutions (Development
Bank of the Philippines (DBP), Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP)) from 1999 to ongoing.
* Regular Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/ Pag-ibig programs
* Special projects of the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC),
Department of Public Waterworks and Highways (DPWH)
Indirect o Mobilizes financing for shelter through direct developmental loans, local governments.
housing * Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) Guaranty Program (retail guaranty, developmental guaranty,
provision mortgage-backed securization)
* Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-ibig (Pag-ibig programs, developmental loans
local government pabahay, other housing-related loans)
Source: Asian Development Bank
The Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC) has to meet annual housing
targets based on estimated housing demand and supply. However, the satisfaction of targets for flawed
programs revealed that the existing modes of housing finance to be unsustainable. Thus, this prompted the
government in mid-1996 to commission a World Bank (WB) Study of potential reforms in the housing
finance system. Initial studies that were released convinced the government of the need to sustain the
socialized and low -cost housing finance system with more transparent, explicit, and time-bound
budgetary transfers, and also to establish a more market-determined housing finance system for the
middle income to upscale markets159 . These study findings initially found its way into the Medium Term
Development Plan for Shelter (MTDP-S).
Under the Estrada administration, the National Shelter Medium Term Development Plan for Shelter
(MTDP-S) (1999-2004) was launched. The major policy thrusts of the MTDP-S were: a) situating shelter
within the broader national urban policy framework wherein shelter is both a component of social policy
and an instrument for economic growth; b) distinguishing between housing subsidy'60 and housing
finance such that sources of housing subsidies are "on-budget" and kept separate from transactions in the
housing market and; c) directing public resources to a ratio level of 80%/20% in favor of socialized
housing 16. Key to note is that the MTDP-S was a plan that was to have been funded by the World Bank
to facilitate its implementation' 62 .
Unfortunately, in a major policy shift by the Estrada administration, the MTDP-S was apparently shelved
with the creation of the Presidential Commission on Mass Housing (PCMH). In an Executive Order
(EO) which created the PCMH, the EO stated that the PCMH was created "to fast-track the
implementation of mass housing projects, stimulate economic activity, and provide for the needs of the
poor." The new body's functions include formulating "the overall framework and implementation plan (to
include targets and timetables) of the centerpiece program, including its components," and the "strategies
and incentives to encourage private financial institutions to provide for the financial backbone."06 3
159 Reside, Renato S. Mortgage-Backed Securities in Asia. Asian Development Bank. 1999. Pasig City,
Philippines.
160 Subsidies are defined as "non-market, direct or indirect transfers of resources by the government to a particular
sector. A common form of subsidy is an interest rate subsidy where the government provides housing funds that are
lent at below market interest rates." (Philippine Institute of Development Studies (PIDS)).
161 Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan 1999-2004 Executive Summary.
162 Tenorio, Arnold S. Whereto for the Government's Housing Program: Overhaul of funding scheme may not
sound good under new program. Businessworld Publishing Corporation. October 22, 1999.
163 The EO merely paralleled the tasks that the Housing and Urban Development Council (HUDCC) was already
performing the same tasks have also been assigned to the HUDCC under the government's MTPDP-S, leading to
what former HUDCC Chairperson David's resignation which cited "parallel structures" that "create confusion."
The de-facto government mass housing policy is the Multi-Window Lending Scheme (MWLS), a
derivative of the Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP), which was a carryover from the Estrada
administration164 . Thus, we will initially discuss the UHLP, followed by the Medium Term Development
Plan for Shelter (MTDP-S), a plan that was scrapped by the Estrada Administration, despite World Bank-
support. We will conclude with a discussion of the Multi-Window Lending Scheme (MWLS).
Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP)
The UHLP is the homebuyers financing component of the National Shelter Program (NSP) which
integrated the respective housing programs of the Social Security System (SSS), GSIS (Government
Service Insurance System) and the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig. There are three
levels of transactions 165:
1. The SSS, GSIS and HDMF negotiate with the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation
(NHMFC) on an annual funding commitment to the Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP)
based on their annual investible funds.
2. The NHMFC re-lends the funds to eligible homebuyers through accredited originators which
include financial institutions, developers, and corporate employers. Prospective originators apply
for a Purchase Commitment Line (PCL) with the NHMFC. Once the PCL is approved, the
NHMFC will purchase up to the granted commitment line the mortgage deliveries of the
originators following an agreed upon draw down schedule. Through this arrangement, the
originators were able to undertake more housing projects because they were able to immediately
swap cash for their mortgage investments. The mortgages taken out from the originators were
then assigned to the funders.
3. The NHMFC collects from the borrowers their monthly loan payments which are then turned
over to the funders. The NHMFC was obligated to pay the funders the yearly loan amortizations
arising from the loan originations made by the private developers/banks, regardless of whether or
not it collects from the borrowers. Thus, the whole lending, relending, mortgage take-out and
loan repayment revolved around the NHMFC.
Loan terms. There were three loan packages offered under the Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP),
with fixed interest rates and a maximum loan-to-maturity of 25 years.
164 The Multi-Window lending system (MWLS) followed the unsuccessful Presidential Commission on Mass
Housing (PCMH) program.
165 Llanto, Gilberto M., Aniceto Orbeta, Jr., Ma. Teresa C. Sanchez and Marie Christine G. Tang. A Study of
Housing Subsidies in the Philippines. Philippine Institute for Development Studies. November 1998. Makati City,
Philippines.
Interest Rates under the Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP)
Loan Tier Category Interest Rate Term-to-maturity
Up to P150,000 (US$2,830) Socialized 9% p.a. 25 years
housing
Over P150,000 (US$2,830) - Low Income 12% p.a. 25 years
P225,000 (US$4,250) housing
Over P225,000 (US$4,250) - Low Income 16% p.a. 25 years
P375,000 (US$7,080) housing
Over P375,000 (US$7,080)- P500,000 Low Income 17% p.a. 25 years
(US$9,430) * housing
*Loan bracket amount only applicable for Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig.
The interest rates were supposed to give the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) an
average return of 12.25% to cover both its cost of funds and its administrative costs. The Unified Home
Lending Program (UHLP) was designed to operate on the principle of cross-subsidization, wherein the
borrowers of the higher loan packages would subsidize the buyers or the lowest loan package6 .
Origination guidelines. The National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) did not have any
initial contact with the borrowers because only the originators screened the borrowers. The NHMFC used
a "formula lending" system where borrower eligibility was based solely on the borrower's monthly
income, but no effort was made to determine the capacity to pay.
Gross Income Required for Loan
Loan Amount Amortization + 5% origination Required Gross Income
fee
1 6 7
P150,000 (US$2,830) P1,321.73 (US$25) P3,777.00 (US$71)
P225,000 (US$4,250) P2,488.24 (US$47) P7,110.00 (US$134)
P375,000 (US$7,080) P5,350.63 (US$101) P15,289.00 (US$288)
Source: Real Estate Development in the Philippines
The "formula lending" approach, used by the originators, would based the loan amount on the borrower's
monthly income multiplied by 30, with monthly amortizations not to exceed 1/3 of his/her monthly
income 16. Key to note is that the loans made under the original Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP)
166 Llanto, Gilberto M., Aniceto Orbeta, Jr., Ma. Teresa C. Sanchez and Marie Christine G. Tang. A Study of
Housing Subsidies in the Philippines. Philippine Institute for Development Studies. November 1998. Makati City,
Philippines.
167 Under the Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP), the originators are allowed to charge a maximum origination
fee of 2.5% of the loan amount. The origination cost to the borrower would be 5%, with the balance 2.5% going to
the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).
168 The UHLP allowed for a housing loan to be obtained based on the combined salary of the principal and the co-
borrower if both are active members of the supporting agencies. For example, if a principal borrower wants to
borrow P375,000 (US$7,080) but only has a salary of P10,000 (US$190) a month, he/she can merely have his wife
or any relative of either party within the second degree of consanguinity or affinity to act as a co-borrower.
under the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) were not guaranteed by the Home
Guaranty Corporation (HGC) because of the leniency of the "formula lending" policy'.
In 1996, after the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC)'s mortgage function was
suspended and it was relegated to a mere collection agency for existing portfolio, the Home Development
Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig was assigned NHMFC's original take-out role until a new multi-window
lending system could be put into place".
Medium Term Development Plan for Shelter (MTDP-S)
The Medium-Term Development Plan for Shelter (MTDP-S) was hailed as a breakthrough in housing
finance in the Philippines as it moved away from a production-oriented mindset for the Housing and
Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC) towards a market/finance-oriented one'71 . Based on
the plan, the government expected to have established by 2004 a housing program that had "a viable
market-oriented housing finance system with sufficient sources of long-term mortgage finance."
Under the previous administration, the previous "formula lending" approach led to the bankruptcy of the
government's housing program because of a) the inability to collect loan repayment; b) the unsustainable
nature of lending practices, and c) an existing subsidy mechanism that led to substantial leakage of
government support for the non-poorn2. Crucial to reforming the finance system was the elimination of
unsustainable lending policies and of an existing subsidy mechanism that led to substantial leakage of
government support to the non-poor".
Under former Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC) Chairperson Karina
Constantino-David's leadership, the HUDCC redefined the government's role in the housing market via
169 In an interview with Arthur Tan, Vice-President of the Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC), the HGC had
actually approved a guarantee facility for the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC). However,
the NHMFC could not avail of the guarantee because of the strict conditions.
170 However, developers who found it easier to originate loans under the Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP)
complained about the stricter rules, and consequently, the slowdown in takeout of Home Development Mutual Fund
(HDMF)/Pag-Ibig loans.
171 In an interview with Romeo Bernardo, former Finance undersecretary during the Ramos administration (1992-
1998) said that the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC) and the Department of
Finance (DOF) would often be at loggherheads because the HUDCC perceived housing as a production, not finance
problem. "It didn't matter if the financing for their targeted number of houses was not sustainable," he said "They
(HUDCC) would twist the arms of the pension funds and then get the money, without worriying if the collections
were good."
172 This will be discussed in more detail under the failures/shortcomings of Government Housing Policies.
173 Tenorio, Arnold S. Housing program back to square one. Businessworld Publishing Corporation. February 8,
2001. Makati City, Philippines.
the Medium Term Development Plan for Shelter (MTDP-S). The major changes versus the previous
National Shelter Program (NSP) consisted of a) tapping the private mortgage market to finance the
housing demand of low income groups and; b) targeting housing subsidies to low income households'".
The rationale for the 'market-based' housing finance approach under the leadership of former
Chairperson Constantino-David was to integrate socialized housing into the mainstream financial
markets.
One of the key innovations introduced by the Medium Term Development Plan for Shelter (MTDP-S)
was to give due attention to the rental housing market, which has been a long ignored segment of the
housing sector that degenerated under the housing control law'75. The MTDP-S corrected a 'false
premise' of earlier government housing programs which equated shelter provision to home ownership.
Public Sector Role. In this approach, the government would pursue an 'enabling' role where its primary
role would be to create an environment conducive to private sector participation in the housing market .
Thus, the Constantino-David led housing team, in a radical turnaround, declared that it was devoting 80%
of its funds to support socialized housing, with no more than 20% funneled into economic housing.
There is also a separate on-budget subsidy mechanism targeted to the poorest 30% of beneficiaries, but
which is complementary to the market-oriented system. The on-budget subsidy would replace the existing
off-budget subsidy mechanism that was implicit in below-market interest rates on mortgage loans, and,
thus, susceptible to leakage to the non-poor". Such a revision, according to the plan, was seen to "ensure
a better distribution of responsibilities and risks (between government and) the private sector." By
making the cost of housing to the poor "on subsidy", it appears in the annual government budget, versus
the interest subsidy approach of the Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP), where the amount of
subsidies was "hidden" from public scrutiny".
"4 Llanto, Gilbert M. and Leilanie Q. Basilio. Housing Policy: Developing a Market-based housing finance system.
Philippine Institute of Development Studies. December 1999. Makati City, Philippines.
175 Bernardo, Romeo L. Revisiting housing finance. Philippine Daily Inquirer. March 12, 2001. Makati City,Philippines.
176 It is interesting to note that the Medium Term Development Plan (MTDP-S) for Shelter and the previous National
Shelter Program (NSP) had basically the same principles; namely a) involving the private sector in housing finance
and; b) the government playing an enabling role. However, the difference in implementation (at least, if the MTDP-
S) of both programs radically diverge.
177 Tenorio, Arnold S. Housing program back to square one. Businessworld Publishing Corporation. February 8,2001. Makati City, Philippines.
178 Bernardo, Romeo L. Revising housing finance. Philippine Daily Inquirer. March 12, 2001. Makati City,
Philippines.
As part of the on-budget subsidy, the Medium Term Development for Shelter (MTDP-S) recommended
the establishment of a Housing Assistance Fund (HAF), with a set of transparent target mechanisms. The
HAF, which would have been funded through bond proceeds, was meant to hand out capital grants to
poor households applying for a mortgage loan, and facilitate a multi-window home mortgage loan system
run primarily by the private sector.
Private Sector Role. The three primary roles of the private sector would be to a) strengthen its role of
primary lending to the low income sector (since it is no longer competing with government subsidized
interest rate loans), b) provide liquidity as institutional investors of Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS),
and c) establish a private sector-managed secondary mortgage institution (SMI) that would serve as
catalyst for a viable secondary mortgage market 9.
Key Highlights of the Medium-Term Development Plan for Shelter
Objectives e Formulate a comprehensive shelter program in accord with a defined national urban policy.
* Develop a sustainable, market-oriented housing finance system that will encourage maximum
private sector participation.
* Design a system that will focus and address the need of the bottom 30% of the society.
* Facilitate a decentralized shelter delivery system that will bolster valuable community support,
thus making it demand-responsive.
Strategies e Initiate reforms in the housing finance system to enable private sector participation in housing
finance and production improvement of institutional infrastructures in the primary mortgage
market, as well as the development of a secondary mortgage market through securitization
review and rationalization of the shelter agencies' operations.
* Institute the Housing Assistance Fund (HAF), an "on-budget" subsidy fund, and a corresponding
transparent targeting mechanism.
* Provide unambiguous support to the low-end sector via explicit, nominal grants versus distortive
interests and tax subsidies to mortgage loans.
* Encourage involvement of private institutions in socialized housing finance by allowing the
sector to operate within the market interest rates.
* Enable efficient rental market to augment shelter for less affluent, more mobile households.
* Render accessibility to developmental, cooperative-led and community-based lending through
decentralized housing delivery via the local government units (LGU).
Private e Private developers and lending institutions. Handle the origination and channeling of funds to
Sector Role homebuyers.
* Banks. Engage in enhanced investment in mortgage-lending especially in socialized housing;
undertake financial advising and intermediation in the securitization program.
* Private investors. Provide liquidity through investments in Mortgage-Backed Securities.
Contractual e Provide liquidity as institutional investors in Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS) and in primary
Savings markets. This was expected to ease pressure on the CSIs from directly lending out funds to an
Institutions unsustainable socialized housing program (i.e. Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP)) and,
(CSI) Role instead, increase their viability and indirectly help the housing sector through the development of
the capital market.
Housing * Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC). Undertake effective
179 Tenorio, Arnold S. Housing program back to square one. Businessworld Publishing Corporation. February 8,
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Agencies supervision and coordination of all agencies.
e National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC). Possible 'rationalization' of the
NHMFC (i.e. closure) or possible reversion into its unfulfilled mandate as a SMI.
* Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC). Enhance risk management capability.
* Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig. Develop asset-liability management.
Primary e The proposed Plan for Shelter and Urban Development principally adopted the framework of the
Mortgage previous primary mortgage program of the National Shelter Program (NSP) (i.e. Resettlement,
Market Community-based lending, retail lending, guarantees, etc.) but not the ailing and structurally
flawed programs which will be discontinued.
e There will be an explicit prioritization for socialized housing (i.e. 80%/20% allocation of
aggregate public resources in favor of low cost hosing programs, specified target share of
developmental lending including guarantee provisions).
* An innovative "on-budget" subsidy (Housing Assistance Fund) will be established to
complement the regular low-cost programs under the housing agencies and promote greater room
for private bank low-cost lending. Banks and other lending institutions are unable to compete
under the former strategy because of the distorted interest subsidies that the government loan
offers.
e Under the Housing Assistance Fund (HAF), the subsidization period of loan amortization for
qualified borrowers will be reduced from 25 years to 10 years. This is due to the consideration
of the rising capability of the borrowers to service their loans over time4.
e Effective implementation (i.e. adequate fund releases and collection efficiency should, however,
be installed to avoid the pitfalls of the previous programs, namely the Unified Home Lending
Program (UHLP))
e Development of auxiliary infrastructure should also be achieved to help ensure the program's
success.
Secondary * The other important component of the Plan for Shelter and Urban Development is the
Mortgage development of the secondary mortgage market through asset securitization.
Market
Source: Philippine Institute of Development Studies, Businessworld, Philippine Daily Inquirer.
World Bank Recognition. It is noteworthy to mention that the World Bank (WB), after staying away from
the Philippine housing sector for almost a decade, had not only regained confidence but also (and more
importantly) was willing to finance the new housing finance program under Chairperson Constantino-
David.
The World Bank (WB), in a report issued earlier this year pointed out, in no uncertain terms, that the key
to drawing in private sector funding and making shelter finance sustainable was a) setting market rates of
interest for low-income housing loans and; b) instituting a carefully targeted and transparently budgeted
upfront subsidy program for poor homebuyersm. The report read that, "This is the vision embodied in
the Medium Term Philippine Development Plan for Shelter. It would seem to recommend itself over any
attempt to resurrect directed lending under another guise." In fact, the Medium-Term Development Plan
for Shelter (MTDP-S) was based largely from the recommendations of the 1997 World Bank Study on
180 While amortization remains constant in nominal terms, nominal income increases due to inflation and income
improvements. Thus, the problem of loan affordability then is re-assumed to exist only for a maximum of ten years.
"Philippines Housing Finance: Reforming Public Provision and Promoting Private Participation" 82. As
early as April 1999, the World Bank announced that it was providing technical assistance in the effort to
restructure the housing sector's financing system. An assistance project amounting to $4.6 million was in
the works and was ready to begin by the following month8 3.
The project, entitled Housing Finance Technical Assistance (HFTA), which was to be handled by the
Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC), was supposed to help attract private
financing to support the socialized housing program for the next six years. The World Bank (WB) was
ready to finance the implementation of the MTDP-S, but it was shelved shortly after President Estrada set
up the Presidential Commission on Mass Housing (PCMH) 84.
The Multi-Window Lending Scheme (MWLS)
The Multi-Window lending scheme (MWLS) appears to be a combination of the Unified Home Lending
Program (UHLP) and the Medium Term Development Plan for Shelter (MTDP-S). The Housing for
Urban Development and Coordinating Council (HUDCC), claimed that the MWLS was a "two-pronged
program" - one a market-based, demand-driven, private sector led program, and the other a government-
led program.
The Multi-Window Lending System (MWLS) not only brought back the contractual savings
institutions 15 into primary lending at below-market interest rates, but also other government owned and
controlled financial institutions as well, which include Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), and the Philippine National Bank (PNB).
The Multi-Window Lending Scheme (MWLS) engages in wholesale or institutional lending to private
banks and to other government owned and controlled financial institutions1 86. These private banks and
government owned and controlled financial institutions will serve as conduits, and lend money to the
181 Tenorio, Arnold S. Political will needed to reform weak housing sector. Businessworld Publishing Corporation.
February 9, 2001. Makati City, Philippines.
182 The World Bank study has been incorporated into several portions of this thesis.
183 Tenorio, Arnold S. Housing program back to square one. Businessworld Publishing Corporation. February 8,
2001. Makati City, Philippines.
184 Tenorio, Arnold S. FOCUS: A secondary market for housing. Businessworld Publishing Corporation. December
1, 1999. Makati City, Philippines.
185 Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), Social Security System (SSS), and the Home Development
Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig
186 Businessworld Publishing Corporation. Property sector airs views on new scheme. March 27, 2000. Makati City,
Philippines.
homebuyer under, presumably, the same uniform lending guideline set up by the government under the
Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP).
Interest Rate Scheme under the Multi-Window Lending Scheme (MWLS)
Interest rates from funders to Interest rates to homebuyers from
Category GFI* Private GFI* Private Banks
Banks
Socialized housing (P180,000 6% 9% 9% 12%
(US$3,400) and below)
Low cost to Open Housing 6% 9% Market rates** Market rates**
(P180,000 (US$3,400) and above)
Source: Businessworld
*Government Financial Institution
** From a technical standpoint, these are also fixed interest rates. For example, if the loan is contracted at a
market rate of 16%, the loan will stay at 16%for the whole period'.
Although Businessworld reported that the low cost to open housing rates under the Multi-Window
Lending Scheme would be at market rates, a cursory review of the respective websites of all the
contractual savings institutions reveals that the program continues to maintain the same three-tiered
interest rate scheme that was used in the Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP). The loan terms and
interest rate schemes used in the Multi-Window Lending Scheme (MWLS) are discussed in depth in
Chapter 5. Presumably, the maximum term to maturity of these mortgage loans was 25 years, similar to
the Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP).
It must be noted that at the time these 'subsidized' interest rates were being pegged, the market rates for
mortgages was 16%188. Similar to the Unified Home Lending Program, the Multi-Window Lending
Scheme (MWLS) is supposed to generate an effective return of 12% through the principle of cross-
subsidization 89.
Government support will include amortization support for the first five years on socialized housing loans,
and the Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) guaranty (which comes together with a tax incentive) for
government financial institutions and private banks who lend at 11% per annum. Unlike the previous
Unified Home Lending Program (MWLS), the loan guarantee and appraisal services will be provided by
187 Ortille, Lucille. Deputy Secretary General of the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council.
Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati City, Philippines.
188 In a Businessworld interview, an SSS official was quoted as saying, "We'll just have to absorb the differential
and look at it as a form of service."
189 In the case of the Multi-window lending System (MWLS), the socialized housing loan rates would be subsidized
by the 'market rate' loans of the low cost to open housing, to generate an effective return of 12%. However, the
effective rate will be dependent on the prevailing 'market rates'.
the Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC). Supposedly, the 'market-driven' mechanism for the scheme was
defined as assigning contractual savings institutions and government financial institutions to cater to
particular market segments.
Market Segmentation under the Multi-Window Lending Scheme (MWLS)
Institution Market Segment
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) Developmental loans to Local Government Units
(LGU)/Developers
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) Teachers and government employees
Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF) Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the
Philippine National Police (PNP)
Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) Developmental financing, cooperative housing
Social Security System (SSS) Overseas Filipino workers and trade union workers and
other private sector workers
Source: Businessworld, HUDCC
Former Chairperson Leonora de Jesus190 had made several modifications to the Multi-Window Lending
Scheme (MWLS) which included: a) ensuring private sector participation and breakup of monopolies and
cartels operating in the industry, b) Risk sharing through contract-to-sell (CTS) scheme with a buyback
provision over a two-year seasoning period and c) support by a private sector-led guaranty fund
(Subdivision and Housing Developers Association (SHDA) guaranty fund)191.
The contractual and savings institutions had allotted P40 Billion (US$755 Million) for the Multi-Window
Lending Scheme (MWLS). Meanwhile, the government also mobilized P22.65 Billion (US$427 Million)
and a P14 Billion (US$ 264 Million) from the Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC). However, according
to the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council, the utilization rate from the Contractual
Savings Institutions (CSIs), as of June 2001, was at 17%192.
The reasons posited by the contractual savings institutions (CSI) behind the low utilization rate were a)
the stringent housing guidelines set by the accredited banks administering and servicing the loans and; b)
the lingering effects of the 1997 regional currency crisis193. It is interesting to note that private sector
developer groups under the umbrella organization of the Private Sector Consultative Council for Shelter
190 Former Chairperson Leonora de Jesus was the former head of the Presidential Management Staff (PMS) of
ousted President Estrada who replaced resigned Chairperson Karina Constantino-David.
191 Businessworld Publishing Corporation. New HUDCC initiatives seen to perk up home access. October 27, 2000.
Makati City, Philippines.
192 Ortille, Lucille. Deputy Secretary General of the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council
(HUDCC). Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati City, Philippines.
193 Businessworld Publishing Corporation. SS housing loan availments drop despite bigger budget. September 12,
2000.
(PCCS)194 have categorically supported the Multi-Window Lending Scheme, except for the Chamber of
Real Estate and Builders Associations (CREBA). CREBA, instead continued to propose the
establishment of a Centralized Home Financing program with a P120 Billion (US$ 2.3 Billion) seed fund,
which was to be sourced from the government-mandated allocations of the contractual savings institutions
(CSIs) commercial banks, insurance companies, and unused agri-agra'95 allocations from the banking
sector through a proposed executive order'96 .
Failures/Shortcomings of the Government Housing policies
Production-Oriented Versus Finance-Oriented. The apparent shortcomings of all government housing
programs, with the exception of the Medium Term Development Plan for Shelter (MTDP-S), is the
populist logic that politicians adopt of building as many housing units as possible, without consideration
for the financial consequences of this action. Thus, the short-sighted solution to this problem would be,
as former Finance undersecretary Romeo Bernado put it, "throwing in good money after bad"' 97: pumping
in more money through the use of member contributions in the contractual savings institutions (CSI),
legislating budgetary appropriation for subsidized lending, and imposing loan quotas on financial
institutions to force them to lend to target beneficiaries9". In effect, the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC) performed the role of social welfare versus being a market-driven secondary
mortgage institution.
This policy of constructing housing units goes all the way back to the dictatorial Marcos administration,
where houses were built based on supply and not demand, and were carried over through to the Ramos
194 The Private Sector Consultative Council for Shelter (PCCS) include the Subdivision and Housing Developers
Association (SHDA), the Organization of Socialized Housing Developers of the Philippines, National Real Estate
Association, Builders Alliance Towards Action, Women in Shelter and Its Environment, the Realty Service Council
of the Philippines, the Philippine Association of Realtors Boards and the Real Estate Builders Association of the
Philippines.
195 The Agri-Agra law (Presidential Decree 717), issued in May 29, 1975, It mandated banks to grant 25% of their
loanable funds to agriculture (i.e. any kind of borrower engaged in agriculture). The law, whose implementation has
since been amended through several circulars issued by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (Central Bank of the
Philippines), mandates all banking institutions to set aside at least 25% of their loanable funds for agricultural credit
in general. Of these, at least 10% should be made available for agrarian reform credit, or to farmers tilling land
acquired under the agrarian reform program. Otherwise, the entire 25% may be used for agrarian reform credit,
196 Businessworld Publishing Corporation. New HUDCC initiatives seen to perk up home access. October 27, 2000.
Makati City, Philippines.
197 Bernardo, Romeo L. Former Undersecretary of the Department of Finance (DOF). Personal Interview. June 2001,
Pasig City, Philippines.
198 Llanto, Gilbert M., Aniceto C. Orbeta, Jr., Ma. Teresa C. Sanchez and Marie Christine G. Tang. A Study of
Housing Subsidies in the Philippines. Philippine Institute of Development Studies. November 1998. Makati City,
Philippines.
Administration 99. This supply oriented housing policy led to the proliferation of thousands of units
which the intended beneficiaries refused to occupy. Although the Estrada administration initially moved
towards a more market-oriented approach, ousted President Estrada caved into private developers
interests and returned to the supply-oriented approach.
The newly installed Arroyo administration, unfortunately, appears to be bent on taking the same
approach. In her State of the Nation (SONA), President Arroyo promised to build 800,000 houses 200 by
acquiring P20 Billion (US$377 Million) worth of financing from the government financial institutions201.
This problem of supply is further exacerbated by the significant variances for the total housing backlog.
It is troubling to note that the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC) claims
that the total housing backlog is approximately 700,000 to 1,000,000 units, while the Chamber of Real
Estate and Builders Association (CREBA) has estimated that this number to be at 4,500,000 units.
Unsustainability of subsidized interest rate housing programs. The unfortunate return to a subsidized
interest rate mortgage loans via the Multi-Window Lending Scheme (MWLS) tell us that the government
has not learned from the sins of the past. In 1998, the Philippine Institute of Development Studies (PIDS)
had already performed a comprehensive analysis illustrating the unsustainability of a housing subsidy
program. This is due to huge fiscal requirement of providing direct and indirect subsidies, the leakage of
benefits to unintended beneficiaries (i.e. the middle and high income borrowers), and the distortions
introduced in the financial markets which have prevented the private sector from financing the housing
market.
Problems with the Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP)
a. National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) subject due political pressure.
Since the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) is a government institution, it has
succumbed in the past to political pressure 20 2 . Moreover, the NHMFC has been the victim of poor
management given that the heads of NHMFC are usually government appointees. Thus, instead of
199 Tenorio. Arnold S. Focus: A Secondary Market for Housing. Businessworld Publishing Corporation. December
1, 1999.
200 For the remainder of her administration (2001-2004), President Arroyo promised that the government would
build 100,000 for the low income class and 50,000 for socialized housing.
201 www.inq7.net. President Macapagal's State of the Nation speech. July 23, 2001. Makati City, Philippines.
202 Philippine Conference on Securitization. Mobilizing the Markets for Housing: The Case for Asset-Backed
Securities Romeo Bernardo's presentation. October 1999. Makati City, Philippines.
developing policies that could have been market-driven, the government's production-driven focus
arguably prevented this.
b. Lenient origination guidelines and poor servicing/collection efficiency of public institutions.
As can be gleaned from the description of the origination guidelines used for the Unified Home Lending
Program, the lenient "formula lending" approach, based primarily on the potential homeowners' salary
bracket, failed to distinguish among potential borrowers according to their capacity and willingness to
pay. Consequently, the "formula lending" approach led to the poor asset quality of the mortgage loans
that were intended for securitization. The lack of a rigorous screening process and poor collection efforts
presumably led to the high level of defaults/non-performing loans (NPLs) originated by public
institutions203
Alcid added that the intention of the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) was good,
unfortunately the execution left much to be desired. He highlighted the key shortcomings of the program
as the inability to both underwrite and properly service the loans204. Maquera chimes in with poor
processing procedures for the loan, which include a) the failure to send a bill; b) the failure to properly
post the payment of the mortgage loan which leads to an inability to track how much a homebuyer owes
and; c) the need for a homebuyer to take a day off from work merely to pay the monthly amortization.
The cumulative effect of these deficient processing procedures has resulted in the failure by the National
Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) to determine good from bad homebuyers 205 .
Moreover, since the Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP) was perceived by private commercial banks
as catering primarily to low income borrowers, the poor origination and servicing guidelines have given
the impression that the low income segment, as a whole, are poor borrowers.
In the initial stage of the Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP), banks served as the mortgage loan
originators. These originating banks were institutions approved by the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC). The banks were tasked to screen for qualified loan applicants, and issue the
preliminary approval of the maximum loanable amount for the potential homebuyer. The originating
203 Social Security System (SSS), Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), Home Development Mutual Fund(HDMF)/Pag-Ibig, and National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).
204 Alcid, Andrew D. Executive Vice President, Investment Banking Division of United Coconut Planters Bank.
Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati City, Philippines.
205 Maquera, Peter D. Chief Operating Officer of Lighthouse Credit Technologies Corporation. Personal Interview.
June 2001. Pasig City, Philippines.
bank would then receive a commission from the National Home Mortgage Finance (NHMFC). After
that, the loan take-out will be given by the originating bank to the developer.
However, few banks were responsive to the loan origination process because of the retail nature of the
loans. Since there was a political need to achieve a targeted number of housing units, the housing
agencies allowed developers to originate loans to achieve their 'numbers' 2 06. Given that loan origination
is not their respective businesses' core competence, both the developers and the contractual savings
institutions (CSI) (i.e. Social Security System (SSS)/Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), and
Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig) did not possess the capability to satisfy certain
criteria when underwriting mortgage borrowers 207, which is reflected in the wide disparity in non-
performing asset ratios between public and private institutions:
Arrears on Private Banks Total Loan Portfolios and
on Selected Public Lenders Housing Portfolios
Institution Ratio of Arrears to total housing loan portfolio %
Commercial Banks 3.1%
Thrift Banks 7.9%
Home Development Mutual Fund 12.7%
Rural Banks 17.0%
Social Security System 37.9%
National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation 49.0%
Source: World Bank, 1997
Although no estimate was provided for the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), estimates by other
agencies peg the ratio of arrears to 50%.
This indicates that the in-house underwriting and servicing capabilities of public originators hindered
their ability to develop securitizable mortgage loans. According to Reside, this hypothesis is reinforced by
claims made by the Social Security System (SSS) that there has so far been a zero default rate on
mortgages under-written for SSS members by SSS-accredited private banks20s. Thus, this suggests that
the present system of bank accreditation had greatly enhanced the quality of mortgages. In fact, after
206 Manicio, Eduardo T. Vice-President, Funds Generation Group of the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC). Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati City, Philippines.
207 The mortgage loans of the Social Security System (SSS)/Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) are the
loans they provide directly to their members. However, Home Mortgage Development Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig,
given its mandate as a primary mortgage loan provider, appears to be doing a better job versus the two contractual
savings institutions (CSI).
208 Reside, Renato S. Mortgage-Backed Securities in Asia. Asian Development Bank. 1999. Pasig City,
Philippines.
controlling for "cross-institutional" differences in underwriting and servicing209, cross-sectional
differences across the income-level of borrowers do not matter2".
The liberal mortgage screening and servicing procedures adopted in low-cost housing programs such as
the Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP) served as disincentive for timely repayment by any
borrower, regardless of income level21' Moreover, liberal screening and servicing procedures
inadvertently strengthens the perception that these mortgage loans were government dole-outs, further
weakening the homebuyers' credit discipline212 . Alcid anecdotally related that the National Home
Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) did not set up invoices nor did they follow up with the
homebuyers213.
Such adverse incentive distortions presumably accounted for the high rates of arrears among public
originators214 , who generally cater to low-cost housing borrowers, versus private commercial banks, who
generally cater to middle to high income homebuyers. In fact, data from the Philippine Institute of
Development Studies (PIDS) strengthen this argument: The collection efficiency of developer-originated
loans is lower than those loans originated by financial institutions (59% vs. 69%)215.
c. Subsidized interest rates
As elaborated on in the origination guidelines under the Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP), low-
income borrowers were offered below market interest rates and longer amortization terms by the public
versus private institutions, which effectively discouraged private commercial banks to compete because
of the distorted interest rate subsidies of the government-sponsored mortgage loans.
209 Cross-sectional differences in screening and servicing capacity refer to the cross-sectional differences in
institutional capacity and readiness for securitization. Originators that are better underwriters and servicers will also
tend to be better prepared to securitize their mortgages.
210 There is a perception among private commercial banks that low-income borrowers are not good payors.
However, proper screening of the loans disputes that perception.
211 Reside, Renato S. Mortgage-Backed Securities in Asia. Asian Development Bank. 1999. Pasig City,
Philippines.
212 Philippine Conference on Securitization. Mobilizing the Markets for Securitization: The Case for Asset Backed
Securities, Former Finance Undersecretary Romeo Bernardo's presentation. October 1999. Makati City, Philippines.213 213 Alcid, Andrew D. Executive Vice President, Investment Banking Division of United Coconut Planters Bank.
Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati City, Philippines.
214 Social Security System (SSS), Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), Home Development Mutual Fund(HDMF)/Pag-Ibig, and National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC)
215 Llanto, Gilbert M., Aniceto C. Orbeta, Jr., Ma. Teresa C. Sanchez and Marie Christine G. Tang. A Study of
Housing Subsidies in the Philippines. Philippine Institute of Development Studies. November 1998. Makati City,
Philippines.
On top of the distorted interest rates, the intended beneficiaries -the low-income sector - do not get the
benefits of the subsidies. Weak targeting mechanisms, such as the one used in the Unified Home Lending
Program (UHLP), often allow unintended beneficiaries (i.e. 'better educated', 'better politically
connected') to present themselves as 'worthy' beneficiaries of the subsidy versus the targeted
beneficiaries 216. However, since the 'recognized beneficiaries' of the program are the low-income sector,
they are unfortunately blamed for its nonperformance. The Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP)'s
mortgage take-outs, amounting to P29.4 Billion (US$555 Million) from 1993-95 clearly illustrate this:
Mortgages taken out under the
Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP) for 1993 to 1995
Loan Bracket No. of % of total Average Average Income
beneficiaries/ Beneficiaries Loan Value Loan Value
unit /units
P150,000 (US$2,830) 56,323 38.1% 26% P135,513.60 P4,517.10 (US$85)
and below (US$2,560)
P150,000 to P225,000 48,521 32.8% 32.8% P198,625.40 P6,620.80 (US$124)
(US$2,830 - US$4,250) (US$3,750)
P225,000 to P375,000 43,061 29.1% 41.3% P281,699.90 P9,390.00 (US$177)
(US$4,250 - US$7,080) (US%5,320)
Total/Average 147,905 100% 100% P198,778.40 P6,625.90 (US$125)
(US$3,750)
Source: Philippine Institute of Development Studies
Only 38.1% of the low-income borrowers were the beneficiaries of the units, versus the combined 61.9%
of the middle (32.8%) and high-income borrowers. Corollary, the low-income borrowers only comprised
26% of the total loan value of the Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP) versus the combined 74.1% of
the middle (32.8%) and high (41.3%) income borrowers217 . The table makes clear that the interest rate
subsidies went to the middle and high-income groups218.
In fact, it is possible that people with the capacity to pay don't end up paying. The National Home
Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC)'s collection performance for high-priced loans (loans carrying
216 Llanto, Gilbert M., Aniceto C. Orbeta, Jr., Ma. Teresa C. Sanchez and Marie Christine G. Tang. A Study of
Housing Subsidies in the Philippines. Philippine Institute of Development Studies. November 1998. Makati City,
Philippines.
217 Llanto, Gilbert M., Aniceto C. Orbeta, Jr., Ma. Teresa C. Sanchez and Marie Christine G. Tang. A Study of
Housing Subsidies in the Philippines. Philippine Institute of Development Studies. November 1998. Makati City,
Philippines.
218 The interest rate subsidies depended more on the loan size rather than on the level of the interest rate. Thus,
higher income borrowers who availed of bigger loans captured a larger benefit of the subsidized interest rates.
Although the low income groups should have benefited from the subsidized interest rates, the outcome is the
opposite: because of the bigger loan sizes, the middle and high income group derive more of the subsidies.
(Philippine Institute of Development Studies).
higher interest rates) were generally lower versus than low-priced loans (57% for 16% loans versus 73%
for 9% loans) 2 19 . Since credit investigation was practically nonexistent with the Unified Home Lending
Program (UHLP), potential applicants who deserved more government support in terms of the higher
subsidy extended socialized loan packages were boxed out by applicants who could afford higher interest
payments.4
This is further evidenced by a study by the Philippine Institute of Development Studies (PIDS) which
revealed that the social costs of subsidizing housing loans and misdirecting the subsidies to nonporous
borrowers were quite high 1.
Subsidy Incidence under the
Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP) (1993-1995)
Subsidy Incidence Income Group 2 --
Low Middle High
% of Beneficiaries 38 33 29
% of Loan Value from UHLP 26 33 41
% of Delinquent Loans 11 36 53
Source: Philippine Institute of Development Studies
Only 38% of the intended low-income beneficiaries received the subsidy, versus the combined 62% of the
middle (33%) and high (29%) income brackets. In terms of loan value, only 26% of the mortgages were
availed of by the low-income group versus the combined 74% of the middle (33%) and high (41%)
income groups. However, in terms of the delinquent accounts, the high-income borrowers, the
"unintended" beneficiaries, have the highest delinquency rates (53%), followed by the middle-income
borrowers (36%), then by the low-income borrower (11%)223. These results dispute the perception that
low-income borrowers are not good payers (in fact, it appears to be the other way around).
219 Llanto, Gilbert M., Aniceto C. Orbeta, Jr., Ma. Teresa C. Sanchez and Marie Christine G. Tang. A Study of
Housing Subsidies in the Philippines. Philippine Institute of Development Studies. November 1998. Makati City,
Philippines.
220 Tenorio, Arnold S. Housing program back to square one. Businessworld Publishing Corporation. February 8,2001. Makati City, Philippines.
221 Llanto, Gilbert M. and Leilanie Q. Basilio. Housing Policy: Developing a Market-based Housing Finance
System. Philippine Institute of Development Studies. December 1999. Makati City, Philippines.
222 Definition of income groups:
Low - Households with monthly income below P5,000 (US$94)
Middle - Households with monthly income P5,000 - below P7,500 (US$94 - below US$141)
High - Households with monthly income above P7,500 (US$141)
223 Llanto, Gilbert M., Aniceto C. Orbeta, Jr., Ma. Teresa C. Sanchez and Marie Christine G. Tang. A Study of
Housing Subsidies in the Philippines. Philippine Institute of Development Studies. November 1998. Makati City,
Philippines.
This may have been further exacerbated the origination of the loans through the private banks. If the
transfer of subsides occur through private commercial banks, there is usually a bias against the intended
beneficiaries (i.e. low income group). Factors such as high transaction costs, information asymmetry, and
perception of high credit risks prevent poor households from accessing the financial markets22 4. The
Philippine Institute of Studies (PIDS) paper on Housing Subsidies points out that there is a tendency of
banks or lending institutions to credit ration the intended beneficiaries, and to cater to the more
creditworthy segment of the borrowing population (i.e. high income group).
Moreover, the subsidized interest rates were not transparent. This meant that opportunity costs of the
housing subsidies and the government's budget constraints were not adequately considered in the design
on these subsidies. The total amount (P25.4 Billion/US$479 Million) spent on housing subsidies from
1993-1995 appears to confirm the lack of transparency in the subsidy design mechanism. 90% of the
subsidies to the housing sector are coursed into the home mortgage programs (i.e. Unified Home Lending
Program (UHLP)). And among all the housing programs, the Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP)
carried 74.1% of the total housing subsidies225.
d. Moral Hazard with developers
An inherent conflict exists in having developers originate loans as their primary business concern is the
production of housing units, and not loan origination. Since the Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP)
program allowed developers to originate loans, and not the primary mortgage lenders, this led to the
lenient selection of homebuyers as the originator-developers were more concerned with generating more
income by seeking out more homebuyers regardless of the latter's capacity and willingness to pay2 26.
Thus, it is not surprising that the estimates from the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association
(CREBA) are much higher (4.5 million units) versus the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating
Council (HUDCC) (700,000-1,000,000 units).
224 Llanto, Gilbert M., Aniceto C. Orbeta, Jr., Ma. Teresa C. Sanchez and Marie Christine G. Tang. A Study of
Housing Subsidies in the Philippines. Philippine Institute of Development Studies. November 1998. Makati City,
Philippines.
225 Llanto, Gilbert M., Aniceto C. Orbeta, Jr., Ma. Teresa C. Sanchez and Marie Christine G. Tang. A Study of
Housing Subsidies in the Philippines. Philippine Institute of Development Studies. November 1998. Makati City,
Philippines.
226 Tenorio, Arnold S. Housing program back to square one. Businessworld Publishing Corporation. February 8,
2001. Makati City, Philippines.
This conflict was evident in the Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP), as real estate developers
assumed the initial credit and financing risk by starting construction EVEN BEFORE entertaining
applicants for the low-cost housing units. After screening applicants and obtaining the required
documentation from them, the developers drew on the preset purchase commitment lines (PCLs) with the
National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) in amounts corresponding to the appraised
value of the properties 227. The National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) reviewed the
homebuyers' documentation and other proof of capacity to repay to ensure that it met the Unified Home
Lending Program (UHLP) qualifications for borrowers. Amortizations after take-out out of the
developer-originators were made by homebuyers directly to the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC), who would then service of the loans. Moreover, since the loan the developers
performed origination function, the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) was ill
equipped to check on the actual paying capacity of loan applicants228.
In effect, developers were 'incented' to qualify as many homebuyers as possible, despite the fact that
developers were ill-equipped to screen homebuyer capacity and willingness to pay, otherwise these
developers would be stuck with inventory. The take-out scheme virtually allowed developers to pass on
all of their risks to the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC). As a result of the
flawed incentive structure, the 1998 Philippine Institute of Development Studies (PIDS) argues that
private developers will only participate in the government's housing program, particularly the
"socialized" programs, if there are continuing government subsidies229.
More often than not, the production oriented policy of the Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP) led to
unscrupulous developers putting up substandard housing units. Anecdotal evidence reveal that housing
units were built in the most inhospitable (i.e. mountainous areas) or the most inaccessible (i.e. no access
to public transportation nor main roads) of areas, since the developers were confident that they would
eventually be 'taken out' by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC)1 0.
227 The Purchase Commitment Line (PCL) served as the government's assurance that the originator-developers
would get paid through the loans released by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) to the
member-borrowers of the Contractual Savings Institutions (CSI).
228 Tenorio, Arnold S. Housing program back to square one. Businessworld Publishing Corporation. February 8,2001. Makati City, Philippines.
229 Their argument is further bolstered by the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association (CREBA) rejection
of the market-oriented finance scheme of the Medium Term Development Plan for Shelter and lobbying for the
return of the Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP).
230 Alcid, Andrew D. Executive Vice President, Investment Banking Division of United Coconut Planters Bank.
Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati City, Philippines.
The results of the adverse incentives were evident: housing developers who had built housing units even
before entertaining housing applicants were left with a large stock of housing inventory and receivables
that were not "taken out"231. When the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig took over the
mortgage take-out function from the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC), these
developers could not pass the more stringent guidelines set up by the HDMF/Pag-ibig and were stuck
with both the receivables and the inventory.
The generous stance that government has taken with regard to developers is characteristic of the policies
of previous administrations, which encouraged developers to "raid" public financing for the shelter
program. In an effort to address the housing backlog, previous administrations were held hostage to
developers' demands that the government support the developers' production binge through liberal
funding support, through end-user lending, developmental loans, or loan guarantees232 . With reference to
the previous Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig example, the government was 'obliged'
to assist developers who were caught with excess "housing" inventory that were not taken out by the
National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) through making the Home Development
Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig the new, albeit stricter, mortgage take out window 23 3.
The claim made the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association (CREBA) with regard to the failure
of the Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP) was not the program "per se" but rather the people
running it, according to Carlos Nocon, the Executive Vice-President of the Chamber or Real Estate
Builders and Associations (CREBA)234. "The key success factors are in credit scoring, monitoring,
collection and foreclosure or in efficiently managing the entire credit cycle before it becomes
unmanageable." Nocon was quoted as saying. Nocon said that the P42 Billion (US$ 792 Million) Unified
Home Lending Portfolio (UHLP) fund represented payments made to developers after a) constructing the
house and lot packages; b) identifying and pre-qualifying the beneficiaries; c) all necessary documents
were submitted and verified and; d) transferring ownership to individual beneficiaries. "It is not as if the
developers "bled" the financing agency... but simply the end result of a contractual relationship between
the agency and the developer under the National Shelter Program (NSP)" Nocon said.
231 Manicio, Eduardo T. Vice President, Funds Generation Group of the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC). Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati City, Philippines.
232 Tenorio, Arnold S. Housing program back to square one. Businessworld Publishing Corporation. February 8,
2001. Makati City, Philippines.
233 233 Manicio, Eduardo T. Vice-President, Funds Generation Group of the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC). Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati City, Philippines.
234 Catherine C. Junia, Gov't lacks funds to finance socialized housing projects - CREBA. Businessworld Publishing
Corporation. May 7, 1999. Makati City, Philippines.
Although Bernardo makes a similar claim with regard to poor management of the Unified Home Lending
Program (UHLP), he asserts that this was not the root problem. The poor management was a result of the
mismatch of personnel skills with the Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP) 235 . After all, the National
Home Mortgage Finance Corporation was structured to be a Secondary Mortgage Institution (SMI), and
not a primary mortgage lender. Moreover, the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC)
was subject to political pressure to hit a target number of housing units. In the end, the poor management
only highlighted the "confused role" of the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC):
"Was it a Secondary Mortgage Institution (SMI) or was it a Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DWSD)?" (Since the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation acted more like a
welfare agency distributing mortgage loans as dole-outs."
e. Misuse of Contractual Savings Institutions.
The ideal role of the contractual savings institutions (CSI) in a well-functioning secondary mortgage
market is to provide liquidity through investments in Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS). However,
under the Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP), the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation
(NHMFC) paid the funders 10.25%. In effect, the Contractual Savings Institutions lost the opportunity to
earn greater yields in alternative instruments (i.e., government securities) 236.
For perspective, Executive Order (EO) 90 consolidating the housing funds of the contractual savings
institutions (CSIs) under the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) under a temporary
loan agreement, until NHMFC could stand on its own financial footing. However, EO 90 did not specify
a timetable as to when the NHMFC could eventually "stand on its own feet" and was viable enough to
start a secondary mortgage institution (SMI). Thus, a 'temporary arrangement' became a relatively
permanent one, as the lending arrangement between the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation
(NHMFC) and the contractual savings institutions (CSI) were continuously renewed, from 1988 to 1996
(when the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) was relegated to a mere collection
agency for its past due accounts) 237 . As a result, 78% of the housing subsidy programs from 1993 to 1995
235 Philippine Conference on Securitization. Mobilizing the Markets for Housing: The Case for Asset-Backed
Securities Romeo Bernardo's presentation. October 1999. Makati City, Philippines.
236 Llanto, Gilbert M., Aniceto C. Orbeta, Jr., Ma. Teresa C. Sanchez and Marie Christine G. Tang. A Study of
Housing Subsidies in the Philippines. Philippine Institute of Development Studies. November 1998. Makati City,Philippines.
237 Manicio, Eduardo T. Vice President, Funds Generation Group of the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC). Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati City, Philippines.
were shouldered by the contractual savings institutions (CSI), with a bulk of the funding the interest rate
subsidy component of the Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP) 238.
Problems with the Medium Term Development Plan for Shelter (MTDP-S)
a. Developers asserting moral hazard
As mentioned in the "Moral Hazard with Developers" shortcoming under the Unified Home Lending
Program, the Philippine Institute of Development Studies (PIDS) posited that "private developers will
only participate in the government's housing program, particularly the "socialized" programs, only if
there are continuing government subsidies". In the case of the market-oriented Medium Term
Development Plan for Shelter (MTDP-S), this is exactly what occurred.
In fact, the Medium Term Development Plan for Shelter (MTDP-S) did not have the chance to be 'tested'
because it was shelved due to well-placed developers lobbying against the plan during the ousted Estrada
administration239
The Chamber of Realtors and Builders Association (CREBA) had been at odds with the David-led
housing team because of the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC)'s a)
refusal to revive the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) as mortgage take-out
window, b) plan to permanently discontinue the Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP) because of its
flawed structure, c) plan to implement an 80%/20% allocation of the housing agency's resources in favor
of low cost housing programs, and d) market-oriented (versus cross-subsidized) interest rates for low-cost
housing loans. 240. Thus, the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association (CREBA), whose member
companies had benefited greatly from the failed Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP), lobbied against
these plans otherwise it would deal a severe blow to their income.
238 Llanto, Gilbert M., Aniceto C. Orbeta, Jr., Ma. Teresa C. Sanchez and Marie Christine G. Tang. A Study of
Housing Subsidies in the Philippines. Philippine Institute of Development Studies. November 1998. Makati City,
Philippines.
239 The developer group was 'influential' enough to have the Medium Term Development Plan for Shelter (MTDP-
S) plan shelved despite the fact that the World Bank (WB) was prepared to shell out $4.6 Million to facilitate the
plan's implementation.
240 The Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association (CREBA) realized that it would be in
Former Chairperson Karina Constantino-David, in her resignation letter, cited the existence of "parallel
structures without a clear center of accountability create(ing) confusion and instability," with reference to
the sudden creation of the Presidential Commission on Mass Housing (PCMH), a superbody that virtually
displaced the HUDCC from its mandated role as coordinator of government's housing program. On top
of that, she also complained of a "large number of presidential advisers, consultants and assistants (who)
only add disarray." Chief among the presidential advisers alluded to in the letter was a close presidential
friend Estrada named Jose Luis "Sel" Yulo, whom private realty association241 was pushing to replace Ms.
David2 42 . The World Bank (WB), upon resignation of the David-led housing team, had suspended talks
pending the appointment of a new Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC)
Chairperson 243. However, after the appointment of former Presidential Management Staff (PMS) chief
Leonora de Jesus to the HUDCC, the World Bank discussions were not resumed, at least under the ousted
Estrada administration.
241 Although the Businessworld article decline to name the private realty association, this group has strongly been
speculated to be the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations (CREBA).
242 Tenorio, Arnold S. Housing program back to square one. Businessworld Publishing Corporation. February 8,
2001. Makati City, Philippines.
243 The World Bank (WB) team had already forewarned the government about letting politics getting in the way of
official development assistance projects.
5 MORTGAGE AND MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIZATION (MBS)
Primary Housing Mortgage Market - The Philippines
Overview. The Philippine banking system constitutes more than three-quarters of the total assets of the
financial system 244. However, except for the limited participation of the banks in the previous Unified
Home Lending Program (UHLP) and the current Multi-Window Lending System (MWLS), the private
commercial banks have not been actively involved in low-cost housing finance (versus their active
participation in the middle and high-income housing market). Therefore, it might be insightful to briefly
discuss the key patterns in the Philippine financial system and how they affect both the primary and
secondary mortgage market.
Short-term investment orientation. In the Philippines, consumer's savings are largely captured in the
financial system through deposits, and much of these deposits are in the nature of savings deposits and
checking accounts 245.
Savings Channels in the Philippines (as of May 2000)
Savings Channel Percentage
Savings Deposit 77%
Demand Deposits 17%
Time Deposits 6%
Deposit Substitutes 0%
Source: Bankers Association of the Philippines
The main reason that depositors place their funds into savings deposits and checking accounts is to allow
them to draw against it as the need arises. Consequently, the banks must always be ready to honor any
withdrawal from these accounts. This puts pressure on the banks to "protect" their dominant source of
funds, which are "short-term" in nature. During periods where liquidity is most valued, this makes the
yield curve 246 susceptible to inversion in times of crisis24 7 . Thus, this gives rise to the "short-term
orientation" of both the depositors and the bank.
244 Llanto, Gilbert M. and Leilanie Q. Basilio. Housing Policy: Developing a Market-based housing finance system.
Philippine Institute of Development Studies. December 1999. Makati City, Philippines.
245 Bankers Association of the Philippines. Market Reforms Project Presentation. April 4, 2001. Makati City,
Philippines.
246 The yield is the single interest rate that equates the present value of a fixed income instrument's payments to the
instrument's price. Although interest rates may vary over time, the yield to maturity is calculated as the "average"
rate that is applied to discount all of an instrument's payments. Thus, a yield curve is a graph of the yield to maturity
as a function of time to maturity. In well-functioning capital markets, longer term instruments have higher yields,
which reflect that future interest rates are higher than current rates. Given this, a normal yield curve is upward-
sloping.
Another result of this "short-term" orientation is the difficulty in providing longer-term funds for
borrowers. Since over 90% of the funds sourced have an effective maturity of less than one year, the need
for longer-term loans (i.e. 5 to 10 years) creates "duration mismatch" problems for the bank.
When the need arises by banks to raise funds locally, most of these funds are raised through loans (versus
commercial papers) and these loans are usually short (versus long) term in nature.
Loans Data from 1996 to end-May 2000 (Billions of Pesos)
Loans 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Short-term P779B P965B P872B P821B P823B
($14.7M) ($18.2M) ($16.5M) ($15.5M) ($15.5M)
Medium-term P204B P247B P233B P281B P290B
($3.9M) ($4.7M) ($4.4M) ($5.3M) ($5.5M)
Long-term P138B P205B P248B P252B P259B
($2.6M) ($3.9M) ($4.7M) ($4.8M ($4.9M)
Commercial P375B P385B P348B N/A N/A
Papers ($7.1M ($7.3M) ($6.6M) I
Source: Bankers Association of the Philippines
The demand by banks for long-term funds is, more often than not, financed by a supply of short-terms
savings where the interest rate re-pricing takes on a critical role. From 1998 to 2000, interest rates - due
to macroeconomic factors - have to be adjusted upwards or downwards. Since re-pricing for mortgage
loans are usually done on a yearly basis, the volatility of interest rates discourages banks from engaging in
long-term exposures. For example, during the height of the 1997 regional currency crisis, the 91-day
treasury rates were kept artificially low by the government, thus not allowing the banks to price loans
properly for risks.
Thus, we return to the discussion behind the reason why private commercial banks have not actively in
low-cost housing finance. This can be partially explained by a) the negative effect to of the government
subsidized programs (which we discussed extensively in Chapter 4), which have discouraged the
development of the primary market for housing, and b) the short-term orientation of banks assets where
the banks' short-term liabilities do not match the long-term nature of households' housing loans. The
"duration mismatch" of borrowing short and lending long produces risks of term intermediation. The risks
here lie in the relative illiquidity of the housing good and the opportunity costs of unadjustable interest
rates. In the current market environment, if mortgage-backed securities (MBS) are issued to investors,
2 This occurs when when short-term deposit rates are higher than longer-term rates.
they need to be priced higher than current long-term financial instruments (which are presumably
government securities).
I
Due to the lack of a secondary mortgage market, Jacob describes Philippine housing finance as a cyclical
"feast and famine financial structure". This is characterized by the "feast" period, wherein the
commercial sector are flush with liquidity and thus continuously lend to the point that they are carrying
more mortgage loans than they can handle. The feast period is then followed by a "famine" period
wherein the banks have over-lent, and thus merely earn interest from the mortgage loans until they are
able to accumulate enough liquidity to lend again248
Interest rates. The private commercial banks have traditionally been 'crowded out' by the public lending
sector via subsidized interest rates. Given this, it is instructive to find out how private commercial banks
compete for mortgage loans. According to Coronel, these are the typical components built into the
mortgage interest rate2 4 9:
Sample Computation of Mortgage Interest Rate
Cost Approximate % Points Description
Cost of funds 9.9* Based on 91-day T-bill benchmark rate
Intermediation costs 1%-2% Taxes paid on transaction, insurance costs
Administration costs 4%-5% Back-office cost, Hedge against credit/interest rate
risks, etc.
Total 14.9%-16.9% Average market mortgage interest rate to
I homebuyer
Source: Leonilo Coronel, Bankers Association ofthe Philippines
* based on April 2001 91-day T-bill rate from Bankgo Sentral ng Pilipinas (Central Bank of the Philippines)
The largest spread of the private commercial banks comes in the form of the administration costs. These
spreads can vary from bank to bank. For perspective, the current market rates are closely approximated by
the fixed interest rate for low-income housing by the public lending agencies:
248 Jacob, Monico. Former Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig Chairman and Conference Chairman
of the Philippine Conference on Securitization. Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati City, Philippines.
249 Coronel, Leonilo G. Executive Director of the Bankers Association of the Philippines. Personal Interview. June
2001. Makati City, Philippines.
Home Development Mutual Fund Market Segmentation by Loan Size
Income Decile Category Price Range Interest Rate
1-4 Socialized Housing P180,000 and below 9%
5-8 Economic Housing P180,000 to P500,000 12%
8-10 Middle Housing P500,000 to P2,000,000 16%/18% p.a.*
8-10 Open Housing P2,000,000 to P5,000,000 18% p.a.*
Source: Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig, author's estimates
* Available to HDMF/Pag-Ibig members only. If the loan is repaid via salary deduction scheme where the employer
shall guarantee collection of the amortizations due on the housing loan, the loan shall bear an interest rate of 14%
p.a. for the entire term of the loan
However, using the sample computation for the mortgage interest rates, the past seven years were
characterized by prohibitively high mortgage interest rates, particularly right after the 1997 regional
currency crisis. For perspective, the largest spread between the highest market mortgage rate and fixed
interest rates was in 1998, where the spread was 639 basis points (22.3% vs. 16%). However, mortgage
interest rates have decreased of late, with the spread between market and fixed rates is currently at 90
basis points (16.9% vs. 16%):
Average Mortgage Interest Rates from 1995 to April 2001
Years 90-day T-bill interest rate Approximate Mortgage Rates
1995 11.3% 16.3%-18.3%
1996 12.4% 17.4%-19.4%
1997 13.1% 18.1%-21.1%
1998 15.3% 20.3%-22.3%
1999 10.2% 15.2%-17.2%
2000 9.9% 14.9%-16.9%
April 2001 9.9% 14.9%-16.9%
Source: Author's estimates based on Bankers Association of the Philippines sample computation of mortgage
interest rate
* from the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (Central Bank of the Philippines)
Coronel's sample computation appears to approximate current mortgage rates. The Bank of the
Philippines250 website reveals that mortgage loans within the P1 Million - P5 Million (US$19T-US$94T)
with a fixed five-year term to maturity had an interest rate of 17.5%, which is slightly higher from our
computation by 60 basis points. However, for a mortgage loan with same loanable amount and term-to-
maturity but with a two-year fixed interest rate, the rate is 15.5%, well within the approximate mortgage
range.
Loan types. The typical private bank loans are targeted for the mid- to high-income housing segment
(P500,000/US$9,430 up to P5,000,000/US$94,340). These loans have a fixed one-year market interest
rate, which is usually re-priced annually. However, some of these loans are also re-priced at a monthly,
quarterly and even biannually. Loans which retain a longer fixed rate interest on their mortgage loans
have higher interest rates.
Sample Mortgage Loan Interest Rates
Loan Amount Interest Rate
Less than PIM (US$19T)
Fixed for 1 year 15%
Fixed for 2 years 16%
Fixed for 5 years 18%
PIM (US$19T) to less than P5M (US$94T)
Fixed for 1 year 14%
Fixed for 2 years 15.5%
Fixed for 5 years 17.5%
Source: Bank of the Philippines website (August 2001)
The term-to-maturity on these loans are usually fifteen years, but they can range from a minimum of five
years to a maximum of twenty years. The following is a survey of bank mortgage loan terms from 1997
and 1998 (Note that the respective t-bill rates and approximate mortgage rates for those years were
13.1%/18.1%-21.1% and 15.3%/20.3% - 22.3% respectively).
Interest Rates on Retail Mortgage Loans
Bank April September April September
1997 1998 1997 1998*
Commercial Banks
Active Bank 23% 5 years
Asian Bank 17% 19.795% 15 years 15 years/monthly
Bank of the Philippine Islands 17% 15 years
Bank of Commerce 20% 20% 15 years 10 years/monthly
Cityrust 17% 15 years
Far East Bank 17.5% 19.795% 15 years Variable/yearly
PCIBank 17% 18% 15 years 20 years/yearly
Rizal Comml Banking Corp. 17% 19% 15 years 15 years/yearly
Union Bank 17% 20% 15 years 20 years/semiannually
China Bank 17% 15 years
Solid Bank 17% 19% 15 years 15 years/monthly
United Coconut Planters Bank 17% 15 years
Equitable Bank 17.5% 19% 15 years 15 years/variable
Philippine Veterans Bank 18% 15 years
Savings and Mortgage Bank
BPI Family Bank 18% 17.75% 15 years 15 years/yearly
Keppel Monte 18% 22% 15 years 5 ears/biannuall
Philippine Savings Bank 17.5% 19.75%-22.75% 15 years 15-20 years/quarterly
Private Development Banks
Asiatrust Development Bank 17% 17.75% 15 years 15 years/yearly
Planters Development Bank 18% 23.5% 15 years 15 years/yearly
RCBC Savings 19% 15 years
PDCP Development Bank 17% 15 years
Source: Asian DevelovmentBank
* the maturities are quoted along with the frequency of repricing (i.e. monthly, annually, quarterly)
250 Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) is one of the largest universal bank of the Philippines.
The typical public sector loans are targeted to the low- to mid-income housing segment (from less than
P180,000/US$3,400 to P500,000/US$9,430). These loans have fixed interest rate loans over the life of
the loan, with a term-to-maturity of twenty-five, and even up to thirty years. Presented below is a survey
of the packages offered by the three contractual savings institutions (CSI):
Interest Rate and Term-to-Maturities of Public Sector Mortgage Loans(for 2001)
Institution Interest Rate terms Term-to-maturity
Multi-Window e For socialized housing (up to P180,000/US$3,400), 9% fixed rate Multiples of five years
Lending for the life of the loan with a maximum of
Scheme * For P180,000/US$3,400 up to P500,000/US$9,430, 12%/13% thirty years
(MWLS) p.a., subject to review every five years
e Rates include 0.5% Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) guaranty
Home e For P250,000/US$4,720 - P500,000/US$9,430, 16% fixed rate Multiples of five with a
Development for the life of the loan. maximum of twenty
Mutual Fund * For socialized housing (up to P180,000/US$3,400), 9% fixed five years
(Expanded rate.
Housing Loan e For economic housing (P180,000 to P250,000) 12% fixed rate.
Program) e For socialized housing and lot packages (9%)
(P1 80,000/US$3,400 - P250,000/US$4,720)
* For socialized and economic housing, the subsidy period for
socialized and economic housing will depend on the loan term.
Social Security * For socialized housing (up to P1 80,000/US$3,400), 9% fixed rate Multiples of five years
System for the life of the loan. with a maximum of
(Individual e For P180,000/US$3,400 up to P500,000/US$9,430, 13% p.a., thirty years
Housing Loans) subject to review every five years.
Government * For socialized housing (up to P1 80,000/US$3,400), 9% fixed rate Multiples of five years
Service for the life of the loan. with a maximum of
Insurance * For P180,00/US$3,400 to P250,000/US$4,720, 12% fixed rate for thirty years for loans up
System (GSIS) life of loan. to P180,000/US$3,400.
* For P250,000/US$4,720 to P375,000/US$7,080, 14% fixed rate
for life of loan. Multiples of five years
* For P375,000/US$7,080 to P500,000/US$9,430, 16% fixed rate with a maximum of
for life of loan. twenty five years for
loans
P1 80,000US$3,400
P500,000/US$9,430
Source: Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF) website, Social Security System (555) website, Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) website
Size ofprimary housing mortgage market. There have been conflicting reports as to the actual size of the
Philippine mortgage loan market. The 1997 World Bank housing study pegged the market at roughly 1 1%
of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of P312 Billion (US$5.9 Billion)25 11. Given this, Bernardo believes that
251 Versus 20% of GDP in Malaysia, 30% of GDP in Hong Kong, 50%+ of GDP in both the UK and the US.
However, note that all these countries have secondary mortgage markets.
the Philippine mortgage market is large enough to need the liquidity provided by a Secondary Mortgage
Institution (SMI) 252 .
Global comparisons for mortgages outstanding as % of GDP
Country Mortgages Outstanding (US$B) % of GDP
United States 3,600 54
Japan 1,500 33
Malaysia 4 23
Korea 44 14
Thailand 16 13
Philippines 6 11
Indonesia 7 5
Source: Romeo Bernardo Presentation at Philippine Conference on Securitization
However, Kotecha25 3 believes that the mortgage loan market accounts for less than 5% of Gross Domestic
Product (GDP). Thus, similar to the housing 'backlog' issue, the government in conjunction with the
private sector, should reconcile their mortgage loan estimates in preparation for the development of a
secondary mortgage institution (SMI). Nonetheless, similar to Bernardo, Kotecha believes that despite the
small percentage of the market versus
secondary mortgage market5 4 .
GDP, primary mortgage lending can grow rapidly with an effective
252 Philippine Conference on Securitization. Mobilizing the Markets for Securitization: The Case for Asset Backed
Securities, Former Finance Undersecretary Romeo Bernardo's presentation. October 1999. Makati City, Philippines.
253 Mahesh Kotecha is the President of the Structured Credit International Corporation (SCIC), a consulting and
advisory firm that provides specialized financial advisory services in the area of debt capital markets to financial
institutions and other business entities particularly in emerging markets. Kotecha was commissioned by the
Financial Executives of the Philippines (FINEX) to draft a business plan on a Philippine Secondary Mortgage
Institution (SMI) in the last quarter of 2000.
254 Kotecha, Mahesh K. Secondary Mortgage Institution (SMI) Philippines - Draft Business Plan. Structured Credit
International Corporation. 2000. New York, New York.
Volume of mortgage loans. According to Kotecha, the total mortgage volume is roughly P151 Billion
(US$2.8 Billion)255. The following is the breakdown of the mortgage volume and their major
characteristics:
Estimated Volume of Mortgage Loans
Loan Category Characteristics
PlOOB (US$1.9B) Public Low to mid income housing loans, low fixed interest
P40B (US$755M) with NHMFC* sector rate loans
P55B (US$IB) with HDMF**
P50B (US$943M) Private Middle to high income housing loans, floating rate
P3 1B (US$585M) with commercial banks sector interest rate loans re-priced annually
P15B (US$283M) with thrift banks
P20B (US$377M) Developers Estimated developers contract to sell for houses
priced within the mid income bracket (P400,000
/US$7,550-Pl,000,000/US$18,870) sold to first time
homebuyers, including overseas Filipino workers
Source: Structured Credit International Corporation
Note: Amounts have been rounded offfor the estimated total of the loans. Thus the aggregate amount may not equal
the breakdowns. * National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC)
** Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-ibig
However, of these loans, Kotecha only considers P71 Billion as eligible mortgage that can be considered
for securitization. These include the private sector and the developer's mortgages (via Contract to Sell),
but exclude the public sector loans.
Financial Instruments in the Primary Mortgage Market
Certain financial instruments in the Philippine mortgage market have evolved in favor of the developer
versus other financing alternatives available to the developer.
Reservation Agreement. As the name implies, the reservation agreement merely reserves the chosen
property for the potential homebuyer with a nominal reservation fee (in some cases, about 5%) made on
the property. In the event that the homebuyer fails to meet his obligations in the reservation agreement
(i.e. down payment and submission of requirements), the reservation and additional payments made are
considered forfeited. The policy of forfeiture and cancellation of the payments remitted to the developer
are usually contained on the reservation agreement 256.
25 P151 Billion (US$2.9 Billion) is roughly 4.7% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). GDP, as estimated by the
International Institute of Finance was roughly P3,233 Billion (US$ 61 Billion) in 2000.
256 Tan, Edward L. Real Estate in the Philippines. Solar Publishing Corporation. 1999. Manila, Philippines.
Contract to sell (CTS). Contracts to sell (CTS) enable developers to obtain bridge financing at market
rates for housing construction from private commercial banks until the credits are taken out by the
contractual savings institutions (CSI). The title subsequently passes on to the homeowner, and the
mortgage passes to the contractual savings institution (CSI), who assumes the role of creditor. The
Contract to Sell (CTS) can also be structured like a lease-purchase transaction, where the developer or the
contractual savings institution (CSI) retains title to the property until all amortizations are paid257.
The contract to sell (CTS) is the formal and legal agreement between the homebuyer and the developer. In
a Contract to Sell (CTS), unlike a regular mortgage, the title to the property does not immediately pass to
the homebuyer, but merely a mutual promise to sell and buy. The homebuyer binds himself to fulfill his
obligations in terms of paying his monthly amortization fees to the developer. While the developer, in
turn, binds himself to deliver what he has promised to the homebuyer (i.e. housing unit, quality of
development, amenities) 28.
The Contract to Sell (CTS) has been deliberately structured to serve developers, who are given a certain
degree of flexibility in dealing with delinquent clients without being subject to the Foreclosure Law 25 9.
However, although the Contract to Sell (CTS) isn't covered by the foreclosure law, it is covered under the
Maceda Law (Republic Act 6522), which requires a developer or any financing institution to reimburse
the defaulting borrower if the latter has completely paid at least two years' worth of amortization260 .
Regular mortgage instruments. In lieu of the contract to sell (CTS), banks use regular mortgage
instruments when granting housing loans, which are governed by the Foreclosure Law (Republic Act
3135).
Deed of Absolute Sale. The deed of absolute sale signifies that the buyer has fulfilled all financial
obligations to the seller26 1. With the deed of absolute sale, the title of the property is now transferred to
the homebuyer's name. However, the seller may still have unfulfilled obligations, in terms of
development, to the homebuyer. In some cases, only partial developments are completed in the
residential subdivision, and some buyers have already paid their property in full to avail of some
discounts.
257 Reside, Renato S. Mortgage-Backed Securities in Asia. Asian Development Bank. 1999. Pasig City,
Philippines.
258 Tan, Edward L. Real Estate in the Philippines. Solar Publishing Corporation. 1999. Manila, Philippines.
259 The Foreclosure Law will be discussed in Chapter 7.
260 The Maceda Law will be discussed in Chapter 7.
Primary Housing Mortgage Market - The United States
Overview. The US Government provides stability in the early stages of the market development in the
following ways. First, they provide tax subsidy by allowing for deductibility of mortgage interest.
Second, they provide insurance for loans. Third, they create agencies to buy loans on the secondary
market and create secondary mortgage market instruments. They also create incentives for support of
affordable housing in developed markets. There is one key government housing agency within the U.S.
primary housing mortgage market.
Federal Housing Administration (FHA)
The Federal Housing Administration, a wholly owned government corporation, was established under the
National Housing Act of 1934 to improve housing standards and conditions; to provide adequate an
adequate home financing system through insurance of mortgages; and to stabilize the mortgage market.
FHA was consolidated into the newly established Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) in 1965.
FHA provides mortgage insurance on single-family and multifamily mortgage loans to low- and middle-
income families. FHA bears the risk that a borrower will default and that the lender will convey to FHA
either a property or a loan in exchange for payment of an insurance claim.
Through mortgage insurance, FHA helps lenders reduce their exposure to risk of default. This allows
lenders to make money available to a broader range of income earners, some of whom would otherwise
fail to qualify for loans. Mortgage insurance has made financing available in neighborhoods and
geographic areas facing economic uncertainty, and to individuals and families not adequately served by
the conventional mortgage market. FHA spreads and manages risk through geographically dispersed loan
insurance activity and a portfolio that is diverse in borrowers and products.
Secondary Housing Mortgage Market - The Philippines
Overview. In well-functioning capital markets such as the United States, mortgage securitization has
evolved to a point where the mortgage-backed securities can be 'tailored' to meet the investment risk
preferences of institutional investors and accommodate the financial interests of private mortgage lenders.
Thus, in the United States, the reason behind mortgage-backed securitization has become almost wholly
261 Tan, Edward L. Real Estate in the Philippines. Solar Publishing Corporation. 1999. Manila, Philippines.
financial in nature: improve Return on Equity (ROE), satisfy capital adequacy requirements, increase fee-
based income, and improve liquidity and asset-liability management 262.
However, in developing countries such as the Philippines, not only are the capital markets still in a stage
of 'infancy' (versus the mature United States capital market), but mortgage securitization is only part of
an overall housing policy (which includes finance, production, and regulation) and, consequently, the
national development strategy263. For perspective, the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation
(NHMFC) was originally set up and mandated by the government, via Executive Order (EO) 90 in 1986,
to serve as the Secondary Mortgage Institution (SMI) 26 4.
However, the government has recently expressed its desire to play a catalytic role (vis-A-vis the regulatory
and legal environment) in housing finance, and instead, allow the private sector to develop the secondary
housing mortgage market in the Philippines 265. In fact, the private sector, through the efforts of the
Financial Executives of the Philippines (FINEX) had organized a conference on securitization in 1999
with the objective of mobilizing private funds for housing through a secondary mortgage institution
(SMI) 266.
Given this, there are several differences between mortgage origination between the United States and the
Philippines. In the United States, mortgage loans are mostly privately originated. In the Philippines, a
large portion of the national mortgage portfolio is quasi-publicly originated 2 67 . These quasi-publicly-
originated mortgages are targeted to improve housing finance for the poor in the form of subsidies
268
.
The rationale behind these subsidies in the housing markets is the belief that the majority of the
262 Reside, Renato S. Mortgage-Backed Securities in Asia. Asian Development Bank. 1999. Pasig City,
Philippines.
263 For example, the aborted Medium Term Development Plan for Shelter (MTDP-S) is part of the 1999-2004
Medium-Term Development Plan of the ousted Estrada administration.
264 The National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC), in 1996, has been relegated to a mere collection
agency of its past-due accounts.
265 Although a market-oriented housing finance scheme, wherein the government would have played more an
'enabling' role and the private sector would initiate the development of a secondary mortgage institution (SMI), was
outlined under the Medium Term Development Plan for Shelter (MTDP-S), these plans were abruptly set aside with
the establishment of the now-defunct Presidential Commission on Mass Housing (PCMH).
266 The results of the FINEX-organized October 1999 Philippine Conference on Securitization appear in several
portions of the thesis.
267 According the 1997 World Bank study on housing finance, as of December 1995, at least 30% of the total formal
construction and mortgage lending is being undertaken by the public agencies. However, this statistic most likely
understates the role of the government in the Philippine residential mortgage market since a large proportion of
private sector lending is related to the commercial rather than the residential real estate sector.
population will not be able to afford housing units unless some form of subsidy is made available to
them269.
Secondly, since Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS) as an alternative financial instrument to government
securities is relatively new in the Philippines, regulatory, taxation and legal authorities are still unfamiliar
with the laws that encourage securitization. Given this, the laws governing Mortgage-Backed Securities
(MBS), and securitization as a whole, are still in its infancy. These include the rules on mortgage
valuation, pricing, servicing, foreclosure, accounting, and risk-based capital treatment.
Thirdly, the Philippines have yet to develop the supporting infrastructure for mortgage-backed
securitization, which include bond and mortgage insurance, credit information bureaus, centralized titling
systems and title insurance.
Fourth, given the 'infant' stage of the Philippines in terms of capital market development, there are some
features of the underdeveloped market which constrain the development of Mortgage-Backed securities
(MBS). These include a) maturities for privately-originated, market-rate mortgages have a term-to-
maturity of ten years (publicly-originated, fixed-interest rate mortgages have a term-to-maturity of
twenty-five years); b) since no clear yield curve exists, the average interest rates on Mortgage-Backed
securities (MBS) are based primarily on the underlying mortgages and the benchmark 91-day T-bill rate,
and c) credit channeled by the government to low cost-housing is an implicit subsidy to that segment of
the market 270.
Secondary Housing Mortgage Market Models
United States
The U.S. Government also adds stability to the developed secondary mortgage market. They provide full
faith and credit guarantee on secondary market instruments securitizing mortgage loans for low and
middle-income households.
268 Llanto, Gilberto M., Aniceto Orbeta, Jr., Ma. Teresa C. Sanchez and Marie Christine G. Tang. A Study of
Housing Subsidies in the Philippines. Philippine Institute for Development Studies. November 1998. Makati City,Philippines.
269 The subsidies can come in the form of lowering the cost of production of housing units or bringing down the cost
of the housing unit for the end-user.
270 Reside, Renato S. Mortgage-Backed Securities in Asia. Asian Development Bank. 1999. Pasig City,
Philippines.
Ginnie Mae. Ginnie Mae is a wholly owned government corporation within the Department of Housing
and Urban Development that supports federal housing initiatives by providing liquidity to the secondary
mortgage market and by attracting capital to the residential mortgage markets. Ginnie Mae securities are
backed by the full faith and credit of the US Government ensure uninterrupted flow of capital to housing
markets even in the adverse economic conditions.
Ginnie Mae programs help increase the supply of affordable housing by guaranteeing securities issued by
private lenders backed by pools of residential mortgages insured by the Federal Housing Administration.
Ginnie Mae securities provide lenders with a vehicle for originating, funding and servicing mortgages in a
highly structured and liquid market. At the same time, the securities provide investors with an investment
that offers safety of principal, liquidity and attractive yield.
Ginnie Mae securities are one of the most widely held and traded mortgage-backed securities in the
world. Ginnie Mae has guaranteed more than $1 trillion in mortgage-backed securities. Historically,
95% of all FHA and VA mortgages have been securitized through Ginnie Mae.
Ginnie Mae is a guarantor. It does not issue, sell, or buy mortgage-backed securities, or purchase
mortgage loans.
Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs): Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac, the nation's largest housing finance institutions, are government sponsored enterprises
(GSEs). The Congress created Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to fulfill specific public policy objectives
but they are, nonetheless, private firms owned by stockholders. According to their federal charters, the
mission of both Enterprises is to provide stability in the secondary market for residential mortgages and to
promote nationwide access to mortgage credit by increasing the liquidity of mortgage
GSE's are publicly traded organizations under government oversight. These organizations guarantee the
full and timely payment of principal and interest on mortgage loans in amounts established by the U.S.
Congress. They also have to guarantee the timely payment of principal and interest on mortgage-backed
securities backed by eligible conventional loans or by government insured or guaranteed loans. The
guarantee is not backed by the full faith and credit of the U.S. They also have to buy mortgage loans,
mortgage backed securities for their own portfolios to stimulate secondary market activity.
Freddie Mac played a significant role to find new ways of securitizing mortgages that would make them
attractive to more investors. In 1983, Freddie Mac introduced the first multi-class mortgage backed
security-the Collateralized Mortgage Obligation (CMO). The unique thing about CMOs was that the
investors in a pool of mortgages did not all receive the same pro-rata share of cash flows. Rather, cash
flows from the pool of mortgages were allocated to investors based on a set of rules, enabling us to target
investors whose portfolio needs were more suited to a particular profile of cash flows. Rather cash flows
from the pool of mortgages were allocated to investors based on a set of rules, enabling them to target
investors whose portfolio needs were more suited to a particular profile of cash flows. In the early years
there were limits to what multi-class mortgage securities could accomplish as issuers faced complex tax,
accounting and regulatory obstacles.
Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLBs). FHLBs are government-sponsored enterprise owned by member
banks and funded by debt issued into the capital market.
The mortgage backed securities market second only to U.S. Treasuries as the largest segment in the fixed
income securities market has provide to be a more effective and efficient means to manage the interest
rate risk associated with home loans. However, the transfer of mortgage credit risk to the capital markets
has developed more slowly.
Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae have positioned GSE debt as one logical alternative to help meet investors'
needs. That is because both firms issue debt in very large volumes and with regularity, and trade closer to
Treasury yields than other credit instruments because of their high credit quality, liquidity and
institutional integrity.
Models ofSecondary Mortgage Markets. Whereas the traditional model of housing finance was based on
specialized institutions performing all or most of the functions of mortgage lending, the modem model of
housing finance is one in which the various functions (origination, servicing, risk management, funding)
are unbundled and done by specialized entities.
Modern Mortgage Model
-Credit Risk Insurer * Agency
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Source: International Housing Finance
The modem model of housing finance is based on a secondary mortgage market where mortgage loans
are sold and securitized. Loan sales come from either traditional mortgage lenders or mortgage companies
that specialize in the origination and servicing of the mortgage assets. Mortgage companies may operate
on a retail (dealing directly with the borrowers or brokers) or wholesale basis (buying loans from other
lenders, packaging them and re-selling or securitizing them. There are two primary secondary market
models:
* Direct Sale: In a direct sale system the originating lender pools the loans and issues the
securities, typically through a trust or special purpose vehicle (Figure 4). Credit enhancement is
done by a third party (government agency as with Ginnie Mae in the US), pool insurer (mortgage
insurance (like MGIC) or bond insurance company (like MBIA), or by structuring the securities
(e.g., senior-subordination, reserve funds). Most MBS issued in Europe have been direct sales by
originating lenders.
Secondary Market: Direct Sale
* Conduits: Conduits are specialized institutions that purchase mortgages from a number of
different lenders, contract with those lenders or other institutions to service the mortgages and
issue MBS backed by pools of mortgages (either from a particular lender or a number of lenders).
Credit enhancement may be as above or by the conduit itself (e.g., Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
in the US). Conduits may be government supported (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Banco
Hipotecario in Argentina, Hong Kong Mortgage Corp.), or private (US, Australia, UK). Figure 5.
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The origins of securitizations date back to the founding in 1938 of the Federal National Mortgage
Association (FNMA), popularly known as Fannie Mae, which was established by the U.S. government
following the Great Depression to buy and sell federally insured residential mortgage loans made to lower
income individuals. In the late 1960's, due to the federal government's increasing concern for the
availability of housing and mortgage credit, the mortgage backed securities (MBS) market was greatly
expanded. In 1968, the Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA or Ginnie Mae) was created
as part of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.
Its guarantee represents the further obligation of the U.S. government on pools of loans guaranteed by two
government agencies, the Federal Housing Administration and the Veterans Administration. In 1970,
Freddie Mac was established to insure securities backed by pools of non-government (conventional)
mortgages. Both FHLLMC and FNMA now have this mandate. Their mission is to provide stability in
the secondary market for residential mortgages and to promote access to mortgage credit throughout the
U.S. by increasing the credit quality and liquidity of mortgage investments.
The market views both FNMA and FHLMC as equivalent to triple-A credits based on the implicit support
of the U.S. government, although there is no record of the need for actual government financial support in
recent history. These two agencies purchase and securitize conventional mortgages. Unlike Ginnie Mae,
which is a government owned and operated entity, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are publicly owned,
traded on the NYSE and privately managed. FNMA is one of the largest issuers of the U.S. dollar
denominated debt after the Department of the Treasury, with $606 billion outstanding in MBS at mid-year
1996, representing roughly 25% share of the U.S. residential mortgage market. It enjoys an excellent
credit performance with a delinquency rate at half of the industry average and loan losses at about 0.06%
of its total mortgage loans.
The establishment of these federally sponsored agencies has led to the development of securitization and
the growth of an active secondary mortgage market for U.S. government guaranteed mortgage securities.
Nearly 50% of the over $3.6 trillion of the total mortgage debt outstanding by year-end 1995 had been
securitized. In addition, over $70 billion of the outstanding home equity loan (HEL) market (which is
dominated by private lenders with virtually no role for the secondary mortgage agencies) has been
securitized since 1990. Pricing of MBS is much more efficient owing to the implied government support
in addition to the underlying collateral cash flows. Standardization of mortgage types and documentation,
and homogenization of underwriting to conservative standards have been additional benefits. Some
market participants have estimated that the mortgage rates for consumers might have been 25 to 60 basis
points higher in the U.S. without development of the MBS market.
The savings and loan crisis during the 1980's provided an opportunity for new types of lenders, the U.S.
mortgage banks, who originate and warehouse loans for a short period before reselling them. In 1990, the
mortgage banks were responsible for around 35% of residential mortgage originations; by 1996 the figure
had risen to around 55%. The following table summarizes the key characteristics of the U.S. mortgage
market.
Characteristic Consequence
The US mortgage market is dominated by mortgage US mortgage markets limited own funds to do their
banks. business as large parts of their mortgages are sold to
government sponsored enterprises.
The rise of mortgage banks was triggered by the Risks are sold to third parties (investors)
Savings & Loans crisis where the lack of capital
induced institutions to remove loans from the
balance sheet through securitization.
Mortgage banks sell their loans into secondary Risks are outside supervisory scrutiny
market, primarily to US government sponsored
enterprises who benefit from lower capital-to-assets
ratios than banks.
The mortgage bank does not need to be successful
in funding in order to create the conditions
necessary to be successful in lending.
Source: International Housing Finance
The Implicit Guarantee of the US Government Agencies. In the US, central government agencies play a
central role. They buy individual packages of mortgage loans from lending institutions and either hold
them on balance sheet or securitize them, selling them into the secondary mortgage market. There are
three such agencies active in the secondary market in the U.S. The Government National Mortgage
Association (GNMA), guarantees pools of loans originated by mortgage banks. The loans are insured by
the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and are targeted toward lower and moderate-income
homebuyers. GNMA is backed by the full faith and credit of the U.S. government, which guarantees the
timely receipt of principal and interest. U.S. institutions buying GNMA mortgage securities do not need
to allocate capital to back these purchases, as GNMA paper enjoys a zero percent risk weighting, the same
as U.S. Treasury bills. There are two other federal agencies active in the market, the Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation, FHLMC or Freddie Mac, and the Federal National Mortgage Association, FNMA
or Fannie Mae. In many cases, it can be advantageous for a lending institution to sell loans to one of the
federal agencies and repurchase credit-enhanced securities backed by the original loans.
Public Guarantee: The Important Role of the US Government Agencies
Characteristic Consequence
The US central government sponsored enterprises There is an element of state aid in American
(Ginnie Mae, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) buy mortgage funding
mortgage loans from mortgage banks and sell them
into the secondary market.
These enterprises enjoy implicit government This advantage reduces funding costs by about 50
guarantees which reduce funding costs by about 50 bp.
Bp.
They have an emergency credit line from the
Treasury of $8.5 billion (so far unused)
Fannie and Freddie have roughly $0.032 of debt for
each dollar of capital (compared to $0.115 of debt
per dollar at private banks)
The sheer size of the enterprises allows economies
of scale. 50% of all outstanding residential
mortgages at the end of 1997 were securitized. This
amounted to about $2 trillion out of a total market
of $4.1 trillion.
Source: International Housing Finance
Capital Adequacy Implications. These agencies enjoy an implicit U.S. government guarantee; there is a
belief, so far untested, that if the agencies failed they would be bailed out, in one way or another, by the
U.S. government. They are, however, in other respects, conventional shareholder-owned institutions,
with widely traded equity. Bonds and mortgage backed securities issued by Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae
carry only a 20% risk weighting for U.S. banks, compared to the internationally agreed 50% weighting
for conventional residential mortgages. Fannie Mae holds about 17% of all outstanding mortgages (and
therefore about 34% of securitized mortgages), Freddie Mac holds 14% (28%), and Ginnie Mae, about
13% (26%). About 8% of outstanding mortgages (20% of securitized loans) are in pools issued by
private conduits, not backed by the federal agencies. This provides us with an indication of why the
secondary market in the United States is so large and attractive.
As it is government backed and enjoys implicit government guarantees, the secondary market is able to
provide a less expensive source of funding than other mechanisms. Informal estimates suggest that the
federal backing for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, for example, reduces their funding costs by about 50
basis points. Moreover, the sheer size of the institutions allows them to develop significant scale
economies. Also, the agencies are allowed to operate with significantly lower capital-to-assets ratios
than banks. The did not become subject to specific capital adequacy regulation until the mid-1990s.
U.S. Standardization. The size of the federal agencies enables them to impose homogeneity on the
market. Fannie Mae, for example, has developed standardized software to assist lenders in the
underwriting processes. The federal agencies can insist on loans have particular characteristics before
they purchase and they are able to publish uniform, widely available mortgage rate benchmarks in order
to facilitate comparison shopping by borrowers.
Fixed versus variable rate mortgage products. The U.S. market is dominated by fixed-rate mortgages.
Almost two-thirds (65%) of loans held by the federal agencies are 30-year fixed-rate loans and a further
15% are 15-year fixed rates. Just 10% of the loans are adjustable-rate mortgages and the rate charged by
the mortgage lending institution is linked to an index.
Pre-payment Risk. In the U.S., pre-payment risk is a very important consideration. In the US borrowers
typically take out a 30-year fixed rate mortgages, but there are no, or minimal, redemption penalties. The
secondary market - which operates under a risk of not receiving the expected return from the borrower if
he pre-pays - offers an effective mechanism for pricing that risk. This means that he prepayment irks is
mutualised among the borrowers t and that borrowers who do no prepay effectively pay for other
borrowers' mobility. On early repayment penalties, there are significant differences in national laws.
Products and techniques, which operate in the US market, are not yet transferable to the Philippine
market, not least because of the dominant role of the federal agencies. However, conditions in the
Philippines and Asian markets are changing rapidly. Intense competition, greater focus on the need to use
capital efficiently, changing funding conditions created by historical low inflation and interest rates, and
an acceleration of already trends towards specialization may drive the creation of a much larger secondary
market.
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Other Models
Malaysia (Cagamas). Cagamas was incorporated in December 1986 to support the Malaysian
Government's policy of encouraging house ownership, particularly of the lower income group, by
providing liquidity to the financial institutions, and at the same time, to develop the private debt securities
market. The company has established itself as the leading issuer of private debt securities in Malaysia.
Cagamas had securitized 23.8% of the outstanding housing loans of the financial institutions.
Hong Kong (HKMC). The corporation was established in 1997 with the primary objective of promoting
the development of the secondary mortgage market in Hong Kong. A liquid secondary mortgage market
will help the authorized institutions to address three funding risks, namely maturity mismatch, the
liquidity risk and the concentration risk.
Hong Kong started securitizing mortgage sin 1994, thereby developing Asia's first private mortgage
market. In recent years there has been a strong appreciation of Hong Kong property values, contributing
to the growth of this market. Hong Kong's residential mortgage market is estimated at over US$30
billion and offers ample opportunities for securitization with supportive legal and regulatory regimes.
Banks and property developers will need to sell mortgage assets because of balance sheet constraints.
Consequently, the government is spearheading the establishment of a Fannie Mae-type institution in
Hong Kong.
Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS) Supply Issues
Overview. Technically, there are two types or mortgage loans that have the potential to be currently
securitized:
1. Securitization of the nonperforming loans (NPLs) for liquidation. Theses are mortgages from both
the public and private sector, which can partially be rehabilitated through the introduction of
improved collection and servicing efforts271 (notwithstanding such issues as fixed vs. market
interest rates and term-to-maturity of the loans). Currently, these are the non-performing mortgage
loans from the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) from the defunct Unified
Home Lending Program (UHLP), the contractual savings institutions (Social Security System
271 The assumption on the rehabilitation of residential non-performing loans is based on an estimate provided by
Norman Macasaet, Principal Transactions Group of Lehman Brothers. In an interview with Norman Macasaet,
Brothers was able to rehabilitate an estimated 8,000 of 15,000 residential loans (53%), that the Thai government
foreclosed on from private finance companies, for securitization.
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(SSS), Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), Home Development Mutual Fund
(HDMF)/Pag-ibig), and the banks (commercial, thrift and rural). These type of loans are usually
sold to an Asset Management Company (AMC), at a steep discount, by the mortgagees.
2. Securitization of the 'Performing loans'. These are mortgages from both the public and private
sector (notwithstanding such issues as fixed vs. market interest rates and term-to-maturity of the
loans). These loans cover the 'utilized loans' from the Housing and Urban Development
Coordinating Council (HUDCC)'s Multi-Window Lending Scheme (MWLS), the contractual
savings institutions (Social Security System (SSS), Government Service Insurance System (GSIS),
Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-ibig), the developers Contracts to Sell (CTS), and
the banks (commercial, thrifts, and rural). These type of loans are usually sold to a Secondary
Mortgage Institution (SMI).
The third type of mortgage loans are for new loan origination that have the potential to be securitized.
These mortgage loans include the unutilized portion of the Multi-Window Lending Scheme (MWLS), the
new loans to be originated by the contractual savings institutions (CSIs) to their members and employees,
the new loans to be originated by the banks (commercial, thrifts, rural), and the new Contracts-to-sell
(CTS) to be originated by the developers. These type of loans are usually sold to a Secondary Mortgage
Institution (SMI).
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The following two tables are the author's estimates and projections for the performing and non-
performing loans that can be currently securitized:
Assumed non-performing loans (NPLs) for rehabilitation and securitization
(Please refer to end of chapter for computational details)
Sector Institution Amount Issues
Public National Home Mortgage P1O.9B (US$205.8M) Fixed rate loans with a composite
Finance Corporation interest rate of 1 %272 and a term to
(NHMFC) maturity of 25 years.
Multi-Window Lending P1.4B (US$25.8M) Fixed rate loans with a maximum
Scheme (MWLS) term to maturity of 30 years.
____________________HGC guaranteed
Home Development P3.7B (US$69.8M) Loans to members
Mutual Fund (HDMF) Fixed rate loans with a maximum
term to maturity of 25 years.
Social Security System P61M (US$1.2M) Loans to members and employees
(SSS) Fixed rate loans with a maximum of
term to maturity of 30 years.
Government Service P221.5M (US$4.2M) Loans to members and employees
Insurance System (GSIS) Fixed rate loans with a maximum of
term to maturity of 30 years._
Total Public P16.3B (US$307M)
Private Commercial bank P492.9M (US$9.3M) 7 3  Adjustable rate market loans with a
Sector term to maturity of five to twenty
years.
Thrift Banks P628M (US$11.9M) (Figure Adjustable rate market loans with a
6 (end of chapter) term to maturity of five to twenty
years.
Ruralbanks No data available Adjustable rate market loans with a
term to maturity of five to twenty
years.
Total P1.12B (US$2.M)
Private
Total P17.4 (US$328.8M)
Assumed 'performing' loans for securitization
272 This was the estimate provided by Deputy Secretary General Lucille Ortille as the composite interest rate for the
fixed interest rates of 9%, 12% and 16% under the previous Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP).
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Sector Institution Amount I Issues
Public Sector National Home Mortgage P1O-P12B (US$189- Fixed rate loans with a
Finance Corporation US$226M) 274 (out of a composite interest rate of 13%
(NHMFC) possible P42B and a term to maturity of 25
(US$792M)2 7 s years.
Multi-Window Lending P4.2B (US$79.7M) Fixed rate loans and a maximum
Scheme (MWLS) Figure 7 (end of term to maturity of 30 years.
chapter) HGC guaranteed
Home Development P48.015B (US$906M) Loans to members and
Mutual Fund (HDMF) employees
Fixed rate loans with a
maximum of term to maturity of
30 years.
Social Security System P189.4M (US$3.6M) Loans to members and
(SSS) employees
Fixed rate loans with a
maximum of term to maturity of
30 years.
Government Service P418M (US$7.9M) Loans to members and
Insurance System (GSIS) employees
Fixed rate loans with a
maximum of term to maturity of
30 years.
Total Public P52.8B - P54.8B
Sector (US$997M-US$1.03B)
Private Sector Commercial Bank P30.07B (US$567M) Adjustable rate market loans
with a term to maturity of five to
_________________________________twenty years
Developers Contracts-to- P20B (US$377M)276  Adjustable rate market
sell (CTS) loans/Fixed higher than
prevailing market rate loans with
a term to maturity of five to
twenty years
__________________________________ need to confirm)
Thrift banks P13.8B (US$261IM) 277  Adjustable rate market loans
with a term to maturity of five to
twenty years
Rural banks No data available Adjustable rate market loans
with a term to maturity of five to
twenty years
Total Private P63.87B (US$1.21B)
Sector
Total P126.7B - P128.7B
(US$2.39B-US$2.43B)
274 This was a ballpark estimate given by Deputy Secretary General Lucille Ortille of the Housing and Urban
Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC) with regard to "cherry-picked" loans eligible for securitization from
the total portfolio of the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC). Note that this 'securitizable'
amount is only 29% of the total loan portfolio. Ideally, the total amount of securitizable mortgages should be P21.4
Billion or 51% of the loan portfolio.
275 This was the estimate provided by the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council. Note that it
higher by P2B (US$38M) from the estimate of Mahesh Kotecha from the Structured Credit International
Corporation (SCIC). (P42B/US$792M vs. P40B/US$754M).
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These are the new mortgage loans that have the potential to be securitized:
New Loans for Securitization2 78
Sector Institution Amount Issues
Public Sector Multi-Window P33.2B (US$626M) Fixed rate loans and
Lending Scheme term to maturity of up
(MWLS) to 30 years.
_______________HGC guaranteed
Home Development P7.43B (US$140M) Loans to members
Mutual Fund Fixed rate loans with
(HDMF)/Pag-Ibig a maximum of term to
maturity of 25 years.
Social Security P97.8M (US$1.8M) Loans to members and
System (SSS) employees
Fixed rate loans with
a maximum of term to
_______________maturity of 30 years.
Government Service P25.08M (US$473T) Loans to members and
Insurance System employees
(GSIS) Fixed rate loans with
a maximum of term to
maturity of 30 years.
Total Public Sector __________P40.8B (US$769M)
Private Sector Commercial Bank P930M (US$17.5M) Adjustable rate
market loans with a
term to maturity of
five to twenty years
Developers Contract-to- P600M (US$11.3M) Adjustable rate market
sell loans/Fixed higher than
prevailing market rate
loans with a term to
maturity of five to
twenty years
(need to confirm)
Thrift banks P45M (US$8.5M) Adjustable rate market
loans with a term to
maturity of five to
twenty years
Rural banks No data available Adjustable rate market
loans with a term to
maturity of five to
atwenty years
Total Private Sector P2B (US$37.4M)
Total Contract-t- P42.7B (US$806M)
276 Figure based on 2001 Structured Credit international Corporation study.
278 These are for mortgage loans generated in a year based on the performing loans, of both public and private
institutions, in the previous year.
105
Mortgage-Backed Securitization (MBS) supply issues.
Difficulty to securitize public sector-originated loans. According to Kotecha, the only mortgage loans that
are eligible for securitization are the aggregate private sector loans and the developers' contracts-to-sell
(CTS), which amount to P71B (US$1.3B) 279. Given this, Kotecha believes that public sector lenders can
only do stand-alone mortgage-backed securitization (MBS), and cannot sell any of these mortgages to a
secondary mortgage institution (SMI) for securitization 280. Kotecha noticeably excludes the public sector
mortgages of P100B (US$1.9B), which include P55B (US$1.04B) from the Home Development Mutual
Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig and P40B 28 1 (US$755M) from the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation
(NHMFC). Presumably, the reasons behind the 'ineligibility' of the public sector mortgages are a) the
fixed interest rates on these loans and; b) the long term to maturities (25 years), thus making these
mortgages difficult to securitize. In the event that these loans are securitized, these securities may not
deliver higher yields as a long-term investment alternative versus government securities (i.e. treasury
bonds) of similar maturities 282. According to Ortille, the composite rate for the Unified Home Lending
Program (UHLP) mortgage loans was 13%283. The only government security which trades at the same
duration is the 25 year treasury bill, which is 303 basis points higher versus the composite mortgage rate
(16.036%)284.
In the event that publicly originated mortgages are securitized, Alcid added investors (i.e. the commercial
banks) will be hesitant to purchase publicly originated mortgages, even if the mortgage backed security
(MBS) has credit enhancements (i.e. guarantees), because of the underlying asset quality (i.e. the
underwriting standards of the public mortgage loans are not of the same underwriting standard as those of
the banks) 28 5.
279 Kotecha, Mahesh K. Secondary Mortgage Institution (SMI) Philippines - Draft Business Plan. Structured Credit
International Corporation. 2000. New York, New York.
280 Kotecha, Mahesh K. Secondary Mortgage Institution (SMI) Philippines - Draft Business Plan. Structured Credit
International Corporation. 2000. New York, New York.281 Note that Kotecha's estimate of the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) is $2B (US$38M)
lower versus that of the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council's estimate.282 For perspective, the logic behind the three tiered interest rate (9%/12%/16%) scheme pursued under the Unified
Home Lending Program (UHLP) was to let the higher-tiered loans subsidize the lower-tiered loans, which was
termed a "cross-subsidization".
283 Ortille, Lucille. Deputy Secretary General of the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council.
Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati City, Philippines.
284 As of August 10, 2001. Source: Hong Kong Standard Chartered Bank Corporation Philippines.285 285 Alcid, Andrew D. Executive Vice President, Investment Banking Division of United Coconut Planters Bank.
Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati City, Philippines.
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National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) securitization issues. Aside from the other
public lending institutions that used "formula lending" practices and subsidized/fixed interest rates to its
members and employees, there are issues idiosyncratic to the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC). The NHMFC, the sole take-out window during the Unified Home Lending
Program (UHLP), which currently holds a P42B (US$792M) portfolio of past due loans, almost became
insolvent for a third time before it was relegated to a collection agency function in 1996. The issues
associated with the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) are:
1. Questionable asset quality. In the previous congress, Former Chairperson Karina
Constantino-David said during a joint hearing of the House of Representatives committees on
good government and on housing and urban development that there may have been "ghost
loan applications"286, 287 due to a collusion among the housing agencies, developers,
employers and borrowers 288. This was purported be one of the key factors that led to the
collapse of the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).
Even the private sector questions the integrity of the records of the NHMFC to support a
credible asset-backed securitization289 . Jacob relates that, due to the tarnished reputation of
the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC), investors will be hesitant to
purchase any mortgage-backed securities (MBS) that the NHMFC issues290. As further
anecdotal evidence, Benardo cites that the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation
(NHMFC) may have had intentionally had "sloppy" accounting systems to hide the "unholy
alliance" between developers and the NHMFC 291. Presently, there are roughly 50,000
unoccupied housing units nationwide due to these ghost beneficiaries 292. Moreover, Alcid
added that the inability to generate accurate and timely information with regard to the status
286 Businessworld Publishing Corporation. Housing scam. September 17, 1999. Makati City, Philippines.
287 Ghost beneficiaries are applicants for housing projects of government housing agencies who do not occupy or
pay for the units. They cause the government to lose money because the housing agencies that pay the developers
for the construction of the units are supposed to collect from the occupants.
288 Businessworld Publishing Corporation. Accountability for bad loans Developers' accountability in real estate
scams probed. September 16, 1999. Makati City, Philippines.
289 Matoto, Senen L. Director of the Financial Executives of the Philippines. Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati
City, Philippines.
290 Jacob, Monico. Former Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig Chairman and Conference Chairman
of the Philippine Conference on Securitization. Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati City, Philippines.
291 Bernardo, Romeo L. Former Undersecretary of the Department of Finance. Personal Interview. June 2001.
Makati City, Philippines.
292 Businessworld Publishing Corporation. Developers in housing scam can't be charged. September 5, 2000.
Makati City, Philippines.
107
of the mortgage loans for the potential investor is another stumbling block to the
securitization of National Home Mortgage Corporation (NHMFC)-originated mortgages 29 3
2. 'Political issues' with selling mortgage loans at a discount. Given the high default rate of the
National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC), certain sectors have recommended that
these mortgage loans be sold off to an Asset Management Company (AMC), at a discount, for
liquidation. However, there is serious concern as to whether or not the government has the
'political will' to absorb such steep discounts. Recall that the contractual savings institutions
(CSIs) lent money to the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC), which in turn,
was used for primary lending through loans originated by developers. When the NHMFC was shut
down as a take-out window, these were the amounts lent by the respective contractual savings
institutions (CSIs) to the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) for the Unified
Home Lending Program (UHLP):
Breakdown of P42Billion loan portfolio of the
National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC)
Institution Approximate Amounts
Social Security System (SSS) P30B (US$566M)
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) P6.5B ($123M)
Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF) P4.5B ($85M)
Source: National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC)
Obviously, the Social Security System (SSS) is the most concerned with regard to their 'exposure'
in the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC). In terms of investments, the P30
Billion (US$566) housing loan exposure constitutes roughly 18% of the total investments of the
SSS, and 71% of total housing loan exposure294 . In 1999, the Department of Finance received
offers from Goldman Sachs and Lehman Brothers with regard to the sale of the assets. However,
former Finance Secretary Edgardo Espiritu claimed that "the most we can get is 50%", which
would be dependent on the due diligence on the assets295 . However, the Commission on Audit
(COA), which is not used to such steep discounts, expects that all government dealings will
293 293 Alcid, Andrew D. Executive Vice President, Investment Banking Division of United Coconut Planters Bank.
Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati City, Philippines.
294 Based on December 2000 Social Security System Investments and Assets. Total investments was
P165B(US$3.1B) and total housing loans was P42.5B (US$802M).
295 Calica, Dymphna R. US banks eye P43-B assets of NHMF. Businessworld Publishing Corporation. August 30,
1999. Makati City, Philippines.
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generate a profit 29 6. Thus, the COA may not approve of such a large loss unless there is presumably
political will from the executive branch to "eat the losses". In the meantime, Limlingan believes
that the government will just continue to postpone the "selling off' of these loans and "pretend"
that everything is in working order 297.
Commercial banks don't want to give up their 'performing loans' to a Secondary Mortgage Institution
(SMI). Due to the undesirable economic conditions in the Philippines, banks are hesitant to sell off their
mortgage loan portfolios, which presumably consist of mid income housing loans, because there is an
impression that the banks will have a hard time generating new mortgage loans2 98 . As mentioned in
Chapter 3, Coronel says banks consider these loans "recession proof'. "The last thing that you will have
is homeowners reneging on their loans unless it is a deep-seated recession" Coronel states2 9 9 . Moreover,
private banks are liquid right now, thus there is no pressing need for them to liquefy their assets through
selling off their mortgages to a Secondary Mortgage Institution (SMI) 300 . This argument is strengthened
by Matoto, who says that the banks' priority right now is to maintain a good portfolio, rather than to
liquefy good assets30 1.
Development and thrift banks are willing to securitize mortgages to gain liquidity. Development banks
have a greater requirement for liquefying assets as their liquidity reach is limited versus universal
banks30 2 . Similarly, thrift banks, which are constrained by their portfolio, could benefit from selling their
loans to a Secondary Mortgage Institution (SMI) to generate liquidity and originate more mortgages 303.
296 As an aside, former Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF) President and Chair of the Philippine Conference
on Securitization says that the Commission on Audit (COA) does not have a "commercial orientation" (i.e. the
expectation that when engaging in commercial transactions, government entities cannot make a loss)
29 imlingan, Victor S. Professor at the Asian Institute of Management. Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati
City, Philippines.
298 Limlingan, Victor S. Professor at the Asian Institute of Management. Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati City,
Philippines.
299 Coronel, Leonilo G. Executive Director of the Bankers Association of the Philippines. Personal Interview. June
2001. Makati City, Philippines.
300 Kotecha, Mahesh K. Secondary Mortgage Institution (SMI) Philippines - Draft Business Plan. Structured Credit
International Corporation. 2000. New York, New York.
301 Matoto, Senen L. Executive Director of the Financial Executives of the Philippines. Personal Interview. June
2001. Makati City, Philippines.
302 Matoto, Senen L. Executive Director of the Financial Executives of the Philippines. Personal Interview. June
2001. Makati City, Philippines.
303 Kotecha, Mahesh K. Secondary Mortgage Institution (SMI) Philippines - Draft Business Plan. Structured Credit
International Corporation. 2000. New York, New York.
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Developers want their current Contracts to Sell (CTS) to be liquidated. Because of the softness of the
real estate market, developers have had to resort to 'in-house' financing304 schemes to support their
development efforts as they have experienced difficulty in borrowing development money from the
banks305. For perspective, Alcid says that private commercial banks don't want to book any more real
estate exposure as may real estate developers loan went into default as a result of the 1997 regional
currency crisis306.
Moreover, developers have also have difficulty in getting commercial banks to discount their mortgage
receivables from in-house financing since most large banks are already liquid, and would presumably like
to originate their own mortgage loans. Thus, most developers are capital constrained to engage in new
development projects. Given this lack of alternative financing sources, it appears that certain developers
groups look forward to the development of a secondary mortgage institution (SMI) to liquidate their
mortgages. In fact, the Subdivision and Housing Developers Association (SHDA) appears to have thrown
their support behind President Arroyo's initiatives to pass the securitization bill3 07. Limlingan adds that
the Subdivision and Housing Developers Association (SHDA) are in favor of mortgage-backed
securitization as they are confident in the asset quality of their mortgage loans30 8.
Commercial banks want to liquidate non-performing real estate loans. Since most commercial banks are
liquid, there concern is oriented towards securitizing their non-performing real estate loans (versus
securitizing their 'good' mortgage loan portfolio)30 9 . Recent reports 10 have said that Lehman Brothers has
forged separate deals with Metropolitan Bank and Trust Corporation, the country's biggest bank in terms
of assets, and Equitable PCIBank, the third largest bank, to establish their respective Asset Management
Companies (AMC) to dispose of their nonperforming loans (NPLs) 311 (which presumably include a
sizeable portion of real estate loans).
304 In some cases, developers require as little as a 5% to 10% downpayment on the property.
305 Ducay, Santiago F. Executive Director of the Subdivision and Housing Developers Association. Personal
Interview. June 2001. Makati City, Philippines.
306 Alcid, Andrew D. Executive Vice President, Investment Banking Division of United Coconut Planters Bank.
Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati City, Philippines.307 Aquino, Norman P. GMA says gov't to prioritize mass shelter programs. Businessworld Publishing Corporation.
June 28, 2001. Makati City, Philippines.
308 Limlingan, Victor S. Professor at the Asian Institute of Management. Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati
City, Philippines.
309 Matoto, Senen L. Executive Director of the Financial Executives of the Philippines. Personal Interview. June
2001. Makati City, Philippines.
3 1 Yap, Cecille E. Lehman, Metrobank, Equitable, step up efforts to create AMCs. Businessworld Publishing
Corporation. July 18, 2001. Makati City, Philippines.
311 For perspective, as of end-2000, Metrobank's Non-performing loans (NPLs) have reached P29 billion, while
Equitable PCI's is worth P24.8 billion, representing 15% and 19% of the their total loan portfolio, respectively.
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Computational Details For
1. Assumed non-performing loans (NPLs) for rehabilitation and securitization
2. Assumed 'performing' loans for securitization
3. Assumed new loans for securitization
Figure 1. Computation for National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC)
Amount Assumptions
P42B (US$792M) Estimated number of mortgage loans (Source: Housing and Urban Development
Coordinating Council (HUDCC)) Note that there is a P2B (US$38M) difference
between the HUDCC estimate and Structured Credit International Corporation (SCIC)
(P42B/US$792M vs. P40B/US$754M)
Multiplied by 49% Ratio of arrears of to total housing portfolio of HDMF (Source: World Bank)
Multiplied by 53% Based on rehabilitated loans of Lehman Brothers in Thailand for residential loans.
(US$205.8M) Total 'rehabilitated' loans for securitization
FIGURE 2. Computation for Multi-Window Lending Scheme (MWLS) that can be rehabilitated
Amount Assumptions
P6.8B (US$128.3M) 17% (Utilization rate of MWLS) X P40B/US$755M (Total amount budgeted for
MWLS) = P6.8B/US$128.3M
Source: Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC)
Multiplied by 37.9% Since there is no more National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC), we
will assume that the ratio of arrears to total housing portfolio is the documented highest
ratio of arrears for a public originator, which is the Social Security System (SSS).
Source: World Bank
Multiplied by 53% Based on rehabilitated loans of Lehman Brothers in Thailand for residential loans.
Pl.4B (US$25.8M) Total 'rehabilitated' loans for securitization
Note: This assumes that there will be a default as well for the MWLS, similar to the Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP) because of similar
'formula lending" practices.
FIGURE 3. Computation for Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/
Pag-Ibig that can be rehabilitated
Amount Assumptions
P55B (US$1B) Estimated number of mortgage loans
(Source: Structured Credit International Corporation (SCIC))
Multiplied by 12.7% Ratio of arrears of to total housing portfolio of HDMF
(Source: World Bank)
Multiplied by 53% Based on rehabilitated loans of Lehman Brothers in Thailand for residential loans.
P3.7B (US$69.8B) Total 'rehabilitated' loans for securitization
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FIGURE 4. Computation for Commercial Bank that can be rehabilitated
Amount Assumptions
P31B (US$585M) Estimated number of mortgage loans
(Source: Structured Credit International Corporation (SCIC))
Multiplied by 3% Ratio of arrears of to total housing portfolio of commercial banks
(Source: World Bank)
Multiplied by 53% Based on rehabilitated loans of Lehman Brothers in Thailand for residential loans.
P492M (US$9.3M) Total 'rehabilitated' loans for securitization
Figure 5. Computation for Thrift Bank performing loans
Amount Assumptions
P15B (US$283M) Estimated number of mortgage loans
(Source: Structured Credit International Corporation (SCIC))
Multiplied by 92.1% 1 - Ratio of arrears of to total housing portfolio of thrift banks
(Source: World Bank)
P13.8B (US$261M) Total performing loans
Figure 6. Computation for Commercial Bank New Loans
Amount Assumptions
P31B (US$585M) Estimated number of mortgage loans (Source: Structured Credit International
Corporation (SCIC))
Multiplied by (1.03%) Estimated base case growth rate per year compounded over two years (Source:
Structured Credit International Corporation (SCIC))
P930M (US$17.5M) Total performing loans
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6 MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIZATION (MBs) PROCESS
Mortgage Origination
Overview. In the Philippines, there are two sources of mortgage origination: public and private
origination.
The public institution originators are the government owned and controlled contractual savings
institutions (CSIs) 3 12 that provide in-house primary mortgage lending to their members and funding for
the Multi-Window Lending Scheme (MWLS) program313. During the Unified Home Lending Program
(UHLP), which ran from 1986 to 1996, the contractual savings institutions pooled their funds together to
purchase mortgages generated by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).
The private institution originators are the private banks. Although developers can be classified as
originators as well, this was more prevalent under the Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP). The
UHLP allowed developers to originate loans from homebuyers which would then be 'taken out' by the
National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC). However, some developers continue to
originate mortgage loans as well via "in-house" financing schemes.
Recent history and current state of public mortgage origination. Technically, the largest originator for
public loan originators from 1986 to 1996 was the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation
(NHMFC). Although the NHMFC was originally envisioned to become a public sector secondary
mortgage institution (SMI), the NHMFC became involved in primary mortgage lending for low to mid
income housing. Obviously, given the original mandate of the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC), primary mortgage lending was not a function that the company was "structured"
to perform.
Nonetheless, the mortgage origination guidelines (which were dubbed "formula lending" approach" used
in the Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP) was drafted and approved by the Housing and Urban
Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC) and the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation
(NHMFC).
312 Social Security System (SSS), Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), and the Home Development
Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig.
313 This was discussed in-depth in Chapter 4.
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The National Shelter Program (NSP) mandated the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation
(NHMFC) to meet the housing target of 1.2 Million housing units. At the initial phase of the Unified
Home Lending Program (UHLP), banks were used as the originators for the primary mortgage loans.
Private banks and savings and loans banks which originated loans from the National Home Mortgage
Finance Corporation (NHMFC), and received a commission from the NHMFC for screening and bringing
qualified buyers on the release of the loan. However, few banks were originating the Unified Home
Lending Program (UHLP) loans. Presumably, the reasons for the low originations by the banks for these
loans were a) few potential homebuyers could pass the screening guidelines of the bank; b) the private
banks would prefer to focus on their privately originated mortgage loans 14 . According to Manicio3 15,
very few banks were originating loans because of the retail nature of the mortgage loans316.
Nonetheless, since the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) needed to "show" that
they were meeting a targeted number of housing units, they allowed developers to originate loans as well.
Developers dominated the loan originations of the Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP)317, because
of an arrangement, which made it virtually "risk-free" for them to originate loans. The National Home
Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) merely had to take out mortgages, which were originated and
initially financed by property developers. Real estate developers negotiated for purchase commitment
lines (PCLs) with the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) wherein the NHMFC
agreed to take out the housing loans from the developer upon appraisal and after the homebuyer submitted
the proper documentation3 18 . Because of this production target orientation for housing units, this 'incents'
developers to start construction even before entertaining applicants for the low-cost housing units319.
When the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) mortgage purchase function was
suspended, the take out function was transferred to the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF). The
current Multi-Window lending scheme (MWLS), which is an "evolution" of sorts from the Unified Home
Lending Program (UHLP), was discussed in depth under Chapter 4.
314 The administrative costs of handling the Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP) loans might have outweighed
the commissions the banks received from screening the loans.315 Manicio, Eduardo T. Vice-President, Funds Generation Group of the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC). Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati City, Philippines.316 Manicio asserted that commercial banks were more inclined to make loans that were a) wholesale and; b) short-
term in nature.
317 Manicio, Eduardo T. Vice-President, Funds Generation Group of the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC). Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati City, Philippines.318 Technically, the developer did not even need to shell out equity to build housing units. The construction loan for
the housing units was taken out from a bank while securing the purchase commitment line (PCL) ensured that the
National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) would take the developer out.319 Again, this is all tied up to the production-oriented policy of the government.
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Recent history and current state of private mortgage origination. As of
mortgage lenders were the thrift banks.
Top Private Bank Originators as of 1997
1998, the largest primary
Name of Bank Estimated share of total Type of bank
mortgages or CTS originated
1. BPI Family Bank 16.0 Thrift
2. Union Bank 12.0 Thrift
3. PS Bank 9.3 Commercial
4. PCI Bank 8.3 Commercial
5. Bank of the Philippine Islands 5.4 Commercial
6. China Trust Banking Corporation 4.5 Commercial
7. Banco Filipino 4.0 Thrift
8. China Banking Corporation 3.5 Commercial
9. Solid Bank 2.8 Commercial
10. Rizal Commercial Banking Corp. 1.5 Commercial
Source: Asian Development Bank
Prior to the regional 1997 currency crisis, commercial banks had been steadily increasing their real estate
loans as proportion of their total loan portfolio. From 1995 to 1997, the real estate exposure of banks had
exhibited the highest growth rate over the past two years. In 1996, bank exposure to real estate and
financial services expanded 97.2% to P244.41 Billion (US$4.6 Billion) from P123.94 Billion (US$2.3
Billion). These two sectors also enjoyed a greater share of the banks' portfolio, increasing to 21.8% from
16.8% in 19952.
Real Estate Loans of Commercial Banks, 1995 to June 1997
Year Real Estate Loans % of total loan portfolio
1995 44,802 5.17
1996 86,492 7.08
June 1997 159,285 11.23
Source: Asian Development Bank
In 1997, the Bangko Sentral (Central Bank of the Philippines) reported that the outstanding real estate
loans of commercial banks stood at P159.3 Billion (US$3 Billion), which was 16.5% higher than the
previous quarter. Metropolitan Manila had the highest concentration of real estate loans (P127.3 Billion
(US$2.4 Billion), which is 79% of the total) and where 95.3% of the total outstanding real estate loans of
trust departments were made321. The "aggressive growth" the Philippine real estate property market
320 Garcia, Elisha R. and Dulce J. Castillo. Stricter limits on real estate loans seen to prolong boom, curb
speculation. Businessworld Publishing Corporation. May 1, 1997. Makati City, Philippines.
321 Reside, Renato S. Mortgage-Backed Securities in Asia. Asian Development Bank. 1999. Pasig City, Philippines.
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began to exhibit the symptoms of the Korean and Thai property markets as property gluts drove them into
a real estate crisis2
Thus, the Bangko Sentral (Central Bank of the Philippines), prodded by the property crisis in the nearby
Asian economies, acted to restrain the local banks' 'over eagerness' in financing real estate projects,
particularly speculative projects 3. Thus in April 1997, the monetary board, the policy-making body of
the Bangko Sentral (Central Bank of the Philippines), set the real exposure limit for banks to 20% of their
respective loan portfolios3 24 . When the ruling was made, the Bangko Sentral (Central Bank of the
Philippines) claimed that real estate exposure was at 9.2%311. Prior to this, banking rules allowed banks
to extend loans to any single industry of up to 30% of their total loan portfolios which the Bangko Sentral
(Central Bank of the Philippines) enforces "moral suasion". On top of the limits to real estate exposure,
the Monetary Board also directed banks to reduce the loan value of real estate extended as collateral for
any bank loan to not more than 60% (versus the previous 70% of the appraised value) of the collateral.
Low-cost housing loans made under the National Shelter Program were exempted from the restrictions on
real estate exposure. However, banks were still wary to lend to low-cost housing due to the perceived
high default rate of this sector32 6. Moreover, the private sector could not compete with the subsidized
interest rates being offered by the Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP) to low income borrowers.
Origination Issues
a. Public sector mortgage origination issues
Continued use of a modified "formula lending" scheme and subsidized interest rates under the Multi-
Window Lending Scheme. Under the Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP), the National Home
Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) used a "formula lending" system where borrower eligibility
was based solely on the borrower's monthly income, but no effort was made to determine the capacity to
322 Ducanes, Geoffrey M. Moody's warns of traces of Thailand in RP banks (BSP figures on property exposure of
banks doubted). Businessworld Publishing Corporation. April 18, 1997. Makati City, Philippines.
323 Garcia, Elisha R. and Dulce J. Castillo. Stricter limits on real estate loans seen to prolong boom, curb
speculation. Businessworld Publishing Corporation. May 1, 1997. Makati City, Philippines.
324 Garcia, Elisha R. and Dulce J. Castillo. ... as Monetary Board limits to 20% banks' exposure to real estate sector.
Businessworld Publishing Corporation. April 30, 1997. Makati City, Philippines.
325 However, Moody's was in doubt with regard the claimed figure. Moody's said that (based on its experience with
other banking markets such as those in Thailand and Japan), "The statistics compiled and reported by central banks
regarding the composition of the commercial banks'loan portfolios frequently lack sufficient detail to identify
particular concentrations or give reporting banks significant latitude in how they classify their exposures."
(Businessworld Publishing Corporation)
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pay. The maximum loanable amounts were subject to fixed interest rates and a term-to-maturity of 25
years.
Under the Multi-Window Lending Scheme (MWLS), a modified version of the "formula lending" scheme
is used to lend money to a targeted homebuyer segment 27. The MWLS has taken measures to ensure
better repayment and an improved determination of capacity to pay versus the Unified Home Lending
Program (UHLP), such as a) having accredited banks screen the potential homebuyers for mortgage
loans3 28 ; b) monthly salary deductions for the mortgage loan. However, despite these measures, the
continued use of the subsidized interest rates does not render these mortgage loans more 'palatable' for
securitization.
Moreover, the utilization rate for the Multi-Window Lending Scheme is only 17%. Perhaps one of the
reasons behind the low rate is that the administrative costs of handling the 'low income segment' is not
worth the effort for the banks, who would rather focus on market-rate, mid to high income loan
packages329. For perspective, these were the sample eligibility requirements used to determine capacity-
to-pay for members of the Philippine National Police (PNP) and teachers (serviced by the Home
Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig):
326 Recall at this point that National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation had already been reporting high levels of
default among its homebuyers, who were perceived to be low income borrowers.
327 Recall in Chapter 4 that each contractual savings institution (CSI) or government financial institution was
assigned to cater to different market segments. For example, the Social Security System (SSS) handles the Filipino
overseas workers, trade union workers and other private sector workers.
328 The Social Security System (SSS) has claimed that there has so far been a zero default rate on mortgages
underwritten for SSS members by SSS-accredited private banks, which suggests that bank accreditation enhances
the quality of mortgages.
329 Tan, Arthur, Executive Vice-President and General Manager of the Home Guaranty Corporation. Personal
Interview. June 2001. Makati City, Philippines.
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Eligibility Active HDMF/Pag-Ibig member330
Must have passed prior screening and pre-processing of the Philippine National
Police (PNP) Housing Board/Department of Education, Culture and Sports(DECS) National Housing Secretariat as to capacity to pay33'
Must not be more than 65 years old at loan maturity and must be insurable.
Must have legal capacity to acquire and encumber real property.
Must have no outstanding Pag-IBIG housing loan, either as principal or co-
borrower.
Loanable amount basis Capacity to pay
Loan-to-collateral ratio
Loan Payment Monthly amortizations over the term of his loan thru salary deduction
Loan Insurance Mortgage Redemption Insurance (MRI) and Property/Fire Insurance (P/FI)
Source: Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig website
Private Mortgage Origination Issues
Lack of borrower credit information. To determine borrower quality in the primary mortgage market, it
is crucial to have information on a potential homebuyers' credit history. Credit-providing companies,
such as local banks and credit card companies, gradually build up credit histories.
However, there is a general lack of data with regard to shared credit histories of consumers due to the lack
of cooperation among data providers 2 . In the existing credit information structure, private banks have
invested substantial amounts to develop proprietary systems in building credit histories and, thus, are
unwilling to share the information with other banks. Banks are wary of the 'free rider' problem, where
sharing the information will "level the playing field", without another bank having to spend money to
acquire the information. The hesitance to share credit information eventually leads to high spreads that
are built into mortgage loans. According to Reside, the exchange of such personal information further
impeded by cultural biases against what are deemed to be invasions of personal privacy3n
33 For a teacher, this must be evidenced by as evidenced by the inclusion of the borrower's name in the Department
of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) Payroll List, and a certification that the borrower is a regular DECS
employee/teacher with a permanent appointment.
331 The Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig website did not specify the screening requirements of
the Philippine National Police (PNP) housing body or Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS)
National Housing Secretariat.
332 Coronel, Leonilo G. Executive Director of the Bankers Association of the Philippines. Personal Interview. June
2001. Makati City, Philippines.
33 Reside, Renato S. Mortgage-Backed Securities in Asia. Asian Development Bank. 1999. Pasig City, Philippines.
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Nonetheless, there has been some progress in sharing "negative" credit information with regard to
consumers (i.e. defaults, delinquencies), credit providers are hesitant to provide "positive" credit
information (i.e. where money is spent by consumer)33 4.
With reference specifically to mortgage loans, the structural deficiencies of the Unified Home Lending
Program (UHLP) (i.e. "formula lending" practice, high default rates which are mistakenly attributed to
low-income borrowers) has led to a "credit rationing" by primary mortgage creditors. Thus, while credit
has been for middle- to high-income primary borrowers, primary creditors in the low-cost housing market
have tried to delay take-outs until such time that lending guidelines are improved to facilitate
crosschecking of borrower information 335 . Reside argues that with the increased awareness of the acute
problems in lending to low-cost housing, potential home-buyers in this sector have become victims of
adverse selection because the lending guidelines and the funding institutions (i.e. the National Home
Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC)) themselves failed to distinguish good from bad credit risks 336.
Lack ofstandardized origination documents andprocedures. The standardization of loan documents is a
necessary prerequisite for securitization. Moreover, the standardization of bank documents will lessen the
private banks' administration costs, by lessening the number of forms that need to be filled out, which in
turn will drive down mortgage loan rates337
According to Coronel, each bank has its own set of standards in terms of originating mortgage loans 338.
Moreover, mortgage rates, which may be similar across private commercial banks 33 9 , continue to be based
on a bank's own reference lending rates 340. Among the lack of standardized documents and processes
include a) documents of conveyance and reconveyance (i.e. deeds of sale with mortgage, contracts to sell,
lease purchase agreements, etc.), b) lack of standardized appraisals for properties, c) a lack of common
"4 Coronel, Leonilo G. Executive Director of the Bankers Association of the Philippines. Personal Interview. June
2001. Makati City, Philippines.
3s This was primarily the case when the Social Security System (SSS) and Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) pooled funds to lend to the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF) when it took from National Home
Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) as the take out window.
336 Reside, Renato S. Mortgage-Backed Securities in Asia. Asian Development Bank. 1999. Pasig City, Philippines.
37 Coronel, Leonilo G. Executive Director of the Bankers Association of the Philippines. Personal Interview. June
2001. Makati City, Philippines.
338 Coronel, Leonilo G. Executive Director of the Bankers Association of the Philippines. Personal Interview. June
2001. Makati City, Philippines.
339 Recall the chart in Chapter 4 which contained the tables on Mortgage Interest Rates as of 1998.
340 Reside, Renato S. Mortgage-Backed Securities in Asia. Asian Development Bank. 1999. Pasig City, Philippines.
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base criteria for due diligence standards and; d) improved disclosure standards3 41. Aside from the lack of
these documents/processes, the Philippine Conference on Securitization also reiterated the need for a title
insurance system, due to rampant cases of fake land titles that have been in circulation 34 2 . However,
Matoto believes that the "players" in securitization can initially live with the lack of the title insurance
system343.
Tan cites that efforts to standardize loan documentation via an interagency committee of the Housing and
Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC) started as far back as the Aquino administration
(1986-1992)344. However, the major impediment to standardization were the private banks' legal counsel
who each held fast to their own belief as to what constitutes primary mortgage documents.
As part of the organization's new mandate to "ensure its active involvement in the development of the
secondary mortgage market for housing mortgages, bonds, debentures, bonds, debentures, notes and
securities"345 , the Home Guaranty Corporation attempted to spearhead the development of standardized
underwriting documents in preparation for securitization. However, the banks appear to be have their
own set of mortgage documents and are reluctant to work on a cooperative basis. Although banks want to
securitize, they each appeared to want to securitize on their own terms.
The Multi-Window Lending Scheme (MWLS) was supposed to facilitate the standardization of primary
mortgage documents. However, banks continue to have issues with the proposed standardized
documents, which include a) the number of documents that the potential homebuyer must fill out and; b)
certain provisions of the documents3 46.
One of the 'outgrowths' of the lack of standardized documentation is that developers have had to serve as
impromptu financial engineers by attempting to combine the different documents that banks require for
loan take-outs. In effect, developers lose focus on their primary responsibility of ensuring the quality of
housing projects as they are grow more concerned over the guarantee that the banks will purchase their
341 Philippine Conference on Securitization. Mobilizing the Markets for Securitization: The Casefor Asset Backed
Securities. October 1999. Makati City, Philippines.
342 Title insurance will be discussed in Chapter 7.
343 Matoto, Senen L. Director of the Financial Executives of the Philippines. Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati
City, Philippines.
344 Tan, Arthur, Executive Vice-President and General Manager of the Home Guaranty Corporation. Personal
Interview. June 2001. Makati City, Philippines.
345 Home Guaranty Corporation. Charter Change 2000. March 2000. Makati City, Philippines.
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mortgage loans. Low cost housing developers have made their appeal during the Securitization
conference to develop a mechanism that would allow for a more comprehensive assessment of granting
housing loans347.
The Banker Association of the Philippines (BAP), in conjunction with several financial agencies and
organizations 348 , had developed an origination and underwriting 'best practices' manual, in line with the
development of the local financial structure to create an atmosphere for a "deep a liquid secondary
market". Presumably, these manuals will be distributed to all local banks who would like to eventually
sell their mortgage loans to a Secondary Mortgage Institution, or perhaps would like to securitize their
own mortgages349
Lack of originator education on securitization. Since there appear to be issues with regard to developing
the primary mortgage lending infrastructure in preparation for mortgage securitization, an issue raised in
the Securitization conference was the general lack of understanding among originators with regard to
securitization as a financing tool. In fact, Matoto adds that the lack of knowledge about securitization,
which is reflected in the financial infrastructure related to securitization, is not due to the lack of "bright
people", but rather the lack of securitization deals in the country"4. Jacob seconds this argument, saying
that there is an abundance of Filipinos with the financial skills to structure a securitization transaction.
Unfortunately, because of a confluence of factors, the government not providing enough support behind
the development of the secondary mortgage market and the heavy tax burden related to secondary trading
of the instruments), these financial experts have chosen to focus on other finance-related priorities35 1.
346 Tan, Arthur, Executive Vice-President and General Manager of the Home Guaranty Corporation. Personal
Interview. June 2001. Makati City, Philippines.
34? Philippine Conference on Securitization. Mobilizing the Markets for Securitization: The Case for Asset Backed
Securities. October 1999. Makati City, Philippines.
348 the Investment Houses of the Philippines (IHAP), the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (Central Bank of the
Philippines), the Investment Houses Association of the Philippines (IHAP), and the Trust Officers Association of
the Philippines (TOAP).
349 Bankers Association of the Philippines. Market Reforms Project BAP Briefing to the Media. April 4, 2001.
Makati City, Philippines.
350 Matoto, Senen L. Director of the Financial Executives of the Philippines. Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati
City, Philippines.
351 Jacob, Monico. Former Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig Chairman and Conference Chairman
of the Philippine Conference on Securitization. Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati City, Philippines.
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Securitization
The securitization of primary mortgages involves several issues which overlap with regulatory, legal and
taxation-related matters. These include issues on recourse/non-recourse, accounting treatment, and
secondary mortgage institution structure (i.e. trust or corporation). Given this, we will focus on the
mortgage pool valuation.
Mortgage pool valuation. Since there is no active secondary mortgage market in the Philippines, where
mortgages can be sold at market interest rats, the selling price of the mortgages sold to a Secondary
Mortgage Institution (SMI) 352 or to an Asset Management Company (AMC) 35 3 will generally be equal to
the present discounted value354 of the outstanding principal of the mortgages 355. However, the appropriate
discount factor to be used in valuing private sector-originated mortgages, prior to selling it to an SMI
should take into consideration the following factors:
1. Market interest rates for long-term financial instruments that have similar maturities. The
"discount rate" or the market interest rates that should be used to discount the mortgages will be
problematic as there is no pronounced long-term yield curves for long-term financial
instruments 356
2. General asset quality of the mortgages for sale to a Secondary Mortgage Institution (SMI).
According to Reside, it is reasonable to assume that higher privately-originated mortgage quality
will be associated with mortgages that have lower loan-to-value ratios (i.e. 60% loan to value)
and longer seasoning (i.e. 2 to 3 years) 3 7. On the other hand, lower quality mortgage will be
associated with mortgage that has higher loan-to-value rations (i.e. 70% loan-to-value) and
shorter seasoning (i.e. below 2 years).
352 A secondary mortgage institution (SMI) is ideal for the current performing mortgage loans and the new mortgage
loans to be originated by the private sector. Presumably, only these loans will be acceptable for securitization
because they are pegged at market rates, thus rendering them "eligible" for securitization.35 An asset management company (AMC) is ideal for the current nonperforming loans originated by the private
sector. These loans are sold to an AMC at a discount, which are then rehabilitated, securitized and sold at a profit.
Presumably, only these private mortgage loans will be acceptable for securitization (once they are rehabilitated)
because they are pegged at market rates, thus rendering them "eligible" for securitization.
34The discount rate is determined by the rates of return prevailing in the capital markets. If the future cash flow is
absolutely safe, then the discount rate is the interest rate on safe securities such as government debt (as is the case in
the United States). If the size of the future cash flow is uncertain, then the expected cash flow should be discounted
at the rate of return offered by equivalent-risk securities. (Brealey, Richard A. and Stewart C. Myers. Principles of
Corporate Finance. Sixth Edition. Irwin McGaw-Hill. 2000. United States of America)
35 Reside, Renato S. Mortgage-Backed Securities in Asia. Asian Development Bank. 1999. Pasig City, Philippines.
356 The only real player in the long-term securities market is the government through the issuance of treasury bonds.
However, the issuances of such long-term securities, that match the tenor of private mortgage loans (i.e. 15 years) is
infrequent.
357 Reside, Renato S. Mortgage-Backed Securities in Asia. Asian Development Bank. 1999. Pasig City, Philippines.
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3. Originator integrity. A primary mortgage originator with a history of poor screening and
servicing standards (which consequently leads to inferior asset quality), will be in no position to
demand a good price for its mortgage pool, regardless of the quality of the assets in the pool.
Conversely, primary mortgage originators with well-established screening and servicing
standards will probably be able to demand a good price for their mortgage pool. In fact, some
private banks have engaged in their own mortgage-backed securitization efforts, as the
institutional investors rely on the bank's reputation and credibility to guarantee the quality of the
mortgage pool.
The valuation of non-performing privately originated mortgage pools to be sold to an Asset
Management Company (AMC) is usually the result of a) the due diligence performed by the Asset
Management Company (AMC) and; b) the negotiations between the private bank and the Asset
Management Company (AMC). Based on the experiences of other countries, where private banks
sold their nonperforming loans (NPLs) to an Asset Management Company (AMC), the discounts
reached as much as 50% of the asset's value358 . The sale of both the performing and non-performing
publicly originated mortgage loans present a problem because of the following:
1. Subsidized and fixed interest rates hamper securitization efforts. Loans sold to a Secondary
Mortgage Institution (SMI) should be priced at appropriate market rates. However, the
problem lies in the fixed composite market rate of 13% for the publicly originated mortgage
loans3 59 . Although there is no pronounced yield curve for the long-term instruments, the next
best alternative would be to use treasury bonds of similar maturities to discount these
mortgages. Obviously, the treasury must offer high interest rates to attract long-term funds.
In the event that treasury bond rates are higher than the composite interest rate (which
presumably will be the case), no reasonable Secondary Mortgage Institution (SMI) would
purchase the mortgage pool at a discounted value of 13% if the treasury bond rate was higher.
The other alternative for these public originated mortgages would be to sell these mortgages
at a discount (i.e. higher than both the composite interest rate and treasury bond rate) to the
Secondary Mortgage Institution (SMI), but this would mean that the primary mortgage
lenders would always sell these mortgages at a loss.
358 Yap, Cecille E. Lehman, Metrobank, Equitable, step up efforts to create AMCs. Businessworld Publishing
Corporation. July 18, 2001. Makati City, Philippines.
359 The composite rate of 13% was provided by Deputy Secretary Lucille Ortille of the Housing and Urban
Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC)
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2. Lack or originator integrity. As mentioned in Chapter 5, the integrity of the National Home
Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) loan portfolio is of questionable quality due to a
possible collusion between developers and the NHMFC. A Secondary Mortgage Institution
(SMI) or Asset Management Company (AMC) will presumably have difficulty in conducting
due diligence on these mortgage loans as the accounting system were deliberately "sloppy" to
hide the "unholy alliance" between certain developers and employees of the National Home
Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) 360.
According to Reside, it would appear that privately originated, market-oriented mortgages would
probably receive better interest rates once securitized361. Meanwhile, publicly oriented, subsidized and
fixed interest rate mortgages would probably receive high interest rates to compensate for the risks
involved3 62
Secondary Mortgage Institution (SMI)/Asset Management Company (AMC)
Overview. There are basically two types of mortgage loans that can be securitized: The pool of
performing mortgage loans are sold by an originator to a Secondary Mortgage Institution (SMI) at the
present discounted market rate value of the outstanding principal of the mortgages. Meanwhile, the non-
performing loans (NPLs) are sold to an Asset Management Company (AMC) at a deep discount of the
outstanding principal of the mortgages. Aside from these options, banks have also performed "in-house"
or "stand-alone" mortgage-backed securitization wherein they securitized their own mortgages, which
were then pre-sold to institutional investors.
In the Philippines, there is no functioning Secondary Mortgage Institution (SMI). Therefore, we will
review the various public and private institutions, which have attempted to perform the functions of a
Secondary Mortgage Institutions (SMIs). On top of that, we will briefly review various in-house
securitization efforts.
As a result of a) the private banks' sizable pool of non-performing real estate loans from the 1997
regional currency crisis and; b) the large arrears on the publicly-originated loans, there have been both
private and public led efforts to establish an Asset Management Company (AMC) to liquidate these
360 Bernardo, Romeo L. Former Undersecretary of the Department of Finance. Personal Interview. June 2001.
Makati City, Philippines.
361 Reside, Renato S. Mortgage-Backed Securities in Asia. Asian Development Bank. 1999. Pasig City, Philippines.
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mortgages and generate fresh funds. Thus, we will discuss current efforts of both sectors to establish
Asset Management Companies (AMCs).
Public Secondary Mortgage Institution
National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation.
Overview. In 1986, Executive Order No. 90 was issued by President Aquino, which mandated that
National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) as the Secondary Mortgage Institution
(NHMFC). Thus, similar to "Fannie Mae" the NHMFC was supposed to accumulate a "critical mass" of
mortgage loans that it would eventually securitize. The National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation
would then use the funds generated from Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS) issues to purchase more
mortgages, providing a long-term and sustainable source of housing finance. However, instead of
performing the mortgage-purchase function, the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation
(NHMFC) was tasked to engage in primary mortgage lending, a task it was not "built" to perform. How
did this come about?
When E.O. 90 was drafted, the government had established that 3.7 million new housing units would be
needed for the period of 1993 to 1998. Given the production orientation of the government with regard to
housing, there was a need to "jump start" housing production, and the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC) was used as the vehicle to promote this end.
Thus, E.O. 90 had a portion of the investible funds from the contractual savings institutions (Social
Security System (SSS), Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), Home Development Mutual Fund
(HDMF)/Pag-Ibig) to be administered by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC)
363 to be lent out directly to homebuyers at subsidized and fixed interest rates and a 25 year term-to-
maturity 364. The provision of the E.O. 90 was translated into a "temporary loan arrangement" between the
NHMFC and the funders, until the NHMFC could finally stand on its "financial" feet. However, E.O. 90
362 Of course, this is in the event that these publicly originated mortgages can be securitized at a fixed composite rate
of 13% (without the benefit of credit enhancements).
363 The National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) administered the Unified Home Lending Program
(UHLP), one of the four mortgage-lending programs of the National Shelter Program (NSP) 363. The other programs
were the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF) Expanded Housing Loan Program, the Home Insurance and
Guaranty Corporation (HIGC) Retail Guaranty Program, and the housing programs of the Social Security System
(SSS) and the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). For perspective, all the programs under the National
Shelter program were largely subsidized and intended for the production of housing units and ownership.
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did not provide for a timetable and a strategy as to when the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHHMFC) would eventually stand on its own feet and be viable enough to begin its
Secondary Mortgage Institution (SMI) function. Thus, what was supposed to be a "temporary loan"
arrangement between the NHMFC and the contractual savings institutions (NHMFC) was renewed
"continuously" from 1986 to 1996. Moreover, since E.O. 90 focused on housing production, there was no
"solid structure" to recycle the loans nor was there a provision to provide for bad mortgage loans365.
For a time, the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) functioned as the sole-lending
window of the Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP). The NHMFC used the low-cost funds lent to it
by the contractual savings institutions (CSIs) and "took out" or purchased mortgages originated by low-
cost housing developers 366. (Please refer to Chapter 4 for a discussion on the take out transaction process
for developers with the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC)).
However, the contractual savings institutions (CSIs) couldn't sustain their large subsidies to low-cost
housing (in some cases, the loan-to-value ratio was 100%), which was further compounded by the
relatively inferior quality mortgage portfolios these funders367 held versus those of private mortgage
lenders368.
Eventually, the volume of transactions being passed on to the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC) from the originator-developers grew too large for them to handle administratively.
The NHMFC could neither properly screen all the transactions according to UHLP guidelines nor
adequately handle these transactions. Moreover, the sloppy accounting and record keeping by the
NHMFC 369 made it initially difficult to ascertain the true extent of the stock losses of the contractual
savings institutions (CSIs).
3" The loan was to be used to either purchase a residential lot, finance the purchase of a lot and house construction,
or purchase a newly constructed residential unit or construct a new house. Home repairs and improvement are also
included in the program.
365 Manicio, Eduardo T. Vice-President, Funds Generation Group of the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC). Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati City, Philippines.
366 Although private banks would screen and originate potential homebuyers for the Unified Home Lending
Program (UHLP), for which they would receive a commission from the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC), the UHLP was dominated by developer-originators.
367 All the mortgage loans that were purchased by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC)
were pledged to the funders. (Source: Manicio, Eduardo T. Vice-President, Funds Generation Group of the National
Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC). Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati City, Philippines)
368 Reside, Renato S. Mortgage-Backed Securities in Asia. Asian Development Bank. 1999. Pasig City, Philippines.
369 Former Undersecretary Romeo Bernardo asserts that such "sloppiness" was intentional to hide the collusion
between certain developers and the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).
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A number of factors: the poor screening guidelines, interest-rate subsidies 370, the lax collection efforts,
and the disincentive for borrowers to repay their loans in due time due to the above standard loan-to-value
ratios contributed to the substantial amount of non-performing loans in the NHMFC portfolio37 1. (The
structural deficiencies of the Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP) were discussed extensively in
Chapter 4).
Thus, in mid-1996, the government suspended the loan purchase facility of the National Home Mortgage
Finance Corporation (NHMFC) due to the poor asset quality of its mortgages. Except for the
administration of the Abot Kaya amortization program and the Community Mortgage Program (CMP) the
NHMFC has since been relegated to merely collecting on its past-due loans.
Current State. While the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) continues its
collection activity, the government has mulled several options with regard to this troubled housing
agency. However, among all these options, none of them appear to be 'restoring' its status as a
Secondary Mortgage Institution (SMI). According to Kotecha, the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC) has lost is opportunity to become a Secondary Mortgage Institution (SMI) as it
will now have great difficulty in gaining investor acceptance as an SM137 2, a sentiment echoed by many
financial and housing experts. Rustia put it succinctly, "Nobody looks at NHMDC as an efficient
institution, and there must be another institution."3 73
The lone voice of opposition comes from the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations
(CREBA), which vehemently opposes the possible dismantling and selling off of the receivables of the
National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) supposedly due to the role of the NHMFC in
the government's housing program374. Serrano argues that it "doesn't matter whether or not it (National
Home Mortgage Finance Corporation) is an effective institution or not, but it was designated to be there.
370 The interest rate subsidy was credit subsidy where the government allocates housing funds that were lent at
interest rates way below market rates. For example, the 9% interest rate for socialized housing -which was below
both current mortgage rates and even the inflation rate - was a significant, long-term subsidy to borrowers.
371 This eventually led to the widespread perception that investment lending for low-cost housing is extremely risky.
Thus, private banks have been wary of lending to this sector, and are even more wary to securitize the low-cost
housing loans.
372 Kotecha, Mahesh K. Secondary Mortgage Institution (SMI) Philippines - Draft Business Plan. Structured Credit
International Corporation. 2000. New York, New York.
373 Rustia, Andres I. Managing Director of the Asset Management Department of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
(Central Bank of the Philippines). Personal Interview. June 2001. Manila, Philippines.
374 Businessworld Publishing Corporation. Fund managers eye NHMFC. September 13, 1999. Makati City,
Philippines.
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CREBA sees no reason why it should not be used". In fact, Serrano believes that "it can be restored to
what it once was before" by putting in "the right people, since it just a fictional entity after all." 3 75
The entire loan portfolio of the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) currently stands
at P42 Billion (US$ 792 Million), which is comprised of 180,000 accounts. According to Manicio, the
collection efficiency, across-the-board, for the NHMFC loans is 50%. The balance 90,000 non-
performing loans (NPLs) are due for litigation376.
For the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) loans that are still considered
performing: the NHMFC manages to collect P350 Million (US$6.6 Million) a month, where the
maximum collectible per month should be P450 Million (US$8.5 Billion)3 7 7 . Thus, the NHMFC is in
arrears of approximately P100 Million (US$ 1.9 Million) a month378
The National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) implemented several schemes to improve
their collection efforts, which included a) auctioning of all delinquent properties, b) outsourcing of
collections services to the private sector, c) computerization of the billing and collection systems; d)
developing new affordable repayment schemes for account re-activation and, e) developing new programs
379to facilitate borrowers, such as the sale of mortgage rights . However, the outsourcing option was not
approved by National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC)'s internal auditors. One of the
agency's statutes maintained that if the function was currently being performed by the institution itself,
the function could not be outsourced. Meanwhile, despite the phenomenal response to the sale of
mortgage rights3o program, there were problems with regard to the program's implementation and was
thus discontinued.
375 Serrano, Atty. Manuel M. Founding Chairman of the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations(CREBA). Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati City, Philippines.
376 Manicio, Eduardo T. Vice President, Funds Generation Group of the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC). Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati City, Philippines.377 This assumes a level payment of a loan over 25 years, the term-to-maturity of the Unified Home Lending
Program (UHLP) mortgage loans.
378 Manicio, Eduardo T. Vice President, Funds Generation Group of the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC). Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati City, Philippines.379Businessworld Publishing Corporation. NHMFC deputizes second batch ofhousing rights sellers. February 8,2001. Makati City, Philippines.
380 The sale of mortgage rights involves the assigning, transferring, disposing or alienating to another person (natural
or juridical) National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation's (NHMFC) rights, or interests or participation in the
mortgage loans NHMFC had earlier financed either under its Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP) or the
Community Mortgage Program (CMP). Manicio related that the monthly collections went from a low of P320
Million (US$6 Million) to a high of P450 Million (US$ 8.5 Million).
381 From an implementation standpoint, there were reports of "double sales" of mortgage rights, potential
homebuyers moving into housing units even before documentation was completed, litigation from prior
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Presently, the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMF) uses a) loan condonation
programs382 to incent delinquent homebuyers to update their loans and, b) a relaunched collection
program wherein management teams are divided into accounts by regions. In 1998, under former
Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC) Chairperson Karina Constatino-
David's leadership, there was a policy move to rationalize the housing agencies, which included
privatizing the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation's (NHMFC) collection activity and
winding down its lending activity38 3 . However, these plans were apparently aborted when David resigned
from the HUDCC due to the set-up of the (now defunct) Presidential Commission on Mass Housing
(PCMH).
In 1999, the Estrada administration planned to securitize the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation's (NHMFC) assets. The government had gone to the extent of hiring Goldman Sachs and
Lehman Brothers as underwriters for the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC)
issues. However, the planned securitization did not materialize due to the lack of a market for the
securities and problems with the valuation of the assets 84 .
In May 2001, the newly installed Arroyo administration again revived plans to securitize the National
Home Mortgage Financing Corporation's (NHMFC) mortgage loans. The Department of Finance (DOF)
lined up the assets of NHMFC as a priority for securitization this year. The government plans to sell of
an estimated P42 Billion (US$ 792 Billion) worth of National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation's
(NHMFC) assets in the form of securities. The government's objective in NHMFC securitization is now
primarily to raise funds for the government and keep its budget gap within target 385.
homeowners who had not paid their loans for a long time, etc. Moreover, the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC) failed to secure the concurrence of the funders prior to starting the program. (Souce:
Manicio, Eduardo T. Vice President, Funds Generation Group of the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation
(NHMFC). Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati City, Philippines.)
382 Delinquent housing loan borrowers, whose accounts have been published in major newspapers prior to sale
through public bidding, have until a specific date to update their payments in order to save their accounts from
auction sale by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corp. (NHMFC). (Source: Businessworld Publishing
Corporation. NHMFC extends loan condonation scheme to Apr. 30. April 10, 2000, Makati City, Philippines)
383 Tenorio, Arnold S. Housing program back to square one. Businessworld Publishing Corporation. February 8,
2001. Makati City, Philippines.
384 Calica, Dymphna R. US banks eye P43-B assets ofNHMFC. August 30, 1999. Manila, Philippines.
385 Calica, Dymphna R. Gov't readies sale of P40-B securitized NHMFC assets. May 7, 2001. Manila, Philippines.
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Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC).
Overview. After the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) was relieved of its
mortgage-origination function, the Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) actively stepped up its
government owned and controlled 'explicit' guaranty corporation, actively stepped up its guarantee loans
to encourage the private sector, via the commercial banks, to securitize their own assets. Thus, instead of
becoming a Secondary Mortgage Institution (SMI), it initially encouraged private banks to engage in their
own stand-alone mortgage securitization.
In 1995, HGC has already approved the request of three commercial banks, namely Philippine
Commercial and Industrial (PCI) Bank, Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), and Solidbank Corp. to
issue MBS. PCIBank planned to issue P1 Billion (US$18.9 Million) worth of Mortgage-Backed
Securities (MBS) while BPI and Solidbank planned to issue P500 Million (US$9.5 Million) each of
Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS) 3 86 .
However, the 1997 regional financial crisis of 1997, which spurred high interest rates due to the peso
devaluation, coupled with the high transaction costs and the lack of a clear mechanism for securitization,
hampered the banks' securitization efforts.
Current State. Due to the sidelining of the National Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) as the
public Secondary Mortgage Institution (SMI), the Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) was touted as the
alternative government-sponsored SMI. Lending credence to this idea is the new charter of the Home
Guaranty Corporation (HGC), signed into law in March 2000 (Republic Act 8763 or the Home Guaranty
Corporation Act of 2000). Among the amended corporate functions is HGC's "new mandate to pursue
the development of a secondary market for housing mortgages, bonds, debentures, notes and
securities" 387 . Loosely interpreted, this could mean that Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) could pursue
386 Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC)-guarantee instruments are exempted from the registration requirements of
the Securities and Exchange Commission (but subject to a case-by-case Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (Central Bank
of the Philippines) approval since bank assets were involved), thus reducing the transaction costs involved in
Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS) issuance. Further, tax exemption is granted up to a maximum of 10% of interest
earnings. Despite the incentives, banks, as issuers, have still been wary of the risks involved in the transaction.
387 Home Guaranty Corporation. The Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Home Guaranty Act of 2000 (With
Republic Act 8763). March 2001. Makati City, Philippines.
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mortgage-backed securitization. This is further strengthened by the expansion of the Home Guaranty
Corporation's (HGC) capital base38 s, the prioritization of lower-cost packages 89 and an extended term390.
However, Bernardo expressed his concern with regard to the Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) being
'strongly urged' by congressional supporters to go into direct low-cost financing given its new
mandates391. In particular, Bernardo fears that the Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) might be
compelled to make a "politically popular but financially disastrous" decision to replace the Contractual
Savings Institutions (CSIs) in terms of funding the Multi-Window Lending Scheme (MWLS) or to
become the new primary mortgage originator (akin to the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation
(NHMFC)). Limlingan supports Bernardo's concern that the Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) might
be transformed into the next National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC). He believes that
the increased capitalization of the Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) was a Chamber of Real Estate and
Builders Associations (CREBA) initiative to create a new take-out window for developers, since the
National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) was no purchasing mortgages 392.
According to Tan393 , general manager of the Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC), the corporation is
studying the possibility of making HGC the Secondary Mortgage Institution (SMI) and will probably
commission a study to look at this in more depth. However, there were no concrete plans to actively
pursue Secondary Mortgage Institution (SMI) plans.
Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig.
Overview. The Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig has engaged in a) limited mortgage-
backed securitization efforts, which include mortgage-backed securities (MBS) issuances of P500 Million
388 The Home Guaranty Corporation's (HGC) authorized capital stock was increased from P2.5 Billion (US$47
Million) to P50 Billion (US$943 Million) with an initial equity infusion of P7.5 Billion (US$142 Million) by the
National Government upon approval of the Act.
389 Republic Act 8763 compels the Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) to give preferential attention and incentives
to socialized and low-cost housing. The Law provides that 70% of its guaranty portfolio must be allocated to this
sector. Moreover, attractive incentives are given to funders of socialized housing - premium fees are lower, tax
shield is higher and the guaranteed portion of the interest earnings is higher.
390 The Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) was given a fresh 50-year mandate to operate a stronger and improved
guaranty system for housing.
91 Bernardo, Romeo L. Former Undersecretary of the Department of Finance (DOF). Personal Interview. June
2001, Pasig City, Philippines.
392 Limligan, Victor. Professor at the Asian Institute of Management. Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati City,
Philippines.
393 Tan, Arthur, Executive Vice-President and General Manager of the Home Guaranty Corporation. Personal
Interview. June 2001. Makati City, Philippines.
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(US$ 9.4 Million) in 1994 and P430 Million (US$ 8.1 Million) in 1997'94 and, b) a mortgage-backed
bond (MBB) issuance of P4 Billion (US$ 75.5 Million), tax exempt, Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC)
guaranteed bonds in March 2000 at 8.25%, equivalent to 14% on a grossed-up basis39 .
Kotecha believes that the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig could securitize its
performing middle-income loans, which comprise 40% of its business volume (30% is evenly divided
between the socialized and low income housing segments). Moreover, Mortgage-Backed Securities
(MBS) could help increase the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig's liquidity position
given that over the next 5 years, its payment liabilities will outstrip its cash flow 3 9 6.
Although the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig's underwriting standards could stand
improvement, Kotecha asserts that they may be sufficient enough to securitize the middle-income loans.
Among the standards Kotecha highlights are: a) loan-to-value rations are typically less than 90% (versus
previous National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) loans which had 100% loan-to-value
rations), b) income checking is performed and the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig
has asked the government to use direct debits against salary payments and, c) in-house appraisers are
used.
Current State. The Home Development Mutual Fund/Pag-Ibig has a total portfolio of P55 Billion (US$
1.04 Billion) 397, with a World Bank-estimated default rate of 37.9%. Out of the Home Development
Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig's 300,000 mortgage loans, an estimated 80,000 are delinquent. Lehman
Brothers reportedly made an offer to securitize the entire portfolio, but it was rejected because of the steep
discount they offered.
Originally, former Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig president, Ramon Palma-Gil,
estimated that Pag-Ibig the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig would only be able to
securitize an estimated P500 million worth of performing loans. However, securitization on an individual
loan basis would result in "cherry-picking" by investors, depriving Home Development Mutual Fund
394 Philippine Conference on Securitization. Mobilizing the Markets for Housing: The Case for Asset-Backed
Securities. October 1999. Makati City, Philippines.
395 Kotecha, Mahesh K. Secondary Mortgage Institution (SMI) Philippines - Draft Business
Plan. Structured Credit International Corporation. 2000. New York, New York.
396 The Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig is a member-owned provident fund, with more than 5
million members in the fund. The members expect annual compounded dividends of 3.5% to 4%.
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(HDMF)/Pag-Ibig of its most attractive loans. And in the process, it will make it harder for the agency to
securitize its remaining loans in the future.
Instead of "cherry-picking" mortgage loans to securitize, which would admittedly be difficult as the
Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig would have to review over 240,000 accounts, the
Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig planned to securitize on a per housing project, with
the objective of developing the infrastructure (i.e. increased participation in the planning and development
of the project prior to financing or lending for take-out) to improve collection efficiency and make the
securitized pool more attractive to investors398
In an apparent change of plans, Palma-Gil re-looked into securitizing the P54 Billion (US$1.01 Billion)
Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig loan portfolio by tapping the services of an
independent company, Lighthouse, a joint venture of former investment bankers and the United Coconut
Planters Bank (UCPB), to look into the records of existing mortgages399
Lighthouse was supposed to conduct a free pilot project to help Home Development Mutual Fund
(HDMF)/Pag-Ibig improve the quality of its portfolio, using proprietary technology to reviewing and
reprocess the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig and improve collection efforts. As of
this writing, the deal has yet to push through. Manuel Crisostomo, the current Home Development
Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig Chairperson, says that, in retrospect, HDMF should be primarily
involved in direct lending to the members of the provident fund, instead of securitizing their mortgages,
as this is one of their main functions4 00.
397 Note that there is a discrepancy between the claims of PlB (US$ 19M) between Kotecha's estimate of the Home
Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig's portfolio (P55 Billion (US$1.04 Billion)) and that the Home
Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig's estimate of their portfolio (P54 Billion (US$1 Billion)).
398 Falgui, Raymond G. Pag-IBIG Fund mulls new tack on housing debt (.. after ditching Lehman Brothers).
Businessworld Publishing Corporation. November 30, 1999. Manila, Philippines.
399 Leilani M. Gallardo. Pag-Ibig sells P4-B bonds Thursday. Businessworld Publishing Corporation. March 20,
2000. Makati City, Philippines.
400 Crisostomo, Manuel C. President and Chief Executive Officer of Home Development Mutual Fund
(HDMF)/Pag-Ibig. Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati City, Philippines.
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Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations (CREBA)-Proposed Housing Finance
Program
The Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association's (CREBA) proposed Centralized Home Financing
Program (CHFP) technically does not focus on the development of a secondary mortgage institution
(SMI), although the proposal calls for the revival of the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation
(NHMFC). Rather, it appears to be a comprehensive proposal by the Chamber of Real Estate and
Builders Association (CREBA) to develop a "sustainable" housing finance program. The Centralized
Home Financing Program (CHFP) is the alternative housing program that the Chamber of Real Estate and
Builders Association (CREBA) has been batting for in lieu of both the shelved Medium-Term
Development Plan for Shelter (MTDP-S) and the current Multi-Window Lending Scheme (MWLS).
The Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association (CREBA) proposes executive orders40' and
legislation to implement the Centralized Home Financing Program (CHFP). Although several of the
"securitization enhancement" measures, such as tax exemptions for mortgage backed securities (MBS)
and the exemption from the Maceda Law402 , several aspects of the Centralized Home Financing Program
(CHFP) are similar to the structurally deficient, and now defunct, Unified Home Lending Program
(UHLP). Key to note is that although the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association (CREBA)
claims to support securitization, they still continue to propose initiatives that are inimical to securitization,
such as proposing subsidized interest rates under the Centralized Home Financing Program (CHFP)403.
Businessworld reports that a number of Housing and Urban Development Coordination Council
(HUDCC) officials believe that the reason behind the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association's
(CREBA) clamor to revise the present housing finance system and revive the Unified Home Lending
Program (UHLP) or any similar program is because a number of its members benefited greatly from the
formula-lending system4 4 .
Nonetheless, the key features of the Centralized Home Financing Program are the following:
"Seed fund" from the contractual savings institutions. The fund pool will come from the following
government agencies:
401 Executive Orders only pass through the Office of the President and not through the upper and lower houses of
congress.
402 The Maceda Law is discussed under legal issues in Chapter 7.
403 Limlingan, Victor S. Professor at the Asian Institute of Management. Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati
City, Philippines.
404 Junia, Catherine C. Gov't lacks funds to finance socialized housing projects - CREBA. Businessworld Publishing
Corporation. May 7, 1999. Makati City, Philippines.
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Agency Amount
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) P15 Billion (US$283 Million)
Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)Pag-Ibig P25 Billion (US$472 Million)
Social Security System (SSS) P25 Billion (US$472 Million)
Agri-Agra Funds405  P35 Billion (US$660 Million)
Total P100 Billion (US$1.9 Billion)
Source: Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations (CREBA)
According to the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association (CREBA), the amounts for the
respective contractual savings institutions (CSIs) were derived by getting the full extent of each of their
investible funds for a year406. Thus, instead of placing their investible funds in other financial instruments
(i.e. government securities), the contractual savings institutions (CSI) are supposed to put all their money
into the seed fund for the Centralized Home Financing Program (CHFP). The Chamber of Real Estate and
Builders Associations (CREBA) argues that since the contractual savings institutions (CSI) are mandated
to provide housing finance under their respective charters, that these funds be effected in a one-time lump
sum basis versus annual installments, under the Centralized Home Financing Program (CHFP).
Similar to the Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP), the contractual savings institutions (CSIs) are
made to invest in primary mortgage lending, instead of developing the capital markets by investing in
mortgage-backed securities (MBS). Instead, the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association
(CREBA) recommends banks (via their housing credit allocation and statutory reserves) as the primary
investors in the mortgage backed securities (MBS).
Key to note is the financing scheme that the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association (CREBA)
developed for the Centralized Home Financing Program (CHFP):
1. A swap of the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation's (NHMFC) outstanding loans at
face value (P42 Billion/US$792 Million) with the contractual savings institutions (CSIs) in
exchange for promissory notes or housing bonds from the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC) of an equivalent amount.
405 The Agri-Agra Law (Presidential Decree 717) mandates that banks set aside 25 %of their loan portfolio (15% for
agriculture and 10% for agrarian reform lending) to help spur growth in both these sectors. The law has since been
amended to allow socialized or low-cost housing as one form of alternative compliance to the Agri-Agra Law.
406 According the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association (CREBA), full investible funds of each of the
Contractual Savings Institutions is 70% for the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig, 30% each for
the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and the Social Security System (SSS).
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2. The National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) promissory note/housing bond will
have a term-to-maturity of 10 years. The term-to maturity presumably corresponds to the median
maturity of the outstanding mortgage portfolios of the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC).
3. The National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) promissory note/housing bond
yield will be set at an average rate of the outstanding National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC). However, the yield will be less 2%, to allot for the overhead, collection
and related costs of the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) in servicing the
mortgage for the contractual savings institutions. For perspective, the Housing and Urban
Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC) reports that the average yield of the mortgage
loans under the Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP) was 13%. Thus, the contractual savings
institutions will be receiving only 11% over a period of ten years. As of August 8, 2001, the 10-
year treasury bill was trading at 15.7886%.
4. The National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) promissory note/housing bond
will be amortized annually for a period of ten years.
The proposal assumes that the total investment of the contractual savings institutions (CSIs) will be
liquidated on the 10th year, with all interest accruals being paid yearly.
Production oriented housing target. The Centralized Home Financing Program (CHFP) expects to build
350,000 housing units a year over a 10-year period. According to the Chamber of Real Estate and
Builders Association (CREBA), this production target will "eliminate the problem of homelessness and
squatting within 20 years". Moreover, this will allow developers to undertake long-term programming of
housing activities such as land banking. For perspective, the production oriented objectives of the
previous housing programs resulted in a) 'financially disastrous' consequences, as evidenced by the
failure of the Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP) and; b) the proliferation of thousands of units
which the intended beneficiaries refused to occupy.
Revival of the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) as a primary mortgage lender
and sole take out window. Although the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) has
already been relegated to a collection agency of its P42 Billion (US$792 Million) loan portfolio, the
Centralized Home Financing Program (CHFP) proposes reviving its primary mortgage lending and
136
mortgage take out function 07. In the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association (CREBA)
proposal, the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) will simultaneously undertake
BOTH primary mortgage lending and securitization activities408. However, in the Centralized Home
Financing Program (CHFP), the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) will be
engaged in wholesale collection efforts from the developers. Presumably the reason why Serrano4 09
argued that it "doesn't matter whether or not it (National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation) is an
effective institution or not, but it was designated to be there. CREBA sees no reason why it should not be
used...it can be restored to what it once was before" by putting in "the right people, since it just a
fictional entity after all"4 10 was because the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations (CREBA)
planned to use it for their proposed Centralized Home Financing Program (CHFP).
Decentralized lending. Mortgage origination for the Centralized Home Financing Program (CHFP) will
be undertaken either through participating banks or through developers via Contract-to-Sell (CTS)
origination. Under the previous Unified Home Lending Scheme (UHLP), mortgages versus contracts-to-
sell (CTS) were provided to the homebuyers. For perspective, mortgages are covered under the
foreclosure law, which allows the homebuyer up to a year to redeem his/her foreclosed property 1 .
Under the Contract-to-sell (CTS), the title of the property will not pass to the homebuyer until full
payment of the property. In the Centralized Home Financing Program (CHFP), the National Home
Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) will "take-out" the Contract-to-sell (CTS) from the developers.
Developer origination. After the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) takes out the
developer's Contract-to-Sell (CTS), the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) will
407 Unlike the Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP) where the sole mortgage take out window was the National
Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC), the current Multi-Window Lending Scheme utilizes several
government financial institutions (via their accredited banks) for primary mortgage lending and take out.
408 Again, the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) is being used to perform primary mortgage
lending, an activity that the organization was not structured to perform. Presently, the National Home Mortgage
Finance Corporation (NHMFC) has since refocused and correspondingly restructured its activities to collect on its
loan portfolio.
409 Serrano, Atty. Manuel M. Founding Chairman of the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations
(CREBA). Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati City, Philippines.
410 The Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association (CREBA), through Serrano, appears to be the lone voice
endorsing the use of the revival of the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC), although all other
key players in securitization agree that the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) can no longer
serve as an effective secondary mortgage institution (SMI).
411 Presumably, the Contract-to-sell (CTS) is used versus mortgage origination to avoid the foreclosure law.
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release 90% of the balance of the Contract-to-Sell (CTS). The retention of the 10% of the balance of the
housing unit is suppose to a) 'alleviate' the risk burden that was shouldered by the National Home
Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) under the Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP), where the
UHLP paid out 100% of the property to the developers; b) render unnecessary the Home Guaranty
Corporation (HGC) guaranty because it already incents the developer to ensure that payments are made
on the contract-to-sell (CTS) and; c) prevent delays in "take outs" to developers because the National
Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) does NOT have to undertake a lengthy process of credit
evaluation of individual loan applications.
The developer shall a) take collect the first 2 years of the Contract-to-sell (CTS) for the National Home
Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC), and; b) have a 100% warranty in writing to back up the
collection of mortgage receivables. After the first 2 years, the developer will deliver an absolute deed of
sale to the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC), effectively transferring its
ownership to the NHMFC.
Use of purchase commitment lines. Similar to the Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP), the
Centralized Home Financing Program (CHFP) will draw up purchase commitment lines (PCLs) for the
developers and participating banks that will "take out" the Contracts-to-Sell (CTS) and mortgages. For
perspective, the purchase commitment lines (PCLs) created incentives for developers, who were also
originating the mortgage loans, to build housing units even before entertaining applicants for the low-cost
housing.
Standardization of lending parameters. The proposal calls for the standardization of lending terms,
conditions, and documentation, as a means of reducing costs and ensuring marketability. The Centralized
Home Financing Program (CHFP) appears to use the same uniform lending guidelines/borrower
eligibility that were characteristics of the Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP), namely all income-
earning citizens who are non-members of the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-ibig,
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), and the Social Security Service (SSS) under the Urban
Development and Housing Act (Republic Act 7279) or members of the contractual savings institutions
(CSI) who have not previously availed of government housing assistance
Subsidized interest rates. Similar to the Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP), the National Home
Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) will administer the three-tiered fixed interest rates of 9% for
socialized housing, 12% for low income housing, and 16% for mid income housing. For perspective, the
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unsustainability of subsidized interest rates for the mortgage loans was identified as one of the
shortcomings of the Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP).
"Full" securitization program. The subsidized mortgage loans will be recycled through a continuous
securitization program. Presumably, this implies that all mortgage-backed securities (MBS) from the
Centralized Home Financing Program (CHFP) will be purchased to maintain the liquidity of the seed
fund. Moreover, the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association (CREBA) believes that the
program will be successful behind proposed securitization enhancement measures by raising the net
yields WITHOUT correspondingly raising the mortgage rates.
The Centralized Home Financing Program (CHFP) proposed the use of the Home Guaranty Corporation
(HGC) as a credit enhancement on the securitized pool of mortgages. For perspective, a guarantee facility
was not extended by the Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) to the Unified Home Lending Program
(UHLP) because or the lenient borrowing guidelines. Presumably, this would be the case for the
Centralized Home Financing Program (CHFP) since it uses similar lending parameters. For perspective,
the lending requirements for the program would be developed by the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC) BASED upon the lending parameters that the Chamber of Real Estate and
Builders Association (CREBA) drafted for the proposed Executive Order on the Centralized Home
Financing Program (CHFP).
The Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association (CREBA) asserts that the securitization program
will be high-investment grade because of the a) strong hold on the collateral property and; b) 100%
collection of receivables and; c) proposed exemption from the Maceda Law412.
The Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association (CREBA) defines "strong asset hold" as the use of
contracts-to-sell (CTS) versus mortgage origination, because the title of the property doesn't transfer to
the homebuyer until the property is fully paid. Thus, the developer, acting on the National Home
Mortgage Finance Corporation's (NHMFC) behalf, can cancel the contract-to-sell (CTS) and re-sell the
property.
Furthermore, the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association (CREBA) claim that the possibility of
defaults is rendered remote because of the a) the "low" loan-to-value ratio which increases the
homebuyers' stake in the contract-to-sell (CTS) ( For perspective, the Chamber of Real Estate and
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Builders Association (CREBA) uses the loan to value ratio of 95% for socialized housing and 90% for
non-socialized housing. For perspective, commercial banks have a 60% to 70% loan to value ratio) and;
b) the use of the contract-to-sell (CTS) to incent homebuyers to fully pay the housing unit before the
property is transferred to their name.
The 100% collection of receivables is backed up by what the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders
Association (CREBA) termed as a 'developer warranty' scheme. In the event that an account falls in
arrears for more than 2 months, the developer will be required, within a 1-month period, to either update
the account or buy it back. However, if the developer fails to comply, the National Home Mortgage
Finance Corporation (NHMFC) merely cancels the developers' collection agreement and forfeits the 10%
retention. On top of that, the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) will have to take
up the collection efforts.
The following are the securitization "enhancement" measures the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders
Association (CREBA) to "enhance" the yields on the mortgage backed securities without having to
increase the mortgage rate to homebuyers. These measures are proposed in the bill that the Chamber of
Real Estate and Builders Association (CREBA) drafted to create a Department of Housing.
1. Exemption from the 20% withholding tax/final tax on interest income for savings depositors of
banks whose investments in housing bonds is not less than 20% of their investible funds;
2. Exemption from the 20% final tax on income, documentary stamp tax (DST), gross receipts tax
(GRT), and Value Added Tax (VAT), for transactions involving the purchase and sale of housing
bonds/securities;
3. Use of housing bonds/securities as statutory and/or liquidity reserves of banks and insurance
reserves of insurance companies;
4. Use of investments in housing bonds/securities as alternative compliance with the loan-to-deposit
ratio of requirement of banks;
5. Use of investments in housing bonds/securities as alternative compliance with the social housing
quota under the Urban Development and Housing Act (Republic Act 7279).
Other "securitization" enhancement measures to be included in the bill are the a) exemption of housing
units sold under the Contract-to-sell (CTS) from the Maceda Law; b) Reduction of the mortgage period
for foreclosures from 1 year to 3 months; c) Summary ejectment by the Housing and Land Use
412 The Maceda Law is discussed under legal issues in Chapter 7.
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Regulatory Board (HLURB) to facilitate the turnover of defaulted loans/cancelled accounts and; b)
establishment of a 20% credit allocation for housing.
Current State. In an article that came out in the Philippine Star, Charlie Gorayeb, the national president
of the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations (CREBA) seemed to imply that the Centralized
Home Financing Program (CHFP) was finally pushing through under the administration of newly
installed President Arroyo413 . Gorayeb said that the P20 Billion (US$377 Million) that the President had
earmarked for the development of housing units during the State of the Nation Address (SONA) would
form part of the seed money to start of their proposed Centralized Home Financing Program (CHFP) 414.
Moreover, Gorayeb stated that the centralized house financing program (CHFP) would be part of proposal
that they would submit to congress seeking to establish a Department of Housing and Urban
Development. Meanwhile, he adds that the both the mechanics of the common housing fund and the
infrastructure to pursue the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations (CREBA) proposed
housing program would be mapped out by the government.
Issues with the Centralized Home Financing Program (CHFP).
Another version of the Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP)?. The Centralized Home Financing
Program (CHFP) appears to carry the same structural flaws of the Unified Home Lending Program
(UHLP). Since most of these deficiencies are similar to the Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP),
these issues were discussed extensively under the shortcomings of the aforementioned program in
Chapter 4. However, it is also instructive to understand the possible rationale behind the Chamber or
Real Estate and Builders Association (CREBA) aggressive push for the Centralized Home Financing
Program (CHFP).
Key players in securitization have asserted that developers in the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders
Association (CREBA) want to maintain the housing finance structure under the Unified Home Lending
Program (UHLP) because it has worked to the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association's
41 Gorayeb, Charlie V. Government-private sector housing policy to beforged in summit. Philippine Star. August 6,
2001. Manila, Philppines.
414 Gorayeb said that the P20 Billion (US$377 Million) will be The fund will be combined with the P50 Billion
(US$943 Million) coming from the unused portions of the Agri-Agra Fund, and the P 10 Billion (US$189 Million)
contribution from the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig, and a P5 Billion (US$94 Million)
contribution each from the Social Security System (SSS) and the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS).
The aggregate amount will total P90 Billion (US$1.7 Billion), which will start of their proposed Centralized Home
Financing Program (CHFP).
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(CREBA) financial advantage". Under the Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP), developers groups
under the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association (CREBA) were able to pass on sub-par
mortgage loans to the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) via the purchase
commitment loans (PCLs). Similarly, the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association (CREBA) has
been successful in a) securing government subsidy for the development projects and; b) persuading the
government to purchase the debt papers of their members' projects. Thus, it would appear to be in the
Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association's (CREBA) best interests to continue this type of
relationship. This assertion is strengthened by the discussion on the 'moral hazard for developers'
shortcomings under the Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP), wherein the developers has already
built the housing units even before they had qualified potential homebuyers for the low-income units.
Moreover, the desire to maintain a government sponsored housing program may explain why the
Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations (CREBA) favors a publicly- versus privately-led
secondary mortgage institution (SMI). The developer groups in the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders
Associations (CREBA) may have concluded that the 'quality' of their current receivables416 isn't up to
par. Thus, if a private-led secondary mortgage institution (SMI) is established, developer groups under
the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations (CREBA) will not be able to sell off their
mortgage loans because they are not eligible for securitization (i.e. poor asset quality)417. Presumably, the
Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association (CREBA) would be in a better position if the
government merely allocated funding for housing versus having their mortgage origination process
undergo the stringent underwriting guidelines required prior to securitization. This belief tends to be
strengthened by the proposed 10% retention scheme of the total contract-to-sell (CTS) balance of the
National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) under the Centralized Home Financing
Program (CHFP). The rationale of the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association (CREBA)
behind the retention is to prevent delays in "take outs" to developers because the National Home
Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) does NOT have to undertake a lengthy process of credit
evaluation of individual loan applications.
4" Limlingan, Victor S. Professor at the Asian Institute of Management. Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati
City, Philippines.
416 These receivables are presumably mortgage receivables from the loans that were not taken out by the National
Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) under the Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP). Moreover,
these receivables are presumably pegged under the fixed interest rate scheme of the Unified Home Lending Program
(UHLP).
417 Limlingan, Victor S. Professor at the Asian Institute of Management. Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati
City, Philippines.
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For perspective, key players in securitization have argued that most of the developers whose mortgage
loans had become non-performing loans (NPLs) were members of the Chamber of Real Estate and
Builders Associations (CREBA). Again, this assertion appears to be strengthened by a) the revival of the
National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) as the secondary mortgage institution (SMI)
under the Centralized Home Financing Program (CHFP) and; b) Serrano's insistence to revive the
National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) because it is the only institution with the public
mandate to securitize*18.
In the event that the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) could not be revived as a
primary mortgage take out window, Limligan says that the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders
Association (CREBA) has been influencing the government to let the Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC)
become a) the new primary mortgage take out window for developers or; b) to serve as a guarantor for the
mortgage loans of that Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association (CREBA) developers in the
event that they are able find new sources of financing 419. He argues that the that Chamber of Real Estate
and Builders Association's (CREBA) initiatives was the primary reason behind the increased
capitalization of the Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC).
The National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) and contractual savings institution (CSI)
'swap' isfinancially unfavorablefor thefunders. There are several concerns with regard to this proposal.
First, the revolving seed fund calls for a 'swap' of the outstanding loan portfolio of the National Home
Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) with a one-time seed fund from the investible reserves of the
contractual savings institution (CSI). However, the outstanding loans of the National Home Mortgage
Finance Corporation are already technically owned by the three funders. In effect, this proposal charges
the contractual savings institution (CSI) to purchase their 'investments' in the National Home Mortgage
Finance Corporation, which does not appear to make financial sense for the funders.
In the event that this 'swap' pushes through, it still appears be financially unfavorable for the contractual
savings institutions (CSI). The total National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC)
outstanding loan portfolio is P42 Billion (US$ 792 Million). However, the National Home Mortgage
418 Serrano, Atty. Manuel M. Founding Chairman of the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations
(CREBA). Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati City, Philippines.
419 Limlingan, Victor S. Professor at the Asian Institute of Management. Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati
City, Philippines.
143
Finance Corporation (NHMFC) reports that only 50% of loans are non-performing42 0 . Despite this, the
Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association (CREBA) recommends a "face value" swap of the loan
portfolio for the seed fund from the contractual savings institutions (CSI). Given this arrangement, the
more financially sensible alternative for the funders would be to "absorb" the loans from the National
Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) and collect the mortgages themselves instead of buying
out their own investments.
On top of this, the Centralized Home Financing Program (CHFP) swap requires a P100 Billion (US$1.9
Billion) seed fund with the P42 Billion (US$792 Million) loan portfolio. The proposal was silent with
regard to where the seed fund would source the additional P58 Billion (US$1.09 Billion).
Subsidized interest rates will continue to render the Centralized Home Financing Program (CHFP)
mortgages ineligible for securitization. The Centralized Home Financing Plan (CHFP)'s recycled seed
fund hinges on the continuous securitization of the mortgage pool from their receivables. However,
similar to the subsidized interest rates on the mortgage loans of the Unified Home Lending Program
(UHLP), the subsidized interest rates on the mortgage loans of the Centralized Home Financing Program
(CHFP) fail to make these potential mortgage backed securities (MBS) more lucrative versus higher
yielding long-term government securities (i.e. treasury bills). In Chapter 5, we discussed how Kotecha
already discounted all mortgage loans originated under fixed interest rates as being ineligible for
securitization42 1 . Furthermore, the use of subsidized interest rate will continue to "crowd out" commercial
banks from participating in low cost housing since the banks cannot compete against these rates422 .
The use of the total investible funds of the contractual savings institutions (CSI) for the Centralized Home
Financing Program (CHFP) prevents the growth of the capital markets. The contractual savings
institutions (CSI) are the ideal institutional investors for mortgage-backed securities (MBS) because of
the asset-liability duration match 423 . However, as discussed in Chapter 4, the contractual savings lose out
on the opportunity to invest in long-term financial instruments with higher yield (i.e. government
securities).
420 Manicio, Eduardo T. Vice-President, Funds Generation Group of the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC). Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati City, Philippines.
421 Kotecha, Mahesh K. Secondary Mortgage Institution (SMI) Philippines - Draft Business Plan. Structured Credit
International Corporation. 2000. New York, New York.
422 Llanto, Gilbert M., Aniceto C. Orbeta, Jr., Ma. Teresa C. Sanchez and Marie Christine G. Tang. A Study of
Housing Subsidies in the Philippines. Philippine Institute of Development Studies. November 1998. Makati City,
Philippines.
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The Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association (CREBA) recommends that the 'potential'
investors in mortgage-backed securities are the banks424 . However, Bernardo claims that banks are not
ideally suited for providing long-term financing for housing due to the short-term nature of their liabilities
(i.e. deposits) 425.
Private Secondary Mortgage Institution.
Home Corporation
Overview. The Home Corporation would have been the first privately led Secondary Mortgage Institution
(SMI) in the Philippines. In September 1998, Urban Bank created Home Corp., a financing company
owned by UrbanCorp Investments 426. Through Home Corp., Urban Bank expected to syndicate loans
backed by the mortgages of Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig Fund members, in the
process helping Pag-Ibig's middle-income contributors get homes and acquire financing. In fact, Urban
Bank was even in talks with the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the World Bank's private sector
arm, to invest in Home Corp. and allow it to eventually increase its paid-up capital.
The Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig estimated that the middle income group's
funding demand at P1O Billion (US$ 180 Million) a year considering a rate of 5,000 to 10,000 housing
units built per year, with a value of P1 Million (US$19,000) to P2 Million (US$38,000) per loan. These
middle-income groups would be the target of Home Corporation's securitization program since the
families were the target of the program since the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig
catered to lower loan ceilings. Under the program, the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-
Ibig would originate loans of between P500,000 (US$9,400) to P3.5 Million (US$66,000), higher than the
present maximum loanable amount of P500,000 (US$9,400) to its qualified members. Home Corporation
would, in turn, purchase the mortgages and securitize them via the issuance of Mortgage Backed
Securities (MBS). The Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig, at the time, estimated that
423 The discussion on contractual savings institutions as the ideal investors for mortgage backed securities is
discussed extensively under the Investors section of this chapter.
424 The Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association (CREBA) identified the following potential mortgage
backed securities (MBS) sources: a) banks 20% housing credit allocation; b) banks 9% statutory reserves; c) 50% of
75% loan to deposit ratio of banks; d) 50% of the remaining deposits of banks and; e) 50% of the 20% quota for
socialized housing projects.
425 Bernardo, Romeo L. Revisiting Housing Finance. Philippine Daily Inquirer. March 12, 2001. Makati City,
Philippines. The short-term investment horizon of Philippine commercial banks is discussed extensively in Chapter
5.
426 Reside, Renato S. Mortgage-Backed Securities in Asia. Asian Development Bank. 1999. Pasig City, Philippines.
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they would have approximately 15% of the fund's membership of 5 million who would qualify for the
loan under the program
Meanwhile, the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig would handle the administrative
such as retail loan servicing and loan collection. Qualified banks under the program would charge an
interest rate based on prevailing market rates for the first two years of the loan and a fixed interest rate of
18% from the third year until its maturity.
The Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS) would have had a 20-year term with semiannual payment of
principal and yield. The Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS) would be in denominations of as low as
P10,000 (US$190), to make it accessible to retail investors as well as institutional investors. Urban Bank
said that members will have to qualify based on commercial bank-based credit standards, theoretically
making the loans creditworthy and bankable assets in their own right. Urban Bank and the Home
Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig drew up the mortgage origination, lending and servicing
guidelines for securitizable loans to minimize credit risk.
The Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) was to have guaranteed the mortgages, and not the securities
themselves. Since the HGC guarantee is the equivalent of a sovereign guarantee, the pass-through
interest earnings of Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS) investors up to 8.5% of the market-determined
interest rate would have been exempt from the regular 20% withholding tax on interest income. In
addition, the Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS) did not have to be registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC).
To support the securitization process, Urban Bank was going to electronically link originating banks with
Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig's regional offices. On top of this, Equitable Card
Network had been tapped to facilitate the loan collections through credit card in addition to payments
through ATM cards, the branch network of banks and mail check payments. The securities would have
been underwritten and sold to financial institutions and capital market investors, listed on the Philippine
Stock Exchange (PSE), and enrolled in the Philippine Central Depository, Inc. for scripless trading.
During its first year, Urban Bank hoped to generate P10 Billion (US$189 Million) to fund the same
amount of housing loans. However, even up to 1999, there was a failure to list the first ever publicly
listed MBS at the PSE due to the lack of inventory of mortgage loans to back up the securitization. In
turn, the lack of inventory build-up was due to the sluggish economic activity and shrinking interest rate
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margins discouraged developers from turning over their receivables to Home Corporation. In fact, of the
P5 Billion (US$94 Million) earmarked for the securitized housing loan program, only P1 Billion (US$19
Million) had been used up, which was a far cry from P10 billion a year the bank was initially projecting.
Current State. According to Crisostomo, the Urban Bank/Home Corporation never pushed through for
two key reasons 427. Firstly, Urban Bank/Home Corporation wanted the Home Development Mutual Fund
(HDMF)/Pag-Ibig to play the role of originator for Urban Bank/Home Corporation's mortgage-backed
securities (MBS), a role which the provident housing fund was not keen on performing 428. The intention
of Urban Bank/Home Corporation was to "short cut" the system (i.e., despite not having a sizable pool of
mortgages, they already wanted to securitize) and engage in secondary mortgage institution (SMI)
operations. In fact, the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig had still been processing the
loans (i.e. mortgage loans had not yet been lent out), but Urban Bank/Home Corporation had already been
selling the mortgage backed securities (MBS) for mortgages that had not yet been created429
Crisostomo's statements appear to strengthened by preliminary reports on the collapse of Urban Bank43 .
Government investigations of Urban Bank revealed that the bank's misfortune stemmed from the financial
trouble of its investment house subsidiary, Urbancorp Investment. Early reports said Urbancorp has
possibly engaged in "Wincorp-like" transactions, referring to another cash-strapped investment house,
Westmont Investment Corp., which brokered securities deals but was caught by liquidity problems when
investors suddenly preterminated their holdings431.
427 Crisostomo, Manuel C. President and Chief Executive Officer of Home Development Mutual Fund
(HDMF)/Pag-Ibig. Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati City, Philippines.
428 The current retail lending of Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig was intended to provide
housing loan access to low income borrowers (up to P500,000 (US$9,430)). However, Urban Bank/Home
Corporation had wanted Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig to originate middle income loans of
P500,000 to P3.5 Million (US$9,430 to US$66,000).
429 According to Crisostomo, it had been made to appear that the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-
Ibig had been reneging on its agreement.
430 Urban Bank collapsed in May 2000 after experiencing a severe bank run (which led to a bank holiday and its
eventual closure). Preliminary investigation by government agencies on the Urban Bank 'fiasco' indicate that the
bank's management had broken the rules of sound banking. Preliminary findings by the task force investigating the
case showed that the bank, among others, violated the revised securities act and the law on commercial papers.
(Source: Boras, Eric. S. Second Quarter Banking Report: Some hard lessons from the Urban Bank collapse (What
Happened and Can it Happen Again?). Businessworld Publishing Corporation. August 16, 2000. Makati City,
Philippines.)
431 Boras, Eric. S. Second Quarter Banking Report: Some hard lessons from the Urban Bank collapse (What
Happened and Can it Happen Again?). Businessworld Publishing Corporation. August 16, 2000. Makati City,
Philippines.
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Metrobank, Equitable Non-performing loan securitization
Lehman Brothers has recently forged separate deals with Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, the
Philippines' biggest bank in terms of assets, and Equitable PCI Bank, the third largest bank, for the
establishment of their respective Asset Management Companies (AMC) 432 .
Businessworld reports that Lehman Brothers is currently performing due diligence on the Non-
Performing Loans (NPLs) and acquired assets of Equitable PCI Bank. However, there was no mention as
to the percentage of the non-performing loans (NPLS), which were residential loans. For perspective, as
of end-2000, Metrobank's Non-Performing Loans (NPLs) have reached P29 Billion, while Equitable PCI
Bank's Non-Performing Loans (NPLs) have reached P24.8 Billion, representing 15% and 19% of the their
total loan portfolio, respectively.
Thrift Bank Securitization
Thrift banks claimed that they have already begun the process of securitization by purchasing asset-
backed (ABS) or mortgage-backed securities (MBS) among themselves433. According to thrift bank
representatives at the Philippine Conference on Securitization, their experience revealed that Asset
Backed Securities (ABS) have higher yields compared to other financial instruments.
Other securitization efforts. There have been previous attempts by other local and foreign banks to
securitize mortgage loans. However, structural deficiencies in the financial capital markets prevented
these banks from further pursuing securitization efforts. It is interesting to note that both of these
proposals mortgage securitization efforts occur right before the 1997 regional currency crisis.
Lighthouse Credit Technologies Corporation Securitization. Lighthouse is an independent third-party
loan servicer founded by former real estate financial experts and investment bankers from the United
States. Lighthouse plans to be a fully integrated company that engages in all the processes leading
towards mortgage-backed securitization4 34 . These include mortgage origination up to securitization
43 Yap, Cecille E. Lehman, Metrobank, Equitable, step up efforts to create AMCs. Businessworld Publishing
Corporation. July 18, 2001. Makati City, Philippines.
43 Philippine Conference on Securitization. Mobilizing the Markets for Securitization: The Case for Asset Backed
Securities. October 1999. Makati City, Philippines.
434 Maquera, Peter D. Chief Operating Officer of Lighthouse Credit Technologies Corporation. Personal Interview.
June 2001. Pasig City, Philippines.
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process, utilizing global best standards practices. Lighthouse has a) been in negotiations with the
National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) to purchase their total loan portfolio at par
value and; b) won the bid to service 60,000 accounts for the Home Development Mutual Fund
(HDMF)/Pag-Ibig but which did not push through because of the unstable political environment in 2000
(i.e. the impeachment of President Estrada) which consequently led to economic instability.
Bankers trust. In 1997, The Hong Kong unit of Bankers Trust was involved in negotiations with
Philippine banks for the possible securitization of mortgages where peso-denominated mortgage prices
would be swapped with dollars. Bankers Trust had been in talks with foreign institutions, such as the
Financial Securities Assistance, to serve as a credit guarantor to help enhance the creditworthiness of the
securities. However, Bankers Trust mentioned that securitization in the Philippines would only be
successful if the country's credit rating would be upgraded to a notch below investment grade".
Bankers Association of the Philippines/Citibank N.A. In January 1997, the Department of Finance (DOF)
wanted to forge a partnership with the private sector, particularly Citibank N.A., the Bankers Association
of the Philippines (BAP) and the multisectoral Capital Markets Development Council (CMDC), to create
a Secondary Mortgage Institution (SMI) that would facilitate mortgage securitization43 6.. The Department
of Finance (DOF) envisioned the Secondary Mortgage Institution (SMI) to be an organization that would
buy mortgages from banks and selling the Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) to thrift banks with a
guarantee from the Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC). The original motivation for the Department of
Finance (DOF) to spearhead this move was because the contractual savings institutions (CSIs) were
already hard-pressed in funding the government mortgage lending programs. However, the plan failed to
push through supposedly due to the high costs of securitization (which was further exacerbated by the
sluggishness of the housing sector given that proposal came amidst the 1997 regional currency crisis).
Issues with foreign ownership of Asset Management Companies (AMC)/Secondary Mortgage Institutions
(SMI). Macasaet of Lehman Brothers cites that one of the key issues hampering the development of the
secondary mortgage market in the Philippines is the inability of foreign companies to establish and
maintain virtually full control of their asset management companies (AMC)/secondary mortgage
435 Castillo, Dulce J. Bankers Trust in talks with KBs on securitization. Businessworld Publishing Corporation.
January 29, 1997. Manila, Philippines.
436 Duplito, Ma. Salve I. BAP, Citibank eye secondary mortgage firm. Businessworld Publishing Corporation.
October 30, 1997. Manila, Philippines.
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institutions (SMI) 4 3 7 . In Thailand, Lehman Brothers was able to establish an asset management company
that successfully liquidated roughly 7,000 to 8,000 medium to high-income residential mortgage loans
(from a purchased mortgage portfolio of 15,000 loans) that were absorbed by the Thai government from
52 different finance companies. The asset management company (AMC), 99% owned by Lehman
Brothers, and 1% owned by the Thai government, introduced world class servicing facilities to
rehabilitate the loans. When the rehabilitated loans were issued with Lehman's credit enhancements, the
mortgage backed securities (MBS) generated strong demand from domestic Thai investors.
Maquera, of Lighthouse Technologies, adds that investment banks such as Lehman Brothers or Goldman
Sachs will have a) the experience and expertise; b) financial capital and; c) international credibility to
establish and run an asset management company (AMC) 438. However, the current laws on foreign
ownership serve as a disincentive to foreign companies from setting up such institutions in the country.
For perspective, in the event that the secondary mortgage institution (SMI) is considered a quasi-bank, the
Foreign Investments Act of 1991 allows only 60% foreign equity for an investment house or financing
company. In the event that the secondary mortgage institution (SMI) is considered a corporation, it may
possibly be limited to 40% foreign equity on land ownership439.
Guarantees
Overview. An investor in mortgage- backed securities (MBS) requires some level of assurance that he will
receive a regular stream of cash flows originating from the securitized pool of mortgage loans. This
necessarily means that the investor should be 'insulated' from the risks that occur in the primary mortgage
market, such as default risks of the homebuyer 44 0. These "assurances" take the form of guarantees, which
is suppose to provide the risk cover that will make the Mortgage Backed Security (MBS) competitive
with other investment options.
43 Norman Macasaet, Principal Transactions Group of Lehman Brothers. Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati
City, Philippines.
438 Maquera, Peter D. Chief Operating Officer of Lighthouse Credit Technologies Corporation. Personal Interview.
June 2001. Pasig City, Philippines.
439 Land ownership is presumably transferred to the secondary mortgage institution through the non-recourse
purchase of mortgages and contracts-to-sell (CTS).
440 This assumes that the Secondary Mortgage Institution (SMI) is an entity separate from the originating institution(i.e. a private bank securitizing its own mortgage loans).
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The assurance provided to the Mortgage-Backed Security (MBS) is crucial in increasing demand for the
financial instrument. In the United States, the three Secondary Mortgage Institutions (SMIs)44 1 all carry
the implicit guarantees of the U.S. government (i.e. U.S. Treasury), thus rendering their Mortgage-Backed
Securities extremely liquid.
Home Guaranty Corporation. In the Philippines, the guarantee is explicit, and comes in the form of the
Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC, formerly the Home Insurance Guaranty Corporation). The HGC, a
government owned and controlled corporation, is the 'de facto' guarantee for mortgage backed securities
(MBS) issued in the Philippines. Theoretically, most mortgage-backed securities (MBS) are regarded as
having the same risk profile as sovereign debt, and thus are exempt from Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) registration4 4 2. The Republic of the Philippines guarantees the Home Guaranty
Corporation's (HGC) borrowings and guaranty obligations both as to the principal and interest subject to
certain limitation. However, unlike the U.S., the Home Guaranty Corporation doesn't necessarily
guarantee the mortgage loans of the Secondary Mortgage Institution (SMI)44 3.
For example, the mortgage loans lent out through the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation
(NHMFC) for the Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP) were not guaranteed by the Home Guaranty
Corporation (HGC) 44. Although the Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) had actually approved a
guarantee facility for the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC), the "formula
lending" guidelines of the Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP) were too lenient, that the NHMFC
could not secure the guarantee.
For perspective, the Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) guaranteed the first Home Development Mutual
Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig home lending program in 1981 (prior to the Unified Home Lending Program
(UHLP) in 1986). The shortcoming of the program was that upon a mere 3 months worth of default by
the homebuyer, the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) could draw - upon mere
notification - the entire homebuyer's mortgage loan balance from the trust fund of the Home Guaranty
Corporation (HGC)" 5.
441 Federal National Mortgage Association ("Fannie Mae"), Government National Mortgage Association ("Ginnie
Mae"), and the Federal Home Mortgage Corporation ("Freddie Mac")
442 Reside, Renato S. Mortgage-Backed Securities in Asia. Asian Development Bank. 1999. Pasig City, Philippines.
43 In the Philippines' case, this would have been the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).
44 Tan, Arthur, Executive Vice-President and General Manager of the Home Guaranty Corporation. Personal
Interview. June 2001. Makati City, Philippines.
45 Tan, Arthur, Executive Vice-President and General Manager of the Home Guaranty Corporation. Personal
Interview. June 2001. Makati City, Philippines.
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The current Multi-Window Lending System (MWLS) carries a Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) loan
guaranty line approval of P14 Billion ($264 Million)446, and the use of the Home Guaranty Corporation
(HGC)'s appraisal services. But it is of concern to note that the Multi-Window Lending System (MWLS)
continues to use a "uniform lending" guideline, which was rejected by the Home Guaranty Corporation
under the Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP) 447
The Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) is the government agency mandated to operate a viable guaranty
system to mobilize funds for housing. The Home Guaranty Corporation provides guaranty for a)
development loans (guaranty facility covering loans extended for the development of subdivisions,
townhouses, dormitories, apartments, and other residential dwellings) and; b) retail loans (i.e. guaranty
coverage on loans/credit facility extended for the purchase/acquisition or lease of a single-family
residence).
The Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) guarantees are full faith and credit of the Philippine
Government. Thus, one of the agency's programs is the guaranty facility covering asset-backed securities
(ABS). Given this, the Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) has been the primary provider of Mortgage-
Backed Securities (MBS) insurance in the Philippines. HGC guarantees have been widely used. For
example, in March 2000 it guaranteed the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig issue of
P4 Billion (US$75 Million) in March 20000, and the Bank of the Philippine Islands Mortgage Backed
Security (MBS) issue.
In the securitization process, the Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) extends its guaranty on housing
securities to enhances the creditworthiness of the instrument. Housing securities, real properties, housing
mortgages, and contract receivables from the sale of units and housing projects are assets that may be
securitized. In particular, banks and other financial institutions may avail of Home Guaranty
Corporation's (HGC) guaranty for purposes of issuing Mortgage Backed Securities (MBSs) backed up
their portfolio of housing mortgage loans or contract receivables 448.
The guaranteed entity may claim for the guaranty benefits upon default by the mortgagor or borrower.
The events guaranteed for Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) include: a) failure to redeem securities at
446 Businessworld Publishing Corporation. New HUDCC initiatives seen to perk up home access. October 27, 2000.
Makati City, Philippines.
447 Businessworld Publishing Corporation. Property sector airs views on new scheme. March 27, 2000. Makati City,
Philippines.
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maturity, b) failure to service guaranteed interest on the securities, and c) off-mark wind-up4 49. Since the
Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) bears the risk of guaranteeing the retail loans, they have the
opportunity to help improve the origination standards for primary mortgage lending. The Home Guaranty
Corporation (HGC) currently offers a new product line to evaluate a banking institution's lending
guidelines before they extend a guarantee line. Although this product line was meant to be a "double
check" of the banks for their underwriting guidelines, this product line has made the Home Guaranty
Corporation (HGC) a "de facto" source of improving bank underwriting guidelines450 .
Previously, the Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) guaranteed individual mortgage loans that are pooled
and conveyed to the Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) or Trust Fund. A 100% recovery of outstanding
principal loan plus interest to the extent of 8.5% is guaranteed, and an exemption from withholding taxes
of 20%. Thus, from an investor standpoint, the total cash flow of the Mortgage Backed Security (MBS) is
not guaranteed. Also, the guaranteed interest portion is tax-free to the insured or beneficiary of the
guaranty. However, the new law governing the Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) was further 'skewed'
to incent lending to the low-income sector. For example, the law extends 100% recovery only to the
socialized and low cost housing, guarantees a larger portion of the interest and provides higher tax
exemptions for socialized and low cost housing.
Guaranty Cover and Tax Exempt Features for Retail Dwelling Units
Housing type Loan to Value ratio Guaranty Cover Tax Exemption
(% of appraised value) Principal Interest Interest or Yields Earned
Obligation I
Socialized housing 100% 100% 11%
Low cost housing 90% 100% 10%
Medium cost housing 80% 90% 9.5%
Open Housing 70% 85% 8.5%
11%
10%
9.5%
8.5%
Source: Home Guaranty Corporation (HIGC)
Furthermore, the net worth of the Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) has been skewed as well to
guarantee low-income housing packages:
448 Reside, Renato S. Mortgage-Backed Securities in Asia. Asian Development Bank. 1999. Pasig City, Philippines.
449 An off-mark wind-up shall be deemed to have occurred in the following instances: a) if there is a 25% slippage
on each of the following: construction timetable/cost/quality; marketing in terms of units sold; or cash inflows in
terms of equity payments and/or buyers takeout or; b) if the slippage items above reaches 50%.
450 Tan, Arthur, Executive Vice-President and General Manager of the Home Guaranty Corporation. Personal
Interview. June 2001. Makati City, Philippines.
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Allocation of Guaranty Capacity
Type of Housing Package % of Guaranty Capacity
Socialized housing (P1 80,000/US$3,400 and below) 40%
Low cost housing (P180,000/US$3,400 to P500,000/US$9,430) 30%
Medium cost housing (P500,000/US$9,430 to P2M/US$38T) 20%
Open housing (P2M/US$38T to P5M/US$94T) 10%
Source: Home Guaranty Corporation (HIGC)
The guaranteed entity for the retail/single-family dwelling unit has the option to choose the type of
guaranty coverage as follows:
1. Standard Coverage. Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) shall pay in the form of debenture
bonds should default occur within the first five years of guaranteed obligation, and in the
form of cash if the default occurs after the first five years of the guaranteed obligation.
2. Pure Bond Coverage. Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) shall issue debenture bonds as
payment for any retail guaranty claims regardless of when default occurs during the term of
the guaranteed obligation.
The guaranty premium, as well, reflects the bias for low-income housing. The guaranteed entity is
suppose to pay the annual premium upon enrollment or renewal of the guarantee coverage. The payment
may either be in cash or in debentures issued by the Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC).
Guaranty Premium
Housing Type Premium Payment (% of outstanding obligation)
Socialized housing % of 1%
Low cost housing /4 of 1%
Medium cost housing 1%
Open housing 1.5%
Source: Home Guaranty Corporation (HIGC)
In March 2000, Republic Act 8763 of the Home Guaranty Corporation Act of 2000 was signed into
law451, which renewed the charter of the Home Insurance Guaranty Corporation 452 . Among the key
highlights of the Law which were relevant to mortgage backed securitization (MBS) were the following:
SALIENT FEATURES OF REPUBLIC ACT 8763
1. Extending Life Term. The Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) was given a 50-year mandate to operate a
guaranty system for housing.
2. Expanding Capital Base. The Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC)'s authorized capital stock was increased
from P2.5 Billion (US$47 Million) to P50 Billion (US$943 Million), with an initial equity infusion of the P7.5
Billion (US$142 Million) by the National Government.
3. Amending Corporate Function. The Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) has been vested with a new mandate
to pursue the development of secondary mortgage market for housing mortgages, bonds, debentures, notes,
and securities*5.
451 Among other things, the corporation was renamed Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) from the Home Insurance
and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC).
452 Home Guaranty Corporation. The Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Home Guaranty Corporation Act
of 2000 (with Republic Act 8763). March 2000. Makati City, Philippines.
45 The new mandate of the Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) was tasked to "pursue the development and
sustainability of a secondary mortgage market as the primary strategy to encourage private sector participation in
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4. Instituting Safeguards. The charter provides for mechanisms to ensure the Home Guaranty Corporation
(HGC)'s mandate is carried out with prudence. These include:
a. National Government Guaranty. The Republic of the Philippines will guarantee the Home Guaranty
Corporation (HGC)'s borrowings and guaranty obligations both as to principal and interest subject to the
following limitations:
* Guaranty obligations, not to exceed twenty times (20X) the Home Guaranty Corporation
(HGC)'s capital and surplus454 .
* Corporate borrowings, not to exceed the aggregate amount of obligations of all accounts
guaranteed.
b. Sinking Fund. 5% of the annual net operating revenues would be set-aside as reserves for guaranty
calls.
c. Prioritizing lower-cost packages. The new law compels the Corporation to give preferential attention
and incentives to socialized and low-cost housing. The law provides that 70% of its guaranty portfolio
are given to funders of socialized housing - the premium fees are lower, the tax shield and risk cover on
the interest earnings are higher.
Issues with the Home Guaranty Corporation.
The Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) served to increase, not reduce risk, in the primary mortgage
market. According to Toby Monsod, former Secretary General of the Housing and Urban Development
Coordinating Council (HUDCC) under former HUDDC Chairperson Karina Constantino-David noted in
a paper that instead of 'catalyzing' the private mortgage market, the Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC)
crowded out, rather than, crowded in, the private sector455. "Perversely, it may have increased, rather than
reduced risk." Monsod's paper stated.
Prior to the new Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) charter, the basic guarantee was 100% of the
outstanding principal of the loan plus 8.5% of the interest cost and a tax shield of 10% of interest income.
This rendered the mortgage loans a risk-less asset, which was not subject to the single borrower's limit, to
the 20% ceiling on real estate exposure (for banks) and to capital asset requirements, giving it a virtual
'no capital, no taxes'.
However, Monsod claims that the same guarantee inhibited the development of the primary mortgage
market. The Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) guarantees discouraged financial institutions from
undertaking proper credit checks or acquire information essential for underwriting primary mortgages.
As a consequence, the ancillary services such as credit reporting bureaus and insurance failed to evolve
housing finance. The Corporation shall undertake such measures using the guaranty cover as enhancement trading
by the public in a secondary market for housing mortgages, bonds, debentures, notes and securities".
454 This means that capital of the Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) P50B can be leveraged 20 times
45 Tenorio, Arnold S. FOCUS: Secondary mortgage market expected to boost housing. Businessworld Publishing
Corporation. December 3, 1999. Makati City, Philippines.
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because private banks did not need them given the 'sovereign guarantee' of the Home Guaranty
Corporation (HGC).
In fact, Monsod argues that the Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) should be downgraded from a
sovereign guarantee into a mere corporate guarantee to instill market discipline. In a corporate guarantee,
the Home Guaranty Corporation would be forced to "to properly price its services, streamline its
activities, maintain adequate reserves and observe proper disclosure."
The recommendation to downgrade to a corporate guarantee appeared to be coming from the perspective
that a private led secondary mortgage institution (SMI) could not provide comparable credit
enhancements for its mortgage backed securities (versus presumably a public led secondary mortgage
institution (SMI) which had a 'no capital, no taxes' offer from the Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC)).
However, Monsod's argument doesn't appear to take into consideration that a) the private led secondary
mortgage institution (SMI) purchasing the Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) guarantee to enhance the
demand for their Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) and, b) the U.S. Mortgage Backed Securities
(MBS) from the Secondary Mortgage Institutions (SMIs) have both an implicit guarantee from the U.S.
government (although these SMIs are already privately owned) coupled with credit enhancements.
Nonetheless, the argument that the Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) guarantee has prevented the
development of credit discipline is supported by Alcid4 56. Alcid asserts that banks have become reliant on
the guaranty rather than relying on the quality of the cash flow of the underlying mortgages. In fact, in
some unscrupulous deals, the "first way out" is through the Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) guaranty
because those who initiate the deal are aware that the cash flows are not enough to cover the principal and
interest.
The Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) doesn't totally insulate the Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS)
investor from default risks in the primary mortgage market. Firstly, the current Home Guaranty
Corporation (HGC) guaranty for retail/single family home loans is not a full guarantee of market rates,
but have corresponding interest rate caps, which decrease as the housing package increase. Thus, the
Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) investor is subject to the risk between the gap of the Home Guaranty
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456 Alcid, Andrew D. Executive Vice President, Investment Banking Division of United Coconut Planters Bank.
Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati City, Philippines.
Corporation (HGC) guaranty on interest rates and market rates, especially if the securitized pool of
mortgages consists of medium cost and open housing.
Second, the current structure of the guaranty cover attempts to incent private banks to lend to the low-cost
housing sector through a higher guaranty cover for both principal obligation and interest, higher tax
exemptions, and a lower guarantee premium. Moreover, the allocation of the guaranty capacity has been
skewed as well towards the socialized and low-income housing sector. This has two implications:
The Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) encourages private banks to lend to homebuyers at an 11%
mortgage interest rate4 57. As per Coronel's sample computation of mortgage interest rates in Chapter 5,
the banks will be hesitant to lend at this rate as it fails to cover the bank's administration costs. The
interest rate of 11% 400 basis points lower versus the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) 1 year fixed
interest rate for 5 year loans below P1 Million (US$19,000). The low interest rate coupled with private
banks' hesitance to lend to the low income housing sector (and being the housing sector least likely to be
securitized) will presumably lead to the failure to use up the guaranty allocation for the socialized and low
income sector.
The mid-income sector, which is the most likely candidate for securitization, will conceivably avail of the
Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC). Given this, there is the distinct possibility that the guaranty
allocation for this sector will be quickly used up. Consequently, the lack of guaranty allocation for the
mid income may stifle securitization of the mid income-housing sector.
The Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) guaranty is not necessarily a liquid guarantee. Recall that for a
retail/single-family mortgage loan, the Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) will a) for standard coverage,
pay in the form of a debenture bond if the default occurs within 5 years of the guaranteed obligation and,
b) for pure bond coverage, and pay in the form of debenture bonds regardless when the default occurs.
According to Tan, prior to the re-capitalization of the Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) in March 2000,
the cash coverage has posed a liquidity problem for the company as it covers both retail and development
loans. The Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) had come to a point where they did not have liquidity to
service calls, thus they issued bond guarantees, subject to the authorized bond ceilings458. However,
according to Kotecha, the bond guarantees of Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) are illiquid, trade
457 Businessworld Publishing Corporation. Property sector airs views on new scheme. March 27, 2000. Makati City,
Philippines.
458 Tan, Arthur, Executive Vice-President and General Manager of the Home Guaranty Corporation. Personal
Interview. June 2001. Makati City, Philippines.
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poorly and at significant discounts459. In fact, there have been instances that when the Home Guaranty
Corporation (HGC) bond guarantee matured, it was replaced with another bond guarantee4 60. Thus, the
Mortgage Backed Security (MBS) investor is faced with the prospect of receiving an illiquid bond versus
cash.
The Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) is subject to political pressure. As a government owned and
controlled corporation (GOCC), the Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) has been 'coerced' to guaranty
financially unsound projects. Thus, the guarantees have been subject to much abuse, particularly by
unscrupulous developers who use "government connections" to secure a cash guarantee 4 61. For example,
under the Ramos administration, the Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) had extended a controversial
P500 Million (US$ 9.4 Million) guaranty for the construction of the APEC (Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation) Villas for the heads of state during the APEC Summit in November 1996462. The
government ended up shouldering P488.3 Million (US$ 9.2 Million) of the APEC Villas when the private
corporation that constructed the villas defaulted on its loan to the Development Bank of the Philippines
and the ING Bank463
The Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) has been 'persuaded' to support the government's primary
mortgage programs despite their structural deficiencies. Under the Unified Home Lending Program
(UHLP), the Social Security System (SSS) required that the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)
secure a Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) guaranty each time the Social Security System (SSS)
released funds to the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF) to fulfill its annual funding
commitment64 . However, the Home Guaranty Corporation only covered 22% of the loans that the Social
Security System (SSS) extended as a funder.
459Kotecha, Mahesh K. Secondary Mortgage Institution (SMI) Philippines - Draft Business Plan. Structured Credit
International Corporation. 2000. New York, New York.
460 Jacob, Monico. Former Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig Chairman and Conference Chairman
of the Philippine Conference on Securitization. Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati City, Philippines.
461 Alcid, Andrew D. Executive Vice President, Investment Banking Division of United Coconut Planters Bank.
Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati City, Philippines.
462 Garcia, Cathy Rose A. and Yasmin Lee G. Arpon. Palace belittles possible delay in WB loan for housing study.
Businessworld Publishing Corporation. November 12, 1999. Makati City, Philippines.
463 The loan guarantee supposedly ignored Presidential Decree 385, which mandated government financial
institutions to foreclose all loans with arrears amounting to at least 20% of the total outstanding loan obligation.
464This occurred after the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF) took over the role of sole take out window
from the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) under the Unified Home Lending Program.
(Source: Reside, Renato S. Mortgage-Backed Securities in Asia. Asian Development Bank. 1999. Pasig City,
Philippines. )
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Similarly, the Home Guaranty Corporation has extended a P14 Billion ($264 Million) guaranty line for
the Multi-Window Lending Scheme (MWLS), which uses a "formula lending" scheme which did not
originally pass the Home Guaranty Corporation's (HGC) guidelines under the Unified Home Lending
Program (UHLP).
Subdivision and Housing Developers Association (SHDA) Guaranty Fund. The Subdivision and Housing
Developers Association (SHDA) Guaranty Fund complements an arrangement that the Subdivision and
Housing Developers Association (SHDA) forged with the Home Development Mutual Fund
(HDMF)/Pag-Ibig called the Developer Contract-to-Sell (CTS) scheme 4 65. The scheme is a risk-sharing
arrangement between the funder and the developer, where the developer guarantees a 100% collection
efficiency of the homebuyer for the first 2 years of the loan repayment period. However, given that the
Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig is still exposed to the risk of the developer failing to
comply with the buy back guaranty within the 2 year credit seasoning period 466.
The Subdivision and Housing Developers Association (SHDA) Guaranty Fund will provide a stand-by
backup guaranty protection to the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig and other funders
in the event of the failure on the part of any guaranteed developer to comply with its buy back of
defaulting buyers within the first 2 years of the scheme of the housing loan repayment period under the
Developer Contract-to-Sell (CTS) scheme.
The guaranty fund is composed of a) the cash bond posted by developers to cover 5% of the value of the
housing loan takeout and b) a one-time non-refundable guaranty fee equivalent to 2.5% of the loan value
to be charged from the developer to cover the two-year seasoning period467 .
According to Tan, the Subdivision and Housing Developers Association (SHDA) Guaranty Fund
complements the Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) guaranty efforts (in the event that a Home Guaranty
Corporation (HGC) guaranty is purchased on top of the Subdivision and Housing Developers Association
465 On the part of the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig, the funder commits to fast-track the loan
take out and put in place a funding commitment line system to facilitate the matching of housing production with
that of funds available and to adopt a set of lending rules that will be relevant to the needs and capacity of the
intended mass housing beneficiaries. The arrangement is expected to improve both the collection efficiency of the
funder and the cash flow and profit generation capability of the developer.
466 Subdivision and Housing Developers Association. Concept Paper SHDA Guaranty Fund, Inc. December 1,
2000. Makati City, Philippines.
467 Businessworld Publishing Corporation. Pag-IBIG and housing developers sign guaranty deal. December 22,
2000. Makati City, Philippines.
159
(SHDA) Guaranty Fund) 468. In a Contract-to-Sell (CTS), the Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) does
not guarantee the first 2 years of the loan, as this risk is borne by developers469 . Within the first 2 years of
the guaranty, a defaulting account will be substituted with 'an account of current status' by the Home
Guaranty Corporation (HGC)4 70 .
Issues with the Subdivision and Housing Developers Association (SHDA) Guaranty Fund. The
Subdivision and Housing Developers Association (SHDA) Guaranty Fund is a guaranty fund for loans
with fixed interest rates. Although the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig default rate
may significantly decrease due to both the Developer Contract-to-Sell (CTS) scheme and the Subdivision
and Housing Developers Association (SHDA) Guaranty Fund, these mortgage loans are presumably not
eligible for securitization due to their fixed interest rates. Thus, it will have no impact on the
development of Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS) in the Philippines.
In the event that the 16% fixed interest rates mortgage loans of the Home Development Mutual Fund
(HDMF)/Pag-Ibig are securitized, then the investor of the Mortgage-Backed Security (MBS) is still not
insulated from default risks in the primary mortgage market. This is because the capacity of the
Subdivision and Housing Developers Association (SHDA) Guaranty Fund is limited by the number of
developers who sign up with the fund. The Fund currently has an initial authorized capitalization of P20
Million (US$377,000) and a paid-up capitalization of P1.25 Million (US$24,000) 471. However, Mariano
Martinez, president of the Subdivision and Housing Developers Association (SHDA) believes that the
fund will reach P5 Billion (US$94 Million) after roughly a year in operation4 72
Provided that developers sell their contracts to sell (CTS), which have secured guarantees from both the
Subdivision and Housing Developers Association (SHDA) Guaranty Fund and the Home Guaranty
Corporation (HGC), to a private secondary mortgage institution (SMI), the guarantee to the investor is
still limited by the guaranty capacity of the Subdivision and Housing Developers Association (SHDA)
Guaranty Fund during the first two years of the payment by the homebuyer.
468 Tan, Arthur, Executive Vice-President and General Manager of the Home Guaranty Corporation. Personal
Interview. June 2001. Makati City, Philippines.
469 The first 2 years are considered to be the most 'critical' period as seasoning established the whether or not the
loan is good.
470 An account of current status will signify that the title of the property was not transferred to the buyer.471 Subdivision and Housing Developers Association. Concept Paper SHDA Guaranty Fund, Inc. December 1,2000. Makati City, Philippines.
472 Businessworld Publishing Corporation. Property developers put up guaranty fund for industry. June 16, 2000.
Makati City, Philippines.
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Potential to use Subdivision and Housing Developers Association (SHDA) guaranty fund to sell
contracts-to-sell (CTS) to private banks. Limlingan says that if and when the Subdivision and Housing
Developers (SHDA) Guaranty Fund expands its scope to include private commercial banks, banks would
be willing to purchase their receivables as long as there is a guarantee47 3 . Moreover, these market rate
loans would be eligible for securitization. However, the guarantee to the investor continues to be limited
by the capacity of the Subdivision and Housing Developers Association (SHDA) Guaranty Fund during
the first two years of the payment by the homebuyer
Credit Enhancements
Overview. Credit enhancements are used to protect Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) investors from the
losses that may arise from the deterioration of the mortgage pool. Given the dearth of long-term public
and private long-term financial instruments in the Philippines, Kotecha believe that credit enhancements,
such as multilateral guarantees and Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) guarantees will enhance the
viability of mortgage backed securities with terms longer than 5 years4 74 .
There are basically two types of credit enhancements: external (i.e. letter of credit from a bank or a
guarantee from a financial insurance company) or; internal (i.e. structural enhancements like tranches or
over collateralization)47 5 .
To clarify, the Philippines has no equivalent implicit "sovereign guarantee" attached to its Mortgage
Backed Securities (MBS), whether they are publicly- or privately-originated mortgages476. Thus, any sort
of guarantee attached to a Mortgage Backed Security (MBS) will be lumped together with "credit
enhancements". The closest equivalent that the Philippines have to a pseudo-"sovereign guarantee" is the
Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC). However, the Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) guarantee is not
instantly "attached" to a public or private mortgage backed security (MBS), but rather the mortgage loans
should qualify under Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) and the guaranty must be purchased. Thus, in
reference to the previous section, former Secretary General Monsod of the Housing and Urban
473 Limlingan, Victor S. Professor at the Asian Institute of Management. Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati
City, Philippines.
474 Kotecha, Mahesh K. Secondary Mortgage Institution (SMI) Philippines - Draft Business Plan. Structured Credit
International Corporation. 2000. New York, New York.
475 Reside, Renato S. Mortgage-Backed Securities in Asia. Asian Development Bank. 1999. Pasig City, Philippines.
476 Recall that Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) did not guarantee the mortgage loans under the Unified Home
Lending Program (UHLP).
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Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC), the Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) could be lumped
together with the other "credit enhancements".
As per the Bankgo Sentral ng Pilipinas (Central Bank of the Philippines) circular on Asset Backed
Securities (ABS), these are the following enhancements that can be used 477:
1. Standby letter of credit issued by a commercial bank other than the originator/seller or its
subsidiary/affiliate, its parent bank or the parent bank's subsidiary/affiliate, and Trustee or its
subsidiary/affiliate.
2. Surety bond issued by any insurance company other than the originator/seller's subsidiary or
affiliate, the subsidiary or affiliate of the originator/seller's parent bank and the trustee's
subsidiary or affiliate.
3. Guarantee issued by any entity other than the originator/seller or its subsidiary/affiliate, its
parent bank or the parent bank's subsidiary/affiliate, and Trustee or its subsidiary/affiliate.
4. Over collateralization provided by the originator/seller wherein the assets conveyed to the
Special Purpose Trust (SPT) exceed the amount of securities issued. Losses arising from
overcollaterization shall be recognized by the Originator/seller upfront. Such losses shall be
treated as capital charges.
5. Spread account wherein the income from the underlying pool of receivables is made available
to cover any shortfall in the repayment of Asset Backed Securities (ABS). The spread
account shall be handled by the Trustee, which shall account for it separately. If not needed,
the "spread" generally reverts to the holder of the residual certificate.
6. Subordinated securities that are lower ranking, or junior to other obligations and are paid after
claims to holders of senior securities are satisfied.
7. Other credit enhancements as may be approved by the Monetary Board.
Current State. Previous securitization efforts in the Philippines have relied heavily on structural
enhancements such as over collateralization and subordination.
Over collateralization. Over collateralization occurs when the mortgage pool has a peso value in excess
of the value of the securities being used against the pool 47 8. By doing this, more income flows into the
pool from the larger amount of mortgages relative to the required coupon payments to investors. Defaults
would have to be approximately equal to the amount of over collateralization before investors would
suffer losses. The extent of the over collateralization in a mortgage backed security (MBS) is usually
based on the desired debt coverage ratio (i.e. the number of mortgages needed to provide a sufficient
amount of income relative to the interest payment) to investors in the pool.
477 Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (Central Bank of the Philippines). Circular No. 185 (Series of 1998). December 4,
1998. Manila, Philippines.
478 Brueggeman, William B., Ph.D. and Jeffrey D. Fisher, Ph.D. Real Estate Finance and Investments. Irwin
McGraw-Hill Tenth Edition. 1997. United States of America.
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Issue with over collateralization. Matoto says that the Bangko Sentral (Central Bank of the Philippines)
circular on asset backed securities (ABS) discourages underwriters to put a deal together because over
collateralization requires the seller of the mortgages to take a capital charge47 9. This occurs when the
assets conveyed to the Special Purpose Trust (SPT) exceed the amount of securities to be issued. The
Bangko Sentral (Central Bank of the Philippines) rules of the conveyance state that48 0,
The seller shall be under no obligation to provide additional assets to the Special Purpose Trust (SPT) to
maintain a "coverage ratio" of collateral to the outstanding Asset Backed Securities (ABS). A breach of
this requirement will be considered a credit enhancement and shall be charged against capital.
Subordination. Essentially, a mortgage-backed security (MBS) is a claim on the cash flows of a
collection of individual mortgage loans that are pooled together. These cash flows are subsequently re-
allocated to investors based on the rules governing the priority of principal and interest payments.
There are several investment classes within a subordinated mortgage backed security structure481. The
allocation of the pooled cash flows can vary substantially among the alternative investment classes. These
allocations follow a set of pre-specified rules that are set out in the investment prospectus. The rationale
behind securitization is that the value of the sum of the parts exceeds the value of the whole. This occurs
when partitioned cash flows from particular investment classes offer certain benefits that, when
considered as a whole, exceed the value of the non-partitioned (non-pooled) cash flows.
The general approach of subordination is to create mortgage-backed securities (MBS) where investment
risk is shifted down the structure. This is commonly referred to as a "waterfall" structure. The higher
quality investment classes represent "high quality" bonds in terms of (virtually nil) default risks and the
expected receipt pattern of cash flows. However, as one moves downward through the security structure,
investment class risk characteristics represent the risks of the mortgage loans that are used to collateralize
the mortgage-backed security (MBS).
479 Matoto, Senen L. President of the Investment Houses of the Philippines. Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati
City, Philippines.
480 Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (Central Bank of the Philippines). Circular No. 185 (Series of 1998). December 4,
1998. Manila, Philippines.
481 Riddiough, Timothy. Real Estate Capital Markets Course Reader. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Spring
2001. Cambridge, Massachusetts.
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Representation of Mortgage Pooling and Cash Flows
Individual Mortgages
SENIOR PIECE
Primary or
Principal
70%
PRIORITIZIED CASH FLOW
MEZZANINE PIECE JUNIOR PIECE
Subordinate ResidualLittle Default Risk High Default Risk
10% 20%
Source: Timothy Riddiough, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Because of the default risk, the Mortgage Backed Security (MBS) is designed to shift default risk down
through the various security classes. This is typically done through prioritizing the return of the total pool
principal payments wherein the "senior" tranches have priority on the principal that is returned through
either loan amortization or through default/foreclosure recoveries. Meanwhile, the lower priority tranches
have to wait until the senior classes are fully repaid before they can receive a return on principal. Thus,
the principal is allocated "top down".
Losses from defaults/foreclosure, on the other hand, are allocated in a "bottom up" fashion. This means
that the face value of the lowest-rated tranches decline by the realized default loss 482.
482 For example, net recovery of P80 on a face value loan amount of P100 results in a P20 loss that is subtracted
from the face value of the lowest Mortgage Backed Security (MBS) tranche.
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Principal and Default loss allocation structure
L st H hest
Class A
Class B
Class C
First Class D Lowest
Source: Timothy Riddiough, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Thus, the subordinated structure ensures that investment risk increases as tranches become less and less
protected from the loss of principal due the default risk.
Credit Enhancements: U.S. System
Securitization is the method by which loans or mortgages are pooled and enhanced in order to be
converted into investment grade securities. The process makes it possible for firms to separate otherwise
non-marketable assets from their balance sheet and, often with the help of credit enhancement, turn them
into negotiable instruments.
Financial Guarantees. The "originator" of the assets, such as the mortgage lender with a pool of
mortgage loans) sells these assets to a Special purpose Vehicle (SPV). The SPV is a legal entity that is
designed to segregate the ownership of the asset pool and associated cash flow in case of the originator's
bankruptcy. Working with a financial guarantee company, the SPV purchases the assets from the
originator and structures the pool to a level acceptable to the international rating agencies, investors and
the financial guarantor. The SPV then issues securities that are bought by investors with the pool of
assets becoming the collateral that supports principal and interest payments on the securities. These
payments of principal and interest to investors are guaranteed by the financial guarantor, and carry its
high investment grade rating.
The use of financial guarantees, a form of third party credit enhancement, has proven a cost-effective way
for borrowers to tap domestic and international debt capital markets to satisfy their funding needs. The
use of a financial guarantee to enhance the rating of a securitized transaction can lower the cost of funding
for the issuer and provide other advantages, including diversification, off-balance sheet treatment,
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effective asset utilization, ease of documentation and stable funding, all while limiting risks and offering
an attractive yield for the investor.
Mortgage Insurance. The secondary market GSEs require credit enhancement, which is usually in the
form of private mortgage insurance for all loans purchased over 80% LTV. For securities backed by
loans not purchased by the GSEs, additional credit enhancement comes in the form of pool insurance or
senior subordination. The costs of credit enhancement will be a function of the characteristics of the
mortgage loan collateral as well as the past performance of the servicer. For loans sold to the GSEs, the
guarantee fee they charge will also be a function of the loan characteristics and servicer performance.
Lenders (investors) can protect themselves from some losses in the lending process by requiring
insurance. Mortgage insurance at least partially protects the investor against loss from a subsequent
foreclosure that results in sale proceeds that are insufficient to cover the unpaid principal, interest and
foreclosure costs. In the United States, there are three primary sources of default insurance:
1. Federal Housing Administration (FHA): provides 100% coverage of principal loss and
foreclosure processing costs.
2. Veterans Administration (VA): provides partial insurance for a specified percentage of the loss.
3. Private Mortgage Insurance (PMI): provides top loss insurance (e.g., 20% coverage of the
outstanding balance greater than 70% LTV.
Credit Ratings Agencies
Overview. On top of credit enhancements, Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) in developed financial
markets rely on the use of credit ratings agencies (i.e. Standard & Poors, Moody's) to assess the quality of
a Mortgage Backed Security (MBS)4 83 . The credit rating serves as a benchmark that allows the Secondary
Mortgage Institution (SMI) to determine how much credit enhancement is needed to achieve a particular
rating for the issuer.
In a developed financial market, the rating obtained by a fixed income security is crucial because of its
effect on the price. The assignment of a high rating to the issue means that the debt costs are lower (and
issuance proceeds are higher) versus when a low rating is assigned. As a result, the ratings agencies have
483 Reside, Renato S. Mortgage-Backed Securities in Asia. Asian Development Bank. 1999. Pasig City, Philippines.
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gained enormous power and serve as de facto regulators of entities who want to secure debt capital
through the public markets484 .
The rating assigned by a rating agency to a particular investment class is an assessment of the default or
credit risk. The commonly used ratings categories are AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, etc. The ratings that fall
below BBB are referred to as "non-investment grade", which implies that there is a significant default risk
that comes with the ownership of these securities. In a subordinated debt structure, each particular
tranche that is carved out of the mortgage pool and sold is assigned a rating based on that tranche's
perceived riskiness. For some tranches within a single issuance, it is possible to have all the ratings
assigned to the various tranches. However, the credit rating can also be used to assess the creditworthiness
of an institution issuing a specific financial obligation"' or a specific class of obligations*86.
The ratings take into consideration measures such as the properties in the pool, the loan to value ratios,
the debt service coverage ratio, mortgage pool size and mortgage pool diversification, and the
creditworthiness of guarantors, insurers, or other forms of credit enhancements on the obligation (and in
the event that it is an international issuance, takes into account the currency in which the obligation is
denominated).
484 Riddiough, Timothy. Real Estate Capital Markets Course Reader. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Spring
2001. Cambridge, Massachusetts.
485 For example, a private bank might issue its own mortgage-backed securities (MBS), and the credit ratings the
issuance receives is the rating of the creditworthiness of the bank.
486 www.bondtalk.com. Standard & Poor's Ratings Definitions. 2000. United States of America.
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Standard & Poors Long-term Issue Credit Rating
Ratings Definition
AAA An obligation rated AAA has the highest rating assigned by Standard & Poor's. The obligor's capacity to
meet its financial commitment on the obligation is extremely strong.
AA An obligation rated AA differs from the highest-rated obligations only in small degree. The obligor's
capacity to meet its financial commitment on the obligation is very strong.
A An obligation rated A is somewhat more susceptible to the adverse effects of changes in circumstances
and economic conditions than obligations in higher-rated categories. However, the obligor's capacity to
meet its financial commitment on the obligation is still strong.
BBB An obligation rated BBB exhibits adequate protection parameters. However, adverse economic
conditions or changing circumstances are more likely to lead to a weakened capacity of the obligor to
meet its financial commitment on the obligation.
Obligations rated BB, B, CC, CC, and C are regarded as having significant speculative characteristics. BB indicates
the least degree of speculation and C the highest. While such obligations will likely have some quality and protective
characteristics, these may be outweighed by large uncertainties or major exposures to adverse c-onditions.
BB An obligation rated BB is less vulnerable to nonpayment than other speculative issues. However, it faces
major ongoing uncertainties or exposure to adverse business, financial, or economic conditions which
could lead to the obligor's inadequate capacity to meet its financial commitment on the obligation.
B An obligation rated B is more vulnerable to nonpayment than obligations rated BB, but the obligor
currently has the capacity to meet its financial commitment on the obligation. Adverse business,
financial, or economic conditions will likely impair the obligor's capacity or willingness to meet its
financial commitment on the obligation.
CCC An obligation rated CCC is currently vulnerable to nonpayment, and is dependent upon favorable
business, financial, and economic conditions for the obligor to meet its financial commitment on the
obligation. In the event of adverse business, financial, or economic conditions, the obligor is not likely to
have the capacity to meet its financial commitment on the obligation.
CC An obligation rated CC is currently highly vulnerable to nonpayment.
C The C rating may be used to cover a situation where a bankruptcy petition has been filed or similar action
has been taken, but payments on this obligation are being continued.
D An obligation rated D is in payment default. The D rating category is used when payments on an
obligation are not made on the date due even if the applicable grace period has not expired, unless
Standard & Poor's believes that such payments will be made during such grace period. The 'D' rating also
will be used upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition or the taking of a similar action if payments on an
obligation are jeopardized.
Plus or The ratings from AA to CCC may be modified by the addition of a plus or minus sign to show relative
Minus standing within the major rating categories.
P The letter p indicates that the rating is provisional. A provisional rating assumes the successful
completion of the project financed by the debt being rated and indicates that payment of debt service
requirements is largely or entirely dependent upon the successful timely completion of the project.
L The letter L indicates that the rating pertains to the principal amount of those bonds to the extent that the
underlying deposit collateral is federally insured, and interest is adequately collateralized. In the case of
certificates of deposit, the letter L indicates that the deposit, combined with other deposits being held in
the same right and capacity, will be honored for principal and pre-default interest up to federal insurance
limits within 30 days after closing of the insured institution or, in the event that the deposit is assumed by
a successor insured institution, upon maturity.
* Continuance of the ratings is contingent upon Standard & Poor's receipt of an executed copy of the
escrow agreement or closing documentation confirming investments and cash flows.
R The r is attached to highlight derivatives, hybrids and certain other obligations that Standard & Poor's
believes may experience high volatility or high variability is expected returns as a result of noncredit
risks. Examples of such obligations are securities whose principal or interest return is indexed to equities,
commodities or other instruments. The absence of an 'r' symbol should not be taken as an indication that
an obligation will exhibit no volatility or variability in total return.
NR Not rated.
Source: www.bondtalk.com
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Implications of Ratings to Key Players. A credible and independent rating agency plays a critical role in
the sound functioning of capital markets as it:
e Provides investors with objective and unbiased opinions of relative credit risk (conveyed
through simple rating symbols), which are essential tools for making sound investment and
financing decisions;
0 Performs the functions of information searching and monitoring, analysis and dissemination,
and helps to level the playing field by providing transparency and disclosure to all investors
(small private individuals as well as large institutional investors) of credit rated securities;
* Maintains a continuously updated body of opinion (databank) on the credit quality of debt
issuances and issuers; and,
* Does market development and promotion work to popularize public debt securities. (A rating
agency disseminates rating information through press releases and rating publications,
enhancing market awareness on a rated institution's profile and financial capability, while
helping to promote its debt issuance to a wider pool of investors.)
Issuers. Ratings benefit the issuers in the following ways:
* Wider access to capital - Ratings are now widely used and clearly understood by institutional
investors. Also, rating information is disseminated to capital markets in areas where the rate may
not be well known, thus exposing the rate and its rated debt issues to a larger number of potential
investors.
* Financing flexibility - A wider market access often translates into reduced funding costs.
" Efficient new issuance - Pricing structures linked to ratings can facilitate planning of new debt
issues by providing ratees, dealers and investors with acceptable benchmarks.
" Improved counter-party relationships - Prospective business partners or clients are provided
with a certain degree of confidence as indicated in the ratings. Banks and corporations use
ratings to guide their decisions on trade finance, swap agreements, money market transactions,
and other counter-party risk situations.
Investor. Ratings benefit the investor in the following ways:
" Reduced uncertainty - Ratings reduce investment uncertainty as they enhance transparency and
disclosure. Less uncertainty means greater confidence, which encourages capital market growth
and greater market efficiency and liquidity.
* Portfolio diversification - Through ratings, investors get to know the various potential debt
investments available to them across industries and securities types.
* Risk premium assessment - Rated instruments in the market can be compared based on their
level of riskiness as implied in the ratings.
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e Portfolio monitoring - Surveillance or monitoring of ratings is part of a rating agency's credit
rating process. Movements in ratings (upgrades or downgrades) could indicate that an investor's
portfolio may require adjustment.
Intermediary. Ratings benefit the intermediary in the following ways:
e Facilitate pricing and underwriting - Investment bankers and other intermediaries active in the
fixed income markets also find ratings useful in the planning, pricing, and placement of
securities. Ratings can help place new issues with a broader investor base and also mitigate
uncertainties about the credit quality of the issue and the issuer.
e Monitor counterparty risk - Ratings also help intermediaries monitor their risk exposures,
either on behalf of clients or for their own accounts.
* Assist in capital allocation - Ratings are often used in capital models and so-called "haircut"
rules that require securities brokers and dealers to maintain capital against securities in a
portfolio.
e Marketing - Often ratings have proven useful in marketing various forms of pre-packaged bond
or short-term funds to both institutional and retail investors.
Current State. Previously issued Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) were not rated by the former Credit
Information Bureau, Inc. (CIBI) (now Philratings), which at the time was the only domestic credit-ratings
agency. Presumably, these were stand along Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) were issued by private
banks or government financial institutions and sold to private or public institutional investors, who had to
rely solely on the reputation and trustworthiness of the institution making the issue.
Philippine regulatory authorities do not require credit ratings for commercial paper issues. However,
since the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has moved towards more disclosure-based
regulation, this has encouraged more prime corporations to rely on credit ratings and market-driven
demand for such ratings. The passage of the Financing Company Act (Republic Act 5980) has liberalized
the sources of debt financing for finance firms, who are the primary issuers of the commercial paper
(CPs) 487.
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) currently requires only the privately originated
mortgage backed securities (MBS) to undergo credit ratings as publicly originated mortgage backed
securities are exempted from Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). However, Matoto believes
that even the publicly originated mortgages should undergo credit rating as well since the ratings affect
487 Reside, Renato S. Mortgage-Backed Securities in Asia. Asian Development Bank. 1999. Pasig City, Philippines.
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the credibility of an issue488. Moreover, ratings for both the public and private mortgage backed securities
(MBS) provide the potential investor an opportunity to make an "apples-to-apples" comparison and
reduce investment uncertainty between the investment alternatives.
Previously, the sole local credit ratings agency in the Philippines was the Credit Information Bureau, Inc.
(CIBI). Prior to the equity investment of Standard & Poor's (S&P) into the bureau, the Credit
Information Bureau, Inc. (CIBI) was hindered by the lack of skilled technical staff to perform the ratings,
as well as the poor availability, accuracy, timeliness, and regularity of corporate and government data.
The low capacity for ratings reduced both primary and secondary market liquidity by preventing second-
tier firms with below-prime ratings to issue long-term debt to tap capital markets. Consequently, these
second-tier firms become credit-constrained during periods of economic uncertainty, such as the 1997
regional currency crisis. Thus, the money and capital markets reduce the capacity to transfer risks
efficiently.
In the Philippines, there are currently two local credit ratings agencies that are affiliates of international
ratings agencies: Philratings, an affiliate of Standard & Poor's (S&P), Thomson Financial Philippines.
These agencies have mostly focused on rating commercial paper given the dearth of mortgage-backed
securities (MBS) in the country489. According to Coronel, credit ratings agencies are merely "waiting in
the wings" to start rating mortgage backed securities (MBS)4 90.
Philratings. PhilRatings evolved from Credit Information Bureau, Inc.(CIBI), which started in 1982
through the joint efforts of the Bangko Sentral (Central Bank of the Philippines), the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Financial Executives Institute of the Philippines (FINEX). The
Credit Information Bureau, Inc.(CIBI) was set up primarily to serve as a business and credit information
center.
488 Matoto, Senen L. Executive Director of the Financial Executives of the Philippines. Personal Interview. June
2001. Makati City, Philippines.
489 Matoto, Senen L. Executive Director of the Financial Executives of the Philippines. Personal Interview. June
2001. Makati City, Philippines.
490 Coronel, Leonilo G. Executive Director of the Bankers Association of the Philippines. Personal Interview. June
2001. Makati City, Philippines.
171
The Credit Information Bureau, Inc.(CIBI) was eventually given the mandate to implement the
Government's policy of establishing and maintaining an efficient credit evaluation and monitoring process
in the financial system. In 1985, the company, through its Ratings Group, began credit rating commercial
paper (CP) debt issues of Philippine companies. However, the Credit Information Bureau, Inc.(CIBI) was
once perceived to lack independence from the corporations it rated as well as the institutional capacity to
conduct credit ratings.
In 1998, the Credit Information Bureau, Inc.(CIBI) spun off its two major business units, transforming the
Ratings Group into CIBI Ratings, Inc. and the Information Group into CIBI Information, Inc. CIBI
Ratings, Inc., which has since been renamed Philratings, is aggressively involved in capital market
development initiatives491.
Philratings has already signed a mutual cooperation and assistance agreement with Standard & Poor's
(S&P) to develop issuer credit ratings, create enhanced information products, and actively market the
ratings system. For the ratings process, Standard & Poor's (S&P) will provide criteria and analytical
assistance to Philratings. Philratings adopted a new national ratings scale, with definitions and symbols
correlated with Standard & Poor's (S&P).
Philratings Long-term credit ratings
Rating Description
Prs Aaa Smallest degree of investment risk. Interest payments are protected by a large or by an exceptionally
stable margin and principal is secured. While the various protective elements are likely to change,
such changes as can be visualized are most unlikely to impair the fundamentally strong investment
characteristics of such issues.
PRS Aa Margins of protection may not be as large as in PRS Aaa issues. Fluctuations of protective elements
may be of greater amplitude or there may be other elements present which make the long-term risks
appear somewhat larger than for PRS Aaa rated securities.
PRS A With favorable investment attributes and are considered as upper medium grade obligations. Factors
giving security to principal and interest are considered adequate, but elements may be present which
suggest a susceptibility to impairment some time in the future.
PRS Baa Neither highly protected nor poorly secured. Interest payments and principal security appear adequate
for the present but certain protective elements may be lacking or may be characteristically unreliable
over any great length of time. Such issues lack outstanding investment characteristics.
PRS Ba Judged to have speculative elements. The issuer's capability to pay for such issues in the future cannot
be considered as well-assured. Often the protection of interest and principal payments may be very
moderate, and thereby not well safeguarded during both good and bad times over the future.
PRS B Generally lacks characteristics of a desirable investment. Assurance of interest and principal payments
or maintenance of other terms of the contract over any long period of time may be small.
PRS Caa Poor standing. High possibility of default and there may be danger with respect to principal or interest.
PRS Ca Very poor standing; has other marked shortcomings. The issue may be in default.
PRS C In default.
Source: www.philratings.com
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491 www.philratings.com
Although Philratings has rated more than 350 short- and long-term commercial paper (CP)
issues492, they have only started to take steps towards developing ratings for asset and mortgage backed
securities.
Thomson Financial Philippines. Thomson Ratings Philippines entered the credit ratings game in June
1999. The International Finance Corporation, the private sector investment arm of the World Bank made
a 15% equity investment of up to US$75,000 in Thomson Ratings Philippines which planned to offer a
full range of high quality independent ratings services to the Philippine domestic market using
internationally accepted standards493.
Thomson Ratings Philippines, which was capitalized at approximately $500,000, was to rate both
corporations and financial institutions. Short-term and long-term commercial paper (CP) will be the
primary instruments rated, but other instruments such as bonds, municipal government issues, and
securitized papers would have been rated as these markets develop4 94 .
According to Matoto, Thomson Financial Philippines has since closed shop due to the lack of deals to
rate. However, he believes that Thomson will possibly return as more local deals come into play4 95.
Underwriting/Issuance and Sale of Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS)
Underwriters.
Overview. In the United States, newly issued mortgage backed securities (MBS), similar to its other fixed-
income counterparts, are marketed to the public by investment banker through the primary securities
market. The purchase and sale of the already-issued securities among private investors takes place in the
secondary securities markets496.
492 The short-term commercial paper (CP) issues that Philratings rated ranged between P25 Million (US$472,000) to
P2 Billion (US$38 Million), while long-term commercial paper (CP) issues have ranged from between P75 Million
(US$1.4 Million) to P6 Billion (US$113 Million). For perspective, the total outstanding credit-rated short and long-
term commercial papers (CPs) amounted to P51.3 Billion (US$968 Million) as of end- 1999.
493 International Finance Corporation. IFC Invests in Credit Rating Agency in the Philippines. IFC Press Release.
April 29, 1999.
494 Juntilla, Judith S. 1st Annual Philippine Local Debt Conference: Thomson Ratings enhances credibility of RP
debt market. Businessworld Publishing Corporation. February 17, 2000. Manila, Philippines.
495 Matoto, Senen L. Executive Director of the Financial Executives of the Philippines. Personal Interview. June
2001. Makati City, Philippines.
496 Bodie, Zvi Ph.D., Alex Kane and Alan J. Marcus, Ph.D. Investments 4'h Edition. Irwin McGraw-Hill. 1999.
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The public offering of securities is typically marketed via an underwriting by investment bankers. In most
cases, more than one investment banker markets the securities. A lead firm forms an underwriting
syndicate of other investment bankers to share the responsibility for the stock issue.
In the case of a mortgage-backed security (MBS), a loan originator provides mortgage origination
services and secures fees from origination. The underwriter, who often directly coordinates a network of
loan originators, pools the mortgage loans together and determines the appropriate cash flow allocation
rules for securities that are carved out of the pool 4 97 . The income earned by the underwriter is the spread
differential between the weighted average mortgage yield on the pooled loans and the weighted average
securities yield. The ratings agencies earn fees for determining the subordination levels needed to secure
particular credit quality ratings and also for monitoring the post-issuance asset pool performance. These
fees are paid directly by the underwriter, since the free-rider problems prevent the fees from being passed
on directly to the investors. Although the ratings agencies exert control over the security design and
monitoring of the issuances, they do not take investment positions in the securities themselves.
Loan Production and Securitization Process
Loan Funding Issuance Proceeds
Asset Pooling
Loan Payments Loan Payments Loan Payments
Borrower Originator Securit Security/Servicer S
Underwriter Ivso
Rating
Agrenev
Source: Timothy Riddiough, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
The investment banks advise the originator regarding the terms at which it should attempt to sell the
securities. A preliminary registration statement is filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) describing the issue and prospectus of the company. When the statement is finalized by the
Securities and Exchange Commission, it is called the prospectus. The prospectus contains the price at
which the securities will be offered to the public.
497 Riddiough, Timothy. Real Estate Finance and Investments Course Reader. Massachusetts Institute of
Technology. Spring 2001. Cambridge, Massachusetts.
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In the United States, investment bankers manage the issuance of new securities to the public. After the
Securities and Exchange Commission has critiqued the registration statement and a preliminary
prospectus has been distributed to potential investors, the investment bankers organize "road shows"
where they publicize the upcoming offering.
The "road shows" are performed for two reasons. First, it attracts potential investors and provides them
information about the offering. Second, the investment bank is able to collect information for the
Secondary Mortgage Institution (SMI) and its underwriters information about the price at which they will
be able to market the securities.
In the United States, there are two methods of underwriting a security4 98. The first method is a firm
commitment, where the underwriting arrangement is for the investment bankers to purchase the securities
from the issuing company. In the case of the mortgage-backed securities (MBS), the issuing company is
the Secondary Mortgage Institution (SMI), and then resells them to the public. The Secondary Mortgage
Institution (SMI) sells the securities to the underwriting syndicate for the public offering price, less a
spread that serves as the compensation for the underwriters. This arrangement makes the underwriters
bear the full brunt of the risk if the shares cannot be sold to the public at the stipulated offering price.
Relationship among firm issuing securities, the underwriters, and the public
SMI
Lead Underwriter
Private Investors
Source: Investments 4th E dition
498 Bodie, Zvi Ph.D., Alex Kane and Alan J. Marcus, Ph.D. Investments 4'h Edition. Irwin McGraw-Hill. 1999.
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The second method of underwriting is known as the best-efforts agreement. In the best-efforts
agreements, the banker agrees to help the Secondary Mortgage Institution (SMI) to sell the issue to the
public, but the investment bank does not necessarily purchase the securities. The investment bank simply
acts as an intermediary between the public and the firm. Thus, the bank does not bear the risk of being
unable to resell the purchased securities at the offer price.
Current State. In the Philippines, local investment banks, which are subsidiaries of private commercial
banks, and investment houses serve as the primary underwriting agents for securities issues. According to
Matoto, the 53 members of the Investment Houses of the Philippines (IHAP) are ready to underwrite the
499mortgage-backed securities (MBS) once the proper regulatory infrastructure and incentives are in place4.
The role of a local underwriters is to structure private securities issues and offer them to investors through
a) creating an underwriting syndicate to broaden the market for a corporate security; b) registering the
security with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and; c) obtaining a credit rating from either
Philratings or Thomson Financial Philippines.
Local underwriters normally earn a spread of 1 to 1.5% of the total value of the issue. The securities
dealers or brokers may purchase, sell, or resell securities for clients or for their own account, earning a
spread between the sale and the purchase price of the securities.
Secondary Trading
Overview. There are two types of primary securities market issues: a public offering, which is a security
issue sold to the general public that can then be traded on the secondary market; and a private placement,
which is an issue that is sold to a few high net worth individuals or institutional investors and usually held
until maturity500 .
In the United States, public securities offerings that are traded in secondary markets can be bought and
sold in the a) national and local exchanges, b) over-the-counter market (OTC) and, c) direct trading
between 2 parties.
499 Matoto, Senen L. President of the Investment Houses Association of the Philippines. Personal Interview. June
2001. Makati City, Philippines.
500 Bodie, Zvi Ph.D., Alex Kane and Alan J. Marcus, Ph.D. Investments 4 'h Edition. Irwin McGraw-Hill. 1999.
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Although there are several stock exchanges in the United States, only the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) and the American Stock Exchange (Amex) are national in scope. The New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE) is the largest single exchange and preferred by large traders. Meanwhile, the
American Stock Exchange (Amex) focuses on listing smaller and younger firms. The exchange provides
a facility for its members to trade securities, and only members of the exchange may trade there.
The Over-the-Counter (OTC) market trades securities, but it is not a formal exchange. There are no
membership requirements for trading, nor are there listing requirements for the securities. In the Over-
the-Counter (OTC) market, thousands of brokers register with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) as dealers in Over-the-Counter (OTC) securities. A broker in the Over-the-Counter (OTC) market
can execute a trade by contacting the dealer listing an attractive quote.
The National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation System (NASDAQ) stock market
has a computer-linked bid and asked prices for securities offered by the various dealers. The bid price is
the price at which the dealer is willing to purchase the security. Meanwhile, the asked price is the price at
which the dealer will sell the security. In the United States, the third market is referred to as the trading
of exchange-listed securities in the Over-the-Counter (OTC) market. The fourth market is refers to direct
trading between investors in exchange-listed securities without the benefit of a broker.
Current State. In the Philippines, all previous mortgage backed securities (MBS) issues were sold either
through private placement or through underwriting syndicates. Since the mortgage backed securities
(MBS) markets in the Philippines are neither deep nor liquid enough to warrant secondary market trading,
investors hold most mortgage backed securities (MBS) issues until maturity. However, according to both
the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig and several thrift banks who have started the sale
and purchase of Asset Backed Securities (ABS), there appears to be a lucrative market for mortgage
backed securities (MBS) 0 1.
A concern raised by key players in the securities markets with regard to the secondary trading of
mortgage backed securities (MBS) was the lack of a central trading organization for secondary bond
trading and the concomitant infrastructure that central trading offers: a 2 way-quote system to provide for
an appropriate security pricing mechanism, absence of defined custodianship and clearinghouse for
scripless trading and settlement, and lack of established trading conventions. Without the central trading
501 Philippine Conference on Securitization. Mobilizing the Markets for Securitization: The Case for Asset Backed
Securities. October 1999. Makati City, Philippines.
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system, it was doubtful as to whether the issuance of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) would eventually
create liquidity for housing finance as the securities would not be actively traded.
To address these concerns, Chapter 2 discussed the Bankers Association of the Philippines (BAP)-led
market reforms project which was to set up a fixed income exchange to be up and running by end-2000.
Matoto supports the establishment of the fixed income exchange as it a) allows for more transparency in
trading, b) allows the investor to access a larger market (and is not longer constrained to re-sell the
security back to the dealer), and c) drive market prices for the mortgage backed securities (MBS).
However, prior to the fixed bond exchange, there were previous plans to list the mortgage backed
securities (MBS) of Home Corporation (the Secondary Mortgage Institution (SMI) set up by Urbancorp
Investments), worth P2.5 Billion (US$47 Million) in the Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE)50 2 . Initially,
the Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE)50 3 planned to fast-track the formulation of the rules and regulations
governing the trading of mortgage backed securities (MBS), with an interagency task force composed
Urban Bank, the Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and
the Philippine Central Depository (PCD). A manual of rules and regulations was being drawn up as well
that would cover listing requirements, trading procedures, and regulation.
According to the Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE), the Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE) member-
brokers would be entitled to as much as 25% of the mortgage-backed securities (MBS) underwritten by
syndicate that would be formed semiannually. Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE) members would also
participate not only in the secondary trading of the mortgage backed securities (MBS) but also in the
primary offering as well.
However, as discussed under the Secondary Mortgage Institution (SMI) section on Home Corporation,
Home Corporation's mortgage backed securities (MBS) never took off due to lack of market demand for
the securities.
502 Businessworld Publishing Corporation. Mortgage-backed securities to debut at PSE by October. March 25,1998. Manila, Philippines.
503 On March 4, 1994, President Ramos ordered the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to grant the
Philippine Stock Exchange, Inc. (PSE) its license to operate as a securities exchange. Although there is one virtual
exchange, achieved through computer link-up, there are two existing trading floors.
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Demand Issues and Potential Investors for Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS)
Demand Factors.
Market participants are knowledgeable with regard to mortgage-backed securities (MBS). Although the
October 1999 Philippine Conference on Securitization outlined the need for further investor education
with regard to mortgage backed securities (MBS), Kotecha believes that the major investors (i.e.
institutional investors such as contractual savings institutions (CSIs), trust departments of commercial
banks) are sufficiently knowledgeable about mortgage-backed securitization50 4 . Kotecha supports this
argument behind the previous stand alone mortgage backed securitization efforts in the Philippines which
have an aggregate value of P2 Billion (US$ 38 Million). These mortgage backed securities include
Citibank in 1992, Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig in 1993, Home Guaranty
Corporation (HGC) in 1996505, Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) Family Bank, Solid Bank, Ayala Life
and Home Corporation. Furthermore, private sector-led efforts (i.e. the Philippine Conference on
Securitization) have helped push for institutional reforms (i.e. passage of the law exempting the secondary
trading of fixed-income instruments from documentary stamp tax (DST)), albeit slowly.
Lack of investor education may dampen demand for mortgage-backed securities (MBS). Unlike Kotecha,
there is still a sentiment among various stakeholders in the mortgage backed securitization process that
investor education is a paramount concern. In the 1999 Philippine Conference on Securitization, the a)
lack of investor understanding behind securitization as a financing tool and, b) lack of market information
on mortgage backed securities (MBS) were cited as key reasons for the failure of securitization in the
country. The conference pointed out that even individuals in the finance and investment sector are
unfamiliar with securitization. According to Finance Assistant Secretary Jeremias Paul, investors need to
be aware of the sort of instrument they are dealing with, as well as its costs, and its risks and returns for
mortgage backed securities (MBS) to gain a foothold as a long-term financial investment506.
Matoto adds that among retail investors, there is demand for long-term financial instruments, as
evidenced by the strong demand for government-issued retail bonds worth P5 Million to P6 Million
504 Kotecha, Mahesh K. Secondary Mortgage Institution (SMI) Philippines - Draft Business Plan. Structured Credit
International Corporation. 2000. New York, New York.
505 According to Arthur Tan, Executive Vice-President and General Manager of the Home Guaranty Corporation
(HGC), HGC securitized a portion of their loan portfolio to run through the process and a) evaluate how the Home
Guaranty Corporation (HGC) would work for mortgage backed securities (MBS) and; b) better understand what sort
of requirements they will require from clients who would request for their services.
179
(US$94,000 to US$113,000) issued in April 2000. However, this retail demand may not necessarily
translate into demand for mortgage-backed securities (MBS) as these type of investors are used to simple
financial instruments and may not understand complexity of instrument507 .
Alcid uses anecdotal evidence of the previous administration's desire to securitize 'idle land' as proof of
the lack of understanding behind securitization5 08. Alcid points out, rather obviously, that securitization
occurs when there is an underlying stream of cash flows coming from the property, which is not the case
with idle lands.
Lack of potential market depth for mortgage backed securities (MBS). Peter Maquera, Chief Operating
officer of Lighthouse Credit Technologies, believes that there is no 'critical mass' of mortgage loans that
can be securitized509. Maquerra cites the critical mass of commercial properties of the United States
Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) that required liquefaction, which gave rise to the commercial
mortgage backed securities (CMBS) market51 0. In the case of the Philippines, the P100 Billion (US$1.9
506 Paul, Jeremias N. , Jr. Department of Finance Assistant Secretary. Personal Interview. June 2001. Manila,
Philippines.
507 Matoto, Senen L. President of the Investment Houses of the Philippines. Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati
City, Philippines.
508 Under the previous Estrada administration, the government wanted to transfer state-owned lots to the National
Home Mortgage and Finance Corporation (NHMFC) to increase the agency's capital to P50 Billion (US$ 943
Million) from P2.5 Billion (US$47 Million). They wanted to use these lands as collateral for loans to develop them
for commercial and socialized housing purposes. According to the former Finance Secretary Edgardo Espiritu, they
were "assigning future earnings to secure the loans." (Source: Serapio,
509 Maquera, Peter D. Chief Operating Officer of Lighthouse Credit Technologies Corporation. Personal Interview.
June 2001. Pasig City, Philippines.
510 One of the key factors which led to the birth of the commercial real estate capital market in the United States was
banking deregulation and. In the early 1980s, bank deregulation occurred in response to the high inflationary
environment of the 1970s. The problem with encouraging a "survival of the fittest" atmosphere resulted in deposits
remaining insured (i.e. deposit insurance became more generous) while bank regulation decreased. This allowed
both banks and the Savings & Loans (S&Ls) to borrow money at rates that were not commensurate with the
investment risks. As a result, huge amounts of debt capital were allocated to commercial real estate at extremely
"competitive" prices. The outcome resulted in a moral hazard. By the end of the 1980s, bankruptcies became
commonplace and the traditional capital sources had dried up.
The public markets for capital emerged when the US federal government, through the Resolution Trust Corporation
(RTC) owned large quantities of commercial real estate debt that needed liquefication. The RTC could not hold on
to the distressed properties for political reasons while selling the debt on an asset-by-asset basis was too slow and
inexpensive. Thus, the most politically (and arguably economically) feasible alternative was to sell the assets in
bulk. Securitizing the assets and dividing the cash flows into different securities turned out fairly well. Moreover,
since the federal government were more concerned with disposing of the properties quickly (rather than getting the
highest price), Wall Street was able to incorporate their start-up costs into the security pricing (i.e. buying from the
Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) at low prices and selling to public bondholders at significantly higher prices).
This process was further helped by the lack of private debt capital for origination, which rendered public debt
capital a viable alternative. This led to the emergence of the capital markets for commercial mortgage backed
securities (CMBS). (Source: Riddiough, Timothy. Real Estate Capital Markets Lecture Notes. Spring 2001.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Cambridge, Massachusetts. )
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Billion)51' worth of publicly originated mortgages could have provided a critical mass for a secondary
mortgage market. However, given the poor asset quality of publicly originated mortgages coupled with
the fixed interest rates, Maquera believes that only P10 Billion (US$189 Million) to P12 Billion (US$226
Million) of these mortgages are securitizable.
Kotecha, on the other hand, believes that a secondary mortgage market could rapidly develop, but it can
only be sustained by selling efforts of professionals who are able to execute deals and offer a range of
products. For example, mortgage backed securities (MBS) that are complemented by whole loan trading
and purchases with recourse 5 .
There is a short-term versus long-term investment orientation among local investors. As discussed in
Chapter 5, there is a "short-term" investment orientation among banks and investors (due to the nature of
the deposits), thus preventing banks from investing in long term instruments such as mortgage backed
securities because of an asset-liability duration mismatch. Assistant Finance Secretary Paul related the
short-term orientation to the general level of macroeconomic instability of the country. Given the
volatility of interest rates (and consequently the yield curve), investors would rather place their funds into
short-term instruments and refinance periodically, rather than place their funds in long-term financial
instruments such as mortgage-backed securitiesm
Private banks liquidity dampens demand for mortgage-backed securities. A majority of local commercial
banks are generally liquid and do not require mortgage-backed securities (MBS) in their portfolio514.
Given this, Jacob feels that banks may not be interested in developing the secondary mortgage market" 5 .
In fact, banks can probably earn more by holding on to their mortgages 516 . Matoto adds that some private
banks may want to purchase mortgage-backed securities (MBS) as a matter of strategy, but is unsure as to
511 The P100 Billion (US$1.9 Billion) comprises P40 Billion (US$758 Million) from the National Home Mortgage
Finance Corporation (NHMFC) and P55 Billion (US$1.04 Billion) from the Home Development Mutual Fund
(HDMF)/Pag-Ibig.
512 Kotecha, Mahesh K. Secondary Mortgage Institution (SMI) Philippines - Draft Business Plan. Structured Credit
International Corporation. 2000. New York, New York.
513 Paul, Jeremias N. , Jr. Department of Finance Assistant Secretary. Personal Interview. June 2001. Manila,
Philippines.
514 Philippine Conference on Securitization. Mobilizing the Markets for Housing: The Casefor Asset-Backed
Securities. October 1999. Makati City, Philippines.
515 Jacob, Monico. Former Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig Chairman and Conference
Chairman of the Philippine Conference on Securitization. Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati City, Philippines.
516 Jacob estimates that these banks carry mortgage loans worth between P1.5 Million (US$28,300) to P3 Million
(US$ 56,600), for an average period of 5 to 7 years.
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whether the volume purchased will merit the establishment of a Secondary Mortgage Institution (SMI)517.
Most private banks would consider purchasing mortgage-backed securities (MBS) when it is
economically justified, especially since these securities provide better asset and liability matching as they
fund mortgages with short term liabilities. However, Matoto believes that there is still strong
institutional demand for long-term financial instruments (i.e. government securities). However, there has
been interest expressed by lenders such as United Coconut Planters Bank, the Bank of the Philippine
Islands, and insurance companies such as Philippine-American Life.
Contractual savings institutions plan to shift funds into securities. Both state pension funds have declared
that they will "dramatically" shift their investments to fixed-income securities and reduce their exposures
in the stock market518 . The Social Security System (SSS) said it plans to channel its investments to "risk-
free" government securities and loans to members. Meanwhile, the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) said the fund will continue to invest in the stock market, but will increase its exposure in
fixed-income investments such as long-term bonds with higher returns. Presumably, these long-term
investments will include mortgage-backed securities (MBS) once these instruments are introduced in the
market, as these funds have been mandated to invest in housing finance.
Mortgage backed securities (MBS) from privately originated loans are a financially attractive option for
investors of long-term instruments. Private sector originated mortgage loans are attractive to institutional
investors for several reasons. First of all, there is a low default risk (3.1% for commercial banks, 7.9% for
thrift banks according to 1997 World Bank study) associated with private bank originated loans. This is
further strengthened by the impression among bankers that middle income mortgage loans, the target
home loan clients of banks, are "recession-proof' and will not renege on their loans unless it is a deep-
seated recession. Second, according to Kotecha, the mortgage backed securities (MBS) based on private
bank mortgages can remain competitive with government securities because they are at market rates, re-
priced annually and pay interest of roughly 20%519. Third, according to Alcid, mortgage backed
securities (MBS) are more appealing financial investments versus long-term commercial papers (LTCPs)
because the default risk is spread out over the mortgages. Alcid's argument is strengthened by a spate of
517 Matoto, Senen L. Executive Director of the Financial Executives of the Philippines. Personal Interview. June
2001. Makati City, Philippines.
518 Yap, Cecille and Ma. Elizabeth L. Sanchez. State pensionfunds eye shift to securities investments. Businessworld
Publishing Corporation. April 4, 2001. Makati City, Philippines.
519 Kotecha, Mahesh K. Secondary Mortgage Institution (SMI) Philippines - Draft Business Plan. Structured Credit
International Corporation. 2000. New York, New York.
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long-term commercial papers (LTCP) that have gone into default520. Among these companies were C&P
homes, a well-known low cost housing developer 2 , the Trust International Paper Corporation
(TIPCO)s22, and a partial default by the Bonifacio Land Corporation 2 1.
Conversely, mortgage backed securities from publicly originated loans are a risky option. Presumably, in
the event that these public mortgages are to be securitized, these loans will have to be "cherry picked"
(i.e. finding "performing" loans with preferably a 16% interest rate). According to both Deputy Secretary
General Lucille Ortille and Lighthouse Chief Operating Officer Peter Maquera, the mortgage loans that
can be securitized range from P10 Billion (US$189 Million) to P12 Billion (US$226 Million). The risk in
these loans lies in their fixed interest rate.
Although the fixed 16% interest rate closely approximates current market rates, local interest rate
volatility (i.e. similar to the interest rate swings during the 1997 regional currency crisis) has the potential
to "burn" the investor, especially if the Bureau of Treasury (BOT) offers higher yields on long-term
instruments in times of crisis. Furthermore, the yield for a publicly originated mortgage should be higher
versus government securities (i.e. treasury bonds) which carry a "sovereign guarantee"). However, the 25
year treasury bond (which has the same "maturity" as the government originated loans) is currently traded
at an average of 16.34%524, which is already 34 basis points higher than the fixed mortgage rate. Unless
credit enhancements such as over collateralization and subordination, coupled with other government
incentives, enhance the value of the publicly originated mortgage backed securities (MBS), it is doubtful
if this security will be more attractive versus treasury bonds.
520 Many corporations issued long-term commercial papers during the "economic boom" years preceeding the 1997
regional currency crisis.
521 In May 2000, PhilRatings downgraded C&P Homes, Inc.'s outstanding P3 Billion (US$ 57 Million) long-term
commercial paper debt issue (LTCP) from "PRS Ca" to "PRS C", which means the loan is in default. PhilRatings
noted that, due to liquidity problems, C&P Homes had stopped paying interest on their paper since November 1999,
which was issued in November 1996 (right before the 1997 regional currency crisis). C&P Homes is now
negotiating with LTCP holders to restructure its debt obligations, possibly through asset-for-debt swap
arrangements. (Source: www.philratings.com)
It is interesting to note that C&P topped the housing loan releases of mortgage takeouts under the government's
Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP). (Source: Businessworld Publishing Corporation. Villar's companies top
list leading participants in Government's UHLP. November 17, 1994. Makati City, Philippines.
522 In August 2001, Philratings rated "Trust International Paper Corporation's (TIPCO) outstanding P200 Million
(US$3.8 Million) long-term commercial papers (LTCPs) was rated PRS Caa, meaning "Poor standing. High
possibility of default and there may be present elements of danger with respect to principal or interest." (Source:
www.philratings.com)
523 Flores, Shirley L. Bonifacio Land partly defaults on bond payments. Businessworld Publishing Corporation. June
7,2001.
524 Average rate that 25-year treasury bond was traded from January 2, 2001 to August 10, 2001. The treasury bond
traded at a high of 19.11% and a low of 15.42%. (Source: HSBC Bank Philippines)
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Lastly, although these mortgage backed securities have already been "cherry picked" loans, due to
information asymmetry, potential investors will have the general impression that these loans have high
default rates. Thus, they will tend to shy away from these securities despite reassurance to the contrary.
Moreover, it must be noted that if the mortgage loans to be securitized are from the Unified Home
Lending Program (UHLP), they do not carry a Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) guaranty.
Properly structured mortgage backed securities (MBS) will be the key to generate investor demand.
According to Matoto, a properly structured deal will compel institutional investors to purchase mortgage-
backed securities. In particular, Matoto referred to contractual savings institutions (CSIs), which are
mandated to invest in long-term financial instruments5 25 . Arguably, whether the mortgages are publicly or
privately originated, the proper credit enhancements (i.e. Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) cash
guarantees for both private and public mortgage backed securities (MBS), subordinated structures where
"risky" mortgages as the most junior tranche) can enhance their appeal to potential investors.
Aside from properly structuring the mortgage-backed securities (MBS), there must be adequate
information provided on the transaction in the prospectus to reinforce the security and integrity of the
underlying mortgages. These include information on homebuyers, originator, servicer, secondary
mortgage institution, guarantors, credit enhancers, and all other institutions that participated in the
transaction. Inadequate information will undermine mortgage backed securities (MBS) development 26 . In
the case of privately originated mortgages, information on the credit history of the homebuyer loans may
be readily available for the investor. However, the credit history might be more difficult for publicly
originated mortgages given the "sloppiness" and "questionable integrity" of the records of certain public
institutions, such as the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).
Potential Investors
Local investors. Since mortgage-backed securities (MBS) are securitized from a pool of mortgages
extending from 5 to 25 years, the ideal investors for these instruments would be those who need to match
the 'duration' of these mortgages with their long-term liabilities. For example, a pension fund purchases
mortgage-backed securities (MBS) because its maturity matches with their obligation to pay their client's
dividends. Thus, the ideal investor for mortgage-backed securities (MBS) is investors whose long-term
liabilities match the long-term funding needs of housing.
525 Matoto, Senen L. Executive Director of the Financial Executives of the Philippines. Personal Interview. June
2001. Makati City, Philippines.
526 Reside, Renato S. Mortgage-Backed Securities in Asia. Asian Development Bank. 1999. Pasig City, Philippines.
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Reside says there are a few available statistics on previous mortgage-backed securities (MBS), as most of
these were done through private placement 27 . However, underwriters of previous issues (i.e. Citibank)
have indicated that the typical mortgage-backed securities (MBS) investor is a long-term investor, usually
an institutional investor such as a pension fund or insurance company.
Kotecha identified the following institutions as potential investors for mortgage backed securities
(MBS) 28.:
1. Contractual savings institutions (Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), Social
Security System (SSS),and the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig;
2. Private Insurance companies;
3. Pension funds;
4. Banks (particularly the trust departments and the money markets of commercial bankss2 9) and
Quasi-banks;
According to Bernardo, banks are not ideally suited for providing long-term financing for housing due to
the short-term nature of their liabilities (i.e. deposits)5 30 . Among all these institutions, the contractual
savings institutions (CSI) are the touted as the ideal anchor investor because they are able to channel vast
long-term resources into the housing markets without sacrificing their viability. The contractual savings
institutions (CSI) would benefit from the better matching of assets and liabilities, a wider selection of
investment grade securities, and better returns on investments.
For perspective, the assets of the contractual savings institutions (CSI) were P422.6 Billion (US$8
Billion) in 1995, which comprised 18% of the assets of the financial system. The public contractual
savings institution (CSI) alone dominated the contractual savings sectors at 66.3%531. According to
Monico Jacob, the former Chairman of the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig,
contractual savings institutions (CSI) already have the mandate to provide financing to the housing sector,
albeit on an unsustainable basis, through providing a portion of their annual investible reserves for
primary lending to both the Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP) and the Multi-Window Lending
527 Reside, Renato S. Mortgage-Backed Securities in Asia. Asian Development Bank. 1999. Pasig City, Philippines.
528 Kotecha, Mahesh K. Secondary Mortgage Institution (SMI) Philippines - Draft Business Plan. Structured Credit
International Corporation. 2000. New York, New York.
529 Alcid, Andrew D. Executive Vice President, Investment Banking Division of United Coconut Planters Bank.
Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati City, Philippines.
530 Bernardo, Romeo L. Revisiting Housing Finance. Philippine Daily Inquirer. March 12, 2001. Makati City,
Philippines.
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Scheme (MWLS). However, he said that the contractual savings institutions (CSIs) should compel the
development of the secondary mortgage market and stop primary lending 32. These investible reserves
need to be rechanneled into mortgage backed securities (MBS) so as a) to provide better "returns" to these
institutions versus primary mortgage lending533 and; b) to provide long-term, sustainable financing for
housing.
Issues with Contractual Savings Institutions (CSI) as potential mortgage backed securities
investors.
Continued misuse of contractual savings institutions (CSIs) annual investible reserves in housing finance.
Manuel Crisostomo, current President and Chief Executive Officer of the Home Development Mutual
Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig, said that the role of HDMF/Pag-Ibig should be to invest in mortgage-backed
securities (MNS) and not to be a loan originator as they are "a provident fund and not a bank". The
provident fund should be investing in long-term financial instruments that guarantee a fair amount of
dividend earnings to members, and objective not currently met through primary lending534. However, the
current funding system of direct lending by the contractual savings institutions are not only damaging to
the capability and viability of the contractual savings institution, but it also stunts the growth of the
capital markets.
First, direct lending to housing prevents the capability of contractual savings institution (CSI) to make
financially sound investments (i.e. government securities) which are suppose to deliver fair amounts of
dividend earnings to its members. This is clearly not the case in primary mortgage lending. Under the
Unified Home Lending Program, the contractual savings institutions were earning 10.25%, a rate below
that of government securities. The Philippine Institute of Development Studies (PIDS) estimated that the
contractual savings institutions (CSIs) lost a total of P8 Billion (US$151 Million) from 1993 to 1995 by
lending to the Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP) instead of investing in other higher return, long-
term financial instruments
51 World Bank. Philippines Housing Finance: Reforming Public Provision and Promoting Private Participation.
June 1997.
532 Jacob, Monico. Former Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig Chairman and Conference
Chairman of the Philippine Conference on Securitization. Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati City, Philippines
53 Under the Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP), the contractual savings institutions (CSIs) were making
10.25% on their primary mortgage lending, which is lower versus government securities.
54 Crisostomo, Manuel C. President and Chief Executive Officer of Home Development Mutual Fund
(HDMF)/Pag-Ibig. Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati City, Philippines.
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As a consequence of primary lending to the Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP), the viability of the
contractual savings institutions (CSI) is affected. The liquidity of these institutions investment is locked
away for 25 years instead of allowing the money to be recycled for other investments5 5 . This is further
exacerbated by the fact that these institutions have to "eat the losses" from a structurally inefficient
housing finance program. For perspective, the government is having difficulty selling off the P42 Billion
(US$792 Million) loan portfolio held by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC)
because of the losses that the contractual savings institutions will book due to the poor investment 536 .
Moreover, the continued investment of contractual savings institutions (CSIs) into the primary mortgage
market, instead of the secondary mortgage (or secondary fixed income) market, retards the development
of long-term financial instruments. Long-term investors will continue to have limited financial
alternatives, save for government securities. Only the introduction of the large financial resources of the
contractual savings institutions (CSIs) into mortgage-backed securities (MBS) can provide an impetus for
a secondary mortgage institution (SMI) to securitize. Moreover, the investment of contractual savings
institutions (CSI) will allow other relatively smaller investors to follow suit, paving the way for a vibrant
secondary market.
However, the newly installed Arroyo administration continues to use contractual savings institutions
(CSI) for primary lending purposes. In her recent state of the nation address, President Arroyo promised
to build 800,000 houses5 7 by acquiring P20 Billion (US$377 Million) worth of financing from the
government financial institutions538. This effort is already on top of the P40 Billion (US$755 Million)
allotted by the contractual savings institutions for the Multi-Window Lending Scheme (MWLS), a
derivative of the failed Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP).
Lastly, it is quite alarming to note that the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations (CREBA)
claimed that the P20 Billion (US$377 Million) appropriation as part of seed money that will start the
Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations (CREBA) -developed Centralized Home Financing
Plan (CHFP). The fund plans to appropriate P10 Billion more from the Home Development Mutual Fund
s3s Alcid, Andrew D. Executive Vice President, Investment Banking Division of United Coconut Planters Bank.
Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati City, Philippines.
536 The default rate of the P42 Billion (US$792 Million) loan portfolio is 50%. The Social Security System (SSS)
hold P30 Billion (US$566 Million) of the portfolio, followed by the P6.5 Billion (US$123 Million) of the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), and the P4.5 Billion (US$ 895 Million) of the Home Development
Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig.
537 For the remainder of her administration (2001-2004), President Arroyo promised that the government would
build 100,000 for the low income class and 50,000 for socialized housing.
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(HDMF)/Pag-Ibig, and P5 Billion (US$94 Million) each from the (SSS) and the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) as seed fund for a housing program53 9. Note that this is the same Centralized
Home Financing Plan (CHFP) that CREBA was offering as an alternative to both the Medium Term
Development Plan for Shelter (MTDP-S) and the Multi-Window Lending Scheme (MWLS).
Issues with potential investors.
Foreign investors
The foreign exchange risks render local mortgage backed securities (MBS) unattractive to foreign
investors. According to Limlingan, foreign investor demand will shy away from Philippine (and
Southeast Asian) securities because of the foreign exchange risk associated with these securities 540. Since
these mortgage backed securities (MBS) are peso-denominated, coupled with the volatility of the peso
against the US dollar, only foreign investors who have the "appetite" for this sort of foreign exchange risk
will venture into purchasing these securities. However, Matoto doubts that local mortgage backed
securities (MBS) will attract foreign investors5 41. Limlingan adds that the only companies securitizing
their future earnings are those with dollar assets such as airline and telecommunication companies.
538 www.inq7.net. President Macapagal's State of the Nation speech. July 23, 2001. Makati City, Philippines.
539 Gorayeb, Charlie V. Government-private sector housing policy to beforged in summit. Philippine Star. August 6,
2001. Manila, Philippines.
540 Limlingan, Victor S. Professor at the Asian Institute of Management. Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati
City, Philippines.
541 Matoto, Senen L. President of the Investment Houses of the Philippines. Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati
City, Philippines.
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Mortgage-Backed Securitization (MBS) Process - United States
Standardization
Standardization of the mortgage instrument is a key factor in secondary market development. Mortgage
should be pooled with similar characteristic to facilitate larger pool size and more liquidity and to reduce
the due diligence costs of investors and rating agencies. There can be many types of mortgages present in
the housing finance system, but only those with sufficient volume are candidates for sale and
securitization.
Investors and rating agencies must be able to do due diligence with reasonable cost. The more
heterogeneous the terms and documentation of the loans, the greater the cost of due diligence and the less
competitive is sale through securitization. In order to reduce the transaction costs of evaluating mortgage
loans and the processing costs of issuing and administering MBS, the characteristics (e.g., rate
adjustment, amortization schedule, term) of the mortgages should be uniform.
The degree of uniformity depends on the characteristic involved. In the U.S. residential market, almost
all pools will be restricted to 1-4 family residential properties. Loan size may be restricted (for example,
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are constrained by law to maximum loan size for 1-4 family loans of
$275,000, a limit which is changed annually according to an external index). Geographic restrictions may
apply for certain pools of non-conforming loans (loans not eligible for purchase by the government-
sponsored enterprises).
Constraints on loan adjustment features are common. For example, fixed; rate mortgages (FRMs) are not
pooled with adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) and ARMs with different indices will not be pooled
together. Loans with deferred interest or negative amortization are not pooled with fully amortizing
loans. There will be an allowed range of loan maturities and loan coupon rates. These limits allow
investors to more accurately predict prepayments and pool cash flows. A wider range allows for more
loans in a pool (enhancing liquidity) but more uncertainty in estimating prepayments. An important
constraint in pooling is that no loan in the pool can have a coupon rate less than the security coupon rate.
This constraint ensures that the servicer always has a financial incentive to service the loans. There may
be constraints on loan purpose or LTV in order to achieve certain ratings or credit enhancement
objectives.
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Documentation. In addition, standardized documentation must be available for all loans. Typical
documentation includes the mortgage note (document describing the mortgage obligation) and deed
(document conveying ownership to lender as security for the repayment of the mortgage. Because the
U.S. is comprised of 50 states, there is variation in the security for the loan, which can be in the form of a
deed of trust, mortgage or deed to secure debt. A key legal perquisite is the timely and cost effective
registration of title and lien. A barrier that exists in many developing countries is the imposition of
transfer taxes or stamp duties on title and lien registration or transfer. Long delays in the registration
process can also increase the risk of primary market and secondary market transactions.
A loan file will contain the application, property appraisal and borrower credit report. Lenders use
standardized application and disclosure forms, the format of which has been determined by the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development. The appraisal determines the value of the property
through examination of the sales prices of similar properties construction costs of new properties, and
market conditions and trends. Since January 1995, a uniform residential appraisal report has been used
for nearly all lenders, including those intended for sale to Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac and those insured
by the FHA and VA. In addition to the implicit oversight of investors, financial institution regulators
have established appraisal guidelines for the institutions they supervise.
The credit report is a key document that is required for all loans. There are no specific guidelines
regarding credit reports but they have become increasingly important in underwriting. The information
compiled by credit bureaus is used to compute credit scores, such as the FICO score, which have become
the basis of loan decisions, in some cases even supplanting the appraisal. Additional credit requirements
include employment verification, income verification (pay stubs, in some cases income tax returns) and
asset/liability information (e.g., bank accounts, loans etc.)
The final major document requirement is the title report or title insurance policy. A title search verifies
that the mortgagee owns the property being pledged as security for the lien. The title insurance policy
insures against the risk that the mortgagee may not have clear title or may have encumbered the property
with other liens (which could exceed the value of the property or have a priority to the loan being applied
for). Lenders also require property and casualty insurance. A key aspect of the secondary market is the
representations and warranties given by loan originators. In all loan sales transactions, the seller will
warrant that all documents are present and completed to the standards of the investor.
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Information Requirements
Investors are dependent on the servicer to collect and remit payments. The servicer must have good
systems for accumulating and remitting cash and performance information on a timely basis and a good
track record in collections.
Home mortgage servicing is characterized by low revenue per loan and potentially high expenses for
difficult-to-service loans. As a result, loan quality and efficiency of operations is critical to a servicer's
success. Servicing in the U.S. has become increasingly automated. This trend reflects demand of
investors for more timely and comprehensive information, profit opportunities in marketing and cross
selling, and their own needs for improved risk management. As a result there has been an increased
consolidation of servicing in the U.S.
Information processing and real time transmission have become increasingly important in the U.S.
secondary market. Historical performance data on mortgage payments (e.g., default and prepayment) is a
major factor in risk assessment and pricing. Because of the importance of data in the assessment of risk,
the demands on servicers are potentially great. Servicers must be able to process and disseminate large
amounts of information. Thus, they must develop effective, automated management information systems.
Secondary Marketing
Functions. Secondary marketing is the function of financing and, subsequently, selling the originated
mortgage to institutional investors. This activity includes the warehousing of the mortgage between the
time the mortgage is closed and subsequently sold to an investor. It is arguably the most critical function
in the secondary market. More mortgage bankers fail as a result of failure to manage the risks of
secondary marketing than for any other reason.
The secondary mortgage in the U.S. is dominated by the Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs). The
two U.S. GSEs that perform these activities are Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The GSEs guarantee
mortgage-backed securities and the seller servicer acts as the custodian holding the mortgage loans as
collateral for the securities.
FHA-insured and VA-guaranteed loans are pooled and sold as mortgage-backed securities guaranteed by
a U.S. agency called the Government National Mortgage Associate (Ginnie Mae or GNMA). Other
mortgages are sold to private mortgage conduits that use them as collateral for MBS. In recent years, the
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private secondary market (in which non-conforming loans ineligible for purchase by the GSEs are sold)
has been rising in importance.
o Risk management: The function of secondary marketing is to find investors to purchase the loans
from the mortgage bank and for managing the financial risks involved in making loans with an
established interest rate in a changing interest rate environment, as well as other risks associated
with the process. Although referred to as pipeline risk, there are in fact four major risks the seller
must manage as part of the secondary marketing function.
o Commitment risk: The risk than an interest rate commitment ("rate lock") offered to a home
buyer for a loan is made and the firm is unable, generally due to market forces, to earn an
adequate sales price to cover the costs of providing the commitment. This risk may be reduced or
offset by purchasing offsetting commitments (i.e. committing in advance to sell a loan or pool of
loans at a particular rate).
o Pipeline risk: The risk that a closed loan will change in value between the time of closing and
shipment to an investor. This risk is often hedged using forward, option or futures contracts.
o Documentation risk: The risk that a closed loan is underwritten improperly and does not conform
to the investor's requirements. These loans are known as "lame loans" and frequently can be
converted into acceptable loans for delivery, but usually after months of seasoning and additional
documentation. The delays in delivery, or inability to deliver, produce costs for the originator.
o Liquidity risk: The risk that certain types of mortgage loans may face large buy price-sell price
(bid-ask) spreads.
This can happen if the firm buys loans wholesale (i.e. from other lenders) and is unable to generate a
sufficient volume to securitize or sell the loans at a profit. Problems in reselling the loans may produce
losses for the firm. Most mortgage lenders in the U.S. have highly developed data processing systems
that track loans during the commitment phase in order to ensure that there is sufficient volume to meet
future sales obligations and that loans are pooled according to the precise characteristics demanded by
investors. One of the main prerequisites of a secondary market is availability of such data and the means
to manipulate it.
Servicing
Functions. The servicing of mortgages is a critical component of a viable secondary mortgage market.
The collection of mortgage payments and the periodic remittance of these payments to the investor (or
conduit) is the major task of servicers (whether they are originators or third parties). In addition, servicers
192
are the primary repositories of information on the mortgage loans. Thus, they must maintain accurate and
up-to-date information on mortgage balances, status and history and provide timely reports to investors.
Mortgage loan servicing involves all the activities related to:
o collecting mortgage payments
o accounting for all financial transactions
o collecting past due accounts
o remitting payments to investors
o foreclosing on seriously delinquent properties
o disposing of foreclosed real estate
Collections and Default Management. An important part of the servicing function is establishment of
clear guidelines for the collection of mortgage payments. The documents must spell out payment
obligations and procedures to be followed in the event of default. Although lender discretion in working
with borrowers is an important part of the collection process, third party investors must know what those
procedures are before making their investment (in order to assess the degree of default risk) and what
latitude exists in dealing with the borrower (e.g., forbearance or restructuring). Servicers also must make
decisions about and implement procedures leading to foreclosure and repossession in the case of defaulted
loans.
The servicer has the primary responsibility of default management. When loans become delinquent, it
costs the servicer more for which they receive no additional revenue. A delinquent loan may also require
an even more costly foreclosure process. The Mortgage Bankers Association of America (MBA) reported
that as of March 31, 2000, the overall seasonally adjusted delinquency rate on one-to-four family unit
homes was 3.82%. The 90+ days past due rate was 0.54%. Foreclosure refers to a legal process by which
a mortgagee obtains title to the property from a mortgagor in default for purposes of disposing of the
property to provide funds to pay off the loan. The MBA reported that the foreclosures started for all types
of loans were 0.85% on March 31, 2000. Investors expect servicers to be pro-active in default
management. The typical actions that a loan servicers will take at various stages of delinquency are:
o 30-60 days: Reminders to delinquent borrower through mail or phone and/or provide counseling.
o 90 days: consider loan restructuring such as forbearance (reduced payments) or lower interest
rate.
o 120+ days: commence foreclosure process
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7 STRUCTURAL ISSUES
The biggest obstacle that faces mortgage backed securitization issuance in the Philippines is the
government's lack of familiarity with regard to the securitization process. The Philippines is just starting
to develop well-defined rules for mortgage-backed securitizations42 . However, due to the lack of
sophistication in the local financial markets and the lack of regulatory experience, each regulator has
historically insisted on drafting their own set of ruless 4 3.
The lack of familiarity with securitization manifests itself in the regulatory, taxation and legal structure
which is hardly conducive to mortgage-backed securities (MBS) development. Thus, Limingan argues
that entrepreneurial-minded private sector entities will need to take the risk to engage in mortgage-backed
securities (MBS) 54 4 . The Home Corporation, a subsidiary of UrbanCorp, was the first private sector
secondary mortgage institution to venture into mortgage-backed securities (MBS) development despite
the unsure regulatory, taxation and legal environment it would face. Expectedly, the company's failure
highlighted the lack of clear regulatory guidelines form the government agencies that were supposed to
monitor the company. Therefore, it is integral that we understand how the regulatory, taxation and legal
environment affect the development of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) in the Philippines.
Regulatory Issues
Overview. There are two government institutions that directly impact the development of the mortgage
backed securities (MBS) industry in the Philippines, namely the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (Central
Bank of the Philippines) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Market players have
complained of inconsistent provisions with regard to the regulatory guidelines issued by both these
organizations as one of the primary reasons behind the failure of securitization.
These concerns came to the forefront after the collapse of Urban Bank, which owned Home Corporation,
a secondary mortgage institution (SMI) that was purchasing mortgage loans for securitization from the
542 Reside, Renato S. Mortgage-Backed Securities in Asia. Asian Development Bank. 1999. Pasig City, Philippines.
543 The two government regulatory agencies, the Bangko Sentral (Central Bank of the Philippines) and the
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) recently drafted a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) on June 7, 2001 to
carify their respective roles in mortgage backed securitization.
544 Limlingan, Victor S. Professor at the Asian Institute of Management. Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati
City, Philippines.
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Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-big545. Right after the collapse, both government
regulators initially "pointed fingers as to who was to blame for the Urban Bank fiasco" 546. The Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) had claimed that regulatory supervision of investment houses rested
solely with the Bangko Sentral (Central Bank of the Philippines). The Bangko Sentral (Central Bank of
the Philippines), on the other hand, asserted that their responsibility over Urban Corp, which was
considered an investment house, was merely to ascertain if it had violated banking laws (versus complete
oversight). However, the Bangko Sentral (Central Bank of the Philippines) has admitted to the ambiguity
of the law over which government regulator has supervisory responsibility over quasi-banking
institutions such as Urban Corp.
Thus, it is instructive to understand the respective regulations of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (Central
Bank of the Philippines) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in light of our review of
the establishment of a secondary mortgage institution (SMI) and the issuance of mortgage backed
securities (MBS).
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
Overview. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is the government regulator that has
jurisdiction over all corporations, partnerships, and associations in the Philippines. The Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) licenses, registers, supervises, and regulates companies and keeps their
public records.
Currently, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) also has oversight functions over (1) the
Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE); (2) Over-the-counter securities trading, as well as over all other
participants in the securities industry, which include brokers and dealers. Only government-issued and -
guaranteed securities are exempt from SEC registration5 47 . Given this, the mortgage backed securities
545 Investigation by the government officials revealed that the collapse of Urban Bank stemmed from its investment
house subsidiary, Urban Corp (which, in turn, owns Home Corporation.). Government reports revealed Urban Corp
had brokered securities deals but was caught by liquidity problems when investors suddenly preterminated their
holdings. Apparently, Urban bank supported Urban Corp's investments that turned sour. An official from the
Central Bank said that Urban Bank may have actually been sound, but it was the liquidity problems of Urban Corp
when clients preterminated their investments. Most withdrawals serviced by Urban bank were then said to be
pretermination of placement by investors of Urbancorp. (Source: Eric S. Boras. Second Quarter Banking Report:
Some hard lessons from the Urban Bank collapse (What Happened and Can it Happen Again?). Businessworld
Publishing Corporation. August 16, 2000. Makati City, Philippines.)
546 Eric S. Boras. Second Quarter Banking Report: Some hard lessons from the Urban Bank collapse (What
Happened and Can it Happen Again?). Businessworld Publishing Corporation. August 16, 2000. Makati City,
Philippines.
547 Reside, Renato S. Mortgage-Backed Securities in Asia. Asian Development Bank. 1999. Pasig City, Philippines.
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(MBS) that would have been issued by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC), and
those that were issued by the Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) and the Home Development Mutual
Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig were exempt from Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) registration.
Securitization concerns. The Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) concern with regard to
securitization is the need for full disclosure of the Asset Backed Securities (ABS) prior to its release to
investors. Since the financial concept of securitizing (what are essentially) "future receivables" is
relatively new in the Philippines, regulators require full disclosure to ensure potential investors are fully
knowledgeable and understand that they are purchasing 548. Moreover, the regulators as well are also still
grappling with concept of securitizing, which manifests itself in the rules and regulations that have been
released by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
The guidelines that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) uses with regard to securitization are
a) the Rules on the Registration and Sale of Asset Backed Securities, which was implemented on March
25, 1991 and; b) a Memorandum of Agreement between the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
and the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (Central Bank of the Philippines) with regard to the supervision of
institutions issuing Asset Backed Securities (ABS), which was implemented on June 7, 2001. The
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), as well, has released proposed amendments to the Rules on
Asset Backed Securities (ABS) that appears to be more conducive to the development of a Secondary
Mortgage Institution (SMI) and the mortgage backed securitization 49.
548 Reside, Renato S. Mortgage-Backed Securities in Asia. Asian Development Bank. 1999. Pasig City, Philippines.
549 The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (Central Bank of the Philippines) and the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) rules will be compared in later parts of this section.
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KEY HIGHLIGHTS OF THE PROPOSED CHANGES THE RULES ON THE SEC RULES ON
THE REGISTRATION AND SALE OF ASSET BACKED SECURITIES (ABS)
Definition of A group of physically A group of identified, self amortizing assets that comprise the specific
"Asset Pool" segregated or otherwise assets underlying the asset backed securities (ABS), and are either
particularly identified conveyed to the special purpose trust (SPT) issuing the asset backed
assets originally owned securities (ABS), or pledged by the special purpose vehicle (SPV)
by the originator, owning the assets to secure performance of the asset baked securities
conveyed to, held, and (ABS).
owned by the issuer.
Two or more originators or sellers may form a common asset pool for
the purpose of issuing asset backed securities (ABS).
Rationale: All assets in the asset pool must be specifically identified and either conveyed to the trustee of the
security of pledged by a special purpose vehicle (SPV) to secure performance of a debt security.
Also, this rule allows for two or more originators or seller to combine assets in a common asset pool for the
purpose of issuing a single security. This ability to combine assets originated by several sellers into a single asset
pool may improve asset quality and minimize financing costs for small issues.
Definition of
"Asset
Backed
Securities"
Trust certificates issued
by a trust created
pursuant to the rules
representing undivided
ownership interests in the
assets forming the pool.
Securities that represent undivided ownership interest in the assets
forming the asset pool and; represent the right to of the holder to
receive payments from the proceeds expected to be derived from the
assets forming an asset pool owned by a Special Purpose Vehicle
(SPV) and pledged by the SPV to secure payment to holders of the
securities. Asset-Backed Securities (ABS) may be issued in series.
An ABS may include a credit enhancement.
Rationale: The rule is intended to clarify that either "pass through" or "pay through" structures are acceptable
organizational forms for asset-backed securities (ABS). Under the existing rules, only the "pass through"
structure, in which the asset pool is actually held by the Special Purpose Trust (SPT) is permissible. With either
structure, however, there must be a Special Purpose Trust (SPT) administered by an independent trustee.
Scope of These include sinking These include subordinated structures, over collateralization, sinking
Credit funds 550 and separate funds, third party guarantees, standby letters of credit, swaps, spread
enhancements bank accounts. accounts or reserve funds.
Rationale: Under the current rules, the only permissible credit enhancements are "sinking funds" and separate bank
accounts, which are too restrictive and often uneconomical. Under the new definition, it is permissible to create
any type of credit enhancement intended to increase the likelihood that investors in asset-backed securities (ABS)
receive payment of the amounts due to them. The credit enhancement need not provide a 100% coverage or
guarantee payment until maturity of the enhanced security. A credit enhancement may be established by the seller,
originator or issuer, it may be built into the structure of the security, or provided by a separate entity for a fee, or
comprised of a combination of structure and outside entities.
550 Sinking fund is defined as the proceeds of collection from the asset pool including all income therefrom, set aside
in an account with a custodian bank to be used by the issuer to redeem the issued securities.
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Definition of
"Originator",
"Seller" and
"Servicer"
Originator is the original obligee
of the assets, such as the financial
institution that grants a loan or a
corporation in the books of which
the assets were created.
Seller conveys to the issuer the
assets forming the pool. The
seller may also be the originator.
Servicer is the corporation
appointed by the issuer to perform
the servicing of the asset pool.
Servicing shall mean primarily
collecting and recording payments
received on the assets and
remitting such collections to the
issuer.
Rationale: Although asset servicing is often transferable, usually the originator or seller will already be servicing
the assets at the time the asset backed security (ABS) is issued, and under this definition may continue to do so. In
most cases, it would be efficient for the originator to also be the servicer. The originator is more familiar with the
assets than an unrelated third party and may be able to collect payments on the assets more effectively than a new
servicer. Additionally, if the originator maintains an economic interest in the cash flows from the asset pool - its
incentives to service the assets effectively align its interests with those of the security holder.
Definition of Trust constituted solely to Trust administered by a trustee independent of the seller,
"Special purchase assets (the trustee of originator, servicer or any underwriter of the Asset Backed
Purpose such trust must be trust Security (ABS), or an affiliate/subsidiary, or director/officer
Trust" department of a commercial and relatives to the 4' degree, and created solely for issuing
bank), owning or holding the asset or administering an ABS.
pool for a definite period of time
until all Asset Backed Securities
(ABS) are redeemed.
Definition of No equivalent. Special purpose corporation, limited partnership, or other
"Special person created solely for the purpose of formation, issuance,
Purpose and administration of Asset Backed Securities (ABS).
Vehicle" Special Purpose Vehicles may own the assets in the asset
pool, but shall not engage in any activities or incur any
indebtedness not connected to the formation, issuance or
administration of the ABS.
Rationale: Sale of the assets to a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) protects the assets from inclusion in any
subsequent insolvency of the seller or originator. While in many asset backed securities (ABS) issues the SPV will
ultimately transfer ownership of the assets to the Special Purpose Trust (SPT), in the "pay though" structure it
continues to own the assets in the asset pool and itself issues ABS in the form of debt, pledging the assets and their
cash flow to secure the payment of the debt.
The Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) must be created "solely" for the issuing asset backed securities (ABS) and thus
cannot engage in any activity or incur any indebtedness other than in connection with the formation or
administration of the ABS, since other activities may lead to claims against assets in the asset pool.
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Same.
Seller conveys assets to the issuer of the Asset Backed
Security (ABS). The seller may also be the originator.
Servicer has the contractual responsibility to administer the
assets in the asset pool. These functions include, but are not
limited to, collecting and recording of payments received on
the assets in the pool and remitting of such payments to
issuer, compiling data on the assets in the pool and reporting
such information to the issuer and trustee, monitoring of
delinquencies and instituting legal actions to recover
collateral, and any other functions covered in the servicing
contract. A servicer may have one or more subservices. The
seller or originator may also be the servicer.
Special
Purpose trust
functions
The issuer of the Asset
Backed Security (ABS)
must be created solely
for owning and holding
the asset pool.
It may only hold
asset pool at a time.
one
Each Asset Backed Security (ABS) must be administered by the
Special Purpose Trust (SPT), created solely for administering the
ABS. The trust must terminate upon final distribution of the proceeds
of the last series of the ABS.
The trustee of the SPT must be independent from and not affiliated
with the seller, originator, issuer or any underwriter of the ABS, or
any affiliate/subsidiary, director/officer or their relatives up to the 4 th
degree.
The trustee of the SPT can be, but is not required to be, the trust
department of a commercial bank.
Duties of the The issuer of the Asset Form and administer the Asset Backed Security (ABS). These duties
trustee Backed Security (ABS) include holding the assets in the asset pool or the ABS, collecting
(Special a) must be a trust' b) principal and interest payments from the servicer of the assets and
Purpose should own the asset making principal payments to holders, and monitoring the
Trust) pool and; c) issue the performance of assets in the pool
ABS.
Rationale: The trustee, in the event of default, must be prepared to act in the best interests of the holders of the
asset backed security (ABS). The rules thus require that the trustee be wholly independent of the other parties
involved in the formation, issuance and administration of the ABS.
Typically, asset backed securities (ABS) trustees have been the trust departments of large commercial banks
because of their expertise in performing this function. The proposed rules allow banks to continue to act as
trustees, but does not require the trustee to be a bank trust department, as long as the trustee's independence is not
compromised.
Conveyance to the issuer of the
assets forming the asset pool shall
be absolute and on a without
recourse basis.
Conveyance of the assets to the asset pool shall transfer
ownership of those assets to the trust or special purpose
vehicle.
Conveyance shall be accompanied by an opinion from an
independent Certified Public Accountant (CPA) that the
transfer constitutes a true sale under generally accepted
accounting principles (GAAP).
An agreement requiring the seller/originator of the assets to
repurchase/substitute the assets contained in the asset pool
for breach of representations or warranties made in the
agreement shall not affect the non-recourse nature of the
original conveyance.
Rationale: The transfer of assets must constitute a "true sale" to ensure that the asset is "bankruptcy remote" and
available to support the Asset Backed Security (ABS) as intended, even if the originator or seller of the assets
becomes insolvent.
Additionally, a provision in the sales agreement that requires the seller or originator to repurchase the or
substitute particular assets for bona fide breaches or representations or warranties on the nature or quality of the
asset (in contrast to simple default), should not transform the transaction into a recourse transaction. Repurchase
is not a general recourse requirement: for example, repurchase is not generally required upon default and does not
reflect retention of credit risk by the seller. Instead, it is usually triggered by the discovery that a particular asset is
not what it was promised to be, or occasionally by breach of servicing warranties. The ability of the trustee of
special purpose vehicle (SPV) to require repurchase or substitution is necessary to facilitate high volume asset
sales.
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Conveyance
Credit No equivalent. Originator/seller/issuer of an Asset Backed Security (ABS) may at any time
Enhancements create a credit enhancement designed to increase the likelihood of payment,
if part or in full, of the amounts due to the holders of the security. The
credit enhancement may be provided by the seller, originator, issuer or
third party.
More than one type of credit enhancement may be used to support a single
ABS.
Rationale: The seller, originator, or issuer of asset-backed securities is given wider latitude to provide a variety of
credit enhancements to the security. Credit enhancements may be built into the security structures, or provided by
an outside entity. Enhancements may be provided by the originator or seller, based on its own creditworthiness, or
by an independent third party for a fee. There may be more than one enhancement supporting a security, so that a
series of credit enhancements may offer tiers of support for the asset backed security (ABS).
Credit enhancements are not required to ensure that all payments due on the securities are paid on a timely basis:
enhancements may cover non-payment "in full" or "in part ". Through this, the parties can allocate the credit risks
of the transaction in a manner that best suits their particular needs. In addition, credit enhancements can be
created at "any time ", which permits an Asset Backed Security (ABS) to be credit enhanced at the time of issuance
or any time afterwards.
Liquidity No equivalent. Seller/originator of the assets in the pool may agree to make
supports advances to the holders of the Asset Backed Securities (ABS)
to cover late payments on the assets, or otherwise
compensate holders to compensate for decreased returns
caused by late payments.
Rationale: Sellers or originators can provide liquidity supports, and advance or otherwise compensate (i.e. discount
adjustments) security holders for shortfalls due to late payments on the assets.
Source: Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (Central Bank of the Philippines)
Overview. The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) handles the securities issued by banks and institutions.
These securities include asset- or mortgage-backed securities issues where the bank plays the role of the
originator, the trustee, or the issuer.
Current State. The guidelines of the Bangko Sentral (Central Bank of the Philippines) with regard to
securitization are a) Circular (No. 185) governing the origination, issuance, sales and servicing of asset-
backed securities by any bank or non-bank with quasi-banking functions, including its subsidiaries and
affiliates engaged in allied activities and, b) a Memorandum of Agreement between the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas with regard to the supervision of
institutions issuing Asset Backed Securities (ABS). For perspective, under the Philippines' General
Banking Act, the Bankgo Sentral (Central Bank of the Philippines) supervises nonbank financial
institutions that engage in quasi-banking activities such as the
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Securitization Concerns. The Bangko Sentral's (Central Bank of the Philippines) main concern with
regard to mortgage backed securities are a) possible conflicts of interest within banks who have
subsidiaries/affiliates that securitize the mortgage loans, b) possible risks to the originating banks, and c)
possible risks of mortgage backed securities (MBS) to potential investors. From a macroeconomic
perspective, the Bangko Sentral is concerned about the monetary policy implications that will result from
wide scale securization initiatives.
The primary concern of the Bangko Sentral's (Central Bank of the Philippines) circular on asset backed
securities (ABS) appears to be to keep the loan originator completely distinct and separate from the
secondary mortgage institution to avoid a conflict of interest. In particular, this concern appears to be
targeted to a) commercial banks that sell their mortgage loans to their investment banks/investment house
subsidiaries or affiliates or b) secondary mortgage institutions (SMI) that are subsidiaries of commercial
banks, and not towards the development of a private secondary mortgage institution (SMI) that has no
affiliation with a particular commercial bank.
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KEY HIGHLIGHTS OF BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS (CENTRAL BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES) CIRCULAR 185 ON ASSET BACKED SECURITIES
Conveyance of
Assets
The conveyance of the Assets comprising the Asset Pool shall be done within the context of a
"true sale" and, for this purpose, the Seller 5 may not retain in its books the asset backed
securities (ABS), except the residual value, if any.
The Seller shall have no obligation to repurchase or substitute an asset, or any part of the Asset
Pool at any time, except in cases of a breach of representation or warranty.
The Seller shall be under no obligation to provide additional assets to the Special Purpose Trust
(SPT)5 52 to maintain a "coverage ratio" of collateral to outstanding Asset Backed Securities
(ABS). A breach of this requirement will be considered credit enhancement and should be
charged against capital. Losses of the originator/seller from over collateralization shall be
recognized upfront.
Securitized assets shall be considered the subject of a true sale between the seller and the
Special Purpose Trust (SPT). Sold assets shall be taken off the books of the seller and shall be
transferred to the books of the Special Purpose Trust (SPT). For accounting purposes, the
transfer shall only be considered a true sale if a) the transferred assets have been isolated and
put beyond the reach of the seller and its creditor; b) the Special Purpose Trust (SPT) has the
right to pledge or exchange its interest in the assets and; c) the seller does not effectively
maintain control over the transferred assets by any agreement
Third Party A due diligence review by an independent entity mutually agreed upon by the seller and the
Review issuer553 shall be done before the assets are sold.
Originator and The Seller may itself be the Originator54 and may likewise be designated as the Servicer555 .
Seller
Trustee and The trustee5 5 6 shall be the trust department of a bank licensed to do business in the Philippines.
Issuer The trustee shall have the right to manage or administer the asset pool. The trustee shall see to
it that necessary measures are taken to protect the asset pool.
Underwriter An expanded commercial bank or investment house shall have written policies and procedures
on the underwriting of an Asset Backed Security (ABS).
An Underwriter may deal in Asset Backed Security (ABS), except those administered by its
trust department, the trust department of its subsidiaries/affiliates, the trust department of its
parent bank or the trust department of its parent bank's subsidiaries/affiliates.
An expanded commercial bank/investment house may act as an underwriter, on a firm basis, of
Asset Backed Securities (ABS) except those administered by its trust department, the trust
department of its subsidiaries/affiliates, the trust department of its parent bank or the trust
department of its parent bank's subsidiaries/affiliates.
The underwriter may not extend credit for the purpose of purchasing the Asset Backed Security
which the expanded commercial bank/investment house or its subsidiaries/affiliates underwrite.
Guarantor Only an entity whose regular business is that of guarantee issuance or similar undertaking can
55 The Seller is defined as the entity with conveys to the Special Purpose Trust (SPT), or in our case the Secondary
Mortgage Institution (SMI), the assets that constitute the asset pool.
552 The Special Purpose Trust (SPT) is defined as trust administered by a trustee and created solely for the purpose
of issuing and administering an Asset Backed Security (ABS).
"3 The Issuer is defined as Special Purpose Trust (SPT) that issues the Asset Backed Security (ABS).
"4 The Originator is defined as the bank, non-bank with quasi-banking functions, and/or its subsidiary or affiliate
engaged in allied activities that grants or purchases loans or receivables and assembles them into a pool for
securitization.
"5 The Servicer is defined as the entity designated by the issuer primarily to collect and record payments received
on the assets, to remit such collections to the issuer and to perform such other services as may be specifically
required by the issuer excluding asset management or administration.
556 The Trustee is defined as the entity designated to administer the Special Purpose Trust (SPT).
557 The Underwriter is defined as the entity engaged in the act or process of distributing and selling of the Asset
Backed Security (ABS) either on guaranteed or best effort basis.
202
Issue Bankgo Sentral requirements
Issue Bankgo Sentral requirements
act as a guarantor.
Credit Standby letters of credit, surety bonds and guarantees can be used, other than those issued by
enhancement the Originator/seller or its subsidiary/affiliate, the Originator/seller's parent bank or
subsidiary/affiliate, or the Trustee or its subsidiary/affiliate.
To be consistent with the concept or true sale, subordinated securities shall be sold to third party
investors other than the originator/seller's parent company or its subsidiary/affiliate or, if held
by the seller, capital charges shall be booked upfront. Otherwise, the subordinated securities
shall be treated as deposit substitutes subject to legal reserves.
Prohibited The seller may not, under any circumstances, designate its trust department, the trust
Activities department of its subsidiaries/affiliates, the trust department of its parent bank or the trust
department of its parent bank's subsidiaries/affiliates as trustee.
The trust indenture shall not contain any stipulation whereby the seller, its
subsidiaries/affiliates, its parent bank or the parent bank's subsidiaries/affiliates shall commit to
extend any credit facility to the issuer and/or trustee.
The Asset Backed Security (ABS) shall not be eligible as collateral for a loan extended by a
bank/non-bank with quasi-banking functions which originated/sold the underlying assets of
such Asset Backed Securities (ABS).
The trustee may not designate its subsidiary affiliate, its parent or the parent's
subsidiaries/affiliates as servicer or vice-versa.
Source: Bangko Sentral (Central Bank of the Philippines)
Regulation of the Secondary Mortgage Institution (SMI)
The recent memorandum of agreement (MOA) signed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
and the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (Central Bank of the Philippines) states,
"That while the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has jurisdiction over the
sale or offer of asset backed securities (ABS), the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (Central
Bank of the Philippines) shall regulate the origination, issuance, sale, servicing and
administration of asset backed securities (ABS) by any bank/quasi-bank, including its
subsidiaries and affiliates engaged in allied activities as well as securitization schemes
where the originator/seller is not supervised by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (Central
Bank of the Philippines) and the trustee/issuer of the asset backed securities (ABS) is the
trust department of a bank or a non-bank financial institution under Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas (Central Bank of the Philippines).55 8"
In the event that both the Secondary Mortgage Institution (SMI) and an Asset Management Company
(AMC) are considered quasi-banks by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (Central Bank of the Philippines),
then the rules and regulations that will govern the issuance of mortgage backed securities (MBS) will fall
under the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas' (Central Bank of the Philippines) Circular No. 185. Otherwise, if
the secondary mortgage institution (SMI) is considered a corporation, then it falls under the regulation of,
potentially, the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) proposed rules on the issuance of Asset
Backed Securities, which appears to be more favorable to mortgage backed securities (MBS).
558 Memorandum of Agreement between the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (Central Bank of the Philippines) and the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). June 7, 2001. Manila, Philippines.
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However, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (Central Bank of the Philippines) has reservations over
allowing the secondary mortgage institution (SMI) to be a corporation because securitization creates a
multiplier effect in capital markets and money supply with the creation of credit and with the turnover of
liquidity. If the secondary mortgage institution (SMI) is under the control of the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas (Central Bank of the Philippines), the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (Central Bank of the
Philippines) feels that it will limit the scope of their monetary authority, and hence undermine their
constitutional mandate to provide policy direction in banking and credit for the purpose of attaining
monetary stability559.
Given this, it would appear that the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (Central Bank of the Philippines) will
insist that secondary mortgage institutions (SMI) fall under their rules and regulations. This appears to be
the case for investment banks/houses that are subsidiaries of commercial banks or investment houses as
Matoto confirmed that the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas' (Central Bank of the Philippines) Circular 185
has made it difficult for them to put together mortgage backed securities (MBS) deals 560 . In the event that
a private secondary mortgage institution (SMI) that is not particularly affiliated to any commercial bank is
established, it would seem likely that the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas' (Central Bank of the Philippines)
would insist that it fall under its rules and regulations.
Recourse. In theory, there are two methods by which mortgage loans are sold to a Secondary Mortgage
Institution (SMI) 561: on a non-recourse or a recourse basis. For mortgage loans sold on a non-recourse
basis, the secondary mortgage institution (SMI) a) acquires complete ownership over all the future cash
flows arising from the mortgage pool and b) assumes all the risks, particularly the default and credit risks,
that were borne by the loan originator562
When the originator transfers all the ownership rights and thus relinquishes all its claims to the mortgage
pool to the secondary mortgage institution (SMI), the SMI is deemed to be "bankruptcy remote". A non-
recourse sale of mortgage loans insulate the mortgages from claims by the originator's owners and
creditors in the event that the originator goes bankrupt. Given this, a secondary mortgage institution
(SMI) is desirable because it is a bankruptcy-remote vehicle that isolates the mortgage from undue claims
on the cash flow and protects the interests of investors. For mortgage loans sold on a recourse basis, the
55Reside, Renato S. Mortgage-Backed Securities in Asia. Asian Development Bank. 1999. Pasig City, Philippines.560 Matoto, Senen L. President of the Investment Houses of the Philippines. Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati
City, Philippines.
561 Or for the case of nonperforming mortgage loans, sold to an Asset Management Company (AMC).562 Reside, Renato S. Mortgage-Backed Securities in Asia. Asian Development Bank. 1999. Pasig City, Philippines.
204
loan originator chooses to retain some ownership interest, rights, or credit risk in the pool, or is otherwise
is required to provide liquidity or insurance for any or all of the secondary mortgage institution's (SMI),
risks over the mortgage pool. According to Reside, recourse transactions don't make the assets
bankruptcy remotes63 . Under both the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas' (Central Bank of the Philippines)
circular and the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) proposed rule on asset backed securities
(ABS), they both require that the conveyance of assets to be a true sale564 , thus without recourse.
However, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas' (Central Bank of the Philippines) circular and Securities and
Exchange Commission's (SEC) proposed rule on asset-backed securities (ABS) appear to diverge with
regard to the "scope" of non-recourse. Unlike the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC), the non-
recourse for the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (Central Bank of the Philippines) appears to extend to the
credit enhancements as well.
s63 Reside, Renato S. Mortgage-Backed Securities in Asia. Asian Development Bank. 1999. Pasig City, Philippines.
s64 The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (Central Bank of the Philippines) states that "Securitized assets shall be
considered the subject of a true sale between the seller and the Special Purpose Trust (SPT). Sold assets shall be
taken off the books of the seller and shall be transferred to the books of the Special Purpose Trust (SPT). For
accounting purposes, the transfer shall only be considered a true sale if a) the transferred assets have been isolated
and put beyond the reach of the seller and its creditor; b) the Special Purpose Trust (SPT) has the right to pledge or
exchange its interest in the assets and; c) the seller does not effectively maintain control over the transferred assets
by any concurrent agreement ". Meanwhile, the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) proposed rules states
that "a) the conveyance of the assets to the asset pool that transfer ownership of those assets to the trust or special
purpose vehicle (SPV) and; b) the conveyance shall be accompanied by an opinion from a Certified Public
Accountant (CPA) that the transfer constitutes a true sale under generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP)."
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COMPARISON OF RECOURSE/NON-RECOURSE RULES BETWEEN THE BANGKO
SENTRAL (CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES) AND THE SEC
Issue Bangko Sentral SEC
External credit Standby letters of credit, surety bonds and Originator/seller/issuer of an Asset
enhancements guarantees can be used, other than those issued Backed Security (ABS) may at any
by the Originator/seller or its time create a credit enhancement
subsidiary/affiliate, the Originator/seller's designed to increase the likelihood of
parent bank or subsidiary/affiliate, or the payment, if part or in full, of the
Trustee or its subsidiary/affiliate. amounts due to the holders of the
Internal credit To be consistent with the concept or true sale, As above.
enhancements subordinated securities shall be sold to third
party investors other than the originator/seller's
parent company or its subsidiary/affiliate or, if
held by the seller, capital charges shall be
booked upfront. Otherwise, the subordinated
securities shall be treated as deposit substitutes
subject to legal reserves.
The seller shall be under no obligation to
provide additional assets (over collateralization)
to the special purpose trust to maintain a
"4coverage ratio" of collateral to outstanding
asset backed securities (ABS). A breach of this
requirement will be considered a credit
enhancement and should be charged against
capital.
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Since there is no functioning private secondary mortgage institution (SMI), the organizations that would
be most inclined to engage in mortgage backed securities (MBS) transactions are the local investment
banks. However, since the Bangko Sentral's (Central Bank of the Philippines) non-recourse scope seems
to include 'credit enhancements', this has made it difficult for investment banks to put together mortgage
backed securities (MBS) deals.
In the Philippines, most of these investment banks/houses are either affiliates or subsidiaries of
commercial banks. If the conveyance of the mortgage loans to the secondary mortgage institution
(SMI) 565 was considered a non-recourse arrangement, then theoretically there would be no issue for these
investment banks with regard to offering their own credit enhancements or securing credit enhancements
from their parent commercial banks. However, this is not possible under the Bangko Sentral's (Central
Bank of the Philippines) rules, as a) all external credit enhancements need to be secured from third parties
and; b) investment banks can't invest in subordinated structures 566 otherwise the securities will be
considered deposit substitutes and subject to legal reserves.
The Bangko Sentral's (Central Bank of the Philippines) insistence to keep credit enhancements as part of
the "non-recourse" scope possibly stems from the Bangko Sentral's (Central Bank of the Philippines)
suspicion that commercial banks may use mortgage backed securities (BSP) to create another "informal"
repurchase agreements with their buyers to avoid liquidity reserve requirements. Recall that in Chapter 2,
Saldana elaborates on the practice of commercial banks to execute "informal" repurchase arrangements
with a buyer to repurchase government securities at an agreed date567. This practice allows dealers to
avoid Documentary Stamp Taxes (DST) and circumvent liquidity reserve requirements for instruments
that the Bangko Sentral (Central Bank of the Philippines) considers deposit substitutes.
The Bangko Sentral (Central Bank of the Philippines) securitization rules seem to imply this. Under the
rule of conveyance, it states that "the seller does not effectively maintain control over the transferred
assets by any concurrent agreement". Moreover, anecdotal evidence appears to prove that the 'distrust' of
565 Which in this case, is the investment bank/house of the commercial bank.
566 An investment bank's investment in the subordinated structure can be construed as a confidence-building
measure for the investor because it gives the impression that the bank stands behind the mortgage backed security
(MBS).
567 This "informal" practice was discussed extensively in Chapter 2.
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the Bangko Sentral (Central Bank of the Philippines) with regard to the 'misuse' of commercial papers
will extend to mortgage backed securities (MBS)568. According to Limlingan, the Investment Houses
Association of the Philippines (IHAP) wanted to securitize assets, and classify these assets as an off
balance sheet transaction. However, the group was berated by the Bangko Sentral (Central Bank of the
Philippines) governor who said he did not want a repeat of the commercial paper case 69.
Matoto says that, as a result of the Bangko Sentral's (Central Bank of the Philippines) securitization rules
that 'anticipate' the circumvention, is not only clearly prejudicial on the part of the Bangko Sentral
(Central Bank of the Philippines), but it has also effectively "killed" securitization. For perspective,
Matoto points out that no securitization deal has been put together yet since the circular was put out in
1998570, presumably due to the stringent rules on credit enhancements.
Since there is no functioning private secondary mortgage institution (SMI), the organizations that would
be most inclined to engage in mortgage backed securities (MBS) transactions are the local investment
banks. However, since the Bangko Sentral's (Central Bank of the Philippines) non-recourse scope seems
to include 'credit enhancements', this has made it difficult for investment banks to put together mortgage
backed securities (MBS) deals.
In the Philippines, most of these investment banks/houses are either affiliates or subsidiaries of
commercial banks. If the conveyance of the mortgage loans to the secondary mortgage institution
(SMI) 571 was considered a non-recourse arrangement, then theoretically there would be no issue for these
investment banks with regard to offering their own credit enhancements or securing credit enhancements
from their parent commercial banks. However, this is not possible under the Bangko Sentral's (Central
Bank of the Philippines) rules, as a) all external credit enhancements need to be secured from third parties
and; b) investment banks can't invest in subordinated structuress 72 otherwise the securities will be
considered deposit substitutes and subject to legal reserves; or the seller (presumably the parent
commercial bank of the investment bank) will have to book a loss if it provides additional assets (over
568 Limlingan, Victor S. Professor at the Asian Institute of Management. Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati
City, Philippines.
569 With reference to having informal repurchase agreements for mortgage backed securities (MBS) to avoid
liquidity reserve requirements, which was being done with commercial papers.
570 Matoto, Senen L. President of the Investment Houses of the Philippines. Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati
City, Philippines.
571 Which in this case, is the investment bank/house of the commercial bank.
572 An investment bank's investment in the subordinated structure can be construed as a confidence-building
measure for the investor because it gives the impression that the bank stands behind the mortgage backed security
(MBS).
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collateralization) to the investment bank for over collateralization. The Bangko Sentral (Central Bank of
the Philippines) prefers that credit enhancements be provided by a third party rather than by the originator
573to avoid the recourse issue
The Bangko Sentral's (Central Bank of the Philippines) insistence to keep credit enhancements as part of
the "non-recourse" scope possibly stems from the Bangko Sentral's (Central Bank of the Philippines)
suspicion that commercial banks may use mortgage backed securities (BSP) to create another "informal"
repurchase agreements with their buyers to avoid liquidity reserve requirements. Recall that in Chapter 2,
Saldana elaborates on the practice of commercial banks to execute "informal" repurchase arrangements
with a buyer to repurchase government securities at an agreed date574 . This practice allows dealers to
avoid Documentary Stamp Taxes (DST) and circumvent liquidity reserve requirements for instruments
that the Bangko Sentral (Central Bank of the Philippines) considers deposit substitutes.
The Bangko Sentral (Central Bank of the Philippines) securitization rules seem to imply this. Under the
rule of conveyance, it states that "the seller does not effectively maintain control over the transferred
assets by any concurrent agreement".
Moreover, anecdotal evidence appears to prove that the 'distrust' of the Bangko Sentral (Central Bank of
the Philippines) with regard to the 'misuse' of commercial papers will extend to mortgage backed
securities (MBS) 575. According to Limlingan, when the Investment Houses Association of the
Philippines (IHAP) wanted to securitize assets, and classify these assets as an off balance sheet
transaction. However, the group was berated by the Bangko Sentral (Central Bank of the Philippines)
governor who said he did not want a repeat of the commercial paper case576.
Matoto says that, as a result of the Bangko Sentral's (Central Bank of the Philippines) securitization rules
that 'anticipate' the circumvention, is not only clearly prejudicial on the part of the Bangko Sentral
(Central Bank of the Philippines), but it has also effectively "killed" securitization. For perspective,
573 Reside, Renato S. Mortgage-Backed Securities in Asia. Asian Development Bank. 1999. Pasig City, Philippines.
574 This "informal" practice was discussed extensively in Chapter 2.
575 Limlingan, Victor S. Professor at the Asian Institute of Management. Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati
City, Philippines.
576 With reference to having informal repurchase agreements for mortgage backed securities (MBS) to avoid
liquidity reserve requirements, which was being done with commercial papers.
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Matoto points out that no securitization deal has been put together yet since the circular was put out in
1998"', presumably due to the stringent rules on credit enhancements.
Perceived conflict of interest. Directly related to the issue of non-recourse is the insistence of the Bangko
Sentral (Central Bank of the Philippines) to keep each "process" leading towards mortgage backed
securitization as "arm's length" as possible. Similar to the non-recourse issue, the difficulty of investment
banks to control the entire securitization process as the Bankgo Sentral (Central Bank of the Philippines)
requires them to 'frame out' specific functions to different entities makes it difficult to progress with
mortgage backed securities (MBS) issuance.
In contrast, the proposed rules of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) are not as stringent
with regard to the "processes" leading towards mortgage-backed securitization. Thus, in the event that a
private led secondary mortgage institution (SMI) is established, that is not particularly affiliated to a local
commercial bank, and it will arguably undergo an easier mortgage backed securitization process versus
investment banks.
PROCESS TRANSACTION OF THE BANKGO SENTRAL WITH THE SEC FOR ASSET-
BACKED SECURITIES (ABS)
Bangko Sentral SEC
Asset Backed Security (ABS) An underwriter" cannot deal No equivalent.
dealing with asset-backed securities
administered by its trust
department, the trust department
of its subsidiaries/affiliates, the
trust department of its parent
bank/parent bank's
subsidiaries/affiliates.
Asset Backed Security (ABS) An underwriter cannot administer No equivalent.
underwriting asset-backed securities (ABS) of
its trust department, the trust
department of its
subsidiaries/affiliates, the trust
department of its parent
bank/parent bank's
subsidiaries/affiliates.
Asset Backed Security (ABS) An underwriter cannot extend No equivalent.
credit extension credit for the purpose of
purchasing the asset backed
securities (ABS) which it
underwrites or is underwritten by
577 Matoto, Senen L. President of the Investment Houses of the Philippines. Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati
City, Philippines.
578 The underwriter can be an expanded commercial bank or an investment house.
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its subsidiaries/affiliates or its
parents bank/parent bank's
subsidiaries/affiliates.
Designation of trustee Seller579 cannot designate its own The special purpose trust (SPT)
trust department, the trust must be a trustee independent of
department of its the seller, originator, servicer, or
subsidiaries/affiliates, the trust any underwriter of the asset
department of its backed security (ABS), or any
subsidiaries/affiliates, trust affiliate/subsidiary, or
department of its parent director/officer and their relatives
bank/parent bank up the 4 hdegree.
subsidiaries/affiliates as trustees.
Purchase of asset backed The trust department of a bank No equivalent.
securities (ABS) by a trust that has discretion in the
department management of any trust or
investment account may not
purchase asset backed securities
(ABS) administered by the trust
department of the same bank, the
trust department of its
subsidiaries/affiliates, trust
department of its parent
bank/parent bank
subsidiaries/affiliates as trustees.
Source: Bangko Sentral (Central Bank of the Philippines), Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
Trust or corporation structure
Prior to understanding the benefits of a trust structure or corporate structure with regard to a Secondary
Mortgage Institution (SMI), it is instructive to understand the difference between a pass-through and a
pay-through structure.
Under a pass-through structure, the mortgage-backed securities (MBS) issued by the secondary mortgage
institution (SMI) represent an undivided ownership interest in the asset pool. Thus, the mortgage backed
securities (MBS) holders are treated as beneficial owners of the assets. Under a pay-through structure, the
mortgage-backed securities (MBS) issued by the secondary mortgage institution (SMI) takes on the form
of debt of the issuer rather than ownership interest in the asset pool. A pay-though structure allows the
cash flow from the mortgage pool to be structured like a fixed-income security. Thus, the mortgage-
backed securities (MBS) are not paid immediately to investors once the mortgage loans in the pool are
paid by the homebuyer, but instead on a monthly or quarterly basis to suit investor preference18 0. Given
the ability to structure payments according to investors preferences, a pay-through structure is preferred
for a secondary mortgage institution (SMI).
579 The seller can also be the originator and may likewise be designated as the servicer.
211
The Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) proposed rules for asset-backed securities (ABS)
allow the special purpose vehicle (SPV) to be either a pass through or pay through organizational
structure581 . The ownership of the assets will be transferred to the special purpose vehicle (SPV) that
shall a) own the assets in the asset pool; b) issue mortgage backed securities (MBS) in the form of debt,
and; c) pledge the assets and their cash flow to secure the payment of the debt 58 2.
However, Bangko Sentral's (Central Bank of the Philippines) circular only allows a pass through
structure for banks and non-bank entities with quasi-banking functions that plan to issue mortgage-backed
securities (MBS)5 83. Given that investment banks are presumably the organizations keenest on issuing
mortgage backed securities (MBS), these banks will presumably be under the Bangko Sentral's (Central
Bank of the Philippines) supervision. If the investment bank is structured as a pay through, the mortgage-
backed security (MBS) will be considered a deposit substitute584 . As a deposit substitute, the security
becomes subject to reserve requirements, which effectively increases the intermediary costs of issuing a
mortgage-backed security (MBS) 85. Moreover, the secondary mortgage institution (SMI) will be
required to secure a quasi-banking license to issue an asset backed security, a license that the Bangko
Sentral (Central Bank of the Philippines) has not issued in many years5 86 . However, it is yet
undetermined if a secondary mortgage institution (SMI) that is not affiliated with any particular
commercial bank will fall under the supervision of the Bangko Sentral (Central Bank of the Philippines)
or the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Although Rustia admits that the treatment of the pay
through structure de-motivates securitization, he recommends that the "private sector package something
580 Reside, Renato S. Mortgage-Backed Securities in Asia. Asian Development Bank. 1999. Pasig City, Philippines.
581 The Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) proposed rules states that the securities shall be "administered
by an independent trustee which (i) represent an undivided ownership in the assets forming the asset pool, or (ii)
represent the right of the holder to receive payments from the proceeds expected to be derived from the assets
forming the asset pool owned by the special purpose vehicle (SPV) to secure payment to holders of securities."
582 Securities and Exchange Commission. Commission release proposing rules governing the issuance, sale and
administration of asset backed securities. 2001. Mandaluyong City, Philippines.
583 The Bangko Sentral's (Central Bank of the Philippines) circular states that "asset backed securities (ABS) shall
refer to certificates issued by a special purpose trust (SPT) representing an undivided ownership in the asset pool."
584 A deposit substitute is defined as an alternative form of obtaining funds from the public other than deposit
through the issuance, endorsement, or acceptance of debt instruments for the borrower's own account for the
purpose of relending or purchasing of receivables. This would require the secondary mortgage institution (SMI) to
secure a quasi-banking license because the contracting of debt to purchase receivables constitutes a quasi-banking
activity under Philippine law.
585 Alcid, Andrew D. Executive Vice President, Investment Banking Division of United Coconut Planters Bank.
Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati City, Philippines.
586 Philippine Conference on Securitization. Mobilizing the Markets for Securitization: The Case for Asset Backed
Securities. October 1999. Makati City, Philippines.
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where the provision of the law is not violated"58 7 but presumably offering the same benefits of a pay
through structure (i.e. structuring payments on a periodic basis versus paying the security holder every
time a mortgage loan in the pool is paid.)
Taxation
The whole process of mortgage-backed securitization in the Philippines is marked by a high incidence of
taxation. From the investor's standpoint, the cascading taxes that accrue to the purchaser of mortgage-
backed securities (MBS) are such that the potential income that can be derived from the transaction is
drastically reduced. From an issuer's standpoint, the aggregate amount of taxes strongly discourage
mortgage backed securities (MBS) development as they eventually add to the large transaction costs
behind these securities. The prohibitive amount of taxes is further exacerbated by the prevailing
uncertainty of the regulatory authorities with regard to the tax treatment of mortgage-backed securities
(MBS). Thus, the 1999 Conference on Securitization stated that mortgage-backed securitization would
not take off with such an onerous and burdensome tax regime' 8 .
Thus, conference attendees have batted for a reduction or elimination of these taxes, which they argue
would not result in a significant revenue loss or shortfall for the government since the taxes derived from
these transactions are very minimal. The following table illustrates the high incidence of taxation
involved in mortgage-backed securitization:
Transaction Details Applicable taxes Tax Rates
Constitution of real Purchase of mortgage on real National taxes
estate mortgage property from original seller (based Capital gains tax 6%
on appraised value as transfer value). Documentary stamp tax (DST) 1.5%
Municipal taxes
Register of Deeds fee maximum of
Documentary stamp tax (DST) 0.5%
Constitution of mortgage by variable
mortgagor to mortgagee bank (based 0.2-0.4%
on allowed loan value of appraised
property)
Transfer or Documentary stamp tax (DST) 1.5%
assignment of
loans secured by
the mortgage
587 Rustia, Andres I. Managing Director of the Asset Management Department of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
(Central Bank of the Philippines). Personal Interview. June 2001. Manila, Philippines.
588 Philippine Conference on Securitization. Mobilizing the Markets for Securitization: The Case for Asset Backed
Securities. October 1999. Makati City, Philippines.
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Mortgage backed Issuance of mortgage backed Documentary stamp tax (DST) 1.5%
securities (MBS) securities (MBS) certificate in the
issuance primary
Market Final withholding tax
Interest income earned on such 20%
securities Secondary trading of Documentary stamp tax (DST)
Mortgage backed securities (MBS) no longer taxed589
Foreclosure of Extra judicial National taxes
property Foreclosure Capital gains tax 6%
Documentary stamp tax (DST) 1.5%
Municipal taxes
Register of Deeds fee maximum of
0.5%
variable
Credit Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) Tax break on interest Up to 11% of
enhancements guarantee interest on
socialized
Fidelity bonds Earnings housing590
Documentary Stamp Tax
Indemnity/Surety bond (DST) earnings are tax
Documentary Stamp Tax free
(DST) 12%
7%
Source: World Bank
(HGC)
1997; updates from the Tax Reform Act of 1997 (R.A. 8424), Home Guaranty Corporation
The following section will discuss the taxes that are involved in the transformation of a mortgage loan
into a mortgage-backed security (MBS).
Documentary Stamp Tax (DST). Taxes on financial intermediaries and transactions constitute one of the
greatest impediment towards the development of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) in the Philippines.
Primary among these taxes is the documentary stamp tax (DST), which hinders both the development of
the primary and secondary mortgage market 91. The documentary stamp tax (DST), which raises the
transaction costs of issuing and purchasing the mortgage backed security (MBS), is the most pervasive
tax that is imposed on almost all transactions in the securitization process. The documentary stamp tax
(DST) is a 1.5% tax that is:
a) Imposed on real estate mortgage;
b) Imposed on deed of sale when purchased by the originator. The total value of the
documentary stamp tax is based on the value of each the mortgages conveyed to the
589 Secondary trading of mortgage backed securities (MBS) has since been exempted from documentary stamp tax
(DST). House Bill 12564, passed in December 2000, removing the documentary stamps tax (DST) on the secondary
trading of financial instruments and those to be traded at the stock exchange.
590 Up to 10% of interest for low cost housing, 9.5% for medium cost housing, and 8.5% for open housing.
591 Reside, Renato S. Mortgage-Backed Securities in Asia. Asian Development Bank. 1999. Pasig City, Philippines.
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secondary mortgage institution (SMI) (i.e. If 100 mortgages are pooled, each one is hit with a
documentary stamp tax (DST));
c) Imposed upon initial issuance of the mortgage-backed security (MBS) from the issuer to the
investor.
It is also key to highlight certain gray areas that continue to exist with regard to the tax treatment of
mortgage-backed securities. Firstly, mortgage backed securities (MBS) are neither strictly debt or equity,
thus there is some a gray area with respect to its tax treatment5 92. Under Philippine tax laws, it is
important as to whether or not the security is treated as a debt or equity. In his paper, Reside says that
Philippine regulatory authorities will treat mortgage backed securities (MBS) as debt instead of equity,
making primary and secondary issues subject to documentary stamp tax (DST) 59 3 and the gross receipts
tax (GRT). However, the treatment of mortgage backed securities (MBS) as debt appears to run counter
to the pass-through structure currently allowed by the Bangko Sentral (Central Bank of the Philippines),
which represents an undivided interest in the asset pool.
According to Finance Assistant Secretary Paul, one of the Department of Finance's (DOF) initiatives is to
propose the removal of documentary stamp taxes (DST) on presumably all related processes which lead
to mortgage backed securities (MBS) issuance as part of a financial sector tax reform package in the
current congress 5 94. However, Jacob believes that this might be difficult to remove as the documentary
stamp tax (DST) continues to be a revenue generating mechanism for the government595.
The 1999 Philippine Conference on Securitization succeeded in partially removing the burden of
documentary stamp taxes (DST) on secondary trading of mortgage-backed securities (MBS). House Bill
12564 was passed in December 2000, removing the documentary stamp tax (DST) on the secondary
trading of financial instruments and those to be traded at the stock exchange596 . The House Bill amended
592 Reside, Renato S. Mortgage-Backed Securities in Asia. Asian Development Bank. 1999. Pasig City, Philippines.
593 Secondary trading of mortgage backed securities (MBS) has since been exempted from
documentary stamp tax (DST). House Bill 12564, passed in December 2000, removing the
documentary stamps tax (DST) on the secondary trading of financial instruments and those to be
traded at the stock exchange.
594 Paul, Jeremias N. , Jr. Department of Finance Assistant Secretary. Personal Interview. June 2001. Manila,
Philippines.
595 Jacob, Monico. Former Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig Chairman and Conference
Chairman of the Philippine Conference on Securitization. Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati City, Philippines.
596 Philippine Conference on Securitization. Mobilizing the Markets for Securitization: The Case for Asset Backed
Securities. October 1999. Makati City, Philippines.
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Section 198 of the National Internal Revenue Code on "the stamp tax on assignments and renewals of
certain instruments and treatment of derivative instruments."
The amended bill states: "No documentary stamp tax (DST) shall be collected on the said assignment,
transfer, renewal or continuance if there is no change in the maturity date or remaining period of coverage
from that of the original instrument, provided further that no documentary stamp tax (DST) shall be
collected on asset-backed securities and any other derivative or secondarily traded instrument of which
the underlying asset or primary financial instrument was already subjected to a documentary stamp tax
(DST) on primary issuance."
Double taxation of the Secondary Mortgage Institution (SMI). A privately led secondary mortgage
institution (SMI) established in the Philippines may be subject to double taxation under Philippine tax
laws5 97. According to Reside, large and mature secondary mortgage institutions (SMI) typically have
large flows of expenditures and revenues pass through their books through a variety of instruments.
Given this, the tax authorities might excessively tax the operations.
For example, the secondary mortgage institution (SMI) will have a significant amount of (interest)
income and (interest) expenditure flowing through its books. In the event that the tax authorities a) treat
the interest income generated by the secondary mortgage institution (SMI) (through the secondary
mortgage institution's (SMI) pass-through spreads) as taxable income and b) does not consider the
interest expense incurred by the secondary mortgage institution (SMI) (in regularly paying out coupons to
the mortgage backed securities (MBS) holders), then this will constitute double taxation which would
significantly hamper securitization efforts.
Capital gains tax. For the mortgage loan originator, one of the key issues is the tax implication of the
conveyance of the mortgages to the secondary mortgage institution (SMI) in the secondary mortgage
markets598. If the mortgage loans are considered as conveyed through the normal course of business, any
capital gains from the transfer may be construed as the tax authorities as taxable revenue. However, if the
mortgage loans are conveyed at a loss or at a discount, the tax authorities may argue that the sale of the
mortgages is not in the ordinary course of business and, thus, is not considered tax-deductible. Reside
argues that to simplify tax administration, the mortgage loans should be transferred at book value to make
the conveyance from the originator to the secondary mortgage institution (SMI) tax neutral.
597 Reside, Renato S. Mortgage-Backed Securities in Asia. Asian Development Bank. 1999. Pasig City, Philippines.
598 Reside, Renato S. Mortgage-Backed Securities in Asia. Asian Development Bank. 1999. Pasig City, Philippines.
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Other Taxes
For the homebuyer. The other taxes levied on mortgage backed securities, such as withholding taxes,
income tax, and gross receipts tax (GRT), are costs that the financial intermediaries may choose to pass
on to the potential homebuyers in the primary mortgage market. Effectively, this would run counter to
the objective of mortgage backed securitization, which is to bring down the costs of borrowing money for
a mortgage loan for a homebuyer.
For the investor. There are two key disincentives for potential investors in mortgage backed securities
(MBS): the withholding tax from the interest income as a result of holding a mortgage backed security
and the capital gains taxes levied on the disposal of the mortgage backed securities (MBS) in the
secondary mortgage market 99. Moreover, the Bangko Sentral (Central Bank of the Philippines) has ruled
that bank-originated mortgage backed securities (MBS), will not be considered as deposit substitutes.
Thus, mortgage backed securities (MBS) investors will be exempt from paying a withholding tax, but will
have to pay corporate income tax.
For perspective, the following is the income tax scale that will be levied on investors from any gain from
the sale of mortgage-backed securities (MBS):
a) 33% on net for domestic and resident foreign corporations;
b) 33% on gross for non-resident foreign corporations;
c) Graduated rates of 5% to a maximum of 33% on net for citizens, resident aliens and non-
resident aliens engaged in trade or business and;
d) 25% on gross for non-resident aliens not engaged in trade or business (These rates are subject
to the provisions of the applicable tax treaty).
For the secondary mortgage institution (SMI). In the event that mortgaged property 00 conveyed to a
secondary mortgage institution (SMI) undergoes foreclosure, the following are the taxes involved6 1:
599 Reside, Renato S. Mortgage-Backed Securities in Asia. Asian Development Bank. 1999. Pasig City, Philippines.
600 A mortgaged property that is an ordinary asset.
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a) Expanded Withholding Tax of 1.5% to 5% of selling price if the seller is habitually engaged
in the real estate business; otherwise the withholding tax is 7.5%602;
b) Documentary Stamp tax (DST) of P5.00/US$0.28 for every P1,000.00/US$19 consideration,
based on the highest bid price and;
c) Transfer of real property ownership tax of 0.5% of 0.75% of consideration of fair market
value, whichever is higher.
Summary of taxes for both the loan originator and the mortgage backed securities (MBS) investor. The
following table traces the incidence of taxation and clarificatory taxation issues for the aforementioned
parties, based on a presentation during the 1999 Philippine Conference on Securitization 63:
601 Philippine Conference on Securitization. Mobilizing the Markets for Securitization: The Case for Asset Backed
Securities. October 1999. Makati City, Philippines.
602 If we are to assume that the secondary mortgage institution (SMI) is not considered as habitually engaged in the
real estate business, the expanded withholding tax would be 7.5%.603 Philippine Conference on Securitization. Mobilizing the Markets for Securitization: The Case for Asset Backed
Securities. October 1999. Makati City, Philippines.
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Step Taxies Issue
Assignment/sale of Income tax This is not usually the subject of income tax because the
assets (receivables) by originator will sell the receivables at either face value or at
the Originator to the a discount.
Secondary Mortgage
Institution (SMI) However, if the receivables sold/assigned are installment
receivables, of which the sale and the corresponding
receipt of payment will trigger income realization.
The discount is a deductible business loss
Gross Receipts tax (GRT) If the originator is a bank, then the receipt of payment
from the Secondary Mortgage Institution (SMI) will
trigger Gross Receipts Tax (GRT) liability.
Value Added Tax (VAT) The sale of receivables is not subject to Value-Added Tax
(VAT).
Documentary Stamp Tax It is not subject to Documentary Stamp Tax (DST)
(DST) because it is not a borrowing transaction, being without
recourse.
The assignment of mortgages is presently subject to
Issuance bDDocumentao m Stain Tax SDSTt.
Issuance by the Documentary Stamp Tax The issuance is not subject to Documentary Stamp Tax
Secondary Mortgage (DST) (DST) under Section 180 of The National Internal
Institution (SMI) of Revenue Code of 1997604 because it is not considered a
the Asset-Backed depository substitute.
Security (ABS)
However, the Department of Finance (DOF) has claimed
that, whether it is a pass through or pay through, the initial
issuance of asset-backed security (ABS) will be subject to
documentary stamp taxes (DST).
604 "SECTION 180. Stamp Tax on All Bonds, Loan Agreements, Promissory Notes, Bills of Exchange, Drafts,
Instruments and Securities Issued by the Government or Any of its Instrumentalities, Deposit Substitute Debt
Instruments, Certificates of Deposits Bearing Interest and Others Not Payable on Sight or Demand. - On all
bonds, loan agreements, including those signed abroad, wherein the object of the contract is located or used in
the Philippines, bills of exchange (between points within the Philippines), drafts, instruments and securities
issued by the Government or any of its instrumentalities, deposit substitute debt instruments, certificates of
deposits drawing interest, orders for the payment of any sum of money otherwise than at sight or on demand, on
all promissory notes, whether negotiable or non-negotiable, except bank notes issued for circulation, and on
each renewal of any such note, there shall be collected a documentary stamp tax of Thirty centavos
(P0.3 O/US$0.005 7) on each Two hundred pesos (P200/US$3. 73), or fractional part thereof, of the face value of
any such agreement, bill of exchange, draft, certificate of deposit, or note: Provided, That only one
documentary stamp tax shall be imposed on either loan agreement, or promissory notes issued to secure such
loan, whichever will yield a higher tax: Provided, however, That loan agreements or promissory notes the
aggregate of which does not exceed Two hundred fifty thousand pesos (P250,000/US$4,720) executed by an
individual for his purchase on installment for his personal use or that of his family and not for business, resale,
barter or hire of a house, lot, motor vehicle, appliance or furniture shall be exempt from the payment of the
documentary stamp tax provided under this Section."
605 SECTION 178. Stamp Tax on Certfdcates of Profits or Interest in Property or Accumulations. - On all
certificates of profits, or any certificate or memorandum showing interest in the property or accumulations of
any association, company or corporation, and on all transfers of such certificates or memoranda, there shall be
collected a documentary stamp tax of Fifty centavos (PO.50/US$0.0094) on each Two hundred pesos
(P200/US$3.77), or fractional part thereof, of the face value of such certificate or memorandum.
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It is doubtful if the Secondary Mortgage Institution (SMI),
if it considered a trust, will be subject to Section 178 of
the Code605 because it is not an association, company or
corporation.
Investment of Withholding tax The income of investible funds from investments in
Funds/Administration Government Securities or deposit substitute instruments
of the Secondary consisting of discounts from issuance wise subject to a
Mortgage Institution 10% withholding tax.
(SMI)
However, this is a tax on the investors holding an
undivided interest in the Asset Pool of the Secondary
Mortgage Institution (SMI), not a tax on the Secondary
Mortgage Institution (SMI).
Distribution to Withholding tax The distribution of income by the Secondary Mortgage
Investors Institution (SMI) to investors is subject to a 20% final
withholding tax imposed on yield and other monetary
benefits from the trust fund and similar arrangements.
The rate is increased to 25% and 33% if the recipients are
non-resident aliens not engaged in trade or business and
non-resident foreign corporations, respectively.
Income tax However, the mortgage backed security (MBS) is not
subject to income tax if:
Distribution of income has already been subjected to a
20% final withholding tax
Distribution of income to individual investors where the
mortgage backed security (MBS) qualifies as a long-term
deposit or investment certification.
Distribution of income where mortgage backed security is
guaranteed by the Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC), up
to 11% of the interest income distributed606.
Distribution to tax exempt investors such as employee
retirement funds, Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS), Social Security System (SSS), foreign
governments, financial institutions owned, controlled or
enjoying refinancing from foreign governments, and
international or regional financing institutions established
by foreign governments.
Source: October 1999 Philippine Conference on Securitization
Summary of taxes for the secondary mortgage institution (SMI). The following table describes specific
income tax related issues that directly impact the operations of the secondary mortgage institution (SMI),
based on a presentation during the 1999 Philippine Conference on Securitization607 .
606 Up to 10% of interest for low cost housing, 9.5% for medium cost housing, and 8.5% for open housing.
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Step Tax/as Issue
Assignment/sale of assets Income Tax There is no income tax levied
(receivables) by the Originator to because it is only an outright
the secondary mortgage purchase of mortgages.
institution (SMI)
The discount of mortgage loans is
not considered interest income to the
secondary mortgage institution
(SMI) because sale of receivables is
not a borrowing transaction.
Distribution to mortgage backed Income Tax The Secondary Mortgage Institution
securities (MBS) investors (SMI) is not subject to income tax or
Gross Receipts Tax (GRT) on the
interest income derived because it is
a pass-through security.
Source: October 1999 Philippine Conference on Securitization
Legal Issues
Maceda Law. The Maceda Law (Republic Act 6552) governs residential property loans that are
amortized in installments. Both mortgages and contracts-to-sell (CTS) are covered by the Maceda Law.
Homebuyers in default whose contracts have been canceled, but who still have two years' worth of
installments, are entitled under the Maceda law to a full refund of the cash value of payments made up to
the fifth year, and 5% every year thereafter608.
Furthermore, the Maceda Law entitles the homebuyer to a grace period of one month for each year of
installment payments made to pay for the unpaid installments without additional interest. If less than two
years of installments have been paid, the grace period shall be two years, within which the homebuyer
may sell his rights or assign them to another person. The Maceda Law becomes an impediment towards
securitization because it creates an uncertain cash flow stream on the mortgage-backed security (MBS).
The uncertain cash flow can prevent potential investors from purchasing mortgage-backed securities
(MBS) due to the 'uncertainty' risks involved.
However, Jacob does not perceive the Maceda Law to be a barrier, but rather as an advantage for
mortgage-backed securities (MBS) 609. Firstly, Jacob presumes that if a homebuyer has been amortizing
over the past two years, the probability of default will already be highly unlikely. Second, in the event
that the trustee of a secondary mortgage institution (SMI) recovers the property from the homebuyer, the
607 Philippine Conference on Securitization. Mobilizing the Markets for Securitization: The Case for Asset Backed
Securities. October 1999. Makati City, Philippines.
608 Reside, Renato S. Mortgage-Backed Securities in Asia. Asian Development Bank. 1999. Pasig City, Philippines.
609 Jacob, Monico. Former Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig Chairman and Conference
Chairman of the Philippine Conference on Securitization. Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati City, Philippines.
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trustee can re-sell the property at a higher price given that the property has presumably increased in value.
Nonetheless, although these measures to mitigate uncertainty of cash flow, the potential mortgage backed
securities (MBS) investor is still subject to the uncertainty risk.
SUMMARY OF MACEDA LAW
Action Description
Complaint To be filed in court; if there are grounds for foreclosure, court orders principal, interest, and
other costs to be paid to mortgagee.
Sale Property can be sold if mortgagor is still in default 90 days from date of judgment.
Sale of foreclosed property is subject to capital gains tax of 6% of gross selling price or
current fair market value, as well as documentary stamp tax of 1.5%.
Estimated total cost of foreclosure to the seller: around P30,000/US$566 per property.
Source: Asian Development Bank
Extra-Judicial Foreclosure Law. The Extra-Judicial Foreclosure Law (Republic Act 3135) governs
regular mortgages. The foreclosure law entitles the debtor and his successors in interest to redeem
foreclosed property within one year from the date of sale610. Similar to the Maceda law, the foreclosure
law creates an uncertain cash flow for the potential mortgage backed securities (MBS) investors because
a) there is no guarantee for the secondary mortgage institution (SMI) that there will be complete and
certain recovery of the value of the foreclosed assets and; b) the prohibitive costs and length of time
associated with foreclosure.
SUMMARY OF EXTRA-JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE LAW
Action Description
Notice of sale Property can be sold if mortgagor is still in default 90 days from date of judgment.
Sale of foreclosed property is subject to capital gains tax of 6% of gross selling price or
current fair market value, as well as documentary stamp tax of 1.5%.
Estimated total cost of foreclosure to the seller: around P30,000/US$566 per property.
Sale By public auction, under the direction of the sheriff, justice, or
auxiliary justice of the province.
Sale of foreclosed property is subject to capital gains tax of 6% of gross selling price or
current fair market value, as well as a documentary stamp tax (DST) of 1.5%.
Estimated total cost of foreclosure to the seller: around P30,000/US$566 per property.
Debtor's rights Right to redeem property within one year of sale.
Right to petition that sale be set aside and writ of possession canceled should courts
later determine that mortgage was not violated.
Obligation of Bond equivalent to 12 months' use of property to indemnify debtor in case it is proven
purchaser of that sale violated mortgage or requirements of Foreclosure Law.
foreclosed
property
Source: Asian Development Bank
610 Reside, Renato S. Mortgage-Backed Securities in Asia. Asian Development Bank. 1999. Pasig City, Philippines.
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Prohibitive costs offoreclosure. In the cases of both the Maceda law and the Extra-judicial foreclosure
law, the prohibitive foreclosure costs serve as a disincentive for institutions (in the case of secondary
mortgage institutions (SMI), their trustee) owning the non-performing assets to dispose these assets in a
timely manner. However, the costs of foreclosure appear to be more onerous for publicly- versus
privately originated mortgages. Given the scope of non-performing loans (NPLs) of the National Home
Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC)61 1, the average costs of P30,000 (US$566) per foreclosure (i.e.
inclusive of foreclosure-related taxes and publication of sale of foreclosed properties) are prohibitive6 12.
On the other hand, Limlingan reports foreclosure is relatively easier for private banks on their middle-
income housing portfolio as the banks have already made previous arrangements with both the lawyers
and the sheriffs. Limlingan relates that it usually takes a week to foreclose on these defaulting loans.
Rather, the high cost housing (i.e. above P50 Million (US$943,000)) are those that are more difficult to
foreclose on as these homebuyers can afford to hire lawyers to delay foreclosure proceedings 613.
Lack of title insurance
Overview. To provide a better understanding behind the lack of title insurance in the Philippines, there is
a need to explain the legal documents that signify proof of ownership. The principal proof of ownership
of a title that a homebuyer owns the lot/house and lot that he/she purchased is the Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) registered in his/her name. These are the titles issued under the Torrens system of
registration by the government, through the Register of Deeds. Under the Torrens system of registration,
the rights acquired by the registrant are guaranteed by the government 614. However, title verification is
necessary because there have been numerous cases of titles being sold by unscrupulous developers or
being resold where the titles have liens or encumbrances, title defects, forgery, falsification and other
similar legal defects. The scale of the widespread title falsification came to light during a fake land-titling
racket that was brought to the attention of Congress in March 1999615. Anecdotally, Manicio relates that
even the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) has had to backtrack 2 or 3 times to
verify the genuineness of the title insurance (and despite the backtracking, there are still fake titles) 616.
The massive faking of land titling was found to be prevalent not only in Metro Manila, but also in the
611 Approximately 50% of their P42 Billion (US$792 Million) portfolio are non-performing loans.
612 Manicio, Eduardo T. Vice-President, Funds Generation Group of the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC). Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati City, Philippines.
613 Limlingan, Victor S. Professor at the Asian Institute of Management. Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati
City, Philippines.
614 Tan, Edward L. Real Estate in the Philippines. Solar Publishing Corporation. 1999. Manila, Philippines.
615 Manila Bulletin. Solons act onfake land titles. March 29, 1999. Manila, Philippines.
616Manicio, Eduardo T. Vice-President, Funds Generation Group of the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC). Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati City, Philippines.
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other parts of the country as well. Thus, the Torrens system has since been reduced to an unreliable
guarantee of ownership of real property.
Current State. In September 2000, both houses of Congress attempted to pass a bill6 17 to that would solve
the fake land-titling problem through the institution of land title insurance, by amending the Insurance
Code to include land titles6 ". The bill proposes the creation of a land title insurance system that would
protect landowners from fly-by-night real estate developers. The policy was to protect the insured from
title defects, forgery, falsification and similar unlawful acts. The land insurance policy is supposed to
guarantee real estate buyers some form of compensation should a defect in their land titles be discovered
later. The bill would task the Insurance Commission to issue guidelines specifying the risk premiums to
be charged by insurance firms for different insurance contracts. The measure also allows companies not
otherwise disqualified by law to engage in the title insurance business.
To complement the title insurance initiatives, another pending bill in Congress is the Special Procedures
for the reconstitution of Torrens Certificate of Title lost or destroyed (HB 6580). Among other this, this
bill proposes that the faking of land titles be considered as a heinous crime6 ' 9. Businessworld reported
that the American National Financial, Inc. (ANFI), one of the larger outfits involved in underwriting land
title insurance in the United States, is reviewing the possibility of lending their expertise in any transfer of
technology that the venture would require for land titling620. There is also a private sector initiative to
provide title insurance which is centrally administered to protect innocent buyers. Jacob proposed that a
central deposit for titles and mortgages assumed to have gone through a due diligence process with the
banks, originators and then upload them to a central depository. This can be modernized or
computerized. Through this process, securitization can be performed and can be easily attached with a
title insurance. Moreover, this can be done even without legislation6 2 1. However, the private sector led
title insurance has yet to materialize 622 . Despite the lack of title insurance, Matoto says that the key
players are willing to live with this risk when they securitize mortgage loans 623 .
617 Lower House bill 11974 and Upper House Senate Bill 1689.
618 Manila Bulletin. Bill to stopfake land titling pushed. September 4, 2000. Manila, Philippines.
619 Manila Bulletin. Solons act on fake land titles. March 29, 1999. Manila, Philippines.
620 Aquino, Norman P. Bill proposes land title insurance. Businessworld Publishing Corporation. August 24, 1999.
Manila, Philippines.
621 Philippine Conference on Securitization. Mobilizing the Markets for Securitization: The Case for Asset Backed
Securities. October 1999. Makati City, Philippines.
622 Paul, Jeremias N. , Jr. Department of Finance Assistant Secretary. Personal Interview. June 2001. Manila,
Philippines.
623 Matoto, Senen L. Executive Director of the Financial Executives of the Philippines. Personal Interview. June
2001. Makati City, Philippines.
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8 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SECONDARYMORTGAGE
MARKET IN THE PHILIPPINES
Primary Mortgage Market
If broadening access to housing finance is the main objective in creating a secondary market, then great
attention must be paid initially and on an ongoing basis to primary market issues. These include loan
product design, origination channels and credit risk, as opposed to other financial risks. Unless these
issues are addressed adequately, then the primary market will not produce a sufficient volume of loans or
sufficient credit quality to allow sustainable secondary market development.
In a presentation by former Finance Undersecretary Romeo Bernardo in the October 1999 Philippine
Conference on Securitization, he said that studies indicated that the Philippine mortgage market is large
enough to need the liquidity provided by a Secondary Mortgage Institution (SMI). In the development of
the secondary mortgage market, we must take into consideration the idiosyncrasies of the local primary
mortgage market:
225
Primary Mortgage Market Considerations in Developing a Secondary Mortgage Institution
Factors Affecting the Primary Low-cost housing Middle- to upper-class
Mortgage Market housin
Mortgage quality Many low quality mortgages Better-quality mortgages and
due to poor origination stricter origination and
standards and low collection servicing by banks.
efficiency by contractual
savings institutions. Private
sector proposes to improve
Standards for securitization
purposes.
Interest rates Three-tiered fixed interest rate Floating Rates
system based on loan amount.
Floating rates mulled by
government to attract private
sector finding.
Tenor Up to 25 years Up to 10-15 years
Mortgage Insurance None Provided by HGC
Political economy of reform Government is trying to shift away from a system where it bears
all the risks to a system where risks are shared by public and
private sectors. Some opposition to stricter lending standards
from developers.
Source: Mortgage-Backed Securities in Asia
Improvement in origination and servicing of mortgage loans. This includes improving underwriting
and screening processes, which needs to be strengthened industry-wide, particularly in the public
institutions. Capital markets will rely on the ability of borrowers to pay their debts, and originating and
servicing institutions to pass on such payments to investors in a timely manner with attractive rates of
return. In a securitization transaction, the capital market participants (investors, financial guarantee firms,
and the SPV that issues the MBSs) shoulder much of the credit risk. Since none of these parties is
expected to come face-to-face with the actual borrower, they will mostly rely on the integrity of the
underlying mortgages when deciding whether or not to purchase MBSs.
Origination and servicing standards may be improved through prudent investments in human capital
and technology. A wide geographic dispersion of collecting agents facilitates servicing. Appraisal
standards also need improvement.
Recent initiatives by primary mortgage lenders to crosscheck borrower credit histories with other
institutions should continue when the MBSs market is developed. Also laudable is the system of rewards
instituted by Pag-ibig for developers who succeed in reducing nonperforming assets and arrears. Much
more creativity is needed to design incentives that reward good behavior throughout the MBSs process. It
is important that there is adoption of minimum standards in the documentation process. Standardization
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will create a more efficient process towards mortgage-backed securitization. But more importantly, it will
also bring down transaction costs from origination to securitization.
The October 1999 Philippine Conference on Securitization recommended that:
* Trade organizations for both housing and finance should coordinate with regulatory agencies to
adopt minimum or common standards for documentation, due diligence, and disclosure.
* Push legislation for reforms/computerization of the Land Registration Administration (LRA) and
the various Registers of Deeds.
* Solicit developer support for origination
* Low-cost housing developers, through the October 1999 Philippine Conference on Securitization,
recommended that they were willing to share the risks with banks on housing projects to improve
the credit risk rating.
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B. Secondary Mortgage Market
Our thesis has covered a broad range of topics relating to the feasibility and viability of establishing a
secondary mortgage market in the Philippines.
* Mortgage origination process;
* Investor, rating agency and credit enhancement issues;
* Role of the public and private sector;
* Role and development of the Secondary Mortgage Institution (SMI);
* Legal, tax and accounting issues; and
* Prerequisites for secondary mortgage market development; and
* Benefits of Securitization
1.1 Mortgage Origination Process
Standardization. A key primary market characteristic is standardization of the mortgage instrument.
There can be many types of mortgages present in the housing finance system, but only those with
sufficient volume are candidates for sale and securitization.
In order to reduce the transactions costs of evaluating mortgage loans and the processing costs of
issuing and administering MBS, the characteristics (e.g., rate adjustment, amortization schedule, term) of
the mortgages should be uniform. In addition, standardized documentation must be available for all
loans.
Along with standardization of mortgage instrument and design, the underwriting of mortgages should
be performed in a comprehensive and consistent manner. The underwriting process establishes guidelines
ensuring that a borrower has the ability and the willingness to repay the debt and that the property
provides sufficient security for the mortgage.
Assessment of the ability to pay generally consists of relating borrower income, assets, liabilities and
net worth to proposed mortgage payments and overall housing expenses. Debt-to-income guidelines help
to standardize underwriting. Willingness to pay is based on the down-payment (borrower investment in
the property) and credit history. The appraisal determines the value of the property through examination
of the sales prices of similar properties construction costs of new properties and market conditions and
trends.
The servicing of mortgages is a critical component of a viable secondary mortgage market. The
collection of mortgage payments and the periodic remittance of these payments to the investor (or
conduit) is the major task of servicers (whether they are originator or third parties). IN addition, servicers
are the primary repository of information the mortgage loans. Thus, they must maintain accurate and up
to date information on mortgage balances, status and history and provide timely report to investors.
228
Ultimately, the attractiveness of mortgages and MBS depends on the ability of investors to understand
the instruments and quantify their risk and return potential. Standardization of mortgage instruments is an
important step in reducing the information costs to investors. In addition, historical performance data on
mortgage payments (e.g., default and prepayment) is important in risk assessment. Because of the
importance of data in the assessment of risk, the demand on servicers (and conduits) are potentially great.
These institutions must be able to process and disseminate large amounts of information. Thus, they must
develop effective automated management information systems.
An important part of the servicing is establishment of clear guidelines for the collection of mortgage
payments. The documents must spell out payment obligations (dates, amounts, terms of adjustments,
obligations for taxes and insurance) and procedures to be followed in the even of default. Although
lender discretion in working with borrowers is an important part of the collection process, third party
investors must know what those procedures are before making their investment (in order to assess the
degree of default risk) and what latitude exist in dealing with the borrower (e.g., forbearance or
restructuring). Servicers also must make decisions about and implement procedures leading to
foreclosure and repossession in the case of defaulted loans.
Install the appropriate infrastructure such as (1) adopting delivery versus payment clearing and
settlement system; (2) posting transactions on a real-time basis on a public medium (i.e. stock exchange)
and; (3) having a credible and reliable bond rating system. Have large institutional investors, such as the
contractual savings institutions, as market makers. Remove the tax disincentives, particularly the DST.
The newly installed Arroyo administration has prioritized the passage of an Investment Company Act
for congress when it begins sessions in end-July 2001 to promote a fair, orderly, and efficient capital
market in order to provide the private and public sectors with access to funds vital to the development of
the national economy. Among the other bills she plans to prioritize are a personal equity requirement bill,
the investment company bill, and the securitization bill. The objective of these bills is to promote long-
term savings, mobilization through mutual funds, common trust funds, and other such forms of unit trust
investment in a bid to expand long-term fixed income market.
Where should the origination guidelines emanate from?
Origination guidelines should be set and emanate from the SMI. Again, banks will 'follow the money'.
If selling their mortgage loans to the SMI is a lucrative proposition versus the option of keeping the loans
on their portfolio or securitizing themselves, then they will adopt the underwriting guidelines.
1.2 Investor, Rating Agency and Credit Enhancement Issues
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Credit Ratings. Attracting investors will be a major task for the Philippine securitization markets.
Ratings and credit enhancement are important means to attract investors as they provide independent
assessments of the credit risks of MBS and provide a measure of investor protection. As securitizations
are issued from vehicles with no track record, investors look to ratings to get reassurance that they will
get their principal and interest on time. Therefore, obtaining high credit ratings from credible rating
agencies should be a major objective for Philippine securitizations. Such ratings can be obtained if a
number of rating agency concerns can be met. These include: availability of asset performance and issuer
portfolio performance information, legal and regulatory isolation of the transaction structure from
bankruptcy of the seller, presence of quality servicers and the ability to change them if necessary,
availability of credit enhancement, and the ability to pierce the sovereign ratings of the Philippines.
One key constraint for the Philippines is the fact that its domestic rating agency CIBI is still
struggling to establish its reputation and its ratings do not yet affect significantly the pricing of securities.
We encourage efforts to strengthen CIBI in any way possible. In addition, we believe that domestic
investors should have additional rating opinions available to help them make prudent investment
decisions. We recommend the following:
1. SEC encourages foreign rating agencies to establish a presence in the Philippines by
easing capital and domestic ownership requirements for this purpose.
2. SEC permit the use of non-Philippine ratings from overseas rating agencies for
domestic MBS.
Credit Enhancements. Another means to attract investor interest is to use third party guarantees. We
believe that financial guarantees would benefit domestic investors and other market participants. We
recommend the following:
1. Leverage the use of the Asian Development Bank's capital for partial credit guarantees. A
combination of multilateral and private sector guarantees, such as from the ADB and another
private sector guarantee, to achieve triple-A international ratings. Borrowers in non-
investment grade countries need partial credit guarantees from multilateral institutions to
achieve triple-A ratings because financial guarantee companies can typically guarantee only
those transactions which are rated investment grade -- triple-B or better -- before the
guarantee, a level which such borrowers cannot easily achieve for international financings.
Investor Regulations and Education. Another means to attract investors is through regulations that
facilitate investments in MBS. To attract major domestic investors, make regulations more clear and
helpful for investing in MBS. From discussions with some investors, we found that they were not
sufficiently familiar with the deals in the market and had many concerns, some of which may be possibly
address with regulatory clarifications or better information. We also found that some investors were not
sufficiently familiar with deals in the market and had many concerns, some of which may be possible to
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dispel with regulatory clarifications or better information. Such observations lead us to believe that in the
Philippines, a process of investor education on securitizations is necessary. We recommend the
following:
1. The government should help the government foster investor confidence by encouraging the
industry to promote investor education through seminars, discussion groups, and other
educational events or informal exchanges.
One of the resolutions from the October 1999 Philippine Conference on Securitization was the need
for "investor" education with regard to MBS as both an investment and a financing tool. Thus, there was
a recommendation for a concerted effort by such groups as the Bankers Association of the Philippines
(BAP), the Investment Houses Association of the Philippines (IHAP), and the Financial Executives of the
Philippines (FINEX), the Capital Markets Development Council (CMDC) and other concerned agencies
to support and conduct institutional advocacy and investor education programs for MBS. Moreover, there
is also a need to get funding support for advocacy/education programs from multilateral institutions such
as the World Bank/IMF.
Changing short-term orientation. Aside from educating the investors, the Department of Finance
(DOF) is also trying to create an investment atmosphere that is more conducive to long-term financial
investments. Thus, it has initiated a shift from short-term bills in the effort of developing the long-term
bond market, according to the October 1999 Philippine Conference on Securitization.
According to former Finance Undersecretary Romeo Bernardo, banks provide most of the capital for
housing. But banks are not suited for this due to the short-term nature of their liabilities. On the other
hand, contractual savings institutions (i.e. pension funds, insurance companies) have long-term liabilities
to match the long-term funding needs for housing. Thus, for the SMI to be viable, the anchor investors
should be the contractual savings sector. Investments in MBS are ideal for contractual savings
institutions because of:
* Better matching of assets and liabilities.
* Better quality and more varied investment-grade securities
* Better rates of return on CSI's loans and investment portfolios.
Working with Rating Agencies, Credit Enhancers and Investors. Rating agencies, credit enhancers
and investors need detailed information on the performance of residential mortgage assets on a historical
and an on-going basis. Seller/servicers and others in the Philippines generally tend to be reluctant to share
such information. The reasons are understandable: high costs of gathering the data from internal files,
long time it may take to gather the information, concerns that disclosure of poor asset quality might
damage a lender's competitive position, and concerns about protecting the privacy of borrowers.
This situation presents the SMI a unique opportunity. If it can gain market confidence and access to
the originator information required by investors, rating agencies and credit enhancers by offering to
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provide useful aggregate information while protecting the confidentiality of lenders and borrowers, it can
provide a very important impetus to the growth of securitization in the Philippines. Hong Kong Monetary
Authority (HKMA) has shown the way by conducting an exemplary study of the territory's residential
mortgage market and making it publicly available, fostering development of secondary mortgage markets.
We recommend the following:
1. The government should give priority to developing and disseminating mortgage loan asset
performance information for the industry, as lack of such information is a fundamental
constraint to developing rated MBS in the Philippines. We recommend that SMI become the
agency responsible for gathering and disseminating such information for the markets on a
regular basis. As a secondary market begins to develop, we recommend that SMI take the
lead, in developing and disseminating relevant information about past and prospective MBS
for the investing public.
Working with Capital Markets Intermediaries. While the SMI needs to cultivate financial intermediaries,
its need for funding will be limited at the outset. Therefore, it needs to exercise leadership in other ways.
It should focus on a major risk management objective in designing MBS, namely, mitigating basis risk,
and take lead in pursuing meaningful market solutions. Interest rates on mortgage loans are set on the
basis of the selling lender's minimum lending rates (MLR), which is not a market index.
Therefore, if MBS backed by such mortgages were sold and financed with securities which are priced
on the basis of any market index, the issuer would face basis risk arising from the mismatch between the
rate charged by investors in the MBS and the rates payable on the mortgage loans. This risk cannot
currently be hedged in the Philippines markets and results in a significant structural problem that needs to
be addressed with product innovations in the mortgage loans and creation of useful capital market indices.
We recommend the following:
1. The SMI work with the intermediaries in the capital and money markets to help develop a short
term index that can be used for term financing in the capital markets, which could be used to
price seven- to ten-year MBS so that basis risk is reduced on adjustable rate mortgage loans. It is
also recommended that pass though structures are considered as they pass along the variability in
the mortgage rate to the investors.
2. Finally, securitization markets depend on a great deal of operational support provided by
specialized bond trustees, servicers, and others.
3. The SMI be encouraged to assume the role of centralized MBS administrator for all domestic
MBS, but recommend that such a role not be fixed by regulation. Competition should be allowed
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so that the market can strive for better solutions and so that competitive pressures keep the SMI
on its toes.
Developing a Presence in Capital Market. The SMI's long term competitive strength will come
from its ability to raise long term funds at better rates than those available to major mortgage
lenders. Therefore, the SMI should chart out a long-term strategy to gain progressively lower
cost funding from a diverse range of sources. In time, it should develop a program of MBS
issues in the domestic markets and enter the international capital markets, when they are more
receptive to domestic borrowers. Such MBS issues, if brought regularly and in reasonable size,
could become liquid and provide additional long-term yield curve benchmarks. We recommend
the following:
The SMI should develop and implement a carefully considered, intense and sustained investor marketing
program which conveys a clear message that SMI is a government-sponsored secondary market agency
with conservative credit underwriting standards, appropriate operational expertise and a sensible business
strategy. It will be important to indicate clearly and credibly that the SMI has strong moral and material
support of the government, either through an explicit guarantee as recommended or otherwise, to achieve
investor acceptance of the SMI as a blue chip, state owned enterprise.
The SMI should obtain domestic and international credit ratings for use initially in the domestic markets
so as to be able not only to raise funds at better rates but also to function effectively as a guarantor. This
will give an SMI guarantee an independent imprimatur from credible third parties and will also impose
external market discipline on SMI.
The SMI should develop and implement a strategy, perhaps in concert with an experienced offshore,
private sector technical partner, to act as a financial guarantor in the mortgage sector. This will foster the
development of SMI as an effective secondary mortgage market promoter / facilitator and enhance its
reputation and contribution to the housing sector.
Fixed and floating rate MBSs certificates to meet investor preferences. The SMI should consider offering
both fixed- and floating-rate MBSs certificates. Offering a broad class of securities would attract a
broader range of investors, enhancing the liquidity of the MBSs market.
Furthermore, by being able to match the interest stream on the MBSs certificate with that of the
underlying instrument, the SPV, the issuing and pass-through agent, reduces its own interest-rate risk.
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Pay through versus pass through securities. Under Philippine laws, the SMI would be considered a
quasi-banking institution under the jurisdiction of the BSP. The SMI would issue pass-through mortgage-
backed securities. Pay-through MBSs would be more flexible, since cash flows from the underlying assets
or mortgages can be structured to meet scheduled principal and interest payments to investors, whereas
the timing of payments to investors in pass-through securities corresponds to the timing of payments by
mortgagors.
1.3 Role of the Public and Private Sector
You need a supportive public infrastructure but privately run framework. What it does is provide
based on merit guarantees for local governments on their own borrowings from the financial system.6 24
Government Housing Policy
Interest Rate Subsidies2 5. Subsidization of interest rates in the primary market negates the
development of a strong secondary market. Almost all of the people interviewed stated that we should do
away with the interest rate subsidy, which is an off budget subsidy, and go for a transparent subsidy. For
example, Professor Victor S. prefers capital subsidy to an interest rate subsidy. There are ways to make it
more affordable: for capital subsidy, you can increase the down payment, so that the amount to amortize
at market rates will be smaller. 626
Make social assistance targeted and transparent. 627 The only group that is opposed to this is CREBA,
(which is strange given that the dept of finance and the NHFMC believe that the subsidies should be
transparent, instead of being interest rate subsidy, as they want to 're-implement' a three-tiered interest
rate scheme with their centralized housing finance program.
The government should separate housing as a commercial good and housing as a social need. These
two concepts should not be mixed up. Socialized and Low income needs to be serviced by the govt.
treated separately. That's where you need government subsidy. Even if the government guarantees low
624 Bernardo, Romeo L. Former Undersecretary of the Department of Finance. Personal Interview. June 2001.
Makati City, Philippines.
625 Subsidies are non-market, direct or indirect transfers of resources by the government to the housing sector.
626 Limlingan, Victor S. Professor at the Asian Institute of Management. Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati City,
Philippines.
627 Bernardo, Romeo L. Former Undersecretary of the Department of Finance. Personal Interview. June 2001.
Makati City, Philippines.
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cost housing, banks be hesitant to buy papers because of underlying asset quality, not up to same standard
as banks.628
Incentive Problems. Under the National Shelter Plan, the government has four major programs that
are largely subsidized and intended for production of housing units and ownership. These programs
target either direct end-beneficiaries or private developers/institutions which are encouraged to mobilize
their own resources to meet the demand for housing.
The negative effect of government-subsidized programs which have discouraged the development of
the primary market for housing, and by the short-term orientation of bank assets where the banks' short
term liabilities do not match the long term nature of households' housing loans. This mismatch of
borrowing short and lending long produces risks of term intermediation. These term risks are inherently
associated with the relative illiquidity of the housing good, the opportunity costs of unadjustable interest
rates, and exposure to currency risks, if housing loan programs are financed by foreign loans.
In the low cost housing sector, banks face not only high transaction costs but also information
asymmetry. The lack of information on creditworthiness, relative credit risks and other risks can
discourage bank lending to low income households. The offset could be high interest rates that will cover
risks and generate some profit for the lender. However, adverse selection and moral hazard problems
arise, making this approach untenable. Thus, in the absence of information, collateral and substantial
equity from the low-income borrower, and the lack of long-term funds, banks rarely take on mortgage
loans of low-income households. Incentive compatibility problems in existing subsidy programs
The present subsidy schemes are meant to give the low-income group access to adequate and decent
housing. However apart from the fiscal costs and the ineffectiveness of the present subsidy schemes,
incentive compatibility problem arises on the part of various players in the housing market. Given the
present structure of incentives motivated by the subsidies, these agents choose the best action for
themselves which results in the achievement of their respective goals at great fiscal burden to the
government. Their strategic behavior that maximizes their self-interested goals threatens or undermines
the achievement of society's stated housing policy objectives.
Borrowers. Under the formula approach, borrowers take a housing loan on the basis of their monthly
incomes and contributions to the pension funds and not on their capacity to repay that loan. The
creditworthiness criterion for a loan has been set aside by the government and the private sector in the
desire to increase home ownership. Thus, borrowers who might not normally have qualified for a
loan, do get a loan and end up not repaying it. Delinquent borrowers perceive that the housing loan is
a typical government loan which need not be repaid at all or whose repayment can be delayed or
postponed. In addition, condonation of penalties, the high cost of foreclosure and the lack of effective
628 Alcid, Andrew D. Executive Vice President, Investment Banking Division of United Coconut Planters Bank.
Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati City, Philippines.
235
monitoring of loans encourage loan delinquencies. In time, the loan arrears and the condoned
penalties become effectively income transfers mostly to the high-income groups who get the bigger
loans.
Banks. At present, private commercial lenders do not provide financing for low cost housing. The
transaction cost and information problem associated with relatively small loans deter their active
participation in this market. The situation is aggravated by the design of housing finance for
socialized housing. The loanable funds are sourced from the pension funds and to some extent from
government's budgetary appropriation which are lent at subsidized rates. This discourages the private
commercial lender's participation. Even if they were willing to lend for low cost housing purposes,
they would not because they cannot compete with the subsidized loans provided by the government.
The private commercial lenders have been enlisted simply as credit conduits for a fee and thus, take
no credit risks for lending to the sector. The origination fee of 5 percent of the outstanding loan for
underwriting, approving and channeling public loanable funds to the target clientele seems to be very
high. The end result is that they get rents from the sure income provided by the high origination fees
and the subsidies from HIGC's 100 percent retail guarantee and special tax exemption.
Private Developers. The formula lending finance scheme allows private developers to produce
houses and market them to eligible, but no necessarily credit worthy, borrowers. Their loan exposure
is immediately extinguished by the take-out agreement with the government's housing agencies.
They also earn sure income and do not have credit risk exposure except in so far as there are delays in
getting reimbursement from the housing agencies through the take-out mechanism. IN this case, they
incur opportunity losses. On the other hand, the lack of credit risk, the ability to exploit information
asymmetry in the production of houses and auxiliary infrastructure such as sewerage, piping, etc., and
the guaranteed take-outs by the government's housing agencies create incentives for supplying sub-
standard housing units and defective infrastructure to the most number of borrowers who could be
persuaded to have housing loans.
Public housing agencies. The funders (HDMF, SSS and GSIS) are caught in a bind. The
government which has taken a social responsibility to provide people with affordable homes is using
the funds accumulated from member contributions and managed by those agencies to support and
finance a public policy objective. In other words, the government is to some extent appropriated
funds. Thus, there is little cause to wonder at the insufficiency of resources deployed.
Legislators/policy makers. As long as government views its role as providing low cost housing to
almost everyone household, a populist Congress will have a simplistic look at the housing
We recommend the following:
1. Eliminate the formula approach to lending.
The established securitization markets in the U.S., Europe, and perhaps Hong Kong can provide an
appreciation for complexities of the MBS markets and illustrate how ratings, credit enhancements, and
other market mechanisms provide sensitive and flexible checks and balances to complement official rules
and regulations.
The development of the United States' Primary and Secondary Mortgage Markets has been
significantly enhanced by the active role of the Federal Government. Without the active participation of
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the Federal Government, affordable housing for lower to moderate income Americans, arguably would
not exist. The United States experience indicates that with proper risk management techniques, important
social goals can be achieved, while at the same time creating profit opportunities for both private sector,
as well as government.
The Philippines must carefully evaluate the proper role of their governments in the development of
their housing sectors, taking into consideration of all risks identified and quantified, where possible
Private or Public.
"We need to have a cohesive, coherent housing policy. It is difficult to have this if the policies are always
subject to politicking." 62 9
"That's why it has to be private sector led." 630
The politics should be brought out of it. It is too political. It is mostly a public sector market with
inadequacies in the infrastructure for servicing so that the private sector does not want to participate. But
because it is public, and shelter for masses is such a highly politicized issue, especially for getting elected,
shackled from acting in a commercial for-profit way.
How do we address the lower income population?
Our read on the market is that if you apply best practice underwriting criteria, what the housing
agencies lent on argue is that 2/3 could afford a market rate loan. He thinks it can be market rate, can be
securitized, but need to put house in order. The other third will need some kind of assistance. "Call a
spade a spade". If you choose to lend to them, well that's a subsidized social housing program. Don't
pretend its market rate, recognize for it. (my opinion: thus, remove it from funding from pag-ibig, sss,
gsis, as this is not a profitable investment. Put it under another funding window. As a social need, it needs
to be funded by another agency).631
There should be separate housing assistance for the poor from the commercially viable.6 32 When you
mix these groups up, you see it as a production problem, you cannot bring in the private sector, because
the subsidy elements are unclear. Poor efficiency in collection. "Sorry, we can't collect because we are
629 Coronel, Leonilo G. Executive Director of the Bankers Association of the Philippines. Personal Interview. June
2001. Makati City, Philippines.
630 Maquera, Peter D. Chief Operating Officer of Lighthouse Credit Technologies Corporation. Personal Interview.
June 2001. Pasig City, Philippines.
631 Maquera, Peter D. Chief Operating Officer of Lighthouse Credit Technologies Corporation. Personal Interview.
June 2001. Pasig City, Philippines.
632 Bernardo, Romeo L. Former Undersecretary of the Department of Finance. Personal Interview. June 2001.
Makati City, Philippines.
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trying to help the poor" these are how they couch those terms. Even those who can afford, they don't pay
because it is perceived as a government dole-out. Since this was almost a 100% LTV ratio, this further
gave the low-income incentive to think that it was a government incentive. Let the commercial portion of
real estate be market driven. There should be no direct government lending for the commercial part.
Allow that to be taken care of by the private sector. Government's role should be to develop institutions
and develop capital markets.
Why don't you consider rental housing as an option?
Low cost and socialized housing - forcing Filipinos to become homeowners, not every Filipino is
ready to become homeowner. Separate program to build low-income units.633 People who are transient
will most likely be renters.
The housing problem is not simply a funding issue. A number of reforms must take place and
includes:
1. rationalize the government's housing programs and institutions
2. promote a market-based housing finance system as a mechanism for financing low cost housing.
3. target subsidies, e.g., one-time capital allowance, to well-identified low-income households.
4. require targeted households to mobilize savings as equity contribution in the low-cost housing
program of government.
5. stimulate the private rental housing market by lifting rent control and providing on-site
(upgrading) and off-set (new developments) services to localities outside the major metropolises.
6. provide infrastructure that will lead to the opening of new lands for low-cost housing
7. review zoning regulations, building codes and other regulations, e.g., development permits, land
conversion, and others, to eliminate high transaction cost.
8. introduce reforms in the pension funds to make more long-term funds available for housing.
9. review/amend the comprehensive shelter and finance act and the urban development and housing
act to make them more consistent with a market based housing finance system.
10. provide a legal, institutional and regulatory infrastructure for the efficient functioning of the
primary and secondary mortgage markets.
11. maintain a stable macroeconomic condition characterized by low inflation and low interest rates.
It is critical from the public policy standpoint to review the housing subsidy program of government
for several reasons. First the fiscal resources used in subsidy programs, especially those targeted to a very
large segment of the population, are non-trivial. Those resources have competing, alternative uses and
thus, any misallocation of resources imposes costs to society. Scarce fiscal resources have their
alternative demand and appropriate public policy requires that the social benefits from the housing
subsidies exceed the social cost of those subsidies. In this study, the social cost is measured by the total
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633 Alcid, Andrew D. Executive Vice President, Investment Banking Division of United Coconut Planters Bank.
Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati City, Philippines.
fiscal resources devoted to subsidies given their alternative uses. The social benefits are indicated by the
magnitude of the subsidies and their intended compared to actual incidence.
Second, the housing subsidies target the relatively poor members of society. It is important to find
out whether indeed the target beneficiaries are the actual beneficiaries of the subsidies. Third, apart from
the determination of the fiscal cost or burden and the incidence of benefits of housing subsidies, it is
equally important to assess how the incentive structure created by the subsidy schemes has affected the
behavior of economic agents, i.e., borrowers, private banks, private developers, public housing agencies,
policy makers, legislators, relative to the objective of making housing markets more efficient. Efficiency
refers to the larger market role of private agents in the production, financing and distribution of housing
units, with the government and the housing agencies providing a favorable environment for private sector
participation in the housing market.
Role of Originators and Developers. Originators should remain separate and distinct from developers due
to the prevailing moral hazard that exists in collapsing the function into one entity. Developers' expertise
remains in development and not underwriting. Each should stick with their respective expertise. From an
anecdotal standpoint, developers were left with inventory which they made prior to even underwriting any
claims.
The developer community must also receive education on the benefits of the secondary mortgage
market. Perhaps a lack of understanding behind securitization is the reason that developers may be
hesitant to actively support this initiative. Case in point: the Central Housing Fund continued to support
the use of subsidized interest rates, and left origination in the developers' hands.
It is necessary to develop aligned incentives for developers that will encourage them to strengthen the
development of the secondary mortgage market. Show them that the Central Fund is not sustainable.
Continued insistence on subsidized interest rates is not sustainable and will not bring about the creation of
a secondary mortgage market.
Housing Demand.
Where do we get targeted housing numbers from? Are they accurate?
A more accurate computation of housing demand will also help developers rationalize development.
Instead of being production oriented, we must separate the socialized income from the low and mid-
income who can pay.
We should be wary of following target production numbers or we fall again into the trap of producing
inventory. Developers also need a clear number to work against, and a number provided by third-party,
instead of developers, to avoid conflict of interest.
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The socialized income may require government assistance through a transparent subsidy. Also, we
must look at the possibility of rent-to-own for the socialized income. Since banks don't want to look at
socialized income housing, then it might be time to look for more creative solutions for this, such as
micro financing, which has a high repayment rate of 98%. Moreover, with proper underwriting
guidelines, these can still be securitized and bought by the CSIs, who are mandated to support housing.
The low to mid income can adopt either a cooperative housing/mixed-income housing scheme similar
to the US model. You can also align developers here as well. They can build mid income projects with a
component of low-income housing integrated into the project. In effect, they get tax incentives, or tax
shelters in return.
1.4 Role and Development of the Secondary Mortgage Institution (SMI)
The newly installed administration of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo will push for four key
economic reforms when congress opens in end-July 2001. Among these measures will be the passage of a
securitization bill. Although there is not much information with regard to this, newspapers claim that it
wants to securitize mortgage payments to develop a secondary trading market.
According to Prof. Reside of the University of the Philippines School of Economics, the SMI and the
regulatory authorities should set prudential limits on the volume of MBSs issues while the operating
procedures and monetary management of SMI-issued MBSs are being fine-tuned. There are three reasons
for this recommendation.
First, automating the origination and servicing systems of the SMI would increase substantially the
volume of purchased mortgages and MBSs issues and therefore also the SMI's operating risks. Thus, the
SMI should ensure that it has adequate staff capacity to process and manage the increased volume of
transactions.
Second, MBSs provide originating banks with additional reserves and additional liquidity. MBSs
proliferation, if left unchecked, may therefore inhibit effective monetary management by the BSP, aside
from creating asset bubbles in property prices.
Third, as an efficient mechanism for risk transfer, MBSs development may also provide a mechanism
for the financial sector to evade prudential limits on bank lending to real estate. These limits, initially
imposed by the BSP in 1996, were designed to reduce excessive risk taking by banks in lending to a
single industry. Thus, for example, if a bank sells a mortgage to an SPV and takes the loan off its books, it
can provide the same borrower with another loan. In this regard, automating the originating and servicing
process in stages may be wise given the central bank's uncertainty about the macroeconomic effects of
securitization.
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Minimization of SMI transaction costs. To achieve the lower spreads between the primary mortgage
market and MBS yields, efficiency measures must be undertaken. There have been private-sector
proposals to automate mortgage origination and servicing is an important first step in lowering the
transaction costs of issuing MBSs. Assuming the existence of a critical mass of borrowers, automation
and the use of electronic communications systems will lower average origination and servicing costs. The
initially large lump-sum investments in technology by an SMI also justify providing it with fiscal
incentives at the start.
Initial Securitization of Performing Loans. SMI may initially consider securitizing mortgages with
values slightly above the socialized housing class. Thereafter, it should gradually strengthen linkages
with the low-cost housing market.
The current tightness in low-cost housing finance is primarily due to systemic weaknesses stemming
from the inadequacy of current lending guidelines in ascertaining the creditworthiness of borrowers.
While the financial squeeze felt by potential homeowners, funders, and developers in the low-cost
housing market will be compounded by the inability to securitize mortgages in their segment, the major
players, such as the SSS/GSIS and the HDMF should take immediate steps to improve origination and
underwriting standards.
Given the current severe asset quality problem in the low-cost housing industry, the SMI might
consider purchasing only housing loans above the socialized housing limit, where collection efficiency
appears to be better, to ensure the quality of mortgages.
In the event of new loan origination, Pag-Ibig/HDMF, in the October 1999 Philippine Conference on
Securitization, recommended that socialized and low-cost housing should be brought into the commercial
financial system to rein in more private capital, but subjected to the same market standards and practices
to ensure the same level of asset quality and collection efficiency.
We should start securitizing mid-income loans.634 Limlingan says that we should start with
securitizing mid income housing. Also, explore the possibility of having mid income developers
securitize their own loans as this is one way to get the ball rolling. 635 Do not worry about high-end
people, they can take care of themselves. Focus initially on the mid income to be securitized, then later
go to socialized (socialized is a substrata of low income) income. "The problem is not housing finance for
the poorest, their problem is poverty and no financial solution can solve that and by putting that as a
634 Asian Institute of Management
635 Matoto, Senen L. President of the Investment Houses of the Philippines. Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati
City, Philippines.
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responsibility of a financial institution simply pollutes the commercial viability of the financing
institution." 636
Underwriter/Trading. The SMI should be listed in the stock market and should be allowed to raise
funds by issuing either MBSs or shares of stock. Private-sector sources have expressed interest in using
the clearing and settlement facilities of the Philippine Central Depository (PCD) and the Philippine Stock
Exchange (PSE) for scripless trading of MBSs in the primary and secondary markets. Allowing MBSs to
be traded in the stock market enhances their visibility and attracts more investors. It also diversifies
potential ownership and the funding sources of the SMI, which can thus issue both MBSs and equity, in
amounts to be determined by its optimal MBSs-equity mix.
Since the SMI is vested with a sovereign guarantee, a flight to quality in times of economic distress
could raise demand for, and prices of MBSs, and lower yields, as in the recent case of Cagamas bonds in
Malaysia.
In the October 1999 Philippine Conference on Securitization, the Department of Finance (DOF)
claimed that it had forged an agreement with the Philippine Stock Exchange to set up the tradability of
long-term bonds as a step to encourage secondary trading of MBS.
Custodian Institutions. Use previously existing institutions to serve the custodianship and clearing
functions for the MBSs. Adoption of market-driven approaches to determine the levels of
underwriting/issue costs.
Development of trading rules/conventions. The PSE, IHAP, BSP and SEC to coordinate in crafting
trading rules and conventions. These include:
* Trader licensing
e Delivery Conventions
e Settlement conventions
e Trading hours, etc.
We will attempt to identify areas where the government needs to take a step back and play a catalyst
through a regulatory role. Then there are also times when the government needs to have a more "hands-
on" approach. In the government's haste to provide housing for the lowest sub-strata of Philippine
society, they gloss over underwriting procedures and ambiguous policies to hit targeted housing numbers.
Delinquency or failure to pay appears to be a natural consequence of serving the poor. Thus, the private
sector has shied away from lending money to the low-income sector. However, serving the poor, both
from the public and private sector standpoint, should not be a losing proposition. There is a very simple
636 Bernardo, Romeo L. Former Undersecretary of the Department of Finance. Personal Interview. June 2001.
Makati City, Philippines.
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guideline that needs to be followed. Peter Maquerra of Lighthouse Credit Technologies phrased
succinctly, "You aren 't going to lend, unless you think you are going to get paid back"63 ,
The reasoning that government offers behind the high default rate among the poor is that they have a
social need to fulfill. However, the reasoning behind this must be put into question. Is it because the
poor cannot afford to pay? Or are the high delinquency rates related to the poor collection efficiency
and lenient lending standards which don't incent the poor to pay.
In the book Mortgage-Backed Securities in Asia released by Asian Development Bank, several
developing Asian countries were surveyed, including China, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan,
the Philippines and Thailand. Among all these countries, only the Philippines and Pakistan had
considerable amounts of non-performing mortgage loans while the default rate in other countries were
manageable 638 . The problem in both countries was traced to public institutions that used inadequate
borrower screening regulations.
Guidelines and incentives can be put into place that correct the situation which effectively renders
housing finance more sustainable, even for the lowest economic sub-strata, instead of maintaining its
"feast and famine63 9" cycle for all potential homeowners.
"The problem, as most of us see it, is ideology," Mr. Nocon said. "We feel that Ms. David's
orientation has always been left of center, and we, as businessmen have always been capitalists," he
added.64 0 However, despite their orientation, they were asking for banks to reduce lending rates while
Karina David pursued a market-rate interest rate policy even for low income housing, as per the World
Bank recommendation.
There are two types of securitization- securitize bad assets to liquidate and securitize the good assets.
For the securitization of bad assets, which is accomplished through an AMC, he believes the Philippines
will adopt the Korean model. 641 There should be an Asset Management Company (AMC) for the bad
loans. 642
637 Maquera, Peter D. Chief Operating Officer, Lighthouse Credit Technologies Corporation. Personal Interview.
June 2001. Pasig City, Philippines.
638 Reside, Renato, S. Ghon Rhee, and Yutaka Shimomoto. Mortgage-Backed Securities Markets in Asia. Asian
Development Bank. 1999. Manila, Philippines.
639 Jacob, Monico V. Conference Chairman on Philippine Conference on Securitization. Personal Interview. June
2001. Makati City, Philippines.
640 Junia, Catherine C. 'Zero' output in gov't housing program noted (No direction from the administration, say
developers). Businessworld Publishing Corporation. March 26, 1999.
641 Ortille, Lucille. Deputy Secretary General of the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council. Personal
Interview. June 2001. Makati City, Philippines.
642 Limlingan, Victor S. Professor at the Asian Institute of Management. Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati City,
Philippines.
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Lehman Brothers suggested that HUDCC put up an AMC that will spin off into an SMI and buys off
all the old loans at a discounted value. It will start initially with the bad loans. After that, you can take in
better mortgages. 643 Bring in a Goldman Sachs or Lehman Brothers, in some form of partnership with
the government, to show them how to run a for-profit mortgage company. And do that for a number of
years. Try securitization and other liquefaction techniques, and enter into exit strategies with Lehman or
Goldman. At least you know it can be done.
1. Not the NHMFC. Investors are wary on NHMFC because of track record, bailed out three times.
People known to be corrupt, a lot of contingent liabilities associated.
* Lehman has had models to do this in the past.
* Devise public private partnerships
* (Refer to the example given by Lehman Brothers Thailand).
We cannot do it ourselves because it is too political.644 An AMC can be the precursor to an SMI. An
AMC, empowered by private charter to securitize assets and real estate owned (ROPOAs). A lot of banks
have ROPOAs that can be liquefied. Use ABS to develop specific securities of the bank.
Nearly all of the people interviewed for this thesis agreed that the SMI should be private sector led.
However, you need government participation in the private led SMI. You need government participation
to influence policy. The government should have sensible policies. It can be a joint venture with private
sector money. But the government needs to put in some money as well. But it has to be privately owned.
645
SMI may need to be spearheaded by the private sector. NHMFC - more practical if you got people to
put money into private sector led initiatives. IFC and major banks have expressed strong sentiment in
investing. The government should not own more than 30%, preferably CSI, GFIs with a developmental
and long-term view. A certain percentage is made available to foreign, multilateral organizations (IFC).
Local market should be provided some shares as well (banks, private insurance companies, developers).
Then after some time, eventually the public should be able to invest in SMI. 646
643 Maquera, Peter D. Chief Operating Officer of Lighthouse Credit Technologies Corporation. Personal Interview.
June 2001. Pasig City, Philippines.
"44 Jacob, Monico. Former Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig Chairman and Conference Chairman
of the Philippine Conference on Securitization. Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati City, Philippines.
645 Coronel, Leonilo G. Executive Director of the Bankers Association of the Philippines. Personal Interview. June
2001. Makati City, Philippines.
646 Crisostomo, Manuel C. President and Chief Executive Officer of Home Development Mutual Fund
(HDMF)/Pag-Ibig. Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati City, Philippines.
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Is the NHMFC still a viable institution? If the government runs the SMI, the problem is that it
remains dependent on government policies. This is a problem because policies change as administrations
change, and therefore the SMI will be influenced by the somewhat unstable political climate in the
Philippines. Also, policies need to be consistent at least for the medium term, 6-10 years, because the
maturities of mortgages are also 6-10 years. The SMI should be isolated from frequent changes.
Almost all interviewed agree that the NHMFC should sell off their loans.
" "We aren't used to deep discounts, but let's face it. Let's give it up if we need to."647
* "The government has to bite the bitter pill and swallow the losses. It doesn't have very
good options." 648
Forget about NHMFC and start a new SMI. Government relegated to regulatory role. Let
shareholder employ professional managers. Private sector alone cannot do it. They need government
to push certain things. Regulatory, legal, and tax structures cannot be reformed without government
support. NHMFC no longer has credibility because of large amount of non performing loans. The
Department of Finance, wanted to wind down NHMFC operations, but it wasn't pursued under the
Estrada administration. 649
NHMFC - it already has a bad reputation, it has deteriorated, if it securitizes, people will not
touch it. It is gone, it has been sidetracked by the fact that when EO 90 in 1986, and government
pooled funding "rationalized funding" all CSIs then mandated NHMFC to do primary lending.
Mandate is to be SMI. Any other institution? Time the private sector took over.650
What we should do with the bad loans of NHMFC?
* To have an RTC, separate totally from NHMFC, contract out to another company.
* Sell it to buyers at a discounted price.
* Sell it off if it is in public interest. But he is unsure if the government can take the hit. 651
647 Coronel, Leonilo G. Executive Director of the Bankers Association of the Philippines. Personal Interview. June
2001. Makati City, Philippines.
648 Alcid, Andrew D. Executive Vice President, Investment Banking Division of United Coconut Planters Bank.
Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati City, Philippines.
649 Bernardo, Romeo L. Former Undersecretary of the Department of Finance. Personal Interview. June 2001.
Makati City, Philippines.
650 Jacob, Monico. Former Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)/Pag-Ibig Chairman and Conference
Chairman of the Philippine Conference on Securitization. Personal Interview. June 2001. Makati City, Philippines.
651 Bernardo, Romeo L. Former Undersecretary of the Department of Finance. Personal Interview. June 2001.
Makati City, Philippines.
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Is there a market for several SMI's? Once you start something with government support, but it
shouldn't preclude a private group, the opportunity is there for several entities. There is a logical
progression of the market, similar to in the U.S.
Who can be an effective SMI? It still has to be created, and feel that it should be private sector led
with government participation to temper for policies that will be benefit lower income. Otherwise, you
see people only within the 2-3MM range, and the lower income households are once again ignored.s 2
Nobody looks at the NHMFC as an efficient institution, there must be another institution. Even
though those interviewed in government agencies believe that the NHMFC can still be revived as a
secondary mortgage institution, it may not be in the best interest to keep this institution. Preferably a
private run business, it will operate more efficiently versus a government institution. The government
cannot hope to be at par with the private sector.65 3 Come up with a private sector led SMI. 654 Privately
managed and owned. Maybe government should be a part of it at the start, then gradually withdraw.
The Asian Institute of Management (AIM) still believes that the NHMFC should be the SMI. It
doesn't matter if they are capable or not, the point is that they are the only ones with the mandate.
However, the rationale behind CREBA's wanting to keep the NHMFC around is because CREBA has
probably concluded that the quality of their receivables isn't that good. That is why they are probably
adamant about keeping all the old structures in place because they can work it to their advantage. They
have really been throwing to the government their bad loans. CREBA doesn't seem to be in favor of
developing a private led SMI. They would rather continue with NHMFC because it is the only one with
the public mandate, "which truly baffles me". Although CREBA claims to be on the side of securitization,
they still continue to do things inimical to it, such as proposing subsidized interest rates. However, there
is a suspicion that the receivables of the CREBA members cannot be securitized because they are of poor
quality. Most of the mortgage loans which became non-performing loans that developers took out came
from CREBA. In contrast, groups like SHDA, which has a much better reputation, are in favor of
securitization because they are confident in the quality of their receivables.
The SMI has a challenging role to play as a "change agent" to influence the primary markets for
residential mortgage loans. It must develop powerful funding machinery to gain leverage with the primary
market. It should aim to set industry standards based on intellectual capital and technical assistance to
652 Rustia, Andres I. Managing Director of the Asset Management Department of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas(Central Bank of the Philippines). Persona/Interview. June 2001. Manila, Philippines.
653 Paul, Jeremias N. , Jr. Department of Finance Assistant Secretary. Personal Interview. June 2001. Manila,
Philippines.
654 Tan, Arthur, Executive Vice-President and General Manager of the Home Guaranty Corporation. Personal
Interview. June 2001. Makati City, Philippines.
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gain a large following in the residential mortgage markets in the Philippines in a number of strategic areas
which include origination, mortgage loan design, risk management and securitization. The SMI can
influence origination only indirectly, through its purchase guidelines and design of mortgage loan
products that would be easier to securitize.
The SMI's secondary market activities, if successful, will influence origination of loans, gradually
leading to standardization in the underwriting process, documentation, servicing and enforcement. This
will lead to greater predictability of residential mortgage assets and to greater capital market access for
the housing sector through MBS, increasing availability of longer-term funds and reducing costs for
homeowners. Achieving such long-term benefits will require that SMI impose strict loan purchase
standards, which may initially be more stringent than the common industry practice.
We believe that it is important for the SMI to gain investor confidence, it should exercise strict
discipline, especially when credit quality has generally deteriorated. Securitization of mortgage loans can
be done on a larger scale only when mortgage loans are designed with secondary markets in mind. The
current mortgage loan products, not being designed for the secondary mortgage markets, are difficult to
securitize. We recommend the following:
1.5 Legal, Tax, and Accounting Issues
Legal, regulatory, tax and accounting issues have a significant impact on the feasibility and
attractiveness of securitizations. For the benefits of MBS to be achieved in the Philippines, there is a need
for a clear framework in these areas, which affect not only the likelihood of high credit ratings for MBS
but also the economic costs to the issuer. Changes in the legal framework need to balance a respect for
existing laws and practice with the need to perfect security interests, achieve a true legal sale and limit
additional costs. For the primary and secondary mortgage markets to develop, however, there is a need to
develop the legal, institutional and regulatory infrastructure that will minimize risks in origination of
primary mortgage loans and securitization, ensure market pricing of mortgage assets and provide credit
enhancement mechanisms.
Regulatory authorities must balance their concerns for financial soundness with the need for fair,
prudent and transparent rules on off balance sheet treatment for capital adequacy purposes. Without tax
neutrality to minimize additional costs, the economics of securitization can be unattractive relative to on-
balance sheet funding. The accounting profession must set out reasonable rules on off balance sheet
treatment for GAAP purposes to fairly reflect the company's operations as analysts may use financial
reports to compare and rate the company, thereby affecting its access to capital markets.
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Legal Issues. A successful housing finance system is premised on a well-developed legal and
regulatory structure. The primary concern for investors it the security interest. In other words, how
enforceable is the claim the investor has on the collateral in the even to default. The answer depends on
the clarity of land title, the ability to establish priority of liens on the collateral (i.e. an effective title and
lien registration system) and the ability to enforce foreclosure and repossession over a reasonable time
period.
Enforceable security interest is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a successful housing
finance system. For transactions involving asset sale or pledging (i.e. collateral), security interests must
be transferable and investors must have the ability to perfect their security interest after transfer. The
transfer of interest must be at a relatively low cost. An additional legal concern is the borrowers,
servicers, or other third parties.
* The possibility of a "true" sale and perfection of a security interest.
e The feasibility of establishing a Special Purpose Vehicle that is bankruptcy remote.
* The legal right to transferred assets upheld even in the even of bankruptcies.
In the October 1999 Philippine Conference on Securitization, the Department of Finance state that it was
actively going to support housing securitization through: proposing securitization in terms of technical
and financial assistance via Accelerated Growth in Liberalization with Equity (AGILE) by proposing a
bill regarding reforms in financial sector taxation.
The DOF is also pushing for the swift passage of a revised Securities Act, and has also reinforced its
support for the RICA or the Revised Investment Companies Act. The newly installed President Arroyo
has said that she plans to prioritize the passage of (1) an investment company bill and; (2) a securitization
bill.
The objective of the investment company bill is to promote a fair, orderly, and efficient capital market in
order to provide the private and public sectors with access to funds vital to the development of the
national economy. As of this time, it is unsure as to whether or not the securitization bill the President
plans to prioritize is similar in nature to the one developed during the Philippine Conference on
Securitization.
During the October 1999 Philippine Conference on Securitization, there were several proposals forwarded
with regard to the development of the secondary mortgage market in the Philippines.
e The Revised Securities Act. The proposal was to consider securitization as an exempt transaction.
The reason behind this would be to rationalize the cost of registration and the purpose of
securitization.
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" Revision in foreclosure proceedings. Inclusion through both separate legislation and amendments
to the General Banking Act that all foreclosures done by the SPV shall be considered as payment
of obligation. Thus, not subject to a one-year redemption period.
* Title insurance. In September 2000, Sen. Aquilino Pimentel Jr. and Rep. Dante
Liban of Quezon City proposed the other day a lasting solution to the prevailing
problem of fake land titles through the institution of land title insurance, amending the Insurance
Code to include land titles. Liban authored House Bill 11974, while Sen. Pimentel filed in the
Upper House counterpart which is Senate Bill 1689.
This proposes the creation of a land title insurance system that would protect landowners from fly-by-
night real estate developers. The policy was to protect the insured from title defects, forgery, falsification
and similar unlawful acts.
Senator Pimentel said that the land insurance policy would guarantee real estate buyers some form of
compensation should a defect in their land titles is discovered later.. SB 1689 would task the Insurance
Commission to issue guidelines specifying the risk premiums to be charged by insurance firms for
different insurance contracts. The measure also allows companies not otherwise disqualified by law to
engage in the title insurance business.
So far, the American National Financial, Inc. (ANFI), one of the larger outfits involved in
underwriting land title insurance in the US, are reviewing the possibility of lending their expertise in any
transfer of technology that the venture would require.
However, in the October 1999 Philippine Conference on Securitization, there was also a private sector
proposal to initiate/provide title insurance which is centrally administered to protect innocent buyers.
* Maceda Law alternatives. The October 1999 Philippine Conference on Securitization, there was
a proposal to specify in the plan of securitization or in separate legislation that property buyers
should go after the originator and not the SPV.
Regulatory and Accounting Issues. It is critical that any transaction involving the originator and the SPV
cannot be attacked on the subsequent insolvency of the originator, as otherwise the transaction will not
provide any benefits of isolating the assets from the credit of the originator.
* Authorities' willingness to consider the use of securitization.
* Viability and feasibility of off-balance sheet and non-recourse financing.
In the October 1999 Philippine Conference on Securitization, participants outlined the need to
"harmonize" and align the inconsistent provisions in the regulatory guidelines issues (or to be issued) by
the BSP and the SEC.
There was also a need to rationalize the regulatory framework to promote the further development of the
Philippine ABS market. These are key proposals/resolutions to address regulatory issues as raised in the
Philippine Conference on Securitization:
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Issue Resolution
SPV/SMI Structure:
Only Special Purpose Trusts (SPT) are allowed Regulators has agreed to look further into the
by law possibility of:
- including future receivables as a type of
"securitizable" asset, and;
- allowing Special Purpose Corporations to
issue ABS.
An industry position paper was being prepared
to help regulators in their evaluation of these
two proposals.
Securitizable Assets:
Future Receivables and Financial Derivatives Regulators are still not comfortable with
not included including financial derivatives as a type of
asset that can be securitized.
However, the BSP said that it is amenable to
expanding the coverage, but it cautious in it's
the definition of securitizable assets. Also, the
BSP would prefer to wait until the market has
matured and this activity has gained acceptance
of the investing public before taking any more
steps.
Credit Enhancements:
Upfront recognition of losses from over The treatment of credit enhancements needed
collateralization to be discussed further with the BSP.
Upfront recognition of capital charges for The DOF has said that
subordinated securities held by seller.
Perceived Conflicts of Interest BSP not keen on changing their position; they
Seller may not use its own trust department as need to be assured that all banks have the
trustee for ABS issues. ability to fully comply with Chinese Wall*
Trust department cannot purchase ABS which requirements between the bank proper and their
it administers. respective trust departments.
Underwriters cannot deal in ABS issues which The primary reason behind prohibiting
are administered by its trust department. originator banks from using its own trust
department as SPT issuer is intended to insulate
the SPT from the originator and remove the
possibility that the originator will be pressured
to support a securitization structure backed-up
by its assets when this has deteriorated or has
_______________________________become non-performing.
Chinese Wall. A Chinese Wall is an internal 'wall' between two departments of a bank of other
financial institution which is meant to ensure that conflict of interest do not arise and, in particular, there
is no inside dealing in the shares of a client.
During the 1999 Philippine Conference on Securitization, the Conference Participants drafted an
Executive Order and Draft Bill in Congress that would:
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* Urge the SEC to revise the rules on securitization to recognize the creation of a Special Purpose
Vehicle. The SEC is currently looking into the best practices and the special requirements of
SPCs in developed countries.
" Urge the BSP to not to classify the SPV as either a bank or a quasi-bank, and not to have the
securities issues deemed as deposit substitutes.
* Urge the Insurance Commission to include asset-backed securities as investible assets for
insurance companies. The Insurance Commission has drafted some rules and regulations for the
approval of investments on ABS and will discuss this further with the BSP and SEC.
Tax Issues. On taxes, progress has been made in all areas other than taxation at the level of the issuer,
where it is important to avoid double taxation. Tax neutrality at the level of the issuer can be addressed
most readily through modifications that permit use of mutual funds as SPVs and through other reforms in
the existing laws and regulations. This is the approach we favor. For a securitization to be effective, some
tax considerations are crucial. The transaction must not lead to a greater tax burden than if the originator
had not done the transaction, and potential tax liabilities must not make the SPV insolvent.
In the October 1999 Philippine Conference on Securitization, proposed Executive Orders and a Bill on
Securitization were developed to govern the tax treatment of securitization-related transactions. In
drafting these proposals, the conference wanted to convince the government of the following:
e Securitization will not take off on an onerous and burdensome tax regime and, therefore, there
will be no substantial loss incurred in removing taxes from securitization-related transactions.
* If the government believes it will lose revenue by exempting securitization-related transactions, it
will be more than offset by the increased activity in the primary market, where the transactions
are still subject to tax. In fact, the originator will even be forced to accelerate the recognition of
income tax where the securitization of installment receivables is involved.
* The government must recognize that securitization is primarily a transfer of obligation from one
creditor to another and the additional income to the parties will be taxed.
The DST has been mentioned as one of the largest and most onerous obstacles to the MBS. In the
October 1999 Philippine Conference on Securitization, the Department of Finance (DOF) proposed to
harmonize rates for documentary stamp tax (DST) by establishing a single rate for financial sector
instruments and trade documents. However, the DOF argued that the DST cannot be eliminated,
primarily for the reason that it is a major source of revenue for the government. As a compromise, the
DOF is considering the removal of the DST on secondary trading, in order to encourage a vibrant
secondary market for bonds, stocks, and derivatives.
In reference to the earlier table on taxes to the originator/investor that appeared under taxation issues,
these were the recommended solutions by the Philippine Conference on Securitization:
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Step Tax/es Issue Solution
Assignment/sale Income This is not usually the subject of income
of assets tax tax because the originator will sell the
(receivables) by receivables at either face value or at a
the Originator to discount.
the Special However, of the receivables sold/assigned
Purpose Trust are installment receivables, of which the
(SPT) sale and the corresponding receipt of
payment will trigger income realization.
The discount is a deductible business loss
Gross If the originator is a bank, then the receipt This will be covered by the
Receipt of payment from the SPT will trigger Gross Financial Institution Tax (FIT),
s tax Receipts Tax liability. which will replaced the GRT. The
(GRT) FIT would be imposed on financial
intermediation services which are
equivalent to the spread between
the interest received and the interest
expense based on the 91-day
Treasury bill rate.
Value The sale of receivables is not subject to There is a need to request the BIR
Added Value-Added Tax. to issue a clarificatory ruling to
Tax ensure that this is not subject to
(VAT) VAT.
Docum It is not subject to DST because it is not a Recommend removal of the DST
entary borrowing transaction, being without since the underlying document has
Stamp recourse. not been subject to DST.
Tax The assignment of mortgages is presently
(DST) subject to DST
Issuance by the Docum It is not subject to DST under Section 180 To remove any gray areas, it should
SPT of the Asset- entary of The National Internal Revenue Code of be clarified that even If the SPV is
Backed Security Stamp 1997 because it is not considered a a corporation, as proposed in the
(ABS) Tax depository substitute. draft bill, it should not be subject to
(DST) Doubtful is subject to Section 178 of the DST.
Code because a trust is not an association,
company or corporation.
Investment of Withho The income of investible funds from
Funds/Administra lding investments in Government Securities or
tion of the SPT tax deposit substitute instruments consisting of
discounts from issuance which is subject to
a 10% withholding tax.
However, this is a tax on the investors
holding an undivided interest in the Asset
Pool of the SPT, not a tax on the SPT
Distribution to Withho The distribution on income by the SPT to
Investors Wding investors is subject to a 20% final
tax withholding tax imposed on yield and other
monetary benefits from the trust fund and
similar arrangements.
The rate is increased to 25% and 33% if the
recipients are non-resident aliens not
engaged in trade or business and non-
resident foreign corporations, respectively
Income However, the MBS is not subject to income
tax tax if:
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Distribution of income has already been
subjected to a 20% final withholding tax
Distribution of income to individual
investors where the ABS qualifies as a
long-term deposit or investment
certification
Distribution of income where ABS issue is
guaranteed by the HGC, up to 8.5% of the
interest income distributed.
Distribution to tax exempt investors such
as employee retirement funds, GSIS, SSS,
foreign governments, financial institutions
owned, controlled or enjoying refinancing
from foreign governments, and
international or regional financing
institutions established by foreign
governments.
Elimination of the Documentary Stamp Tax (DST). We recommend the elimination of stamp taxes on
all servicing fees, including excess servicing fees at the end of the transaction, in order to achieve tax
neutrality for securitizations. The government should consider eliminating DST on MBSs. This should
stimulate primary and secondary market liquidity of MBSs. As the volume of securitization issues
increases in the long run, the government may wish to review pass-through spreads, to examine the extent
to which any publicly provided subsidy is retained by an SMI or any other party to an MBSs transaction.
This is done to ensure that SMIs can afford to purchase mortgages from originators at higher prices
(leading to lower primary mortgage market interest rates); at the same time MBSs can be sold to investors
with more attractive yields.
8.1.1.1 Other
Prerequisites for Secondary Mortgage Market Development"5
The success of the secondary market in the US has led both private and public sector officials in
many countries to recommend its creation as a way of enhancing the flow of funds to housing. However,
what is often overlooked in such discussions in the readiness of the primary market. True and sustainable
secondary market development cannot proceed unless and until the primary market is able to produce a
sufficient volume of high quality mortgages that meet the servicing and performance requirements of
investors.
655 Summary from "Prerequisites for a Successful Secondary Mortgage Market: The Role of the Primary Mortgage
Market" by Michael Lea, Housing Finance International, 15, 2, December 2000
253
The role of the primary mortgage market. True and sustainable secondary market development
sufficient volume of high quality mortgages that meets the servicing and performance requirements of
investors. The importance of the primary market is magnified with the introduction of a secondary
market. This is due to the fact that there is a separation of functions in a secondary market. This leads to
functional specialization and dependence of one party on the actions of others. The functions of
origination, servicing, risk management and funding are unbundled and managed by different specialized
entities. Originators may be traditional depositories, mortgage companies or mortgage brokers. The
institution may be traditional depositories, mortgage companies or mortgage brokers. The dependence of
one functional entity on another means that mistakes are more difficult to hide in a secondary market
system. Origination specialists also must be more cognizant of pipeline risk because their loans are sold
soon after origination. Pipeline risk is the risk that between the time a lender makes a binding
commitment to a borrower and the time the loan is either sold or placed in portfolio, the value of the loan
will decline. If a loan is mis-priced, the lender takes an immediate loss. Even if the loan is properly
priced, incomplete or erroneous documentation can lead to a lender having to repurchase a loan at a future
date. Thus the quality of mortgages produced by the primary market becomes much more important in a
secondary market.
What are the major primary market prerequisites for secondary market development? There are at least 8
major prerequisites:
1. Stable Macroeconomic Environment
The state of development of the Philippine's mortgage market will depend in large part upon the
degree of macroeconomic stability and past government policies affecting housing finance.
Macroeconomic stability is very important for several reasons. First, it has a major effect on the
demand for mortgages. High rates of inflation and nominal interest rates are typical features of
volatile economies. These features have the effect of reducing the affordability of conventional
mortgages. A volatile economy also affects the supply of funds and the characteristics of mortgages
offered by lenders. In a volatile environment, lenders are reluctant to offer long-term loans. This
may lead them to not offer mortgages or only offer short maturity loans that in turn are less affordable
for consumers. A volatile macroeconomic environment also creates difficulties for investors. Like
lenders they may prefer short-term assets, in part because of the difficulties of forecasting inflation
and interest rates. Investors must be able to forecast cash flows with a tolerable level of variance in
order to price and evaluate the risk of their investments.
A volatile economy also affects the supply of funds and the characteristics of mortgages offered by
lenders. In a volatile environment, lenders are reluctant to offer long-term loans. This may lead them
to not offer mortgages or only offer short maturity loans that, in turn, are less affordable for
consumers. Pipeline risk (the risk that market rates and prices change between the loan commitment
is mad and the loan is funded) is also much higher in a volatile market rate of return. Thus, the
mortgage rate must be sufficient to cover the investor's marginal funding cost (both debt and equity),
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the risks of mortgage investment (i.e., credit, interest rate and liquidity risk) and the administrative
cost of servicing mortgages (and MBS).
2. Developed Legal Environment
A well functioning title and lien registry are important underpinnings of both the primary and
secondary market. Without good title, borrowers cannot use their homes as effective collateral for
loans and investors will not view securities backed by such loans as safe. A key legal prerequisite is
the timely and cost effective registration of title and lien. A barrier that exists in many developing
countries is the imposition of transfer taxes or stamp duties on title and lien registration or transfer.
Long delays in the registration process can also increase the risk of both primary market and
secondary market transactions. A workable foreclosure and repossession system is an important
although not essential component of an effective legal environment.
3. Competitive Market Structure
Mortgages must be attractive investments. The interest rates on the mortgages must be market
determined and provide investors with a positive, real, risk-adjusted rate of return. The spread must
compensate the investor for the risks of the investment including credit risk, liquidity risk and interest
rate risk. The more competitive is the mortgage market the greater the potential for secondary market
development. This is particularly the case if the market environment will support the entry of
mortgage companies that rely on securitization (off-balance sheet finance) for funding. In countries
in which the dominant lenders are depository institutions with abundant capital and access to
relatively cheap retail funds, securitization is often not a cost effective form of finance and it is
difficult to create a secondary market. There must be a significant volume of loans to justify the up-
front costs of developing the secondary market infrastructure.
Government policies determine the competitive e environment in which mortgage lending is done. In
the past, special circuits for housing finance have prevailed in many countries. A special circuit is
characterized by specialized lenders that dominate the mortgage market, supported by government
incentives, both financial and regulatory. Their preferences often lead to the offering of mortgages at
rates less than that necessary to provide acceptable risk-adjusted returns for investors. This leaves out
those lenders with nonsecuritizable portfolios, unless the government augments the return on the
mortgages for investors.
For secondary market development, mortgage rates must provide a return that is attractive relative to
their alternative investment opportunities. For banks or institutional investors that are typically the
major investors in MBS, this means a positive spread over comparable duration government bonds.
The yields on such bonds provide a default-risk free pricing benchmark for investors. The spread
must compensate the investor for the risks of the investment including credit risk, liquidity risk and
interest rate risk.
The more competitive the mortgage market, the greater the potential for secondary market
development. This is particularly the case if the market environment will support the entry of
mortgage companies that rely on securitization (off balance sheet finance) for funding. In countries
in which the dominant lenders are depository institutions with abundant capital and access to
relatively cheap retail funds, securitization is often not a cost of effective form of finance and it is
difficult to create a secondary market. This has been the case in Europe where secondary mortgage
markets have been slow to develop.
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4. Mortgage Instruments
The cash flows from mortgages must be predictable. There must be relative standardization of the
instrument, documentation, and underwriting. Standardization of the mortgage instrument is a key
factor in secondary market development. Mortgages should be pooled with similar characteristics to
facilitate larger pool size and more liquidity and to reduce the due diligence costs of investors and
rating agencies.
5. Proper Origination Techniques
Solid and consistent underwriting is key to secondary mortgage market development. Investors must
have confidence that lenders are properly judging risk and using a consistent set of criteria in
evaluating loans. A degree of standardization is necessary to lower costs of due diligence and allow
investors, rating agencies, guarantors to quantify credit risk. An accurate assessment of the value of
the property is fundamental to determining whether, in the event of borrower default, the lender could
recoup enough from the sale of the home to cover losses. A repository for credit information that can
be used to ascertain a borrower's track record of handling credit is an important component of
underwriting. Credit bureaus can provide lenders with detailed credit files; they also can provide a
credit-bureau score, which summarizes the information into one number reflecting an individual's
expected credit performance.
6. Secondary marketing expertise
Secondary marketing is the function of financing and, subsequently, selling the originated mortgage
to institutional investors. This activity includes the warehousing of the mortgage between the time the
mortgage is closed and subsequently sold to an investor. There are at least 3 major risks the seller
must manage as part of the secondary marketing function:
" Commitment risk: The risk that an interest rate commitment ("rate lock") offered to a home buyer
for a loan is made and the firm is unable, generally due to market forces, to earn an adequate sales
price to cover the costs of providing the commitment.
" Pipeline risk: The risk that a closed loan will change in value between the time of closing and
shipment to an investor. This risk is often hedged using forward, option or futures contracts.
" Documentation risk: The risk that a closed loan is underwritten improperly and does not conform
to the investor's requirements. These loans are known as "lame loans" and frequently can be
converted into acceptable loans for delivery, but usually after months of seasoning and additional
documentation. The delays in delivery, or inability to deliver, produce costs for the originator.
7. Proper Servicing techniques
The servicing of mortgages is a critical component of a viable secondary mortgage market. The
collection of mortgage payments and the periodic remittance of these payments to the investor (or
conduit) are the major tasks of servicers (whether they are originators or third parties). In addition,
servicers are the primary repositories of information on the mortgage loans. Thus, they must maintain
accurate and up-to-date information on mortgage balances, status and history and provide timely
reports to investors. The ability to collect payments on delinquent loans and institute timely
foreclosure, repossession and collateral sale in the interest of the investor is necessary to safeguard
the investor's interest.
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There are undoubtedly other important factors in developing a secondary mortgage market for the
Philippines. The prerequisites listed above are necessary but not necessarily sufficient conditions. The
lack of these prerequisites does not mean that securitization is impossible as it may be possible to do a
few transactions with a narrow range of collateral in the form of private placements. But a sustainable
secondary market involves generating an on-going flow of transactions that will develop liquidity in the
market, enhance investor and regulatory understanding and comfort and achieve the desired increase in
availability of funds and decreased relative cost of mortgage credit. This can only be done if there is a
sufficient volume of attractively priced, well-documented and underwritten mortgage loans that are
serviced by competent and reputable organizations.
There is of course an element of which comes first, the chicken or the egg. Some will argue that
creating a secondary market is necessary to provide the proper incentives and guidelines for
standardization, processing and management in the primary market. A well-developed secondary market
can indeed have these benefits. But there are clearly minimum requirements regarding the economy,
instrument and institutions that must be met before a viable secondary market can be created.
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8.1.1.2 Benefits of Securitization: Implications for the Philippines
The benefits of securitization are summarized as follows:
* Interest rates for borrowers are lower compared with interest rates through traditional lending.
" The amount of capital available through capital market is significantly larger than capital
available through traditional lending.
e Efficiencies in intermediation and market size reduce transaction costs. Lending institutions
include liquidity premiums in the pricing of loans.
* Capital markets provide better risk diversification and pricing mechanisms than are available
to any individual lending institution.
* Access to a vast wholesale funding market is available to all lenders that securitize.
* Lenders can utilize their origination capabilities to the full.
* Greater lending to the sub-prime and non-conforming segments of the market is facilitated
with the credit risk being passed to the wholesale market.
* As margins become tighter, fee income becomes more attractive than net interest income.
* An efficient flow of information is generated to support the securitization process.
* Standardization of products is also encouraged to ease the complexity of that information.
* Capital efficiency is improved as assets are moved off the balance sheet.
* Competitive pricing might be improved if institutional funding rates are partly passed to
consumers.
* Credit risk is substantially reduced.
Realistic Expectations. It is unrealistic to expect that a sustainable secondary market can be
developed in a short period of time. Even the most developed secondary systems such as the U.S. have
taken decades to evolve; and the more successful emerging market examples such as the Home Mortgage
Bank of Trinidad and Cagamas of Malaysia have been in business for over a decade.
Scale. Ultimately, a sustainable secondary market is a numbers game. Unless certain debt issuance
size thresholds are crossed, the instruments are unlikely to be liquid, and without liquidity in the
instruments, a sizeable premium is likely to be paid in higher interest rates: higher even than the marginal
cost of funds for primary mortgage banks, which reduces the incentive to sell any loans into the secondary
market. Most secondary market institutions start life much smaller in asset size than many of their bank
clients, hence need to leverage their initial size rapidly to achieve critical mass. The core value
proposition of a multi-lender secondary market conduit is that the whole is more than the sum of the parts:
if it is not, its reason for existence will sooner or later be threatened by larger lenders who can and will go
it alone.
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